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Abstract 
 
 “Is there an exit strategy from a preventive war? The opposing cases of Sparta 
in the Peloponnesian War (431-404 BC) and Rome in the Macedonian Wars 
(214-205 BC) through the lens of International Relations’ theory.” 
   
It was once said that “if Sparta and Rome perished, what state can hope to 
endure forever?” (J. J. Rousseau, “Social Contract, Discourses”, B.III.ch. IX). The 
Peloponnesian and Macedonian wars have been scrutinized to the extent that the 
surviving sources may allow for it, but they have never been put under the magnifying 
glass in terms of International Relations’ schools of thought, namely “Realists”, 
“Rationalists” and “Revolutionists”, despite their striking similarities as to the 
prevention of competing state’s ascending power, as well as of their underlying 
dissimilarities regarding the respective exit strategies followed from the said 
preventive wars. This thesis brings together the principal episodes of these two war 
periods placing particular emphasis on notions of power, international anarchy, 
morality, security dilemma which all answer as to why the wars started, how they 
were fought and how they were ended. Furthermore, I extrapolate these deductions 
into the future in an attempt to forecast the main constants of great power behaviour 
in a similar situation of preventive wars. In this regard I demonstrate that “Realism” 
may provide the best toolkit not exclusively at the state (“forum externum”) level as 
the International Relations theory suggests, but also at the unit level (“forum 
internum”), which stands distinct from the holistic notion of domestic politics and 
falls within the contours of the decision making process. I attempt to bridge these two 
levels by injecting the notion of the “cosmo-icon”, which shall be assessed separately 
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by the same aforementioned International Relations’ three schools of thought. Cosmo-
icon is the inherent, unique, alphabet whereby the leader reads the book of 
international politics which is written by the states’ interaction. That alphabet is 
indispensable for “self-orientation” within the political system and emanates from 
fundamental decisions, based upon specific predefined approaches of the reality and 
not solely upon mere reactions to it (“perceptions”). Showing that the level of states 
and the unit level correspond in essence respectively to Thucydides’ famous reference 
to “uneven growth” and “fear” as causes of war and that the cosmo-icon is in fact 
identified within “predetermined” decisions, I stress that a successful exit strategy 
from a preventive war shall be the outgrowth of realism’s preponderance both at the 
state level of analysis as well as at the cosmo-icon’s one. Indeed, I prove that Rome 
succeeded when it cleaved to a “realistic” cosmo-icon, within a “realistic” states’ 
foreign policy, while Sparta failed because within a “realistic” states’ foreign policy 
she adopted a “rationalist” cosmo-icon. That said, it becomes evident from the two 
periods that for a great power a successful exit strategy from a preventive war is 
actually to stay within it, maintaining a “realistic” cosmo-icon towards a decisive 
battle and consequently establishing an authoritative relationship of a “mistress” but 
not of a “lover” with the subject states. That relationship will be based on the 
principle of proactively creating an interest rather than simply defending it, through a 
prudent, constant, political evaluation of alternative options by a small number, if not 
only one, person(s), through a web of ad hoc and restricted alliances, desisting from 
any territory-annexation, but also from ideological affiliations of any kind.  
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Chapter one: Why, What, Who: The M. Wight’s three International Relations’ 
                         schools of thought as guiding theories into explaining and tracking  
                         down the exit strategy of the preventive wars of Sparta and Rome 
                         against Athens and Macedonia respectively. 
 
1.1.
  The Peloponnesian and the Macedonian wars carry one curse and one 
blessing. Although they go back to ancient times, they have been thoroughly 
scrutinised to the extent that the surviving sources may allow for it, but they have 
never, at least to my knowledge, been put under the magnifying glass in terms of 
International Relations’ theory, in spite of their striking similarities in relation to the 
prevention of another’s state ascending power, as well as of their underlying 
dissimilarities in relation to the exit strategy from the said preventive wars, followed 
by the states involved. That mostly uncharted historical territory, I wish to fertilise by 
injecting the contemporary knowledge of International Relations theory, on which 
therefore this thesis is primarily grounded, and using as a tool not only the latter’s, ex 
definitio, external focus (forum externum), namely the state level analysis, but, 
equally, it is often omitted in International Relations’ theory, internal, one (forum 
internum), that is the unit level analysis. Examples of that “omission” abound in 
bibliography and suffice here to recall the monumental exponent of “realism”, K. 
Waltz stating that considering that states often behave in ways that contradict how 
theory of international politics says that they should act, then we need a separate 
theory of foreign policy, which focuses mainly on what are sometimes called unit-
The three “w”s: What, Why, Who. 
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level variables – that often drive state behavior1
 
. Besides, I fully subscribe to the 
observation that “there is nothing wrong with advancing theories that include both a 
realist and a domestic politics component. Indeed, one could argue that such 
compound theories are better at explaining how the world works than straightforward 
realist theories. Whether that is true or not is irrelevant here; the key point for the 
issue at hand is that scholars who employ compound theories are effectively saying 
that there are serious limits to what realism can tell us about international politics. 
Realism needs considerable help from other bodies of theories if it hopes to explain 
state behavior as well as international outcomes”2.  
To my view, the aforementioned internal dimension is being crystallised not in 
the notion of domestic politics per se, as one may hastily claim, since domestic 
politics is rather an holistic notion, bringing inter alia together general developments 
in society, internal developments in the political parties, economy, religion etc., but in 
the notion of “cosmo-icon”, which falls within the inherent foreign policy orientation 
of the leadership and the decision making process, while concurrently defines the 
state level itself quantitatively, but also qualitatively. Quantitatively, because a 
leader’s inherent ideas on foreign policy and thus his outputs to the state level do play 
a determinative role upon not only the stages but also the final outcome of an even 
quite lengthy war. Qualitatively, because a leader’s inherent positioning cannot of 
course be refined in vitro but in constant interaction with his political environment, 
which in turn, it is well known, presents its own separate, superlative, dynamics. This 
is why there is a need to assess distinctively the individual’s positioning towards the 
international developments, with the same toolkit that the scholars of International 
Relations use to devote almost exclusively to the state relations, while approaching 
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them through the lens of a “structural” or “systemic” foreign policy analysis: 
following M. Wight, there are three basic notions on the state’s conduct at the 
international scene (“outputs”), namely a struggle either for power, or cooperation, or 
world domination and thus respectively emerge the three schools of thought, namely 
“realists”, “rationalists” and “revolutionists”.  
 
 That said and contrary to what one may guess, the central question does not lie 
in monotonous historiographic comparative research, strictly confined to a descriptive 
repetition of historical facts. That repetition would probably seem a reductionist task, 
given that the ancient sources on the issue are remarkably restricted as well as 
subjectively coloured, which seriously limits the chances of constructing a solid, non-
hypothetical, debate. However, the originality of this thesis can be also traced upon 
the very fact that it brings together the salient facts of these specific time periods, the 
deductions made since International Relations’ theory was developed and the current 
empirical knowledge of those wars with a view to capturing their gist and projecting it 
into the future in an attempt to “forecast” the main constants of an efficient great 
power behaviour in a similar situation of preventive wars. This shall not be seen as a 
“cherry picking” approach. It is, on the contrary, based upon the simple notion that 
what it matters is the mix and trade-offs of objectives, rather than their ordering that is 
critical to an understanding, precisely, as I strongly believe, it is the case with the 
foreign policy itself3.  
 
  Exploring the subject, namely the “what”, of the thesis, there has to be 
devoted, at this point, short space to compact definitions of basic, introductory, 
notions. Thus, it is to be clarified that by “exit strategy” I generally mean a planned 
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approach to terminating a situation in a way that will maximize benefit and/or 
minimize damage, while in the approach of the notion of “strategy”, (which like 
“grand strategy”, becomes extremely elusive in the literature4) I find for the purpose 
of this study the distinction between “pure” and “grand” strategy made by L. Hart 
quite satisfactory: “pure strategy was still the art of the general. But the role of grand 
strategy was to coordinate and direct all the resources of the nation towards the 
attainment of the political object of the war – the goal defined by national policy”5. In 
any case I have to stress that the clear implication of Thucydides’ study is that at the 
level of grand strategy all instruments of national power must be leveraged in 
conjunction with military means in pursuit of national goals. And this is why, after all, 
the study is not confined only to the examination of a specific battle, but comprises all 
the defining moments of many other aspects of the war (morale, society, economy, 
domestic politics, etc). Also, for the needs of that study “Preventive war” is defined as 
a war undertaken to avert a plausible but hypothetical future risk, such as an adverse 
imbalance of power, a position of increased vulnerability, or even potential 
subjugation, while “pre-emptive attack” (“attack” is more accurate than the catchy 
term pre-emptive “war”) is an action on the basis of evidence that an enemy is about 
to strike (thus the subjective element here is more powerful than in the preventive 
war). In addition to the aforementioned and in a broad definition of International 
Relations’ theory, it can be fairly said that international relations are the study of how 
countries interact on the international stage. Delving into this definition, the bottom 
line is all about the way a conflict of strategic (serving as an umbrella term to include, 
inter alia, political, geographic, energy associated, military or, commercial) interests 
between two or more states may occur and consequently the way this conflict might 
be terminated.  
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           Why I chose to throw light on the aforementioned wars is at first glance partly 
answered already; the Peloponnesian war between Athens and Sparta and the three 
Macedonian wars of Rome against the Greek states have not been examined together 
using a contemporary International Relations’ theory, although, of course, they have 
been both approached historiographically to a certain extent by the ancient sources 
(considering how many military events of the antiquity have never been examined 
either by an ancient writer or by modern archaeological research). In addition, Sparta 
and Rome acquired, in their respective era, three very powerful elements so as to tag 
them as great powers in their region, namely they enjoyed a unique military prowess, 
a significant level of political maturity, as well as a recognition by others to have and 
conceived by their own leaders and people to have, certain special rights and duties6. 
And also, this region of the Mediterranean Sea was considered to be the "Heartland", 
in Mackinder's terms7, of that period; an affluent space which was destined to be filled 
in and controlled by the most competent state. Those generic observations, which will 
be specified further below, dominate my attention and enforce further my strong 
belief that international relations between states do present the same basic - structural 
characteristics at any time with the human being at their epicentre, but also they 
constitute a safe harbour for the deduction of credible conclusions for the way 
forward. Thus past remains invariably relevant for the present, but also a reliable 
judge for the future.   
 
                In view of the foregoing, the motivation for the aforementioned choice of 
mine goes one step further: these wars are interesting enough to be analysed with the 
aid of the three principal International Relations’ schools of thought, namely the 
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“Rationalists”, the “Revolutionists” and the “Realists”, in order to track, if possible, a 
common pattern for a great power not only to establish its predominant position and 
prevail over its peer competitor, but also, most importantly, to secure it; i.e. to exit 
from the preventive war with success, namely as a state “hegemon". In essence, this 
recipe for success is often regarded as the holy grail of International Relations theory 
and a bone of contention between the corresponding schools of thought, considering 
that it may “enthrone” or “dethrone” any one of them as the most or least, supposedly, 
successful pattern of analysis. I do not of course pretend that this study will put things 
straight once and for all. I also do not claim that all the three aforementioned 
approaches will have to be signalled constantly throughout this thesis and find 
application in every single case; they will offer useful methodological tools, but only 
one can be eventually selected to decipher and evaluate the ramifications of the given 
facts in their entirety. Besides, each pattern or tradition of thought following the 
aforementioned categorization embodies, in very general terms, a description of the 
nature of international politics and also a set of prescriptions as to how men should 
conduct themselves in it.  
 
            International theory contains, apart from these general three categories, many 
other components or sub – components which can be descriptive, speculative, 
predictive or normative. I may stress any one of these, but the best yard-stick by 
which I am to measure my progress would be to use the “realistic” school of thought. 
And that because of two main reasons which precisely are again interwoven with the 
“why” of this study, namely: one reason of objective nature, i.e. power is, indeed, 
evident throughout the ancient sources at hand and permeates much of the reasoning 
of the ancient speakers in history and one reason of subjective nature i.e. I also 
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postulate the essential function of power and international anarchy (no state can be 
subjected to a supreme “arche” or authority) as an inevitable part of the natural order 
of things. Bearing in mind however, that whereas the idealist exaggerates freedom of 
choice, the realist exaggerates fixed causality and slips into determinism, I will 
therefore respect the subtle complexities of M. Wight’s categorization, being aware 
that these may reveal something of value which might deepen my grasp of a larger 
pattern. Besides, it is not the purpose of this study to examine every part of each of 
the three International Relations theories or their detailed implications. That lies 
within the province of another research study. 
 
           Exploring the “who” of this thesis and attempting to re-interpret and re-read 
ancient texts in the light of new knowledge, I wish to utilise, as I have succinctly 
stated before, specifically M. Wight’s compact categorization of the schools of 
thoughts in International Relations’ theory, namely “Machiavellians” (i.e. “Realists”), 
“Grotians” (i.e. “Rationalists”), and “Kantians” (i.e. “Revolutionists”)8. His attempt to 
associate theoretical inquiry with historical inquiry matches perfectly with the remits 
of my study. Indeed, the professional diplomatic historians, on the whole, have not 
been interested in large questions of theory, while the theorists of International 
Relations have lacked the inclination to do the historical work. Wight is one of the 
few to have bridged this gap with distinction and this is the main reason his 
categorization is the one I will be using. Besides, and considering that each school of 
thought believes that the international system can be best seen through its particular 
lens, Prof. Wight himself, in his book Power Politics, is generally thought to embody 
a “Machiavellian” or “realist” point of view and he can certainly be linked more 
readily to the “Machiavellian” tradition than to the “Grotian”. That observation 
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further attests to a positive inclination towards “realism” as a credible toolkit to 
approach state foreign policy: each pattern or tradition of thought embodies a 
description of the nature of international politics, as well as a set of prescriptions as to 
how men should conduct themselves in it and the “realistic” one seems both to 
explain more convincingly the wars in question ratione materiae (nature of 
international politics) and at the same time to be present ratione temporis within the 
ancient texts per se (prescriptions of conduct put forward specifically by the ancient 
writers, protagonist speakers, etc). It is not redundant to contend that, taking into 
account the specific time period of our study and namely its low scale complexity 
relating to today’s (in terms of the self evident fast development of international 
institutional organization at the political level, but also globalization at the economic 
level), “realistic” approach, independently of M. Wight’s specific inclination, does 
seem to position itself ipso facto better so as to meet the explanatory demands of the 
issues in question, since this particular approach chooses to put the accent precisely 
on those primordial elements in the function of international society, such as power 
and anarchy, that were already present in antiquity. It is in this vein that “realism” 
reflects the naturally unrefined or authentic state’s approach of international relations, 
contrary to the more sophisticated one, which is advocated by the “rationalists” and 
which can be easier traced (the one of the “rationalists”) to contemporary international 
interaction only, where international entities and therefore consecutive thorough-
analytic theories of cooperation among states mushroom. Therefore, it is this twofold, 
undisputable, element that provides Machiavellians with a “kick-off” advantage in 
relation to the Grotians and the Kantians. 
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               However, the said ratione temporis and ratione materiae advantage of Prof. 
Wight’s “realism”, does not denote that I will try to dovetail my conclusions into the 
“realistic” school of thought or to dismiss altogether the value of the “rationalists” and 
the “revolutionists”, since I realize that many times reality contains too many 
contradictions to be subjected to a simplistic verdict. In fact, all the other theories can 
procure a valuable retrospective echo in certain ancient writings and still present their 
own merits in certain situations, in which they are necessary to build up a coherent 
picture of a certain set of events. Indeed, what actually concerns me, is not this or that 
school of thought as an academic paradigm per se, but the political considerations that 
lie behind it, which, after all do arise in every human society with the most 
elementary political organization. That said, it is not my purpose to proceed with my 
analysis by using “realism” to the extremes, so as to give a “superlative” approach to 
my issues: As George Schwarzenberger noted “it was necessary to be on guard 
against naive day-dreaming on international politics. Now it is imperative to avoid the 
other pernicious extreme: unrestrained cynicism”9. The overall aim of this study is 
intended to advance knowledge and synthesize the ideas of the debating schools 
(simply largely through the use of the theoretical tools of “realism”) rather than to 
score debating points in defence of entrenched (supposedly “realistic”) positions10.  
 
1.2.
          Referring succinctly to M. Wight on the schools of thought in question, he 
thought of “Machiavellians” as ‘the blood and iron and immorality men’, the 
“Grotians” as ‘the law and order and keep your word men’, and the “Kantians” as ‘the 
subversion and liberation and missionary men’11. In general, for “Realists”, the 
The three schools of thought of international relations’ theory. 
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central truth of international politics lies in the existence of international anarchy, a 
bellum omnium contra omnes, a relationship of conflict among sovereign states. There 
is no international society and what purports to be one, is in fact fictitious. It is for 
each state to pursue its own interest and the question of morality in international 
politics, at least in the sense of moral rules which restrain states in their relations with 
one another, does not arise. Consequently, international politics for “Rationalists” is 
described not as international anarchy but as international intercourse, a relationship 
chiefly among states, but one in which there is not only conflict but also cooperation. 
The states, although not subject to a common superior, nevertheless do form a 
society—a society that is no fiction, and whose workings can be traced in institutions 
such as diplomacy, international law, the balance of power and the concert of great 
powers. In their dealings with one another, states are not free of moral and legal 
restraints, but they are bound by the rules of this international society they compose 
and in whose continuance they have a stake. The third school of thought, the 
“Revolutionists”, rejects both the “Machiavellian” view that international politics is 
about conflict among states, as well as “Grotian” view that it is about a mixture of 
conflict and cooperation among states. For them it is only at a superficial and transient 
level that international politics is about relations among states at all; at a deeper level 
it is about relations among the human beings of which states are composed. The 
ultimate reality is the community of mankind, which is destined to sweep the system 
of states into limbo. The “Kantians”, like the “Grotians”, appeal to international 
morality, but what they perceive by this is not the rules that require states to behave as 
good members of the society of states, but the revolutionary imperatives that require 
all men to work for a kind of a human brotherhood. In this respect the world is 
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divided between the elect, who are faithful to this vision of the community of 
mankind or civitas maxima and the heretics, who stand in their way. 
 
         More concretely, “Realism” is the oldest and most venerable school of thought 
in the study of international politics. In search of complex and historically contingent 
insights I delve into Thucydides, Hobbes12, and Machiavelli who provided all classic 
“realistic” texts, and Hans Morgenthau, George Kennan, Henry Kissinger, Kenneth 
Waltz, and others, who brought “realism” into the twentieth century, with their own 
seminal works (important as it is to clarify what this study is about, it is also 
important to clarify what this study is not about and it is not about citing the numerous 
eulogies of other writers, ancient and contemporary ones as well, for Thucydides’ or 
Polybius’ intellectual integrity and so forth). What is attractive in this school of 
thought is not solely its profound academic base, but the fact that it provides the 
reader with arguments concerning the limits of reason. A significant indication of this 
observation is the fact that the exact nature of its central notion, namely power, is 
actually a matter of controversy. It comprises a highly complex concept, bringing 
together many material/observable elements (military forces, gross domestic product, 
population, a state’s size of territory, bureaucracy, etc), as well as non material/non 
observable ones (culture, diplomatic influence, a state’s reputation, leader’s 
personality at a given moment, a state’s will to proceed with certain decisions, etc). 
What’s more, to conceptualize power solely in terms of material/observable elements 
though plausible, must also take into account its essence is a vaticinium ex eventu, 
since if power matters, it matters because it is there already, it can be felt, it can be 
crystallized, whether its components are visible or not13. However, for the needs of 
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this study I am eager to espouse H. Morgenthau’s seven “elements of national 
power”14, i.e. geography, natural resources, industrial capacity, military preparedness, 
population, national character, national morale, and the quality of government15, 
properly adjusted of course to the special characteristics of the antiquity (so, there was 
obviously no “industrial capacity” as such then, but I could refer to agricultural 
capacity as well).  
 
             “Realists”, mastering their theory with laws that govern human nature16, 
argue that the states, constituting the key actors in the international system, are 
generally mistrustful of each other and cooperation amongst them can be seen as 
fleeting and insecure, since in many ways, one’s security entails other’s insecurity 
(“security dilemma”) and a war of all against all (bellum omnium contra omnes17) 
prevails. In view of this substantial analysis, power and anarchy are the main 
components of a state’s perception of the international society and at the same time 
the decisive determinants in the relations among various communities.  
 
             It is useful to note that it is not self-evident, as one may suggest, that 
monumental terms of a state’s international behaviour, such as “power” or “anarchy” 
or “security” shall be addressed adequately to a certain depth. For instance, E. Carr 
points out that he proceeded with his work “with the deliberate aim of counteracting 
the glaring and dangerous defect of nearly all thinking, both academic and popular, 
about international politics in English-speaking countries from 1919 to 1939 – the 
almost total neglect of the factor of power” 18. In this vein, power is the culmination of 
a state’s incessant quest to defend and promote its vested interests from external 
threats and anarchy. The playground, in which this quest is bound to take place, is an 
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international society without an overpowering regulating state, but with numerous 
other states, which look to gain as much as possible for their people and therefore the 
most important pattern of international behaviour that follows from these fundamental 
assumptions is power maximization.  
 
              To the central question of the theory of International Relations “what is the 
nature of international society” the “Realists” claim that there is no international 
society and what purports to be one — the system of international law, the mechanism 
of diplomacy or today the United Nations — is misleading. The prescriptions 
advanced by this school of thought are simply such as were advanced by Thucydides 
in his entire work: it was for each state or ruler to pursue its own interest; the question 
of morality in international politics, at least in the sense of moral rules which 
restrained states in their relations with one another, did not and could not arise. At the 
epicentre of these remarks lies Thucydidean aphorism that the strong proceeds as 
much as he can and the weak suffers as much as he must. In this context, a state 
should not and cannot be satisfied with any accumulation of power at all, since the 
everlasting, though pious, hope remains the same: the absolute domination over the 
others, given that force remains the ultima ratio in international politics. It is not to be 
underestimated of course the view that most states may go along with the current 
situation without thinking of maximizing their power, solely accepting it as the best 
thing they can expect or achieve; the punctum saliens here is precisely that this is one 
of the reasons they belong simply to the “most” states, but not to the states that 
significantly influent the developments around them or aspire becoming great powers.  
As a corollary to this, it is not that only great powers are entitled to be analyzed by 
realistic theory or other theories as well, but, on the contrary, all states are to be 
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analyzed in these terms when they start to present the signs of maximizing their power 
and disturb in any way the existing balance or imbalance of power between states; and 
this exact tendency is more or less inevitable according to “realism” and its rapid 
emergence depends highly on the intensity of the developments around them.  
 
          In other words, what is in question is not the state behaviour as such, but the 
state’s nature which is latent or evident, but in any case it is there. It is in this notional 
framework that emerges, apart from the nature of the state and its fundamental 
components of actions, the nature of man, this unit level-variable, which needs 
clarification and further refinement as to its exact role and content upon the states’ 
international relations, an integral part of which remains indubitably the war itself. It 
is at this point that the notion of “cosmo-icon”, namely the inherent positioning 
towards the world that one takes, is introduced so as to bridge the competing struggle 
in international relations’’ theory between the unit level and the states level, between 
decision making process and international systemic forces, between forum internum 
and forum externum in foreign policy. The “cosmo-icon” becomes an analytical tool 
and actually portrays a decision maker’s ability for self-orientation within the 
relentlessly competing and multifarious forces of the anarchic international society 
(systemic, domestic, etc).  This ability is necessary for the self-survival of the leader 
and for his adaptation to the constantly arising demands of his special position. In fact 
it derives from a decisive “decision” at a given moment, which is nothing else than a 
process of notionally “segmentizing” the given world into specific parts and choose 
any of them according to the individual’s wish. The said “self-orientation” is first and 
foremost of general character, serving as a compass, and afterwards it is being 
concretized by separate decisions. Eventually the “cosmo-icon” bears the personal 
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stamp of the leader towards his world, serving as his input to the international society, 
while affecting the latter significantly. It is not just a “mental map”, since it is a totally 
distinct stance towards the international system and it is not affected directly or a 
priori by the latter. It is not also merely a “perception”, since it does not seek to 
interpret the international system, rather to inject it with its own, predetermined, 
deliverables. Schematically, a cosmo-icon is an individual’s pre-existing alphabet to 
read a book, written by the states’ interaction.  
 
             The wars in question depict indeed that even if a state’s foreign policy follows 
a specific pattern of approaching the international society, be that “realist”, 
“rationalist” or “revolutionist”, there is something else, more elusive or difficult to 
decipher, that seems to add the decisive paint pigment to the canvas of their final 
outcome. That’s why also a cosmo-icon cannot possibly identified in advance, but 
only ex post factum. Consequently, the aforementioned bridge is theoretically relevant 
also because it can be approached distinctly and it does not fall within the contours of 
the foreign policy per se, but it stands to be assessed separately with the same tools 
that the states’ interaction is being approached by the three aforementioned 
International Relations’ schools of thought. Simultaneously, that bridge acquires 
practical importance because, as the wars in question are about to manifest, it seems 
that whenever there is an imbalance in that bridge with the immediate effect the 
state’s enfeeblement, then it denotes that it should have been preceded by a “cosmo-
icon”, which did not “metabolize” the international systemic forces, an alphabet that 
could not read the book. That may sound slightly deterministic or even latently 
pessimistic, but this is not true. It shall be regarded plainly as part of the function of 
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international society with costs and benefits analysis and their relentless recording by 
history.          
          
           “Rationalists” (among them Wight included the classical international lawyers, 
Locke, Burke, Castlereagh, Gladstone, Franklin Roosevelt, Churchill) on the other 
hand, claim that cooperation is actually possible, through which the imbalance of the 
international system can be rectified. Imbalance denotes war or any conflict that can 
endanger the (mostly) economic synergies (during peace time) between the states. To 
the aforementioned central question of the theory of International Relations the 
“Grotians” returned the answer that states, although not subject to a common superior, 
nevertheless formed a society, which is not merely a perfunctory notion, and whose 
workings could be observed in institutions such as diplomacy, international law, the 
balance of power and the concert of great powers. States in their dealings with one 
another were not free of moral and legal restraints, but they were bound by the rules 
of this international society they composed and in whose continuance they had a 
stake. However, in the case that the states could slide into war – something that was 
occurring undeniably almost as a rule in antiquity- this school of thought intellectually 
begins to seem rather problematic.  
 
               Besides, “rationalists” tend to overemphasize the positive ramifications of 
the term “cooperation” and very often discount the omnipotent possibility that a state 
not only is fearful (besides “fear” is the word, in tandem with “growth”, that 
Thucydides used first to explain the very underlying cause of a state’s march to 
waging a war19) of the other states, but also, expect them to be fearful of the others as 
well (“prisoner’s dilemma” according to game theorists20). These counteracting forces 
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certainly act as a seething cauldron within the foundations of any cooperative building 
and therefore they are not to be hastily dismissed21. The “Grotian” approach to the 
crucial issues of war’s morality is founded upon the recognition that the moral 
problems of foreign policy are existent and furthermore complex, as against the view 
of the “Kantians” that these problems are simple, and the view of the 
“Machiavellians” that they are non-existent. The “Grotian” tradition is sometimes 
seen as a mere compromise that makes concessions to both the “Machiavellian” and 
the “Kantian” points of view. The “Grotian” idea of the just war, for example, is a 
compromise between the “Kantian” idea of the holy war or crusade and the 
“Machiavellian” idea of war as the ultima ratio regum. Compromise, in fact, is also 
the “Grotian” approach, that power in international society can be balanced and 
contained, given that “Kantians” demand that it should be abolished, while 
“Machiavellians” insist that power is the object of the struggle. 
 
            Intriguing to highlight, especially within the purview of my study, is the 
“Grotian” viewpoint on the nature of the relations of the advanced countries with the 
so called barbarians, which could be parallelized, though in extremis indeed, with the 
particular Roman approach towards the Greek states (but also that of the Greek states 
towards Persia in the past). Although the latter were not considered to be barbarians 
by Rome beyond a shadow of a doubt; on the contrary they were widely regarded as 
the beacon of democracy and culture which spread their light to their Adriatic 
neighbours, and through them to the rest of the world22. The “Grotian” position that 
the relations of advanced countries with so-called barbarians should be based on the 
principle of trusteeship, is again a compromise between the “Kantian” notion that they 
should be based on liberation and assimilation, and the “Machiavellian” contention 
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that they should be based on exploitation. Bearing that in mind, it is really interesting 
and challenging to note from the scratch, that the Roman approach towards Greek 
states did contain significant elements of “Grotian” thinking, mixed with 
“Machiavellian” ones; and, for sure, the first ones (i.e. the “Grotian” elements) were 
not abruptly outflanked by the latter ones (i.e. the “Machiavellian” elements), as one 
could probably rush to surmise judging superficially and with a reductionist spirit 
from the mere size of the Imperium Romanum. However, to play devil’s advocate and 
always, in view of Wight’s relative argumentation, I could plausibly indicate that the 
speeches of Flamininus or of other Roman Senators were of course abundant in 
proclamations in favour of a foreign policy conforming with the common moral 
standards and sense of common interest of international society as a whole. But again, 
these proclamations were being spelled out by those statesmen, who, each one of 
them, at the time they spoke, were the leaders of the most powerful. In other words, 
the comfortable “Grotian” phrases could not indeed come so readily to the lips of the 
oppressed, the desperate or even the dissatisfied23. 
 
          The “Kantians” question both the “realistic” view that international politics is 
about conflict, as well as the view of the “rationalists” that it is about a mixture of 
conflict and cooperation. For the “revolutionists” it is only at a perfunctory and 
transitory level that international politics are about relations among states at all; at a 
deeper level it is about relations between the human beings of which states are 
composed. The ultimate reality is the community of mankind, which exists 
potentially, even if it does not exist actually, and is destined to sweep the system of 
states into limbo. In fact, I notice that human nature, which, as I already pointed out, 
lies at the very centre of the “Realistic” school of thought, it serves also as the 
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cornerstone of the “Kantian” approach, but this time it is totally (mis)interpreted and 
rather overtly apotheosized.  
 
            Even if the “revolutionists”, as well as the “rationalists”, reproach “realists” 
for being grandiloquently attached to a certain causality, which supposedly serves for 
the latter (the “realists”) as a panacea to square up with the problems of the 
international relations between states, an overpowering sentiment of determinism is 
also visible within the former (“revolutionists”) ambit; they present human nature as 
inevitably and constantly self improving to its end, something that obviously can be 
regarded as an exaggerated overoptimistic aspiration or at least an observation subject 
to significant criticism. “Kantians”, do not fail, like “Grotians”, to appeal to 
international morality, but what they perceive by this term is not the rules that call 
upon states to behave as good members of the society of states, but the revolutionary 
imperatives that call upon all men to work for a human brotherhood. In the “Kantian” 
doctrine the world is dichotomized into the elect, who are staunch supporters of this 
vision of the community of mankind or “civitas maxima”, and the heretics, who strive 
to block its way. In this sense, it can be argued that “Kantian” thinking of assigning 
particular emphasis to a specific context hints at historicism of Hegel and Marx, as 
opposed to more deterministic theories that assume that all developments can be 
explained by fundamental principles (where probably one can claim that “Grotian” 
thinking through the notion of cooperation or “Machiavellian” through the notion of 
power do lie).  
 
           This “Kantian” pattern of thought, according to Wight, was encapsulated in the 
three successive waves of “Revolutionist” ideology that had divided modern 
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international society on horizontal rather than vertical lines: that of the Protestant 
Reformation, the French Revolution and the Communist Revolution of recent times. 
But it was also encapsulated, he thought, in the Counter-Revolutionary ideologies to 
which each of these affirmations of horizontal solidarity gave rise: that of the Catholic 
Counter-Reformation, International Legitimism and Dullesian Anti-Communism. In 
the end, “Kantians” leave the reader with a school of thought so morally nuanced and 
substantially shaded that it provides few useful tools with which to explain real-world 
politics. 
 
           Having identified these three patterns of thought, Wight went on to trace the 
distinctive doctrines that each of them put forward concerning war, diplomacy, power, 
national interest, the obligation of treaties, the obligation of an individual to bear 
arms, the conduct of foreign policy and the relations between civilized states and so-
called barbarians. It is impossible to summarize what Martin Wight had to say about 
the three traditions without in some measure vulgarizing it, since he, was the first to 
warn against the danger of reifying the concepts he had suggested. It is well known 
that he insisted that the “Machiavellian”, “Grotian” and “Kantian” traditions were 
merely paradigms, to which no actual thinker did more than to approximate: not even 
Machiavelli, for example, was in the strict sense a “Machiavellian”. Wight accepted 
the exercise of classifying international theories requires that there has to be more 
pigeon-holes than three and so he suggested various ways in which each of the three 
traditions could be further subdivided. Thus, the “Machiavellian” tradition can take an 
aggressive and defensive form, the “Grotian” tradition realist and idealist form, the 
“Kantian” tradition evolutionary and revolutionary form, imperialist and 
cosmopolitanist forms, historically backward-looking and forward-looking or 
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progressivist forms. So, although the account of the three traditions might not bear all 
the weight that Martin Wight sought to place upon it, there is no doubt that it has a 
firm basis on reality. The three traditions, it can be argued, form a spectrum, within 
which, at some points, one pattern of thought merges with another, as the colours of 
the rainbow. Thus, that his account of these past traditions of thought contributes 
directly to our understanding of contemporary international politics there can be no 
doubt. The challenge remains to show their relevance to the present and future 
through the analysis of a seemingly distant past.  
 
1.3 
        
Three methodological parameters of the issue in question: level of analysis,  
 
inductive approach and structure of the thesis.   
It may seem paradoxical, but it has been rightly stated that “the first 
prerequisite of a successful observation in any science is a definite understanding 
about what size of unit one is going to observe at a given time”24. In the present case 
the level of analysis is expected to actually derive from the way that the historical 
narration itself will be deployed in terms of the international system of that era and it 
will be eventually completed with the remarks of the said International Relations’ 
schools of thought. That level of analysis will be therefore primary centred on the 
states’ interaction, as it was stated before extensively, but that does not entail that 
neither domestic politics, nor individual decisions will be discredited. On the contrary 
one extremely important pillar of this thesis, in its primordial attempt to deal with the 
main question of the exit strategy in the preventive war, is to actually introduce the 
unit level of analysis in parallel with that of the state level and not to conveniently 
restrict the approach on the historical events per se, which in their majority focus on 
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the states’ comportement as rational, distinctive, actors.  
 
At this point, there is a need for a clarifying remark as to the very content I 
give to the aforementioned observation on the notion of the international system: the 
basic definition of the “system” offers two obvious "top and bottom" candidates for 
levels of analysis, namely the structure, representing that collective element of the 
system which transcends the units, and the units themselves. The unit level of the 
system is defined as "the attributes and interactions of its parts"25, while the system 
level is defined "by the arrangement of the system's parts and by the principle of that 
arrangement"26. It is not the purpose of this study to adhere strictly to the first or 
second approach. In fact although it is evident that I espouse the structural approach 
and the unit level, I do not diminish the valuable lessons that a stricto sensu systemic 
approach can give. In other words, I do believe that in this case structure and system 
do emanate from the same tank, “realism” and they can both co-exist within the same 
theoretical framework.  
 
Also, as I have stressed earlier it is not my wish here to elaborate upon the 
various sub-schools of thought (in this case, “structural realism” or “systemic realism” 
and so forth), but to keep their most basic characteristics, following after all M. 
Wight’s relative distinction. My “systemic” or “structural” approach has one common 
characteristic namely, not that domestic politics or individual behavior will be safely 
ignored in explaining state’s behavior, but that the underlying causes of war can, to 
my opinion, easier be traced upon the structure of power and alliances in the 
international system or in the way that structure takes its various forms over time 
along with that of the notion of cosmo-icon which is to be found within the remit of 
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the unit level. 
 
In view of the foregoing, I will espouse an inductive approach, through which 
the wars in question will be considered in their most critical phases by analyzing all 
the significant factors which could possibly have influenced their course, trying to 
avoid the trap of an a la carte selection of facts, which would seem convenient for my 
conclusions. I will not delve into labyrinthine avenues, which, as it is clearly shown in 
the bibliography, are often isolated, inflated and eventually serve as a justification for 
a preselected view27. On the contrary, I will attempt to pick up the salient features of 
these events and, via International Relations’ theory, extract their crux into, if 
possible, a clear signpost for international political action. In this regard, “realistic” 
argumentation seems more accessible for the analysis at hand than the “revolutionist” 
one, which is too muddled by misperceptions and ideological fixations or the 
“rationalist”, which seems too flimsy in its bid to exonerate the notion of cooperation 
(a fortiori within a demanding and confrontational framework of states’ affairs) and 
therefore inconsistent with its own interpretation of international society.  
 
It is not inconsequential to stress at this point that great attention shall be 
granted to the fact that it is not within the limits of this survey to outline the numerous 
different strands also of the said theories, depending on certain varying answers they 
give to specific issues. For instance, “realist” theory can be discerned to “aggressive 
realists”, or “structural realists”, and so forth, depending on the exclusive emphasis 
they place upon particular issues, such as the calculation of power or the structure of 
the international system, or the nature of the man, etc. These of course are not the 
only points of contention in the debate of International Relations and should not 
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master this thesis. After all, any attempt to characterize the carefully wrought 
arguments of numerous scholars, inevitably oversimplifies. In addition to this, it is 
crucial to underscore that I attach my attention to the aforementioned three paradigms 
as such; their heritage is recognizable in many other strands (be that “aggressive 
realism”, “neo-realism”, “neo-liberalism” or “radical revolutionism” and so forth), 
which, however, are mostly treated in this text as fragmentary hypotheses or as 
separate criticism of this or that school of thought, rather than variants of a single 
distinct and coherent theory of international relations.  
 
Subsequently, I will analyze the wars separately within their concrete historic 
framework and propose alternative interpretations in terms of alternative International 
Relations’ theories. Comparing the conclusions of these two periods is of paramount 
importance, since I know from the outset that Sparta was unsuccessful in her quest for 
hegemony, while Rome was not, so there have to be some suggestive, apart from 
obvious objective ones, causes which led to this effect and that leads me to the 
approach of the individual’s role in the sequence of the events apart from the role of 
the state as such. What also claims most of my attention here is the fact that I choose 
deliberately to investigate the evolution of these wars and not the long period after 
their final outcome. It is well known in general terms what happened afterwards, so it 
could have little impact on my thesis to involve myself in the details of the post war 
settlements. 
 
   The thesis will be divided as follows: Apart from the present, first, chapter 
which centres on a brief review of the main three International Relations’ theories 
(“realists”, “rationalists”, “revolutionists”), regarding more particularly, their 
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approach towards war and warfare, chapter two will address the operational 
ingredients of the project, namely literature and ancient sources with their content 
limitations and possible subjective orientations. The bibliography on my topic is not 
vast and barely adequate because of the lack of primary sources. Although there are 
no lack of historians in the classic, as well as in the Hellenistic world, unfortunately 
very few of their works survive, and most of them not in toto. The lack of a 
continuous narrative remains a difficult obstacle. It is to be noted that most of the 
authors of this period are no more than names to the reader, such as Timaios, 
Hieronymos, Plylarchos, Douris, Aratos of Sikyon, Diodorus Siculus, Diyllus, but 
some names tower above the rest: Thucydides, Xenophon, Herodotus, Polybius of 
Megalopolis, Plutarch, Titus and Livy. International Relations’ theory though can be 
proved to be an extremely valuable tool by creatively filling the gaps that lie within 
the ancient sources and thus facilitating the course of my study. In this respect 
international theory plays rather a complementary than a creative role. Consequently, 
chapters three and four, respectively, will be devoted to an analysis of the 
Peloponnesian and the Macedonian wars in the scope of the three International 
Relations theories: the parties involved; how and why they happened; the 
apportioning of blame, if any, to either of the two sides; military aspects; and the role 
of diplomacy. Other issues to be considered, though extraneous to the core of my 
research, are crucial for the general outline: irrelevant incidents, other international 
players, internal politics, and social developments. In chapter five I will attempt to set 
the two wars against each other in terms of their outcomes, in order also to crystallize 
those elements that are vital for a great power's rise as well its maintenance on the 
international stage. Last but not least, I will attempt to deduce certain conclusions of 
general application and as an epilogue, utilize the aforementioned observations by 
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articulating pertinent suggestions for the present28.  
 
    In relation to the desired conclusions of my work, I aim to show first that the 
“realistic” school of thought explains in a holistic manner the evolution of the wars in 
question. Why these wars started, how they were fought and how they were ended are 
issues that can be dealt with, to a great extent, by any International Relations’ theory, 
but, to my view, only “Realism” can provide the reader with a more distanced grasp 
of the amorality and the anarchic international system of sovereign states of classical 
Greece and Hellenistic world in particular. However, it will be interesting to note, that 
the “realistic” approach does contain elements of the other International Relations’ 
theories in some of its aspects. Subsequently, I will narrow down the elements, which 
differentiated Rome from Sparta as competing powers and try to specify the common 
denominator for an effective exit strategy from a preventive war and whether that lies 
at the distinct level of decision making, or at the comprehensive level of states’ 
system or even at both. Last but not least, I will consider the possibility of projecting 
these findings into the modern system of great powers’ antagonism. This should make 
possible a reasoned guess as to a hegemon's near future not necessarily in a purely 
theoretical, let alone deterministic, sense (taking also aboard P. Kennedy’s pellucid 
remarks on the “Rise and fall of the great powers”) but most particularly at a more 
operational level, i.e. a non exhaustive manual of distinct steps for a great power to be 
taken on board in order to maintain its dominant power. That attempt to pass from 
theory to praxis falls within the greatest challenging task for a statesman, namely “the 
best thing he can do is to wait until he hears the steps of God sounding through 
events, then leap up and grasp the hem of His garment”29. Eventually that “hem of His 
garment” I am struggling to identify. 
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acknowledged by the historians that they were existent and fairly corroborated by the ancient sources, 
although they served merely as a palliative against further and more austere measures at the expense of 
the Greek states. As Harris puts is: “It is plain that from 228 onwards that Roman conduct was often 
influenced by the wish to make favourable impression on a Greek audience. But whether the substance 
of Roman policy was affected and whether the expansion of Roman power was seriously delayed, are 
largely matters for speculation. It certainly seems likely that Roman policy towards the old Greek states 
would have been even more ruthless between 197 and 147, had it not been for dawning Roman respect 
for Greek civilization” (“War and imperialism in Republican Rome”, p. 161). 
 
23 It would be unwise to espouse certain conspicuously subjective claims of Plutarch considering 
Flamininus’ “special” character: “The lot assigned him to the war with Philip and the Macedonians, 
and it was a marvelous piece of good fortune for the Romans that he was thus designated for a field of 
activity where the people did not require a leader relying entirely upon war and violence, but were 
rather to be won over by persuasion and friendly intercourse.” (Plutarch’s Lives, Titus Flamininus, II). 
“Friendly intercourse” is of course an overly simplistic term to describe not only the robust Roman 
foreign policy, but the international activity of any state during that belligerent era. 
 
24 Kurt Lewin, “Field Theory in Social Science”, p.157 mentioned in Singer J. D., “The Level of 
Analysis Problem in International Relations, in International politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in 
Research and Theory” p.2. 
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25 K. Waltz, “Theory of International Politics”, p. 18. 
 
26 K. Waltz, “Theory of International Politics”,p.80. 
 
27 “Modern books on the history of war have the reputation of being tedious, while studies on 
constitutional changes and revolutions often make fascinating reading..The reason, I suggest, is that 
histories of wars seldom go beyond military technicalities, while histories of revolutions explain how 
revolutions came about. Illuminating pages like those in which Guicciardini explained how the balance 
of power was upset in Italy at the end of the XV century and Charles VIII invaded the country are 
extremely rare in historiography” (A. Momigliano, “Secondo contributo alla storia degli studi classici 
e del mondo antico”, p.18). 
28 “Because we have an inadequate basis for comparison, we are tempted to exaggerate either 
continuity with the past that we know badly, or the radical originality of the present, depending on 
whether we are more struck by the features we deem permanent, or with those we do not believe 
existed before. And yet a more rigorous examination of the past might reveal that what we sense as 
new really is not, and that some of the “traditional” features are far more complex than we think”. 
Hoffmann, S., “An American Social Science: International Relations.”, p57. 
 
29 A. J. Percivale Taylor, “Bismarck: The Man and the Statesman”, p. 115. 
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Chapter two: Bibliography and ancient sources. Content limitations and 
                         subjective orientations. 
 
2.1.
 
Ancient bibliography: richness in diversity. 
           One pristine truth is palpably identified when one is to scrutinize the historical 
sources at hand and the contemporary bibliography: the first are notably limited, 
while the latter are almost entirely confined to certain historical descriptive 
approaches.  In fact, if one attempts to evaluate the significant number of the ancient 
writers of the era in question, whose names are known basically due to other sources 
and we are not in possession of their writings, one can detect that only poor fragments 
have survived and mostly in quotation by later authors, often grammarians interested 
first and foremost in peculiar word forms1. At the other end of the spectrum, ancient 
writers continued to consider poetry superior to history because, while history 
presented man with facts, poetry presented universal truths. Arnaldo Momigliano 
pointedly remarked "that Greek historiography never replaced philosophy or religion 
and was never wholeheartedly accepted by either. The status of historiography was 
never clearly settled among the Greeks"2. This is a crucial observation if one wants to 
grasp the content limitations of ancient literature. Besides, by examining the works of 
modern writers I attest that they are mostly oriented towards a thorough depiction of 
historical events, occasionally dotted with political judgments, but certainly devoid of 
any comparisons with similar facts of other historical periods, let alone using tools of 
international relations theory. If not for the period of the Peloponnesian war, which is 
more or less presented as a conditio sine qua non for the studies of the American 
political schools of thought, the study of the Macedonian wars is beset by insuperable 
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problems and the paucity of sources accounts for, and perhaps justifies, the relative 
neglect of this period by modern writers and its marginal place in bibliography. 
 
             In addition to the aforementioned it is also important to note that the historical 
sources are to this extent scarce and elliptical that occasionally one tends to question 
the very existence or scope of the facts under examination. The numerous 
divergences, especially in chronology, delineate the difficulties, which lie within all 
fragmentary sources of the Hellenistic, as well as the Classical period. In any case, 
and as a preliminary remark, in both these two periods in question, two figures are 
predominant in each one of them: Thucydides and Xenophon in the Classical one, 
while Polybius and Titus Livy in the Hellenistic. 
 
2.2.
 
Peloponnesian war and ancient sources. 
          The ancient sources concerning3 the Peloponnesian War are almost exclusively 
limited down to the valuable work of Thucydides and his “History of the 
Peloponnesian War”4, while as merely complementary can be regarded specific parts 
of the works of Xenophon and furthermore of Aristophanes, Cornelius Nepos and 
Diodorus Siculus5. Contemporary literature on the aforementioned war6 contains 
significant number of prominent authors, though few of them concentrate on 
analyzing this period, without elaborating on the historical aspects of the war through 
the international relations theory perspective. And it is to be stressed that for the needs of 
this study I mean this specific period of the War in question as an isolated historical event and 
not on other aspects of the same time period, as it happens for example very often, when one 
finds excerpts of the Peloponnesian War within more general studies which deal with the 
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Spartan or Roman empire, or the Greek antiquity; these works do possess, beyond a shadow 
of a doubt, their own paramount importance but they do not follow my proposed path. 
Amongst the said writers I can distinguish F. E. Adcock, G. B. Grundy, Donald 
Kagan, Victor Davis Hanson, De Ste. Croix, J.D.Romilly, J.H. Finley and J. Bury. 
 
             Trying one to understand classical Greece, by liberating himself from the 
presence of writers with strong world views, such as Thucydides is conceivably an 
illusion. And this, because of two main reasons, one subjective, the other objective: 
 
(a)    There are not many writers who can articulate cogent argumentation and submit 
the reality’s verdict to a simple (though not unsophisticated) truth, to a truth that can 
be unabashedly presented in absolute, clear, terms, contrary to the omnipresent vogue 
of relativism7 and its consecutive catch-all, though nebulous, views. Besides, the 
middle path is very frequently impossible and unattainable because every historian 
has his own personal values that unavoidably color his work. On the other hand, the 
mere invocation of objectivity does not mandate an attitude of cool impersonality and 
emotional noninvolvement or disengagement, nor does it entail a stance of neutrality; 
in other words, the opposite of objectivity is not passion or emotional involvement as 
some claim when they deal with historical texts taking sides, but prejudice, bias and 
the uncritical projection of one’s own wishes, desires and beliefs at the expense of the 
evidence; that approach Thucydides undoubtedly fully respects and in fact builds 
upon it his entire methodology8.  Thucydides dares to accentuate his own version of 
the truth with vigor, without fluctuations and qualms, being almost never tentative in 
his conclusions and very rarely uncertain9. His aim is to investigate the true causes 
and reasons of events, not only why they happened but how they turned out, to take 
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advantage of the usually competing argumentations of the parties involved10 and to 
relate the particular facts to truths that give them a wider intelligibility and eventually 
grant his work with a place in the eternal recognition (“ktima es aei”/which will last 
forever11). This is why, Thucydides seeks to distance himself even from preceding 
historians, emblematic figures such as Homer or Herodotus, who, according to the 
Athenian General, tended to ornament their narrations in order to seduce their 
audience and empower their position as writers12. 
 
(b)     Thucydides’ comparative advantage in relation to all the other authors (from 
Classical and Roman period as well) is that he is one of the very few who attempted a 
history of events belonging entirely to their own time, since he lived through the full 
duration of the conflict between Athens and Sparta13. He was a wealthy Athenian of 
good birth, an admirer of Pericles but not of his successors, a “Strategos” (General 
Commander) in the early stages of the war and a writer whose mind makes an 
overwhelming impression on his reader. Of course, to probe the past is always 
perilous and no documents or monuments can ever quite compensate for the loss of 
many things which could perhaps enable me to see men as they really were. So, it is 
remarkably constructive for my research the fact that Thucydides at least witnessed 
what he described14 and thus even if one first questions15 Thucydides’ objectivity, he 
is then superseded by the writer’s  unprecedented close approach to the facts, which 
facilitates the description of the reality as it is and not as it could be, following the 
vast majority of the rest of the writers who strive rationally to simply recreate the 
historical events and accordingly reach the necessary conclusions. Though some 
aspects of this approach have a stronger foundation in evidence than others, many of 
them could be shown to be historically relative, while some are excessively 
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judgmental, selective or even exaggerated. In any case, it is impossible to understand 
the period in question using as many methodologically “neutral” terms as possible, 
(wealth, groups, power, and so on) and for that reason also, Thucydides’ close 
distance to the unraveling of the facts possess an indubitable importance for the 
credibility of my survey. In this regard, besides, Thucydides wielded a significant 
influence on subsequent Greek historians, including Dexippus in the third century, 
Procopius a sixth century historian, and later Critobulus in the fifteenth century.    
 
               The last point of Thucydides’ impact on other writers brings me to the 
ensuing observation on the lack of equal valued sources on the said time period.  
Xenophon's Hellenica16 takes on exactly where Thucydides breaks off, and covers the 
period through to the end of the Peloponnesian War, and subsequent events down to 
in 362 B.C.17. Xenophon obviously tries to emulate Thucydides' methods through his 
scrupulous attention to detail, his precise account of political and military affairs, and 
his attempt to explain the reasons for Athens' loss of the war. It is to be stressed that 
he served as well in Athenian cavalry in latter stages of Peloponnesian War, so he has, 
almost as Thucydides18, a quite close connection to the war developments. Yet it 
would seem a fair assumption that Xenophon remains an inferior writer; he lacks the 
same level of judgment as to what really is important, and his account has rather the 
approach of a continuous narrative seen from the point of view of various characters, 
which means that there is a lack of deep and objective19 analysis of political issues20.  
Xenophon on the other hand has a different use of language and expression; he is 
straightforward and direct, avoiding the complex expressive structures used by 
Thucydides. His use of speeches is simpler, and although he shows a working 
knowledge of oratory the speeches are used in a more functional and immediate way 
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to propel action forward and to give insight into character. It is to be noted that there 
are allusions to Homer, Hesiod and Pindar in his writing, while a more significant 
influence may have been the sophist Prodicus of Ceos, whose lectures Xenophon 
attended, and therefore he may have had a rather more pragmatic view of affairs than 
the rather sophisticated political viewpoint of Thucydides. His inferiority to 
Thucydides, however, does not mean that Xenophon is not in general terms a 
historian following in the line of research developed by Herodotus and Thucydides21. 
Besides, many critics and editors have suggested that the centrality of Xenophon's 
name in the study of Greek historiography is less related with the quality of his work 
than with the extent to which it has been preserved. Although Xenophon's reputation 
appeared to be that of a minor author in his own age, he became a favorite of Roman 
readers including Cato the Elder, Cicero, Julius Caesar, and Mark Antony, all of 
whom favored his military expertise and simple prose style. In the second century 
B.C., Lucian classed Xenophon with his two notable predecessors, Herodotus and 
Thucydides, and commented that in his own age "everyone wanted to be a 
Xenophon"22. In particular, Thucydides' and Xenophon's accounts, which are the only 
two direct sources of the events of the Peloponnesian War, are essentially rather 
pessimistic; Greece had been embroiled in a devastating competition for hegemony 
for roughly 100 years23 and Pan-Hellenic values were not sufficient to provide an 
enduring unity of interests which would outweigh the perceived benefits of the 
conflict.  
 
               It is worth pointing out that, there is no reason to doubt that Aristophanes, 
Cornelius Nepos and Diodorus Siculus works contain certain useful references for 
illuminating further some aspects of the events in question, but equally there is no 
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good reason for claiming that I can rely upon them to grasp the gist of the time period 
in question as it would be to rely upon Carlyle and Ruskin for the facts and spirit of 
English life before the Great Reform Bill and the Industrial Revolution. There is a 
tendency for overspecialization and one sidedness, the inclination to forget the wood 
for the trees. This is of course a temptation that besets every science, but it is 
particularly insidious in such a study as that of ancient Greece, where for the 
researcher everything depends upon remaining steadily conscious, in and through the 
smallest detail. But there is a second tendency to error, against which it is more 
difficult to guard. It arises from the application of modern methods and ideas to 
ancient times without a sufficient estimate of the difference between ancient and 
modern conditions.     
 
2.3. Macedonian wars and ancient sources.
      
         
                 A striking feature of the Hellenistic period, compared with the classical, is 
the very large number of the non literary texts that survive and their preponderance 
over historiographic data. At one level such sources, documentary papyri, 
inscriptions, coins and archaeology, give one much more direct access to the period, 
on the other hand these sources raise special problems of interpretation and require 
specialized skills in order to be appraised directly, since they cannot speak to the 
reader in their own voice, as Thucydides and Polybius can. The literary sources for 
Hellenistic age, on the other hand, are even more exiguous than those for the classical 
period. This deficiency is not due to any lack of historical writers in the Hellenistic 
age itself, but to the almost complete disappearance of their work in later antiquity. In 
view of the foregoing, first Polybius, Titus Livy, and then Plutarch, Appian, along 
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with Pausanias can be deemed eligible enough to guide me through the nebulous 
passages of the epoch of the Macedonian Wars, if not with outstanding credibility, at 
least with noteworthy accuracy.  
 
             A Greek historian of the second century B.C. who’s Histories provides the 
most detailed contemporary account of the rise of the Roman Empire, Polybius, is 
credited with being the first historian to formulate a methodology of history24. 
Polybius’ ideas about the superiority of mixed constitutions influenced even 
seventeenth and eighteenth century political philosophers and are considered to be a 
source of the system of checks and balances in the United States Constitution. 
Polybius's preference for mixed constitutions was taken up also by the English 
philosopher John Locke and the French philosopher Montesquieu; the German 
historian Barthold Niebuhr, considered the founder of modern historiography, relied 
on Polybius extensively as a source and praised his emphasis on personal experience 
and eyewitness accounts in the writing of history. One should always bear in mind 
that Titus Livy derived much of his material about the rise of Rome from the Histories 
of Polybius25, who is particularly significant for my study for two reasons: 
 
(a)       Polybius, son of a prominent politician in the Achaean League during the early 
second century, was amongst those Achaeans that were detained in Italy after the 
defeat of Macedonia. In view of this fact, he made many acquaintances with Roman 
statesmen, who seem to have exerted a lot of influence on his writings, to such an 
extent as to be considered, in short, by many writers as a Romanized Greek, a 
“rhepsaspes” (the one who throws away his shield and backs off from the battle)26. 
This very fact, however, of being an insider to the events, though from a different 
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camp, gives, indirectly and if carefully interpreted, insights into social, war, attitudes 
and foreign policy’s practices to which classical sources – apart from Thucydides - 
rarely give me access. His treatment of Aratus and Philopoemen, the heroes of the 
Achaean League, and of Cleomenes of Sparta, its most constant enemy, is perhaps 
open to severe criticism. Similarly, his views of Rome and the Romans may have 
been influenced by his firm belief in the necessity of accepting the Roman supremacy 
as inevitable, and by his intimacy with Scipio. Moreover, he had a deep admiration 
for the great republic, for her well-balanced constitution, for her military system, and 
for the character of her citizens and it is true that he sketched the Roman character in 
a masterly fashion. But just as his patriotism does not blind him to the faults of his 
countrymen, so he does not scruple to criticize Rome and its incipient degeneracy 
after 146 B.C. All in all, his work cannot pretend to complete coverage, particularly in 
areas where the author is not an expert (such as the military ones), but once this is 
conceded, it can fairly be said that without Polybius’ shrewd and constructive 
criticism many faults and misconceptions about Greek states’ behavior towards Rome 
might have remained uncorrected. 
 
 (b)       In many fields of knowledge the accepted explanations depend less on the 
marshalling of evidence than on preconceptions of what serves as logical framework 
for the evidence. The framework, sometimes, even dominates the evidence, because it 
dictates what evidence should be sought or ignored. By piecing together the scattered 
evidence that Polybius brings up, veiled or not within his histories, I can actually 
succeed in watching the gradual encroachment of the predominant partner (Rome) 
until she governed all the Hellenic cities by the same laws and political manipulations. 
The Roman rise is actually this frame of the evidence; what Polybius calls his history, 
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namely a “pragmatike historia” (a pragmatic history)27, based on written evidence, his 
own knowledge of events, the evidence of eye-witnesses, while at the same time, he 
arranges his material systematically, by treating the events on an annual basis. In fact, 
Polybius repeatedly asserts, following the example of Herodotus and Thucydides, that 
a written historical work must offer “instruction for the future”28. To accomplish this, 
he suggests that both the writer and the reader of history must not “confine their 
attention to the narrative of events but must take account of what preceded, 
accompanied and followed them”29. It is crystal clear that there are impressive 
similarities particularly with Thucydides’ methodology and both writers’ works do 
not function as an insulated compartment, but more like a pool in one continuous 
medium (history), the circumambient atmosphere of their place and time. 
 
            What follows after Polybius is necessarily a composite picture, indicative 
rather than probative, made up from scraps of literary, papyrological and 
archaeological information. Within this frame, special reference has to be made to 
Titus Livy, first and foremost, whose surviving work is valuable at least due to its 
remarkable extent for such an ancient piece of literature. Titus Livius (c.59 B.C.- c.17 
A.D.), wrote a universal history, which included many texts, based on lost books of 
Polybius, and in his books 26-45, gives a valuable narrative in relation to the 
involvement of the Romans in Greece. The history of Rome from its foundation 
covers the period down to the defeat of Varus in Germany in A.D. 9 and is preserved 
complete down to 293 and from 218 to 167 B.C. However, Livy is considered to be 
clearly prejudiced, a fact that portrays the limits of my possible assessment on the 
events of that period30. It is well known, for instance, that if Polybius, was indeed a 
staunch supporter of Achaeans so as to pose himself to a certain extent against Sparta, 
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then Titus Livy cannot, what’s more, claim the title of the dispassionate historian. 
Livy seems to be haunted by a horror vacui, set out to fill the gap, building on the 
bare record of the Annales Maximi, and his attempt is more like guesswork, than 
history per se, since it conspicuously appears to fail the standard criteria of historical 
accuracy and impartiality. Contrary to Polybius, his story is plainly embroidered with 
patriotic Roman legend, however it need not be rejected altogether; it is worthy of 
investigation and provided I do not seek to torture the evidence and stretch the events 
in the search for fixed chronological boundaries or overnight transformations, Livy’s 
work can be treated as an extremely fruitful complementary tank of information on 
catching the atmosphere of the political, social and military conditions of that era. 
 
             Appian is also considered to be an important source, because of his brief 
though not turgid, book 10 - Illyrian History- which deals with Rome’s involvements 
in north-western Greece in 230-119 B.C., a period quite revealing on Rome’s strategic 
orientation, which was regarded schematically by the Greeks as the “clouds in the 
west”31.  
 
             I shall also not lose sight of the fact that a particularly helpful source for my 
study is not solely historiography, but also other facets of what one calls history in 
general32. “Parallel lives” of Plutarch, who, like Polybius, kept intellectual contacts 
with Rome, is a very indicative example of illustrating social and historical 
developments of a specific era by portraying important personalities of that time. 
Plutarch, a Boeotian from Chaeronea, wrote, inter alia, the “lives” of Aratus of 
Sicyon, Philopoemen, Flamininus and Aemilius Paullus, which cover significant parts 
of the historical era under question. I have to underline, at this point, that Plutarch’s 
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lives are to be handled with extreme care, due to the fact that they do not contain 
historical analysis as such, but certain aspects of some important people’s 
personalities, which further means that, in his effort to highlight character traits and 
points of comparison, his remarks sometimes cannot be deemed pellucid and 
objective, but rather farfetched and superficial. 
                
2.4.
 
 Ancient sources’ complementarity with contemporary International Relations 
theory: two strangers in the same land? 
             On one hand, it cannot be my task here to present the ever-growing material 
(especially of inscriptions), on the other hand, the undisputable fact that I must make 
abstractions or generalizations, cannot be submerged under the mass of variations of 
the sources. In view of the foregoing, and bearing in mind what I stressed in the 
introductory chapter, the quality of the aforementioned ancient writers can indeed 
compensate for the quantity of the lost ancient works. At this precise point, 
International Relations theory can fill the vacuum of the conspicuously inadequate 
ancient sources and advance my work. Two are my fundamental postulations for that 
hypothesis to take shape: 
 
(a)    The durability of the aforementioned ancient literature attests to the continuity of 
international politics and to the fact that the anarchic structure of international politics 
remain intact. Indicatively, I refer to Robert Gilpin who writes33 that ‘‘in my 
judgment, there have been three great realist writers; it is difficult for me to conceive 
that anyone would deny them inclusion in the tradition. They are Thucydides, 
Machiavelli, and Carr’’ or to Robert Keohane, who accepts 34 that ‘‘even as long ago 
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as the time of Thucydides, political realism contained three key assumptions . . . [that] 
have furnished a usable interpretive framework for observers from Thucydides 
onward.’’  
 
(b)      There is no extraordinary discrepancy between the various branches of the so 
called modern “realism” and the one of Thucydides, without, of course, turning a 
blind eye to the works of those who attempted certain categorizations in International 
Relations theory and came up with new sub-schools of thoughts or distinct currents of 
scientific knowledge and so forth. There is indeed no need to quarrel over which 
precise theoretical camp Thucydides himself espouses, since the narration of the 
events speak volumes for the general theoretical orientation of the work, namely the 
“realistic”. For example, when Athenian leadership emphasizes the zero-sum nature 
of politics, the proclamation of ruling or being ruled35, it brings to one’s mind some of 
the “offensive realism’s” theoretical pillars of the need to maximize relative power36. 
If one can trace “offensive realism” in Thucydides, that does not entail altogether that 
he is the harbinger of “offensive realism” as such, simply, because such a notion, 
expressis verbis, in antiquity did not exist. It is a contemporary methodological tool 
and my proclaimed aim is but succinctly to investigate the general extent within 
which the ancient writings fall, using as a metric merely the three basic currents of 
international theory according to Wight’s37 categorization. All that should be kept in 
mind by a generous reader is that there is much that it is still unexplained and the 
views that have been already exposed by various authors often remain simple 
assumptions. 
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1 “The history of Rome from its foundation”, for instance, by Livy covered the period down to the 
defeat of Varus in Germany in A.D. 9 and is preserved complete down to 293 B.C. and only from 218 
to 167 B.C. 
 
2 Arnaldo Momigliano, “Greek Historiography”, p. 23. 
 
3 The Peloponnesian war mainly concentrates on three major phases of the struggle between Sparta and 
Athens (and their respective allies), namely: The Archidamian War (431-427 B.C.), the Sicilian War 
(421-413 B.C.) and the Decelean War (412-404 B.C.). 
 
4 Quite succinctly Kurke notes that “As such, he is the inventor of political history narrowly construed, 
a form which seems quite 'natural' to us, but which was at the time (especially in the wake of 
Herodotus) hardly a self-evident choice (“Charting the Poles of History: Herodotus and Thucydides”, 
p.131). 
 
5 Xenophon: Hellenica (I,II), Diodorus :XII, Aristophanes: The Acharnians, The Knights, The Peace, 
Lysistrata, Cornelius Nepos : Alcibiades, Lysander, Thrasybulus and Plutarch: Lives of Pericles, 
Nicias, Alcibiades and Lysander. 
 
6 For instance marvelous is the work “A study in History”  of A. J. Toynbee, the “History of Greece” of 
G. Grote,  the ’Warfare in antiquity’’ of H. Delbruck,  the “Storia dei Greci” of De Sanctis, the 
“Cambridge Ancient History” B. V & VI. 
 
7 That tendency of an unbridled “relativism” is usually found within the remit of sociological sciences, 
in sharp contrast to the “positivism” of the civil or criminal law of the states and the empirical 
observation of other practical sciences. 
 
8 As J. Bury puts it glibly, "[The History is] severe in its detachment, written from a purely intellectual 
point of view, unencumbered with platitudes and moral judgments, cold and critical." (“History of 
Greece”, p.252). 
 
9  M.I. Finley, precisely underscores ("Introduction to Thucydides”, p.18).) that Thucydides presents 
high  standards of accuracy, especially if I take into account the specific time he lived in (late fifth 
century B.C.). 
 
10 “…so my method has been, while keeping as closely as possible to the general sense of the words 
used, to make the speakers say what, in my opinion, was called for by each situation” (Thucydides 
B.I.22). 
 
11 Thucydides, B. I.2. 
 
12 “And it may well be that my history will seem less easy to read because of the absence in it of any 
romantic element (to mythodes). It will be enough for me, however, if these words of mine are judged 
useful by those who want to clearly understand the events which happened in the past and which 
(human nature being what it is) will, at some time or other in much the same ways, be repeated in the 
future. My work is not a piece of writing designed to meet the needs of an immediate public, but was 
done to last forever”. (Thucydides, B.I.2). 
 
13 Following the end of the narrative of Thucydides, the final years of the Peloponnesian war have been 
reconstructed to some extent by the Athenian Xenophon (c.428-354), a disciple of Socrates, and the 
work by the anonymous so called Oxyrhynchus historian, which has survived in fragments among a 
collection of papyrus documents first discovered at Oxyrhynchus in Egypt in 1906. 
 
14 “And with regard to my factual reporting of the events of the war I have made it a principle not to 
write down the first story that came my way, and not even to be guided by my own general 
impressions; either I was present myself at the events which I have described or else I heard them from 
eyewitnesses whose reports I have checked with as much thoroughness as possible. Not that even so 
the truth was easy to discover; different eye-witnesses give different accounts of the same events, 
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speaking out of partiality for the one side or the other or else from imperfect memories” (Thucydides 
B. I.22). 
 
15 W.R. Connor, (“Thucydides”) generally claims that Thucydides’ work is actually a piece of literature 
and its narrated history is merely the philological ambience of carefully selected events. E. Badian, 
(“Thucydides and the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war”) strongly believes that Thucydides is a 
staunch supporter of Athens’ interests and therefore his objectivity is again severely questioned.  C.N. 
Cochrane regarded him as a pseudo-social scientist (“Thucydides and the Science of History”.) F.M. 
Cornford, and his provocative ‘‘Thucydides Mythistoricus’’ goes as far as to suggest that Thucydides’ 
masterpiece was in fact a work which was antagonizing the Aschylian tragedies of his time, in other 
words a well narrated figment of its imagination. However, it is rather illuminating to note that even the 
contemporaries of Thucydides (such as Dionysius of Haliccarnasus) considered of him as overtly 
realist, who shouldn’t portray historical events as they happened but as they had to happen according to 
some unidentified morality” laws (Finley, “Introduction to Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian 
War”, p.30) and in any case Thucydides could not be accused of naive credulity. 
 
16 Sometimes called “The Story of My Times” but more accurately “Greek Affairs”. 
 
17 There was also an attempted continuation of Thucydides’ History by the fourth century historian 
Theopompus of Chios of which some fragments remain, quite peripheral to my central theme. 
 
18 But not equally to Thucydides, since he was a soldier and not a general, possessing therefore the “big 
picture” of the warfare. 
 
19 Its supposed Spartan bias seems to reflect the one-sidedness of his sources rather than an intentional 
prejudice. 
 
20 Furthermore, he tends to admit reporting events which are notable in themselves, either reflecting on 
the moral nature or on the achievements of cities and individuals, e.g. the last words of Theramenes 
when he is executed by Critias, one of The Thirty in Athens. Here he has broadened his account from 
Thucydidean criteria towards one which allows the interesting or moral to be included in its own right 
(Xenophon, “Hellenica”, B.II,3,47-56). 
 
21 Xenophon's Anabasis, for instance (sometimes also called 'The Persian Expedition'), which described 
the adventures of the Greek mercenary army in the Persia Empire, is regarded a more qualitative 
account than the Hellenica and demonstrates a stronger historical narrative. It pointed out the potential 
weakness of the Persian Empire to leaders such as Alexander the Great, and did influence later 
historians such as Arrian. 
 
22 This judgment trailed through into the twentieth century, captured in M. I. Finley's remark that the 
Hellenica "is very unreliable, tendentious, dishonest, dreary to read, and rarely illuminating on broader 
issues." (M.I. Finley, “The Portable Greek Historians: The Essence of Herodotus, Thucydides, 
Xenophon, and Polybius”,p.14). 
 
23 De Romilly is correct to suggest that this is the failure of the city-state polity, as conceived in the 
fifth century, and rests also on a failure to look beyond the confines of the polis for real solutions 
(“Thucydides and Athenian Imperialism”, p.357). 
 
24 Notwithstanding the fact that his work is cut into pieces, at least the first five of his forty books 
survive intact and some of the rest they can be re-composed in as sufficient way, taking into account 
the well known difficulties of the ancient historiography in general. It is to be noted as well that 
Polybius facilitates the reader, by explaining himself the general scope of his history in certain parts of 
his work. The years before his precious survey, there is no continuous account (only some texts from a 
lost work written in the first century B.C. by a roman Pompeius Trogus) from 301 to 229 B.C., when 
Polybius’s narrative begins. Earlier, perhaps, only Diodorus Siculus can help me out with his 
continuous narrative for the years 323-302 BC, which in fact is based upon the lost memoirs of 
Hieronymus of Kardia, a military officer and archivist of Alexander the Great. The rest of his 
fragmentary follows the steps of Timaius, Polybius and the stoic scholar Posidonius.   
54 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
 
25 Posidonius and Strabo, both of them Stoics, like Polybius himself, are said to have written 
continuations of his history. Arrian in the early part of the 2nd and Aelian in the 3rd century both speak 
of him with respect, though with reference mainly to his excellence as an authority on the art of war. 
 
26 Although Polybius contends in his “Histories” that “a good man ought to love his friends and his 
country, and should share both their hatreds and their loyalties,” he announces that the man who would 
“take up the role of the historian” must “discard all considerations of this kind” (1.14). There has also 
been a contrary tendency within modern scholarship (for example, Peter Green, “Alexander to Actium”, 
or Ronald Mellor, “The historians of ancient Rome”) which emphasizes the easily detectable bias of 
Polybius the Megalopolitan and Achaean patriot, spokesman of the Greek propertied class and 
privileged and compromised champion of the Roman settlement of Greece, and in many aspects 
dismisses the Polybian portrait as mere caricature. 
 
27  “...the knowledge gained from the study of true history (“pragmatikis historias”) is the best of all 
educations for practical life” (I.35) “..and determined on writing a history of actions: first, because they 
are continually new and require a new narrative, —as of course one generation cannot give us the 
history of the next; and secondly, because such a narrative is of all others the most instructive”. (IX.1-
2). The variants of this sort of history can be also seen in other parts of Polybius work: i 2.8, iii 47.8, vi 
5.2, xii 25, xxxvi 17.1, xxxix 1.4. 
 
28 Polybius’ History (3.57). 
 
29 (3.31). “For if you take from history all explanation of cause, principle, and motive, and of the 
adaptation of the means to the end, what is left is a mere panorama without being instructive; and, 
though it may please for the moment, has no abiding value (ibid.)”. 
 
30 Livy gives for instance an account of an interview between Phillip and the consul Villius, of which 
no mention is made by Plutarch, and which, all circumstances considered, appears exceedingly 
improbable (Livy, B.32).   
 
31 Famously described as such by an Aetolian politician around 210 B.C., depicting the threat that had 
risen above the political horizons of many Greeks and cast a looming shadow over all Greek interstate 
relations: “For if once you allow the clouds now gathering in the west 
(“τὰ  προφαινόμενα νῦ ν ἀ πὸ  τῆ ς ἑ σπέρας νέφη”) to settle upon Greece, I fear exceedingly that the 
power of making peace or war, and in a word all these games which we are now playing against each 
other, will be so completely knocked out of the hands of us all, that we shall be praying heaven to grant 
us only this power of making war or peace with each other at my  own will and pleasure, and of settling 
my  own disputes”. (Polybius, 5.104). 
 
32 Geography is one of them, but not particularly decisive for my  study and therefore of limited 
reference: Strabo from Amaseia in Pontus (64 B.C.-21 A.D.) wrote the famous “Geographia”, which is, 
indisputably, one of the primary sources of Greek antiquity, due to his topographical descriptions of the 
eastern areas of Alexander’s empire which became Roman provinces. However, much of his 
geographical information is coming from authors of previous times and is not based on his own 
observations. Pausanias (mid second century A.D.) composed a guidebook to the southern Greek 
mainland and its antiquities, some of which he uses in order to extract some historical, but nonetheless 
limited, narrations. 
 
33 “The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism” (p.306). 
 
34 “Realism, Neorealism, and the Study of World Politics”.  
 
35 Thucydides, B.6.18, 6.82. 
 
36 On the offensive realism I bear in mind for the next steps of the study as well the prolific book of J. 
Mearsheimer, “The tragedy of Great Power Politics”. 
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37 Over-detailed analysis of the approaches of Thucydides’ work from various scholars coming from 
different sub-schools of thought one can find to the article of L.J. Bagby, “The Use and Abuse of 
Thucydides in International Relations”, p. 131–153, where one is invited to distinguish “neo-realists” 
or “third image realists” and so forth among isolated concrete words of the ancient text, ignoring, by 
and large, conspicuous references in the ancient text itself for the contrary. S. Forde, for instance, is 
very illuminating in stressing that “neo-realism” does not possess the scientific element which 
supposedly differentiates it from realism, since that element can be easily found as well back to 
Thucydides and other ancient writers. (in International Relations and the Science of Politics: 
“Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Neo-realism”:p.141.) 
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Chapter Three: Methodology and analysis of the Peloponnesian War. 
 
3.1.
 
The strategic environment. 
            In this chapter I will examine the Peloponnesian War in view of the three 
International Relations theories, wherever these may be applied, placing particular 
emphasis only on the most influential episodes of the war, the parties involved, the 
apportioning of blame to either of the two sides, certain military aspects, as well as 
the role of diplomacy and mediation attempts. What also merits my attention are 
specific associated incidents, various aspects of internal politics, other international 
players’ actions and only significant social developments. Considering that historia 
scribitur ad narrandum non ad probandum1 I methodologically opt for a 
chronological approach to the war informed by interpretations derived from 
international theory, which will be crystallized further in a chapter dedicated to a 
comparison with the Macedonian Wars and the deduction of relevant conclusions. 
This framework facilitates a coherent exposition of the facts, which at the same time 
retain their self-evident didactic power considering the legal principle of res ipsa 
loquitur2. These general observations will also be applied to the examination of the 
Macedonian Wars in the next chapter.  
 
             There is scant evidence from the ancient sources to suggest that at the 
embryonic stage of the Peloponnesian War at least, Athens should not be regarded as 
the principal reference point also for developments outside her territory. Athens 
enjoyed indeed3 the structural power4, a key-word for a great power’s qualification as 
being hegemonic. Hegemony consists of the possession and command of a 
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multifaceted set of power resources and “readers ought to make judgements from the 
facts themselves”5 since facts at this specific period are first and foremost the 
causatum of Athens’ foreign policy activity. This activity, seen in the frame of 
political theory, diplomacy, military operations and economy, was bound to provoke 
the respective Spartan one, which unavoidably – following the “realist” argument - 
strove to balance the Attic preponderance and “take direct responsibility for checking 
it”6. Hence, the war choices taken by the Athenian and the Spartan camp was not an 
outgrowth of coincidental facts, but a mutual strategic interaction, elaborated upon by 
careful calculation and dictation of sound political interests, tinged with geopolitical 
aspirations. 
 
                In this vein, the 50 years period7 before the commencement of the 
Peloponnesian War is characterized by the existence of a dipole in the Hellenistic 
world: the preponderance of Sparta during the 6th century B.C. was gradually 
substituted by the political and military advance of Athens, who benefited and built up 
her international image by taking control of the challenging campaigns against the 
common enemy, Persia8, thus emerging as a pace setter in the political affairs of the 
Greek states. Sparta initially pulled back in response to the Athenian expansion, but 
gradually begun to reassess the situation heading to the final military conflict with 
Athens. This period refers to the so called “First Peloponnesian War” (460-445 B.C.) 
– although paradoxically Thucydides in no place in his work refers to this war as such 
- which was at the same time a prelude to the ensuing major contest between Athens 
and Sparta, but also an addendum to the earlier war of the Greeks against Persia 
(given the seething animosity between Sparta and Athens over the spoils of this war). 
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         The driving force in Athens’ rapid accession was the establishment of Delos’ 
Alliance9 and the subsequent cunning (in the sense that, with quite  striking 
contemporary examples, the majority of the allies disliked military service and 
absence from home, and considering that they agreed to contribute their share of the 
expense instead of ships, thus the Athenian navy was proportionally increased, while 
they themselves were always untrained and unprepared for war when they revolted) 
transformation of her into an Athenian stooge10, contrary to that of the “client states” 
system of Rome, where the allies enjoyed a significant influence upon issues of soft 
policy, thus retaining an illusion of independence. This process of becoming a less 
agreeable leader took flesh for Athens, first with the relocation of the alliance’s fund 
to the city (454 B.C.) and then with the imposition of the Athenian currency system 
on the islands of the Aegean Sea (450-446 B.C.). Athens’ sight on the league’s notion 
can be traced to Pericles who, when referring to the Spartan league, had reproached it, 
claiming unequivocally that: “The confederacy is made up of many races; all the 
representatives have equal votes, and press their several interests. There follows the 
usual result, that nothing is ever done properly”11. Athenians, in this way, formed a 
unified financial community, where they could unobstructedly exercise their political 
power and spread their influence throughout the entire Aegean Sea, and along the 
Ionian coastline (an area opposite to Greece, with particular economic and 
geostrategic importance, which was recognised as well by the Romans in the future). 
It is not unusual for a great power to progressively overpower her allies so as to 
manipulate them. But it merits further consideration the way Athens attempted to 
exercise that task and its ramifications. The motivation behind her manipulations can 
be explained by “realism”, but their practical application clearly deviate from this 
theoretical framework. 
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           The military awakening of Sparta gave rise to the first Peloponnesian War 
(453-446 B.C.)12, which resulted, effectively, in a draw, but, it highlighted the 
existence of two major centers of power within the Hellenistic world. However, the 
political and diplomatic antagonism between Athens and Sparta did not abate with the 
truce treaty (the “Thirty Years Peace Treaty”), because it had not explicitly and 
adequately defined the zones of influence of the interested parties13. The neutral 
towns reserved the right to accede, according to their liking, into the Athenian or the 
Peloponnesian Alliance, a provision reflecting the general political tradition of the 
ancient Greeks and its notions of free spirit and open thought.  
 
              Sparta did not seem at that moment to be interested in creating a wider, Pan-
Hellenic political union under its control, something that was not simply prescribed 
by its introvert political system and its limited social base, but also by its peculiar 
political tradition of self-isolation and self restraint against any foreign seduction14. 
The specific balance of the system did not at that time affect significantly her interests 
as a great Greek power15, which were after all delineated by her extremely introvert 
social and military tradition. Slightly paraphrasing the similar argument of R. Jervis16, 
I claim that Sparta’s statesmen but not necessarily Athens’ did not at the beginning 
interpret Attic expansion as a contravention to the security dilemma.  
 
                Athens, on the contrary, espoused from scratch an exceedingly aggressive 
foreign policy, expanding her élan vital to the furthest parts of the Aegean Sea and 
risking confrontation with the two other great powers of the Eastern Mediterranean: 
Sparta and Persian Empire. In this context, Athens put particular emphasis upon the 
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three main Clausewitzian objects of a state’s grand strategy when it was responsive17, 
(a) gaining public opinion, (b) conquering and destroying the armed power of an 
enemy and (c) taking possession of his material and other sources of strength. 
However, she applied them separately and at her own discretion, after having 
calculated the strength of the specific enemy before her. Against Sparta and her allies 
in Greece Athens pursued all the aforementioned objects of war; while in the case of 
Persia, she seemed satisfied with the mere limited aim of gaining public opinion with 
a view to increasing her influence upon the Ionians of Asia Minor, who were living 
under the constant threat of the Persian Empire. Athens recognised that she was not 
strong enough to sustain such a parallel effort in a two-front war. She had already met 
with two defeats in the past, the destruction of her fleet in Egypt by Persia (454 B.C.) 
and her recoil at the battle of Coronae in Boeotia (447 B.C.)18. Thus, she abandoned 
her hegemonic aspirations and acting upon a carefully enorchestrated policy, she 
provisionally inaugurated a pacifist policy that was to increase her economic and 
political leverage. Its peace treaties with Sparta (446 B.C.) and Persia (447 B.C.) gave 
her time to pursue her hegemonic aspirations elsewhere. 
 
                Around 446 B.C. Pericles convened in Athens, a pan-Hellenic conference, 
supposedly to deal with ceremonial issues of wider Greek interest, but also to promote 
Athens own interests, such as the institutional protection of the freedom of navigation 
and commercial activity in the open seas19.  However, the Athenian proposals were 
not met with enthusiasm, mostly because of the opposition of Sparta and her allies, 
but also of Athens’ allies, who detected these underlying imperialistic connotations. 
Contrary to the established practise, the peace-loving voices at this stage were found 
mostly in the Peloponnesian camp, purportedly the more autarchic one and not 
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amongst the members of the Athenian alliance, subservient to the metropolis and 
devoid of any room for manoeuvre. Actually, whenever there were any rebellious 
manifestations20 against their city, Athenians were very eager and quick to stifle any 
possible resistance, as evidently happened in the cases of various towns and islands, 
like Naxos21, Thasos22, Scyros23, Euboea24 and Istaia25. Verbal preaching about 
cooperation and common goals was nothing more than a colourful mantle, with which 
Athens’ power designs were cloaked. Every Democratic Party in each city state could 
be also considered to be the facilitator of the maritime expansion and power of 
Athens, something that was becoming too apparent to the other players and therefore 
easily exploitable by the enemy’s propaganda. Sparta was indeed very active to 
foment anti-democratic camps and enforce oligarchic parties within the city states 
which were either part of the Athenian alliance or they were still free. It was natural 
that in 447 B.C., after the defeat of the Athenians by the Boeotians in Coronae, the 
oligarchic Boeotian Alliance came to the fore again as a counterweight to the 
Athenian democratic expansionism. Subsequently, when the Peloponnesian war broke 
out, Spartan propaganda effectively projected with remarkable success the principle 
of self-independence and the need for dissolution of the “tyrannical” Athenian 
Alliance. It is evident that the Greek landscape whilst being a fruitful soil for the 
Athenian aggrandizement, also allowed a rich diversity in the political iconography of 
the states and different forms of entanglement of sovereignty: from fully established 
states, to states – satellites, and states totally subservient to others through alliances or 
even not. 
 
              Athenian expansionism was already visible in the economic field during the 
5th century B.C. Whilst Sparta was the principal antagonistic power in the political - 
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military field, it was Corinth the wealthiest, in commercial terms, city state during the 
6th and the 5th century B.C, gifted with the geographic advantage of having 
simultaneous access to Adriatic as well as to the Aegean Sea. To put it in A.Watson’s 
thoughtful comparison, “the main Corinthian interest was that no other corporation 
should dominate Greece, or even lay down the law to the rest, and that the seas should 
be open for their trade. This is the policy that the Dutch adopted in seventeenth-
century Europe, when they were in a similar position to the Corinthians” 26. After the 
Persian invasion to Greece, the commercial dominance of Corinth was being 
threatened by the continuously uprising activity in the Athenian port of Piraeus27. This 
development was bolstered by the favourable geographical position of Piraeus, which 
was close to the Cycladic islands and all the commercial avenues of the Aegean Sea, 
namely to the members – clients states of the Delian League, something that provided 
Athens with a radial point  to promote a common economic area in the heart of the 
Aegean. In parallel, the building of a mighty naval force had two immediate 
implications: (a) it secured even further the Athenian commercial maritime growth 
and (b) undermined, politically, the pro-aristocrat and pro-tyrannical 
farmer/agricultural population of the city, which both, by tradition, used to man the 
fleet. Under the said circumstances, Athens’ commercial rise in tandem with the 
military one was bound to emerge sharply as a threat to the interests of the other 
maritime forces of the Hellenic cities and as a disrupter of the stable equilibrium, 
inevitable spurring the creation of a countervailing coalition.  
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3.2. 
 
War causes and war pretexts: the three stepping stones to war. 
                The period of the 30 years truce (446 B.C.) up to the commencement of the 
Peloponnesian war (431 B.C.) is characterised by three, chronologically consecutive, 
affairs28. They resemble to stepping stones, which facilitate state’s drive to warfare. 
However one shall always recall that they were merely the stones, but not the driving 
force itself. Although they can be tangentially regarded as “causes” of war, one has to 
“peel off” far more than this in order to disclose the true causes of this transition from 
peace to war. Positing that international anarchy is the principal conditioning factor 
which shapes the motives and actions of states, I stress the systemic nature of the war, 
arguing that there is not just a combination of factors which can lead a state up to 
waging a war29 or obfuscating theoretical differentiations between motives and 
causes30, but realistically captured causes of war per se. This is precisely the essential 
difference between pretext and cause of war31. In view of these observations I can 
adduce practical lessons and useful theoretical tools from the affairs below: 
 
              (a)  A first alleged stimulus was the case of Corcyra. The Athenians 
organised a limited defensive alliance32 with Corcyra, promising to protect the latter if 
it was attacked, but not to take part in offensive actions against third states. Corcyra 
was thus silently being transformed into staging post of the Athenian power projection 
schemes to the West. The ongoing contrast between the two states was simply 
clarified after the outbreak of war between Corcyra and Corinth in 435 B.C, when 
Corcyra, being a colony of Corinth, was opposed to her in the affair of Epidamnus, 
which was located in the opposite coastline of Epirus. When the Corinthians started to 
exert military pressure on the Corcyrians, the latter asked for the active support of the 
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Athenians. Corcyrians and Corinthian delegates showed up before the People’s 
Assembly of Athens and expounded their views on the current military conflict and 
on the prospect of military involvement of Athens. Corcyrians, exploiting key notions 
of the “realistic” school, asserted state interest rather than the primacy of law and 
justice, claiming that the unifying factor for an alliance is not the pursuit of a noble 
cause, but a common enemy and the deployment of effective military assets to 
overpower him (maritime preponderance in this case)33. On the other hand the 
Corinthians delegates, using alternatively “Grotian” and “Kantian” wording, 
(“honour”, “common justice”, “Hellenic law”, moral “obligation”, “grounds of 
right”), asserted the necessity for legitimacy and the existence of a general interstate 
law between the city states34. However it may be that this was their only remaining 
path to defend their position, concealing an underlying “realistic” machination to 
influence the Athenian decision makers. In that case, I note that a specific wording, 
indicative at first sight of a certain school of thought may in reality fall within the 
theoretic sphere of another school of thought, to resolve their dilemma. 
 
           The Athenians, always bearing in mind the significant strategic geographic 
location of the Corcyrians, especially in view of a possible future expansion of Athens 
in the Italian peninsula, decided in their favour. What matters, in terms of 
International Relations theory, is that Athens took serious account of the moral 
reverberations of a possible warfare to the other states and she did not proceed with an 
open war declaration (though she did have that option), but with a conscientious 
formation of defensive alliance (“epimahia”), so as not to be seemed breaching she - 
first the 30 years truce. Applying a “Machiavellian” policy, morality for Athens was 
simply “a product of power”35. Besides, political manipulations with a moral mantle, 
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being a symptom of what it is called international anarchy, carry always the 
possibility of awakening the other side from an ‘idealist” sleep. In this environment, 
“States can never be certain about other states’ intentions”36 and this fear might push 
them to seek other sources for support. Athens, however, did not find sympathetic 
voices inside the Corinthian camp, which was also analysing the situation in terms of 
purely economic interests, notwithstanding its previous appeals to the principles of 
law and justice. During the discussions in front of People’s Assembly Athenians 
denounced the Corinthian involvement and without any hesitations infringed upon the 
stipulations of the 30 years truce in the incident of Potidaea.  
 
                  (b) Another alleged37 reason for the outbreak of the war was the case of 
Potidaea. In the summer of 433 B.C., Athenians stepped up their diplomatic demarche 
with Corinth, by demanding that Potidaea, town in Chalcidice and an old colony of 
Corinth but now a member of the Athenian alliance, to reaffirm their allegiance to 
Athens, which was being heavily disrupted at that particular time by antagonistic 
voices within the Delian League. Athenians asked more specifically from the 
authorities of Potidaea to demolish the southern wall of the town, to hand over 
members of the most prominent families as hostages, to expel the Corinthian 
ambassadors and to refuse to accept only in the future. Athenian requests, though 
politically justified, were nonetheless too ambitious and pushed the Potidaeans 
towards the camp of Sparta, most probably – I can safely surmise – after active 
Corinthian pressure. Sparta committed herself to mobilising her forces and invading 
Attica if Athens launched a campaign against Potidaea. The firing of a Spartan as a 
warning shot, as a result of Athenian intransigence, created growing tension in the 
area and encouraged revolutionary responses not only from the Potidaeans, but also 
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from neighbouring cities (the Chalkidians and the Vottaians). Besides, apart from the 
rising possibility of a military attack by Sparta on Athenian soil, the abjuring cities 
could count on the support of the Macedonian King Perdiccus B’, who was already at 
war with Athens for other reasons (444-413 B.C.)38. This support was important, since 
it was not only related solely to military assistance, but also to the supply of a crucial 
war material - wood. Timber was abundant in Perdiccus’ state and Athens could not 
allow the primary material for building up her mighty navy to fall into Sparta’s hands.  
In view of the foregoing, it is clear that what was at stake was not the ethical of 
Potidaea’s contractual commitments, but the tangible interests of Athens. In this case 
these were propounded blatantly by her orators in Thucydides39: “So that at first we 
were forced to advance our dominion to what it is out of the nature of the thing itself, 
as chiefly for fear, next for honour, and lastly for profit”. 
 
                (c) The Megarian Decree was the third alleged reason for bringing about the 
conflict between Sparta and Athens. Corinthians saw the defection of Potidaea as an 
inviting opportunity to form a common Macedonian front against Athens, sapping the 
supremacy of the latter in the northern Aegean sea and concurrently restore their 
former links with Potidaea. By sending a fleet to provide the Potidaeans with the 
necessary military assistance for the latter’s’ defection, Corinth transgressed the 
stipulations of the 30 years truce. Reacting to this, Pericles, in 432 B.C. proclaimed a 
harsh countermeasure, the so called Megarian Decree which was regarded as another 
provocative cause for war, this time, by the Spartan side40. The decree, innovative, 
indeed, in its conception for that era, declared that Megara, being a member of the 
Peloponnesian Alliance, was barred from trading in all the ports and markets of the 
Athenian Alliance. This commercial blockage was meant to be extremely pernicious 
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for the interests of Megara, which was totally reliant upon trading with the other city 
states. Corinth’s provocation was not of course a cause of war ipso facto, but just the 
tip of the iceberg for Athens, who had already set her sights on the strategically 
critical geographic area of the Peloponnesian Isthmus. If Athens was able to control 
Megara, she could monitor the strip of land leading to the isthmus, cutting off the 
Peloponnesians from their Beoetian allies and at the same time keep the Megarians 
away from their other vital commercial sphere, the Black Sea41. There, after all, 
Athens was trading grain and slaves, precisely like the Megarians, who were the 
founders of the very important city of Byzantium in that region. In parallel, the 
Athenian fleet would be even more able to blockade the two harbours of Megara, 
Nisaia and Piges, by dominating the Saronic Gulf and shutting out the Corinthians. 
Thus, it would be very difficult for the Corinthian fleet to operate effectively, but also 
for the Peloponnesian troops to be dispatched to the mainland of Greece, in 
preparation of a possible invasion to Attica. The Megarian Decree was obviously a 
carefully calculated tactical maneuver of Athenian strategy, which was already 
considering the possibility of an imminent war with Sparta and was keen to dictate the 
terms of engagement.  
 
         The forces opposing to Athens decided inevitably to make the first move at the 
diplomatic level, given that they were not powerful enough to make their stand at the 
military level while they could not rest in a supine position following Athens’ 
Megarian Decree. Corinthians, Megarians and Aeginitians dispatched ambassadors to 
Sparta, which convoked a general conference of the members of the Peloponnesian 
league. All the delegates condemned Athens for her action to breach the treaty of 446 
B.C., however the captious Corinthians went as so far as to present Spartans with a 
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major shotgun dilemma: either war against Athens for breach of contract or the 
defection of Corinth from the Peloponnesian league and joining with the anti-Spartan 
city of Argos, a prospect extremely worrying for the Laconians. It was clear that 
Corinth was struggling to associate Sparta with her own security dilemma conforming 
“realistically” to the rules of the “constant security competition, where states are 
willing to lie, cheat and use brute force if it helps them gain advantage over their 
rivals”42. 
 
            The Spartans were now divided into two opposing sides: the doves and the 
hawks. Arhidamus B’ (469-427 B.C.) was the leader of the doves, recommending 
prudence and opted for a shrewd cost-benefit analysis, stressing the cardinal need to 
deal first and foremost with how to finance a war, before any offensive military 
preparation and action (“war is an affair of money first”43) should take place. The 
warmongers were represented by Sthenelaidas, a capricious and rhetorically cunning 
“Ephor” (having ex officio more power than the Spartan King himself)44, who focused 
on the ethical and political obligations of Sparta, capitalizing on the delicacy of the 
situation so as to present the preparation to war as truly inescapable. That proposal 
was promptly approved and the subsequent final decision for war was taken in the fall 
of 432 B.C., following another general conference of the allies in Sparta, which was 
merely conducive to the war’s ceremonial legitimization before the eyes of the other 
states. 
 
             It has to be emphasized, that the front against Athens was not from the outset 
unbroken; already, the Arcadians were very reluctant to fight for a cause which they 
simply could not affiliate their selves with (being farmers who lived in cut-off, 
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distant, mountainous areas in Peloponnesus and they regarded it as an irrelevant 
commercial and maritime antagonism of certain neighbouring city states). However, 
Corinth was there again to pressure the Arcadians, and promote the imminent war as a 
common struggle of the Greek cities to expel the Athenian yoke and fight for the 
noble cause of freedom; something that, was about to become the principal 
declamatory battering ram of the anti-Athenian states45. It is clear that even then, the 
stance of the Peloponnesians in toto hadn’t yet been consolidated into a formal war 
declaration, for reasons of political manoeuvring. Considering that they had already 
acquired the support of many Greek states, they sought, first of all, to gain over the 
remaining neutral cities and to this end they should not appear on the stage as the 
unjustified aggressors. Their plan was not, of course, an end in itself, but given that 
the winter, which was not the ideal time to wage a war, was approaching, the moral 
justification of their plans was becoming necessary, as well as appealing enough to 
the ordinary people. In that sense, diplomatic activity was a scrupulously fabricated 
prelude to the oncoming war rather than an honest effort to avoid an armed conflict or 
to broker a peace settlement. Sparta had in a nutshell chosen to commence the war at 
the level of communication; and diplomacy was the messenger.  
 
            Contrary to what a researcher of Peloponnesian military history may assume, 
Sparta’s introvert society, often overtly accentuated in the ancient sources, was also a 
convenient environment for certain long term diplomatic plans to be developed. The 
first Spartan delegation to Athens submitted pro forma outrageous, though artfully 
articulated, proposals, which precisely aimed solely at undermining the prestige of the 
Athenian state and not at immediately acquiring any tangible results. Sparta 
demanded the banishment of Alkmeonidae’s breed, which was held responsible for 
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the “Cylon Affair”46. Following the proverbial devil’s hiding in the details, the critical 
element in this request was lying in the fact that Pericles himself was descended from 
this very breed. In other words, Spartans were diplomatically astute and impudent in 
actually proposing ex silentio to the Athenians the eviction of their leader. Athenians 
did not succumb to such a request and in order to nullify it tactically, they counter-
proposed a similar one of their own to Spartans47. These proposals were also counter-
productive: they did not stand a chance of getting realised; however, they were a 
telling indicator of the intentions of the opponents, and their level of commitment to 
their strategic cause. This is precisely why, shortly afterwards, a second Spartan 
delegation was sent to investigate how Athens would respond to different requests, 
more “realistic” than the previous ones: the Athenians should terminate the siege of 
Potidaea in Chalcidice, set Aegina48 free (which was subservient to them since 456 
B.C.) and withdraw the Megarian Decree. Reading between the lines, it is not 
surprising once more that behind the moral cloak of the Spartan triptych freedom, 
unity and peace among the city states, there were lurking three crucial demands of a 
purely geo-strategic nature: (a) the Peloponnesian intermediation for the sake of the 
town of Potidaea, intended to create a web of pro-laconic forces in the north, namely 
the soft underbelly of Athens’ geographic position (since in the south there was only 
sea and her navy encircling the area), (b) the request for setting Aegina free pertained 
rather to the well known increasing maritime interests of Corinth in the Saronic Gulf, 
whilst (c) Sparta’s desire to see the Megarian Decree revoked attested soundly to her 
will to retain that city within her own sphere of influence and in essence control the 
Isthmus without any consternations49.   
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             The Megarian Decree constituted the introit of Pericles’ consecration as 
director of Athenian affairs on the Greek mainland. It also served not only as a pretext 
for Spartans, but also as a launching pad for Athenian expansionism. I can safely 
surmise by Pericles’ own words “that this specific Decree, the trifle of which Spartans 
made so much”, was not considered even by the Athenian themselves to be the 
Lydian stone of the Athenian foreign policy; in other words, the Athenians were 
simply making use out of it in order to bolster their unbridled strategic prevalence50. It 
is interesting that Athens, nevertheless, exercising the “art of plausibility” (this term 
denotes a certain diplomatic technique of avoiding, undermining or abrogating the 
other’s proposals, without directly negating them, but by bringing forward arguments 
which although formally constitute a concrete positioning towards the unraveling 
developments, nevertheless in practice invalidate substantially the problems, which 
are supposed to deal with sufficiently)51 brought up the claim that they, Megarians, 
had already encroached upon Athenian territory by cultivating certain pieces of land 
in the nearby area of Eleusina, and by granting shelter to the asylum seekers who were 
expelled from Athens. The third (pre-war) diplomatic approach of Sparta was in fact 
rhetorical attempt to galvanize her aims behind the previous two attempts, namely the 
purported moral metamorphosis of the Spartan campaign and the Athenian resistance 
to it52. The Lacedaemonians declared their desire for peace provided that Athens 
granted autonomy to the Greeks. It was more or less a harsh ultimatum upon Athens, 
the satisfaction of which would mean the reinstatement of the allies’ autonomy, and 
subsequently the dissolution of the Athenian League. At the level of political 
propaganda, it was a deft move, since Sparta and her allies presented themselves now 
as the sole freedom fighter of Greece, the incandescent beacon of justice among the 
city states above and beyond Athens. Their moral principles were indeed “valuable 
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only for propaganda purposes or when they coincided with national power”53. In the 
case of the Peloponnesian states it was for both reasons. 
 
3.3. 
 
Rational and irrational actors: Diplomacy and balance of powerlessness. 
        The role of Pericles at this particular point has been highlighted in the 
historiography, as one of these rare cases where a leader practically strove to educate 
his people and to inculcate them with his own political agenda. In this context, 
Pericles did not recognise that some of his manoeuvres were skewed to such an extent 
as to produce further ill-fated initiatives54.  He was a staunch opponent of 
appeasement, underlining that Athens should remain steadfast against Sparta, 
irrespective of other states’ possible diplomatic initiatives; following this stance, more 
Peloponnesian expansionist demands would be forthcoming (famously said that “if 
you yield to them in a small matter, they will think that you are afraid, and will 
immediately dictate some more oppressive condition; but if you are firm, you will 
prove to them that they must treat you as their equals”55), on the assumption that 
“when one state sees another as extremely hostile, it is apt to find most compromises 
on specific issues unattractive”56. At the same time, he propounded a quite 
dismissively defence-orientated strategy (namely to wait patiently for the Spartan 
attacks behind the Athenian walls), that he actually refuted his previous suggestions, 
as well as the expansive momentum of Athens’, namely the continuous efforts of her 
navy to dominate more regions and states by the sea, in the context of a maritime 
power projection strategy. But feathering the empire’s image and sporadically 
employing a “rationalistic” rhetoric57 supposedly to mitigate his “realistic” approach 
should not sound inscrutable for such a rambunctious politician, who was sufficiently 
73 
 
astute to flower frequently his political speech with the notion of fortune, depicting 
the unpredictable factor of the human fickleness, which could potentially serve as an 
exit door from an unpleasant turn of the events. To this specifically implies 
Thucydides when he stresses that “we ascribe to chance whatever belies our 
calculation”, since “the movement of events is often as wayward and 
incomprehensible as the course of human thought” 58.  
 
          The said notion of the course of human thought or similarly influential 
individual assessments59 on the best way forward by leading personalities, like those 
of Pericles (and later Nicias60, or Alcibiades), bring me unavoidably to one 
preliminary conclusion with two very interesting and interconnected aspects. In this 
specific war and given the sources at hand, the influence of the leader is significantly 
higher and easier to detect within the Athenian democracy, than in the Spartan 
oligarchy. One is acquainted with Pericles and Alcibiades’s strong personalities, but 
not at all with that of Spartan Kings, like Archidamus or Eudamidas, who  during the 
Peloponnesian War61. The Athenian politician Cleon castigated that grandiloquence of 
the Athenian politicians when he stated bitterly in the case of Lesvos’ devastation that 
“our charming orators will still have an arena, but one in which the questions at stake 
will not be so grave, and the city will not pay so dearly for her brief pleasure in 
listening to them, while they get a good fee for a good speech”62. More on this 
delicate issue of lack of influential individuals within great powers’ camps, which, 
nevertheless, can also been seen as a token of significant convergence between them 
in serving their country, will be thoroughly analyzed in the last chapter in the frame of 
the notion of “cosmo-icon”. What has to be retained is that inadequate ancient sources 
do not convincingly explain the lack of important references to the Spartan Kings and 
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thus the conspicuous structural differences between the political regimes in the two 
rivals come unavoidably to the fore. This argument takes me to the next two aspects:  
 
(a) The fundamentally distinct social-political characteristics of Sparta and Athens are 
well known, namely the oligarchic, militarist society in contrast to the democratic, 
commercial one, but they also colour accordingly the notion of individual judgment in 
foreign policy. It is particularly emphasized that a democracy does not really have that 
wide room for strategic maneuvering, since every major action of her is submitted to 
the labile judgment of her citizens (of course there are numerous examples of 
victorious democratic regimes over non democratic ones63). At the same time, it is to 
be expected that when power is concentrated in one or a few persons, as was the case 
with Sparta, the decision making process becomes ex definitio easier, faster and surely 
more unpredictable to the opponent and therefore the state can benefit from the 
element of surprise, especially in the case where it holds the initiative. In other words, 
unquestioned legitimacy for action (even if it formally derives from more than one 
person, but fast enough, as if it emanates from one, like in the Spartan case with the 
ephors and the king) was a quite supportive element to a coherent foreign policy64, by 
empowering the decision maker with valuable assets, such as patience, secrecy and 
perseverance. 
 
(b) The “enemy image”65, which the two countries held for each other, namely the 
impression of the enemy’s level of capabilities, strengths and weaknesses lies at the 
epicentre of the process of an individual estimation. There is a linear relationship 
between Pericles’ perception of Sparta and the perceived harmfulness to Athens of 
any action undertaken by Sparta, so the more Sparta looked to be an enemy, the more 
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her action was likely to be perceived as harmful66. I am careful here to stress that 
Pericles follows the complicated pattern of an arrogant formulation of this icon and 
not the expected one  of “seeing the behavior of others as more centralized, planned 
and coordinated than it is”67, namely to overinflate Sparta’s strength, in order to 
intimidate Athenians and unite them behind him. In fact Pericles, overestimating his 
own political leverage, fails to notice R. Jervis’ warning that “decision makers should 
not jump to the conclusion that the other is a centralized actor implementing a well 
developed plan”68 and thus slips into the sphere of a sentimental foreign policy. 
   
             Keeping chronological track with the narration of Thucydides, the actual 
depiction of the aforementioned observations in the ancient text itself becomes 
pertinent. The lurking discrepancies between the two states do become evident at two 
instances: in the speech before the people (“demegoria”) of the Corinthians to the 
Spartans, shortly before the opening of the war69 and then in the reputable “Obituary 
of Pericles”70. 
 
             In the first case, the Corinthians put into sharp contrast the Spartan and the 
Athenian modus operandi in an effort to lure the Lacaedemonians into a war against 
Athenians. In this vein, the Athenians are presented as “revolutionary” (literally, but 
also in the sense followed by Wight), “bold beyond strength”, “impetuous”, “always 
extrovert”, cunning, duplicitous, fast deciding actors, who do not hesitate to take 
advantage of their allies and the given circumstances to promote their originally 
conceived master plans and launch a decisive attack against any enemy71. On the 
other hand, the Spartans are portrayed as “conservative”, “though strong they acting 
feebly”, “dilatory”, and “always introvert”, sluggish, at times apathetic and 
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procrastinating many decisions of even minor importance, so as to become 
strategically but also politically72 counter-productive.  
 
            In the second case, Pericles himself did not concentrate on the modus operandi 
of the two states, but on the modus vivendi, touching upon specific aspects of the 
respective social and political organisations, which are evocative of their distinct 
foreign policy73. The Athenian politician banked on Sparta’s limited financial 
resources and simultaneously on Athens’ prosperity, through the exploitation of her 
allies and determined on the desirability of a war of attrition against Sparta, whose 
military prowess in a decisive battle could not be questioned. Pericles’, in this respect 
“realistic”, reasoning did not only emphasize what had to be done (war of attrition74), 
but also what should not be done (decisive battle). And by “decisive battle” it is 
meant, in Clausewitzian terms, “the need to use the  entire forces with the utmost 
energy while to concentrate the  power as much as possible against that section where 
the chief blows are to be delivered and to incur disadvantages elsewhere, so that the  
chances of success may increase at the decisive point” 75. What matters at this point is 
not whether his choice proved to be wrong, but that his argumentation involves not 
only political, but also economic constants. The later ones, more particularly, are 
stressed by Thucydides throughout his whole work, providing the reader with an 
unusual, for an ancient writer, insight into the harsh reality of war: “As the power of 
money grew in the cities of Hellas, tyrannies were established in nearly all of them, 
revenues increased, shipbuilding flourished, and ambition turned towards sea 
power”76. He also has Athenians opt for economic criteria, when they assess the 
preconditions of waging a war, at the expense of the stricto sensu military ones: “so 
little confidence have they (Spartans) in their own resources, that they only attack 
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their neighbours when they have numerous allies, and therefore they are not likely to 
find their way by themselves to an island, when we (Athenians) are masters of the 
sea”77.  
 
          That said, Pericles’ positioning in particular is in fact reminiscent of R. Gilpin’s 
cost – benefit analysis78: the international system around Sparta and Athens was 
considered to be stable by Pericles, so long as nobody disturbed Athenian maritime 
commerce. Besides, no one was inclined to do so if the benefits to be gained were less 
than the expected costs. This system, however, was liable to change as the economic 
costs of stability were to rise faster than they could be maintained (at this point 
Corinthians constitute the destabilising factor) and precisely this very fact triggers the 
system’s transformation. It goes without saying that this notion of cost and benefit 
analysis is not necessarily exhausted solely in economic terms, since decision taking 
itself does not of course deal exclusively with commercial parameters of warfare. 
Allowance must be equally made for purely political or even military79 considerations 
in my analysis of the said transformation, although, following Gilpin’s model, they do 
not per se play the decisive role.  
 
                 The initial hostile actions of the first phase of the Peloponnesian war80 were 
not part of a direct conflict between Sparta and Athens, but episodes between their 
respective allies, first between Thebes and Plateaus81. A small state’s fate is indeed to 
try to preserve its independence by carefully aligning itself within the system. It is 
also evident that as far as the local warfare amongst all the other small powers was 
concerned, the Peloponnesian war served merely as a medium to test the degree of the 
long-time simmering antagonism between them. It did not create new enmities or 
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force any new developments. In this context, it seemed that the more acute the great 
powers’ confrontation became, the more likely it was that the self-confidence of the 
smaller states would swell. Thus, the war was a chance for the weaker actors to try to 
increase or demonstrate their power and not merely to preserve it82.  
 
            Thebes, for geographical reasons, was a natural ally of Sparta, whilst Plateaus 
an ally of Athens83. Acceding, furthermore, to the Peloponnesian League provided 
Thebes with a first class opportunity to hold sway over the area of Boeotia and 
thenceforward to gain access to the Aegean Sea, by encapsulating parts of the 
neighbouring area of Evvoia. By launching an attack against Plateaus, the outlying 
bastion of Athens, Thebes had a unique opportunity to attain, on its own, all these 
goals banking additionally on the aid of the Peloponnesian League. On the other hand, 
Plateaus’ very existence as an autonomous centre in Boeotia was strongly interrelated 
with the Athenian support, something that was corroborated one year after the 
establishment of the Athenian empire, when in 509 B.C. they concluded a peace treaty 
with Athens, in the face of the rising power of Thebes. On the other hand, Plateaus 
was also geographically extremely important for Athens, since it was located half way 
distance between Thebes and Megara, so as to physically obstruct a possible territorial 
formation of an inimical Peloponnesian axis.  
 
             To the aforementioned claim about increasing and not simply preserving 
power attested Thebes’ attack on Plateaus, which came even earlier than the formal 
declaration of war between Sparta and Athens and it was regarded as an attempt on 
the part of Sparta’s allies to advance things further and speed up the evolution of the 
looming threat of war. Another indication was also the systematic intransigence of 
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Megara, which rejected a subsequent peace proposal from Athens and dramatically 
aggravated the situation by killing the Athenian ambassador. I can unhesitatingly 
assume that Megara should have had in this affair the implicit support of Corinth and 
Thebes, which had already manifested their uncompromised willingness to drag 
Sparta into war with Athens.  Notwithstanding the fact that Athens had already 
declared war on Megara, the Spartans continued to pursue a diplomatic path, by 
sending an ambassador to Athens, not because all of a sudden they craved for peace, 
but to regain their footing in the course of the events and to proclaim themselves as 
champions of the cause of the freedom fighter at the sight of their allies84. 
 
           In light of the apparent fragile bonds between the members of the Athenian 
alliance, evident from the commencement of the war, the first move of Athens on the 
chessboard to cope with the smaller states’ activities was to dispatch guards to those 
towns which were suspected to defect as well or to subvert the common cause in other 
ways. Consequently, she had to secure the maritime access to the fruitful coastline of 
the Black Sea, with its abundant grain, which was a sine qua non conditio to sustain a 
long war, let alone a siege. Pericles’ “revolutionary” (in the sense that he judged more 
by instinct and overconfidence in his political abilities) decision at this point to 
entrench all the citizens behind the walls and deliberately put the city under siege was 
questionable, because, apart from the fact that he was putting his country strategically 
in a defensive position undermining thus the famous thus far Athenian animus 
dominandi, he was testing severely his compatriots’ morale. The agricultural sector of 
the Athenian economy was doomed to suffer gravely, since all the fertile pieces of 
land outside the city were hastily abandoned along with their crops and, as a result, 
the farmers were also affected, which demoralised fellow Athenians. Concurrently, 
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however, the Athenian fleet did not only attack Sparta, mostly as a diversion to the 
latter’s initial infantry activities, but also severely damaged the Spartan coastline 
(Laconia, Kithira, Methane) and recruited, by force, new members to the Athenian 
club (the islands of Cephalonia and Aegina)85. This proactive aspect of this “war of 
attrition” (compared to the passive Athenian land strategy of simply defending her 
boundaries against Sparta’s land siege) was diplomatically oriented, namely to project 
her power and attract more allies. A tangible outcome was gaining the support of the 
kingdoms of Thrace and Macedonia, consolidating even further her control on the 
Hellespont and isolating the unfriendly cities of the Chalcidice (close to Macedonia) 
area. 
 
         In view of the foregoing, contrary to the dictations of the ancient heroic war 
spirit, Athens’ primary aim was not a moral glory in the field, but the maintenance of 
her maritime empire at all costs. Her vigorous economy was the touchstone of her 
intention to maintain the status quo and not to alter it in any aspect, let alone falling 
back to another period of “diarchy”, namely cohabitation with Sparta in the driving 
seat of Greece, as it was the case with the short period of Sparta’s and Athens’s 
ascending power, immediately after the end of the Persian Wars and before the 
commencement of the Peloponnesian War. Besides, merchant’s class was practically 
the ruling one in Athens and they were ready to tolerate the burning of some pieces of 
land outside the walls of the city, than the devastation of her commercial 
establishments.  That highly controversial86 political decision seemed to be 
contradicted by the Periclean defensive strategy. It is not inconsequential to stress that 
a constant internal opposition raised to this plan, which was expressed paradoxically 
by a radical wing of the Democratic Party itself under the leadership of Cleon, who 
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favoured a full military engagement with Sparta87. Pericles’ political mixture of 
“realism” and “revolutionism” (in the sense that war was not merely “an evil”, but “a 
necessary” one88) rendered internal politics more unstable than the one in Sparta, a 
fact that caused frequent fluctuations in the crystallization of Athens’ long term 
strategy.   
 
                That said, the Peloponnesians did not have the ability to fully encircle and 
confine Athens within her territory, because they lacked, at that moment, battle 
effective naval forces. So, as a first move, they were only able to blockade Athens by 
land, leaving free her outlet to the sea. It would seem that the war had reached an 
impasse, that the Spartans could not force the Athenians to come out and fight a 
decisive battle. The Spartans were confident they could win such a battle, thus rapidly 
toppling the Athenian alliance, harvesting her accumulated wealth (namely looting the 
city, which was an extremely profitable and common avenue for one state to enforce 
its economy) and alleviate the dissenting and distrustful voices within the 
Peloponnesian league, while imposing their own political agenda. Sparta had never 
favoured the strategy of total annihilation (it should not be confused with the 
annihilation of the forces of the enemy in a single decisive battle) of the opponent 
either because of her deep religious orientation as a city and her conservative 
traditions or due to pragmatic calculations of a “realistic” policy according to which 
every enemy, even the most dangerous, was in fact a friend in disguise in the short or 
distant future. After all, it is to this notion that A. Watson traces precisely the initial 
concept of “the balance of power, which remains an important aspect of the present 
global system” 89. 
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3.4. 
               
Decisive battle: elusive or illusive quest. 
              The elusive or illusive quest of a decisive battle reflects, among others, the 
“X factor” in war, namely the element of unpredictability90, fortune, chance or simply 
luck (“tyhe” according to the Thucydides91). My approach towards these 
unpredictable events follows the way they are presented in Thucydides’ narrative. 
That said, it is well known that Thucydides, contrary to his contemporaries, did not 
invent random or non-factual incidents to fill up some inconvenient lacunae in his 
work and therefore there is no issue in questioning the rational validity of his remarks 
per se. For example, Thucydides does not hesitate, let alone in these ancient times, to 
be critical of the interpretation of oracles and claim that people will try reading the 
events that have occurred into a favorable or preferred interpretation of the message92. 
However, these elements often constitute handy tools for the “rationalists” to restrain 
the supposedly unbridled pragmatism of the “realists” and for the “revolutionists” to 
highlight a certain fecklessness in inter-state affairs which, as the argument goes, are 
destined to generate a “free-war” cosmopolitism. And cosmopolis equals “world 
city”, which in turn equals civitas maxima being therefore the most revolutionary of 
“Revolutionist” theories, whereby “it is implied the total dissolution of international 
relations” 93. In view of this observation, unpredictable events receive the treatment 
they actually deserve, i.e. not as an exaggerated basis for promoting this or that 
theory, but simply as precipitators of a development that was already lurking in the 
background. It is in these two communicating channels (namely the incoming events 
and the unexpected elements that speed up their final turn) that the “realistic” school 
(and Thucydides himself) is precisely interested. In this context, Polybius’ approach 
on the issue becomes also pertinent. He also did not treat the factor of fortune as an 
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overriding explanation or direct cause of war, but actually as a link to pre-existing, 
realistically measurable elements, such as the power of a state and its ingredients: 
“We must therefore conclude that it was not its constitution, but its men, that caused 
the high fortune which it then enjoyed”94. Thus, the derivation and actual theoretical 
relevance of luck can be rather tackled marginally than primordially at the state-level 
of analysis95. In a nutshell I claim simply that “things that turn out contrary to our 
calculations we attribute to chance”96.  
 
             Considering the aforementioned, in the spring of 430 B.C. a deadly plague 
inflicted the Athenian population, which was already confined to the limits of the 
town, something that aggravated further the poor hygienic condition of the people. 
This unpredictable event could not be considered ex post factum as an overestimated 
cause of the Athenian defeat. It was of course responsible for the death of 1/3 of the 
population, amongst which 4,700 soldiers and principally Pericles himself, the 
indispensable role of whom is highlighted by the famous citation of Thucydides that 
“Athens, though still in name a democracy, was in fact ruled by her greatest 
citizen”97. It indeed blew the morale of the surviving citizens, an element highly 
important for the social coherence of polis and its subsequent military efficiency98. 
Despite, however, the material (crippling losses in manpower) as well as the non-
material setbacks (internal social and political unrest), unpredictable events did not 
strategically alter the theatre of war itself.  
 
             In fact as regards the material setback, Athens’ clear supremacy in 
comparison to other states even after this plight was invariably there. The Athenians 
persisted through questionable manoeuvres of their Democratic Party99 in their efforts 
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to project their power to crucial hot spots, such as the towns of Epidaurus, Trezena 
and Hermione in Argos, very near to Sparta, or Potidaea in Chalcidice area the 
abundant resources of which were highly important for the continuation of the war. 
The Spartans, also, kept seeking to diminish the Athenian control if not in the Aegean, 
at least in the Ionian Sea and to this end instigate uprisings in the pro-Athenian 
states100. Like Athens, Sparta, while keeping her eyes set on Western Greece, where a 
significant and powerful number of Athenian allies were located (Acarnania, 
Zacynthus, Cephalonia), it was trying to progressively seal off any secondary open 
fronts so as to focus on the primary one, the Aegean Sea, the control of which was 
always seen as strategically critical for a coherent outcome of the war, namely an 
outcome “which emanates from a clear victory not from a simple prevailing over the 
opponent” 101. 
  
             Concerning the non material setback and contrary to what an impetuous 
reader may surmise, the social polyphony and consecutive “fluidity” (being sharply 
opposed to the “rigid” social rules of the Spartan regime) stemming from the 
character itself of the Athenian democracy (which, supposedly, could have erupted 
easier into a social degeneration and eventually into a collapse of the city from 
within), proved to be influential rather for the short term war developments, than for 
the long term ones. Thucydides’ remark that Athenians “continued to resist, and were 
at last overthrown, not by their enemies, but by themselves and their own internal 
dissensions” 102 is one his very few remarks laden with emotional interpretation of 
events. It is rather too simplistic to explain the collapse of a state solely by this fact, 
and these specific remarks on behalf of Thucydides can be better seen in light of his 
Athenian descent. In addition to this, only a factually and theoretically superficial 
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analysis would go as far as to ascribe to the Peloponnesian war the characteristics of a 
purely “ideological war”, a war between democrats and oligarchs, let alone to put 
explanatory weight solely upon the general diverging forces which are of course 
existent, in latent or not form, in every society and irrespective of the latter’s specific 
political organization.  
 
             It becomes therefore necessary to detach the ordinary social developments at 
the state level from the role that the specific political regime plays at the concrete 
level of individual’s decision making process. In this vein, I observe that a democratic 
regime presents visible deficiencies in comparison to an oligarchic one, in the need of 
a continuation of an unpopular policy or of taking up swift action: On one hand, 
Sparta, throughout the war, was endowed with a stable leadership, without resounding 
opposing voices, and as a result its people subscribed to the cause against Athens 
without qualms. On the other hand Athens oscillated between the admonitions of the 
democrats, the oligarchs, the aristocrats and then again the designs of this or that 
fraction within the Democratic Party itself. As a result these excessive ideological 
fluctuations may not had immediate impact upon the war developments after, 
particularly, Pericles’ death, but they did become stronger by the lapse of the time, 
sapping the individual decision making process. It is to be recalled that democracy in 
Athens was an open democracy (not a representative one as today), where any citizen 
could theoretically affect decision making by simply raising his voice and furthermore 
undermine any proposals made in public, by mobilizing a number of like-minded 
persons. But that did not mean that Athenian policy on specific issues of great interest 
was invariably an outgrowth of the population’s will in its totality, but of narrower 
powerful fractions within the parties, which could manipulate the people, act in the 
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background and steer the coveted course of strategy. As Alcibiades insinuates before 
the Spartan Assembly: “For though such of us as have judgment do know well enough 
what the democracy is, and I no less than another...Yet we thought it not safe to 
change it when you our enemies were so near us”103.This consecutive accent on the 
notion of “unitary decision making”104 in the domestic field does not entail 
necessarily a “revolutionist” purely manichaistic rhetoric nor a “revolutionist” mainly 
cooperative one105. On the contrary, it denotes the “realistic” assumption that “in the 
history of international relations, results achieved seldom correspond to the intentions 
of actors…Causes not found in their independent individual characters and motives 
do operate among the actors collectively”106. 
 
              After the previous clarification, it comes not as a surprise that in their conflict 
Athens acted like an expansionist power from the beginning, while Sparta, though 
conservative and revisionist, did not yet espouse that role. That very fact provided 
Sparta with one important comparative advantage: effective propaganda. The 
Peloponnesian league was not only able to propound her willingness to liberate the 
Greek states from Athens (propaganda), but it could deftly undermine one of the 
increasingly shaking columns of the Athenian empire: the solidarity between the 
members of the Athenian alliance (effective). A quite indicative example of this 
policy was the case of Mytilene island in the northern Aegean in 428 B.C., where the 
strings of power were pulled by the oligarchs. The governors of the island tried to 
follow a more autonomous policy, but in the context of the Athenian alliance that was 
tantamount to defection. Sparta did not miss the chance to uphold the desiderata of 
Mytilene, which soon ended up acceding to the Peloponnesian League. In view of the 
foregoing it was not surprising that Athens reacted, but it was astonishing the extent 
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of her reaction (considering the limited proportions of that incident): she mobilised a 
huge fleet of 250 battle ships just in order to manifest her readiness and demonstrate 
the grandeur of her power.  
 
               The aforementioned Athenian power projection merits my attention because 
it can be seen both ways: either as an instinctive initiative to nip in the bud the 
problematic situation or as a targeted action, part of a prior laborious cost and benefit 
analysis of the respective situation. Mytilene was the decisive point in the sense that it 
was located not in the armed force of the enemy, but in his economic and 
administrative centres 107 in the area of Asia Minor and thus a resistance from such an 
ally could trigger further turmoil in the nearby areas of Aegean Sea, compromising 
the maritime commercial activities of Athens. In the words of Athenian General 
Cleon: “Reflect: if you impose the same penalty upon those of your allies who 
wilfully rebel and upon those who are constrained by the enemy, which of them will 
not revolt upon any pretext however trivial, seeing that, if he succeed, he will be free, 
and, if he fail, no irreparable evil will follow?” 108. So, there was an imperative need 
for sending not just any army to the spot, but an overwhelming force to impress 
everyone, which would henceforth command obedience by its mere presence and size. 
Eventually, Athens managed to defeat Mytilene following a long term siege (up to 
June 427 B.C.), despite the simultaneous diverting efforts of Sparta and the occasional 
uprisings in friendly towns.  
 
               At that point of post conflict settlement Athens was confronted with a 
dilemma: either to follow a policy of appeasement by giving a second chance to the 
citizens of Mytilene and their leaders, demonstrating in this way the generosity of the 
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empire, but risking the recurrence of same episodes in the future, or to espouse a more 
cynical approach by exterminating those responsible for the situation, giving at the 
same time to her allies and the other states a sound example of her power and 
determination in the field, risking, though, a counter-reaction against her interests. 
Cleon indeed had proposed the mass genocide of the population in Mytilene without 
any exemptions at all (after all the rulers were oligarchs), something that was finally 
avoided; nevertheless, around 1,000 people were slaughtered, while harsh terms were 
imposed on the living: appropriations of lands, financial penalties and forced 
settlement of 2,700 Athenians to the island to alter the demography. Evidently, 
although Athens’s domination in the Aegean remained for the time being more or less 
untouched, her moral degeneration was already in progress, sapping (a) the efficiency 
of the recruits and (b) the decision making process within the ruling party of the city. 
The first is plausible, while the second can be traced in public political speech and 
Cleon’s missionary rhetoric, which failed to focus on the obvious (that Athens would 
lose credibility in the eyes of her allies) and blinded by arrogance proceeded with 
authoritative interpretations109 and uncalculated threats (“chastise the enemy and 
prove by an example”)110, challenging thus severely Plato’s always pertinent 
admonition: “so long as the Polis grows without losing its unity, let it grow but no 
further”111.  
 
       Similar to the case of Mytilene was the one of Corcyra in 428 B.C., where a 
vicious battle erupted between the oligarchs and the democrats within the city, giving 
Spartans and Athenians the opportunity to send battle ships and eventually provoke a 
mass internal slaughter in the town112. The importance of the island for Athens was 
extremely high given the fact that, just like Mytilene in the East, Corcyra in the West 
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could serve as a critical launching pad for the encirclement and final crush of Sparta. 
Only when Athens dispatched 60 battle ships was the situation sorted out and the 
democrats rushed to hunt down not just the oligarchs, but everyone who showed 
resistance or had even open issues with them113. That was another token of the 
constant rising ferocity of the war and the atrocities accompanying its progress.   
 
3.5.
 
Change in grand strategy: from attrition to a limited aims strategy. 
                The aforementioned armed intervention in Corcyra was not for Athens a 
simple issue of reasserting her power, but also a crucial element in her grand strategy 
towards Magna Grecia, the remote western birthplace of Hellenism in southern Italy.  
The areas of Southern Italy and Sicily had been already colonized by Greek 
populations by the 8th century B.C. in the context of the great immigration current, 
which was called “Second Greek Colonization”. The presence of these Greek 
populations in the western lands created a sort of a net, which, however, was being 
steadily devitalized by numerous internal rivalries of the cities. The said contentions 
impinged on the racial enmity between the Doric and Ionian descent of each 
population as well as on the internal conflicting politics between the tyrannical and 
democratic regimes. The Greek cities were indeed divided into two opposing camps 
on the grounds of their ethnic origin: the Ionians (Naxos, Leontinoi, Catani, Region, 
etc.) and the Dorians (Syracuse, Acreages, Gel, Lokroi Epizefirioi, etc.). That said, 
Hellenism’s position in the West was rather precarious and local hostilities towards 
the presence of a foreign ethnic group was unpropitious for any Greek aspirations. In 
addition to this, the existing Greek colonies were located on the coastline of South 
Italy, while the hinterland was populated by aggressive non Greeks (in the north, 
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since 510 B.C., it was located in the newly born city of Rome, while Etruscans and 
Carthagians controlled significant parts in the west and north of Sicily). It is quite 
clear that geography did not facilitate Athens’s plans in this region and the 
aggressiveness of the local ethnicities was not merely sporadic, but constant and 
increasing (for instance already in 421 B.C., when the first phase of the Peloponnesian 
war was coming to a close, the city of Kyme, the advanced post of Greeks to the 
western coasts of Italy, was seized by Campanians, a local nation which despised the 
Greek presence in the area).  
 
                 In 427 B.C. the stepping stone for an intervention was already there: 
Leontinoi asked for Athens’s assistance to cope with the constantly expanding 
Syracusians on the basis of an already existing defensive alliance between them. 
Athens proceeded with the necessary steps too promptly, without serious prior 
internal deliberations and despite the outbreak of the deadly plague in their city. With 
the tools of “realism” it can be fairly said that Athens was eagerly looking for a 
pretext114 to heal her bleeding great power-image and ostentatiously reconfirm her 
omnipresence, following a policy of deterrence through propaganda, namely 
brandishing against the other Greek states her capability of coping with any situation, 
even if that entailed an overseas entanglement, and thus hampering them from taking 
any action against her interests at its neighborhood.  
 
          Athenian policy did not pass unnoticed. That was the case when Hermocrates, 
representative of Syracuse, propounded during the peace conference of Gela in 425 
B.C. (when the first, short, expedition of Athens to Sicily ended without any 
significant change of the locus standing and the opposing cities of Sicily agreed on a 
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general truce), that Athenians “are fond of coming to Sicily whether they are invited 
or not” and if the Syracusians would “go to war and call for their (Athenians’) 
assistance they would invite their own destruction, and at the same time pave the way 
for the advance of their [Athenians’] empire”115. In addition to Hermocrates’ 
“realistic” remarks, one must also bear in mind that Athens’s reputation was suffering 
considerably at that time to such an extent that even in the geographically remote 
island of Sicily116, her international behaviour was perceived as hegemonic, and a 
harbinger of further invasions117. Besides, Athens seemed to gradually lack the gift of 
communicating its positions in sharp contrast with the past. This observation becomes 
more pertinent if I add that even in the Greek mainland, Athens’ allies seemed 
growingly reluctant to bear any more the burden of her designs and they were trying 
to cater solely for their own limited interests on certain territorial gains; such, for 
example, was the case with Aetolia’s resistance in 426 B.C., which Athens could not 
stifle, because the latter’s allies, Fokeis, Akarnanes and Ozoles Lokroi did not even 
show the necessary enthusiasm to contribute. 
 
      The pace of the war was about to change dramatically due to another 
unpredictable event. The earthquakes in 426 B.C. had awaken the primordial fear 
amongst Spartans, that their slaves (“eilotes”), who constituted their costless 
productive basis, would grab the chance to revolt. Therefore, being a revisionist 
power, who challenged the status quo, Sparta was obliged to react rapidly against 
such a potentially dangerous event and shirk any unpleasant ramifications. These 
ramifications could easily turn to harsh reality, given Sparta’s thinly populated city, 
land-oriented military training and restricted agricultural economy. But they were also 
simmering in the background since the target of a decisive battle against Athens was 
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still distant and there was an evanescent hope in Attica that time would eventually run 
in favour of its people, who were still financially capable of sustaining a prolonged 
warfare following Pericles’ relative suggestions.  
 
                 In view of the foregoing, Spartans brought back from the exile and to the 
fore the moderate King Pleistohanaks (although he was regarded by his co-citizens as 
pro-Athenian) and espoused this time a more peace-loving approach. This Spartan 
diplomatic initiative was not simply an immediate outgrowth of the earthquakes, but 
rather a carefully planned action, indicative of Sparta’s evolving foreign policy and 
serving dexterously two main aims irrespective of any future Athenian response: 
either to drag Athens into a negotiation process, highlight the latter’s descending 
influence, without any Spartan losses in manpower and at the same time to galvanize 
the Lacaedemonian alliance, or, on the contrary, to push Athens to the limits and 
consecutively to lure her into acting hastily and without prudence, so as to facilitate 
the desired decisive blow. What actually happened was indeed the latter, since on the 
other side the tide had already been turned: Cleon dominated the domestic affairs118 of 
Athens and promptly rejected the proposals. Sparta’s cunning approach to test 
Athens’ intentions at this very moment and de minimis calculate safely whether a 
possible post-war settlement would be favourable to her, reflected a level of political 
maturity which at this moment was absent in the Athenian camp, being distracted by 
party political histrionics.  
 
             What followed corroborates my previous observation that unpredictability of 
the events becomes relevant for my study only in terms of a strategic approach and 
not in terms of a superficial effort to justify aphoristically the specific turn of the 
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situation. Thus, what really upset Sparta’s strategic choice of taking up first the 
aforementioned initiative, was not the plague or Pericles’ death, but the surprising loss 
in 425 B.C. of the strategically important Spartan fortress of the isle of Sphacteria, at 
the gate of the bay of Navarino119. What was crucial for a great power like Athens 
was to assess the situation and then turn it over rapidly, because time was valuable 
and in terms of appearances it was already running in favour of Sparta. The 
immediate transformation of a strategy of attrition and of a passive form of war to a 
limited aims and more active strategy can be efficiently dealt with only by a great 
power, which precisely possesses the necessary appurtenances to this end. Despite her 
numerous internal difficulties, Athens proved that she did retain the basic ingredients 
of a great power in the essential field of decision making process, being crystallised 
into a fast military response. Although, it can be also fairly claimed that numerous 
tiny details of purely unpredictable nature defined the course of this operation120, the 
momentum of the Athenian will to counter-attack cannot be questioned. If anything 
could be tagged unpredictable was the Athenian strategic resurrection itself, which 
could be better seen by G. Allison’s models on decision making and specifically those 
of rational actor and governmental politics121. Indeed, power was not concentrated to 
one person in Athens, but there was more than one rational key player (following the 
argumentation of G. Allison) within the Athenian ruling class and every single action 
depended on the particular capabilities of each every bargaining person; therefore a 
sudden change of foreign policy’s course was to be expected in Athens. The said 
models, according to Allison, acquire particular importance when little or no 
information about the enemy is available in crisis situations, something that was 
precisely the case for Athens towards Sparta.  
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            Athenian maritime preponderance and her numerous fleets already present in 
the surrounding area eventually played the most significant role to take over the small 
isle, but Sparta’s defeat per se was not the case. After all, it couldn’t be regarded as 
humiliating and disastrous a fight between 420 Spartan prominent soldiers and 1,000 
Athenians along with 80 battle ships. It was the fact that for the first time during the 
war, Sparta’s vital dependency on her legendary soldiers became so profound122, the 
number of which was inherently restricted due to the stratification of the Spartan 
society itself123. In modern simplified terms, here it would apply the “Lanchester’s 
Linear Law”, which exactly emphasizes mathematically the plausible rule that the 
number of men who remain after the end of a battle represents simply the difference 
between the larger army and the smaller army, taking for granted identical 
weaponry124. In addition to this, the events of Sphakteria’s occupation by Athens, 
demonstrated that if an aspiring (regional) hegemon seeks to prescribe his own 
operational rules of the system (like Sparta), then sooner or later he will be forced to 
put them into test, before the intrinsic reactions of the system take place. Otherwise, 
the aspiring hegemon will be discredited in the eyes of the others and a coalition 
against him will become evident, curtailing prematurely his designs. In short, as in 
physics the constants that define intensity are power, time and area, likewise in 
Sphakteria incident it was depicted that what defines a state as a great power is 
ultimately the intensity by which it sets and attains an objective, at a specific time and 
place.  
 
                In light of the said developments, Spartans opted “realistically” to hastily 
seek for a truce so as to gain time and save their precious captured soldiers. At this 
point emerged a very common aspect of the infamous “arrogance of the power”125; a 
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“Kantian” political choice, which does not envisage a long term, well balanced 
solution, but rather prefers to tag things in terms of white or black, good or bad, all or 
nothing. According to Plutarch, Pericles and the Athenians incited the war, 
scrambling to implement their belligerent tactics "with a sort of arrogance and a love 
of strife"126. Thus, Athens was not pleased with the advantageous peace proposals 
coming from Sparta (i.e. reoccupation of lost territories, financial indemnities, etc. in 
exchange for the Spartan soldiers/hostages), but rejected them, espousing a more 
maximalist and assertive foreign policy following the instructions of Cleon, the 
architect of the Athenian success in Sphakteria. Keeping Spartan soldiers as prisoners 
was not something to be belittled after all: it is quite characteristic that when the 
hostages were transferred within the walls of Athens, the majority of the population 
was filled with such fervour, because for the first time in their life did they have the 
opportunity to even see from close distance a Spartan hoplite127. Athens disregarded 
the fact that every single aspect of the behaviour of a status quo hegemon (like her) 
can actually affect the system even without immediate ramifications. As I have 
already stressed, it was anticipated that Athens would have made every effort to retain 
its supremacy in the system, but by pushing Sparta clumsily (namely by no decisive 
battle, but by lower intensity incidents) on the issue of Sphakteria, it was in fact 
precipitating Sparta’s inevitable reaction. It disregarded also the factual data: (a) 
internal stability in Sparta, (b) unfavourable international environment, (c) interaction 
between them two. Athens failed to appraise correctly these three crucial elements 
and proceeded with her effusively expansive policy. Thus, the victory in Sphakteria 
proved to be a “damn near thing”128 and was soon offset by Sparta’s subsequent 
counter-attack to Delium. 
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            From September 425 B.C. onwards, Athens returned to attrition warfare, 
occasionally combined with a low scale aggressive initiatives, namely by raiding the 
coastline of Sparta and some close isles, but never the mainland, considering that the 
Athenian generals were aware of their own deficiencies compared to the mighty 
Spartan infantry129. What was becoming a pressing need, however, was the return of 
the Athenian farmers from the city walls back to their farms, an issue that constituted 
a slow burning bomb in the very structures of the metropolis. This is also why the 
neighbouring region of Boeotia was always regarded by the rest of the cities as the 
soft underbelly, but also the “cordon sanitaire” of Athens. Concurrently, internal 
political ideology remained a significant factor in the decision making process, 
affecting the national interests, but more interestingly promoting the personal ones. 
Indicative are the cases of Athens’ attempt to invade to the Peloponnesian city of 
Megarida and Boeotia in 424 B.C., when Athens strove unsuccessfully to come into 
prior agreement with the democrat fractions within these cities. The overall picture 
demonstrates that a mere ideological affiliation was not anymore (if ever) regarded as 
a carte blanche to enter a certain league of interests, let alone to create a major 
alliance. Therefore Athens was actually forced to act on the ground on the basis of 
self-defined interests, to the detriment of her democracy’s sympathisers abroad. 
 
            Athens defeat in Delium (an area very close to her walls) in September 424 
B.C. earmarked her gradual debilitation and constituted evidence of the fact that 
Peloponnesian League’s supremacy in land operations proved to be in the long run 
more critical for the outcome of the war than maritime ones. Sphakteria’s case did not 
cause irreparable damage to Sparta, who methodically continued the military and 
diplomatic operations of undermining the Athenian presence all over Greece, placing 
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particular emphasis on the north: The area of Macedonia, apart from the important 
influence of its king, was also important to Athens for two reasons: (a) the gold mines 
of Mount Paggaion were located in eastern Macedonia and (b) the whole area had 
abundant timber supplies, a basic material for building ships and creating a strong 
navy130. 
 
           In the context of the foregoing, Sparta confronted Athens in the first battle of 
Amphipolis (close to the present town of Thessalonica) in 422 B.C., where she was 
victorious, but once again Spartans did not attain the expected results despite their 
mastery in military operations131, since they compromised with a truce and not with 
the decisive surrender of the enemy132. However, the unsuccessful campaigns of 
Athens both in Delium and Amphipolis lost her nearly a quarter of her men, a 
considerably high number in comparison to the Spartan casualties in Sphakteria. The 
Peloponnesian hesitation to act seemed to be an intrinsic part of Spartan modus 
operandi, heavily responsible for the Lacedaemonian inability to put a prompt end to 
the war and to deprive the opponent of the chance to rally again in the future. In this 
case, however, the one year truce, agreed in March 423 B.C. (“Truce of Laches”, after 
the name of the General who along with Nicias urged the Athenians to sign an 
armistice with Sparta), was in reality a one way road for the Lacaedemonians to 
secure the post war advantages without blood shedding, which was of paramount 
importance to them due to their dearth of soldiers. At the same time, the respective 
Athenian considerations about procrastinating even further a final battle with Sparta 
till the desired final exhaustion of the latter clearly could not bear fruit, since what 
mattered now was the war impetus which was growing stronger contrary to the 
expectations of Athenian General Laches. Sparta receded without a clear victory, but 
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a Machiavellian would have claimed that interest is the absolute touchstone of an 
aspiring hegemon’s behaviour and it cannot be compromised for temporary gains or 
lulls. Thus, Sparta did not in fact recede, but she recognized that her interest lied 
behind.  
 
              The Spartans soon started to subvert the truce, utilizing diplomacy and but 
not military means, supporting, just two days after the agreement, the defection from 
the Athenian league of certain northern towns (Scion, Mendi) in Chalcidice. As a 
result, in the said region, came in 422 B.C. the second great battle of Amphipolis, 
where Athens met with a significant defeat, notwithstanding the fact that Vrasidas, a 
great Spartan General, was one of the seven (only) dead Lacaedemonians. Sparta, 
once again, did not fully exploit her victory, clinging to diplomatic solely aid and 
failing to provide other northern cities with military assistance (Iona, Scion).  
 
               The new “peace of Nicias” was agreed in 421 B.C. by the belligerent parties. 
It was called after the moderate Athenian General, political rival of Cleon and aristocrat with 
a fortune from silver mines around Attica’s Mount Laurium, who was dominating for the time 
being the internal affairs in the city and notwithstanding his particular personal financial 
stakes at this specific area in the suburbs of Athens, he insisted in his inclination not to 
transfer the theater of war to Sicily. This truce was serving only the short term interests 
of the opponents, who immediately started to undermine the agreements. Considering 
the stipulations of the pact, nothing really had changed; the Spartan allies remained 
dissatisfied (it has to be stressed that Boeotians, Corinth, Elis and Megara, all allies of 
Sparta did not formally agree to sign the peace) because they did not get in return any 
significant territories or economic privileges while Athenian allies were not pleased 
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with the unaltered status quo, seeking to expand their maritime commercial activities. 
It would appear that Sparta and Athens agreed to a temporary halt of their operations 
because of domestic problems. On one hand, Sparta faced internal social unrest from 
the helots and threatening neighbors were still lurking (such as Argos and Messene in 
the Peloponnesian peninsula itself). On the other, in Athens the farmers wanted to get 
back to their lands and the city’s manpower was severely reduced by the war and 
plague, while profits from trade have been plunged. In addition, the said 
developments were further intensified by Alcibiades’ appearance, since he was a 
young democrat, skillful, dash and cunning, but he was also a highly controversial 
politician who preached for a far too aggressive foreign policy.  
          
          In biology the Red Queen hypothesis is that predators and prey (or more often 
parasites and hosts) are in a constant competition that eventually leads to stasis, as 
each adaptation by one is countered by an adaptation by the other. History teaches 
that signing a peace treaty often resembles a stasis, which ex definitio is temporary 
and constitutes surely not the end of a war but occasionally the beginning of another; 
simultaneously it could be the fruitful soil out of which strong individual personalities 
can spring and mark with their own character the ensuing developments. The peace of 
Nicias was indeed that launching pad for Alcibiades’ rise in power133. Considering 
that I have stressed before the importance of a single politician’s [Pericles’] behavior 
in the decisive shaping of a city’s foreign policy, I am tempted to recall that 
significant part of historiography tends to interpret the final course of the 
Peloponnesian war almost exclusively from Alcibiades’ actions134, while others 
highlight his dominating influence on Athens internal politics135. In both cases, it is 
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widely accepted that Alcibiades did affect his city’s policy up to a certain point, 
important for the final outcome of the war. 
  
             In view of the foregoing, I claim that Alcibiades played indeed a significant 
role in the whole evolution of the events, but this should be seen rather as a normal 
political development, being part of a bigger picture. In my case that is the approach 
at the state level and not merely at the one of domestic politics, where, it is self-
evident, numerous influential personalities with dissenting views can actually play 
their own distinctive role. However, by all means it would be inaccurate to analyze 
war developments solely by every involved person’s contribution. Besides, nowhere 
in Thucydides (or in any other ancient writer) does an individual’s action represent 
the ultima ratio for the final turn of the events. The dynamics of the events are 
primordially interrelated with the systemic operation of the international society, 
which is ruled by certain axioms, directly emanating from its very nature as a living 
organism with intrinsic traits, such as the absence of a supervising authority and the 
incessant struggle for survival and power in various forms. An individual can simply 
make some of the system’s rules seem more evident and streamline its underlying 
process. Like unpredictable events an individual can serve as an accelerator of or 
brake on the developments.  
 
                  That said, Alcibiades was the protagonist in untoward circumstances 
within both camps (he found refuge in both great powers Athens and Sparta as well and at 
the end he died hunted by both of them 136), when he promoted the expedition of Athens 
to Sicily contrary to Pericles’ more conservative suggestions or Sparta’s effort to 
develop a powerful stronghold in Dekeleia, a place located in the underbelly of 
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Athens. However, he proved to be nothing more than an opportunistic politician who 
acted beyond any commitments or principles not only in the frame of any ideology 
within the camps of his country, but surprisingly of either state. One could claim that 
he expressed in that way the ongoing amorality and fatigue of the citizens in both 
cities and represented the systemic necessity to give an end to the abnormality of a 
prolonged war the soonest the possible. But he was not the sole example of that 
fatigue. 
 
              During the period of Nicias’ peace another aspect of the said fatigue came 
out, namely the ill fated birth of a counter-alliance of certain displeased allies from 
both camps, who attempted to form their own united front against their formers 
leaders. Corinth, Argos, Mantinea and other cities of Chalcidice region came together 
in a novel understanding, without ostentatious declarations, which, in essence, 
targeted the great powers only137, and thenceforwards it was supposedly promoted as 
a third path in the politics of that era138. This promising diplomatic initiative aspired 
to bring forward what was the essential missing component of the Spartan strategy in 
the latter’s search for a decisive battle: rapid action. Bismarck, once said that “no 
government, if it regards war as inevitable even if it does not want it, would be so 
foolish as to leave to the enemy the choice of time and occasion and to wait for the 
moment which is most convenient for the enemy”139. And rapid action was becoming 
an imperative so as to solve that counter-alliance’s pressing security dilemma. 
Therefore, since there was a vacuum of power, even the less powerful components of 
the system were eager to fill it than to leave it intact, considering that the existence of 
that vacuum reflected itself a change in the balance of power and constituted the 
harbinger of the system’s incoming reformation. In addition, it was again evident that 
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there was no morality in war, but moral interpretation of war and thus there was no 
strong ideological affiliation to fixed principles which could prohibit the shift to this 
or that alliance. However, that counter-balancing effort lacked the political compass 
(a “cosmo-icon” as I shall call it in a later chapter), which usually earmarks a great 
power and differentiates it form the smaller ones. That third path approach therefore, 
lacking also the sufficient military means to project its power efficiently, soon 
succumbed to the coercive behavior of Sparta and Athens.         
         
             In view of the foregoing, diplomacy after the truce of Nicias was merely a 
prelude to a general warfare carefully contrived by the great powers. Diplomacy 
postulates negotiation and negotiation postulates a will to compromise. Athens, as 
well as Sparta, though the latter to less extent, had both no intention of diluting their 
interests and therefore there was practically no room for diplomacy, but for 
procrastination, which aimed at gaining in peacetime the greatest benefits at no cost 
and concurrently at being prepared to wage a war at a next, more convenient, stage.  
 
              A characteristic example of this strategy (in the sense that a state uses the battles 
to win a war in contrast to “tactics” which is the way to use armed forces to win a battle140) 
was Athens’ novel counter - alliance with Sparta’s neighbors, Argos, Ilida and 
Mantinea in 420 B.C., which came into fruition notwithstanding the substantial, if not 
sincere, prior efforts of Sparta to reach a diplomatic solution with Athens141. Athens, 
incited by Alcibiades, seemed to be particularly intransigent and her relative proposals 
(occupation of Amphipolis in the north, dissolution of the Sparta-Boeotia alliance and 
creation of new Athenian strongholds against Boeotia) obviously sought to undermine 
further Sparta’s ties with her allies and artfully introduce stronger frictions in her 
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relations with them. Ancient diplomacy can be, indeed, seen more as a spasmodic 
verbal encounter in the intervals of limited conflicts than a methodical effort to 
explore with the opposite party a common ground for further understanding of the 
existing differences142. It was guided by “realistic” principles based on fixed 
preconceptions about the “Other” (rival) and the limits of his power, which had 
already been crystallized in the domestic level of decision making and therefore it was 
rather inclined to be a gun-boat diplomacy, namely the art to allow the other do what 
you want, than a consensus making one, that is the art to negotiate with him over a 
mutually accepted solution. In addition, two factors seem to justify the said 
observation: (a) diplomacy at this point lacked adaptability, which should be a 
fundamental aspect of its structure as well as a sine qua non element of a successful 
foreign policy. So it was no surprise that various battles during that period did not 
cease to repeat themselves within short periods of time and (b) diplomacy was not 
conducted within a policy framework built for this purpose by states to facilitate their 
communication, as for instance in Byzantium, but instead, it was rather an outgrowth 
of momentous individual inspiration, without carefully orchestrated aims and plans at 
a wider decision making level. 
 
         Athens’ direct intervention in Peloponnesian affairs was not unexpected in 
Sparta, but it unexpectedly precipitated the resumption of mass hostilities; the great 
battle of Mantinea143 in 418 B.C. between victorious Sparta and its allies and defeated 
Athens and Argos, was, in essence, the inauguration of Sparta’s dynamic counter-
offensive in the Greek world and the reaffirmation that there was never a significant 
opponent to Athens other than her. Athens, on the other side, started to realize that her 
provocative and expansionist strategy was being transformed into a self-trap. So they 
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put Alcibiades on the sidelines and voted for more moderate generals (Nicias, Lahes, 
and Nicostratos) in order to avoid their imminent and alarming involvement in the tug 
of war in Mantinea (Central Peloponnesus). This is another tangible indication that 
Athenians were always aware of Sparta’s capabilities and even if they had 
underestimated Spartan power in some cases in the past, there were always many 
Athenians who were making serious warnings against any prolongation of warfare 
with a superior military power like the Lacaedemonian. However Athens’ risky 
strategic move to openly encourage Argos and the others against Sparta at a moment 
when negotiations were in progress to bring permanent peace was bound to fail.  
 
             One can notice here that Athens’ purblind policy towards Sparta of provoking 
without engaging abuts on the intoxicating hallucination that the hegemon will retain 
its footing, irrespective of the system’s conspicuous oscillations, just because time 
supposedly runs always in favour of the strong and at the expense of the weaker. This 
is partly true and as I have earlier implied, the status quo power can indeed maintain 
its position, as long as it does not lose, but that does not necessarily denote that it 
cannot lose, especially if the peer competitor is really eager to launch a decisive 
attack at all costs. That was the case of Sparta from the battle of Mantinea onwards, 
where she crushed her enemies (Sparta lost around 200 men, whilst her enemies more 
than 2.000 men) and started promptly to take more precursory measures (strategic 
unification of all Peloponnesus, by subjugating minor opposing states, neutralizing 
Argos, etc.) for the final battle against Athens. And with a single, almost decisive, 
battle, as the one in Mantinea, Sparta had managed effectively to dissolve Athens’ 
presence on the Peloponnesian map, namely the ad hoc alliances that had been 
successfully created by Alcibiades’ policy (alliances, seen from the scratch as 
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ephemeral, since they were destined to serve Athenian limited interests in sound 
disregard of Sparta’s geostrategic aspirations) during 418 -420 B.C. Sparta, pivoting 
on a traditionally potent and coherent political ideology, espoused a more aggressive 
policy by imposing without subterfuges, urbi et orbi, her oligarch stooges in the 
defeated cities (as it happened in Sicyon of Corinth) or by patronizing any ideological 
battle between oligarchs and democrats within them (as it happened in Argos).  
 
        Every important battle does not affect only the parties involved but the system 
itself and thus all of its components. The battle of Mantinea aroused Macedonia as 
well, which banked on Sparta’s ascendancy and judging “realistically”, transformed 
herself from an active ally of Athens into a reluctant one, following the diplomatic 
path of a constructive distance, namely to follow Athens discreetly, without openly 
irritating Sparta. I can assume, that certain diplomatic links between Macedonia and 
Sparta did exist, because Macedonia’s primary goal was to keep an even balance in 
her regional sub-system and at the same time take advantage of her rudimentary 
relationship with Sparta, who still occupied Amphipolis, a key-town for the control of 
Eastern Macedonia.  
 
            Athens, concurrently, decided to enhance her status in the Aegean Sea, by 
targeting cities which were not following her orders. One of these was the island of 
Melos, which was pro-Laconic in essence, however typically neutral. Although Melos 
had already contributed financially to Sparta’s military budget for two years (428 and 
427 B.C.), she could not be regarded as a serious threat for Athens’ maritime interests 
and of course she was not actually a sturdy “billiard ball” (following the classic 
reference of the “realistic” school to the international system as a game of billiard, 
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with big and small balls144) supposedly capable of  upsetting  the balance of the 
system. In view of this, the infamous total destruction in 416/415 B.C. of Melos 
(devastation of the country, execution of the population and the hostages 
altogether145) was an evident attempt of Athens to trumpet the power of her empire 
and to spread fear amongst her opponents as well as her wavering allies, although it 
was proved to have precisely the opposite effect: that she was actually desperate 
enough to proceed with an unnecessary act of raw violence against a neutral, small 
city and that she had already plummeted into a degenerated “revolutionist” struggle of 
self-aggrandizement. This reflects the Kantian perspective on the international 
relations theory, which leads abruptly to an upset of the status quo and the 
establishment of a superficially egalitarian cosmopolitanism, behind the mantle of 
which a leading ruthless preaching power is hidden. And this is precisely what De 
Sanctis implies when he stresses the long term disastrous ramifications of the 
Athenian behavior146. Indeed, it is not quite innovative to indicate that every single act 
in the theatre of war can be per se decisive for the final outcome of the war or to give 
a posteriori a moral mantle in such events so as to justify pre-ordained conclusions; 
however, what shall claim one’s attention here is that a great power is qualified to be 
one, when it continuously analyses a war’s particular parameters in a coherent and 
holistic manner, devoid of any sentimental outbreaks and midnight calculations. In 
other words, Melos’ example, apart from what has already been written by historians 
with a particular emphasis on the issue of war’s amorality, clearly shows that if 
Athens desired to remain strong as much as possible, she had, inter alia, to grant value 
to the virtue of inaction at certain times. It is worth recalling here Sun Tzu’s 
everlasting suggestion: “There are roads which must not be followed, armies 
which must be not attacked, towns which must be besieged, positions which must not 
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be contested, commands of the sovereign which must not be obeyed”147. Projecting 
her strength upon an enemy of conspicuously limited capabilities was another 
attestation to the obfuscation of the powerful when power starts to be seriously 
questioned. The lurking causality148 in an empire’s behavior dictates its continuous 
enforcement. This is why Athens ventured for another expedition in Sicily, digging, in 
fact, its own grave. 
 
3.6. 
 
Exit strategy in preventive war: Over-expansion or “forced expansion”. 
                The areas of Southern Italy and Sicily had already been colonized by Greek 
populations by the 8th century B.C. in the context of a great immigration wave, which 
was called Second Greek Colonization. Three factors can be established as the 
primary driving forces of Athens’ quest to Sicily and not to any other geographic 
region, which explain Athenian strategy as a “forced” expansion not “over-
expansion” as it is usually maintained in historiography.  
 
              First was the geographic one: the mere presence of these Greek populations 
in the western lands appeared to offer a welcoming entrance for future inroads from 
neighboring Greece; however, numerous existing internal rivalries between the Greek 
settler cities created a difficult political climate for the new arrivals to manage. The 
local contentions arose from the racial enmity between the rival populations of Doric 
and Ionian descent as well as the internal conflicting politics between the tyrannical 
and democratic regimes. In view of that standing situation, Hellenism’s position in the 
West was in fact rather precarious and the augury of a foreign ethnic group’s presence 
did not bode well. In addition to this, the existing Greek colonies were located on the 
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coastline of South Italy, while the hinterland was already populated by aggressive 
non-Greek people (in the north, from 510 B.C., the city of Rome was towered, while 
Etruscans and Carthagians already controlled significant parts of the west and north of 
Sicily). The political geography of Sicily did not therefore provide a benign, 
untroubled environment for Athens’s long term plans in this region; it was, though, an 
alluring decoy from any short-term perspective, since the approach to these friendly 
coastline cities seemed unimpeded, at least by sea. However, the bitter antagonism 
between the local ethnicities was also not sporadic, but constant and increasing; 
Athens had already showed in the past that she would not be discouraged by this fact, 
banking on her harsh way of imposing her will - by sword or by word –upon her 
allies. Actually, she once again ignored that what was happening in the system of 
Greek city-states on the mainland was not irrelevant to what was also taking place in 
the sub-system of South Italy: the uneven growth – not any growth - of one power 
tended ipso facto to intimidate all the other competing states even from neighboring 
regions. In view of that, Syracuse, a Dorian city (thus by definition closer to Sparta) 
had evolved into a dominant political and military power in Sicily, thus provoking the 
other Athenian-oriented Sicilian cities of Egesta, Leontinoi, Catani, Naxos and 
Region. The plausible immediate effect was indeed the awakening and interference of 
other powerful states as well, be that from Italian peninsula or the Greek mainland, an 
element that Athens should have expected far in advance. 
 
              The second one was economic: Athens’ limited resources were being rapidly 
further stretched as the empire expanded: two of the most precious and basic goods of 
that era, wheat and corn, were abundant in the fertile plains of Black Sea’s region, but 
also in Sicily and at the same time absolutely vital for the citizens of Athens encircled 
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by the Spartan infantry. One should always bear in mind that for the same reason (a) 
Athens was always trying hard to maintain her maritime supremacy in Hellespont (the 
northern Aegean), through which came these valuable goods from the markets of the 
northern populations and (b) that in 454 B.C., just few years before the 
commencement of the war with Sparta, she had again launched an unsuccessful 
campaign against the Persians in Egypt in order precisely to solve her procurement 
problems. Alcibiades himself claimed before the Spartans that “for the better 
accomplishment of our various aims our newly acquired territory would supply 
money and provisions enough, apart from the revenue which we receive in Hellas”149.  
 
              The third and most important one was power politics: Athens advanced her 
policy of plain power in Melos, which was a harsh150 and capricious treatment of her 
allies, based principally on an overestimation of her own power. That rationale, being 
actually the fons et origo of her expansion to Sicily, constitutes a lurking danger for 
the survival of every great power. It is like a slow burning fuse of which the state’s 
leadership should be constantly alerted. It is not merely a symptom of a great power’s 
behavior towards other states, but an inherent and indivisible aspect of it, which can 
come to the fore at any instance due to a system’s change; namely the substitution of a 
great power or hegemon by another, within the same, anarchical, operative 
framework. That overestimation needs to be consciously and prudently checked 
through a reflective decision making in foreign policy. To this observation attests 
“offensive realism” when it “recognizes that great power might pursue these non – 
security goals, but it has little to say about them, save for one important point: states 
can pursue them as long as the requisite behaviour does not conflict with balance-of-
power logic, which is often the case” 151. 
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             That said, the accent should be placed on the decision making process itself 
when on its route, which is precisely defined by the system’s inherent parameters. 
Therefore it is more accurate to label it as a “forced” expansion than “over-
expansion”. This distinction is important because it can explain the theoretical 
framework of my interpretation of Athens’ expansion. At this stage (given that a more 
elaborated analysis will follow in the final chapter), suffice to stress that “forced 
expansion” makes room for a possible future rerouting of the current foreign policy 
and therefore a change, while “over-expansion” hints at an inevitable path of action, 
which is often seen as the hubris of any “realistic” foreign policy. In other words, 
postulating the significance of the decision making process (a par excellence 
subjective element) to the state’s power maximization effort at the state level of 
analysis (which supposedly and following the tenets of the “realistic” school does not 
attribute to the said process a preponderant role and altogether refutes the notion of a 
change, by sticking to a fixed causality and a free-forecast observation of the 
developments) provides me indeed with a sound practical explanation of the causes of 
a state’s actions, but also its plans. Besides, whether one state is over expanded or not, 
it is first and foremost a matter of subjective interpretation and it could be judged 
solely ex post factum, since the moment it occurs, it could be equally seen as a 
“realistic” move for survival. It is to be noted at this point that the said coupling of the 
system level of analysis and the decision making one, does not question per se the 
well known three images or levels of analysis of K. Waltz (that is, the system, the 
theories of human nature and the state attributes152), on the contrary, it rather unifies 
notionally the levels of human nature and the subjective elements of state attributes, 
with a view to exploiting them as means and not as ends in my analysis.  
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            In addition to the said observation about system’s inherent dynamics and 
decision making process, Athens was not certainly dragged out of ignorance or 
reckless political maneuvering into this adventure, as a significant part of the 
literature usually points out153. And that because, there have already been in the near 
past two quite identical incidences that attest to her systemic predisposition to expand 
far away from the Greek mainland, being a great power, in this regard: (a) around 460 
B.C., Athens had already hustled to support a revolt in Egypt, thus challenging the 
Persian Empire. Despite a three years siege of Memphis, Athens did not succeed in 
crushing the Persian resistance, which, subsequently, managed to hit back and throw 
the Greeks out in 456 B.C154, and (b) in 427 B.C. Athens attempted to take advantage 
of an appeal for help from Leontinoi, but she became bogged down in local quarrels 
between the Sicilian cities, which finally produced a doctrine of a “Sicily for the 
Sicilians” doctrine155 and forced Athens back to Greece two years later. It is also to be 
emphasized that Athens nurtured this tendency for expansion to Sicily even before the 
commencement of the Peloponnesian War156. Leontinoi in particular was an important 
pawn in the chessboard of Athens’ grand strategy for Sicily, since in their bid for 
independence they were subservient to the latter’s demands and even after the 
unsuccessful campaign in 427 B.C., representatives of this Sicilian city again played a 
crucial role in pushing Athens towards to her new, in 415 B.C., major intervention in 
Sicily. Certainly, Athens opted for Leontinoi specifically, on the basis of the 
assumption that a great power should not simply create a network of allies, but a 
network of effective allies: Leontinoi was the only non coastal Greek settlement and 
therefore it could be seen as a convenient bridge to the inner land of Sicily in the long 
run. Thus, Corcyreans delegates to Athens took advantage of this Athenian soft spot 
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for Sicily and by claiming that “Corcyra, besides offering many other advantages, was 
conveniently situated for the coast voyage to Italy and Sicily; it stood in the way of 
any fleet coming from thence to the Peloponnesus, and could also protect a fleet on its 
way to Sicily”157. On top of that, such an expedition could not even be regarded as 
spontaneous, given that as Alcibiades claimed, “Sicily was just the beginning and the 
final target was Carthage and the neighbouring region”158.  
 
            An important clarification, though, should be made at this point: the appetite 
for power is in fact insatiable159 and leads naturally160 to the search for more power 
and therefore to expanding campaigns. However, this specific overestimation 
harbours at the same moment the very elements of a “revolutionary” policy (the 
aforementioned “slow burning fuse”), which very often takes the lead when 
aggressive “realism” fails to stay within the remit of its prescriptions. Prima facie this 
deviation or degeneration of a “realistic” policy is often its transformation to a 
“revolutionary” one, which deprived of realism’s balanced, factual and prepared for 
many eventualities orientation, strives to fill in these gaps with impressive 
pronunciations for rapid ascendancy to grandeur and spasmodic moves of power 
projection without any significant groundwork in the background.  As G. Graig puts it 
glibly (referring indicatively to diplomacy and negotiation): “It is a given fact that 
negotiators socialized in commercially oriented societies often pursue an 
accommodative approach to bargaining and they do not ask for more in a negotiation 
than they think is reasonable and likely to be acceptable. In contrast negotiators 
socialized in revolutionary or totalitarian cultures often pursue an optimizing strategy, 
trying to achieve as much as possible in negotiation, not fearing to be unreasonable, 
combative, and abusive”161. Digging deeper, however, and considering that every 
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successful theory162 craves for a factual validation and that the culmination of a 
“realistic” policy is precisely the occupation of the first place among the other great 
powers, namely the position of hegemon (regional in this case)163, then, it is hard to 
escape the claim that Athenian “realism” was in fact “revolutionism” in disguise; the 
latter is not a degeneration of the former, but, first and foremost its successful, for 
some decision makers, transgression, which is of course a fruitful wish. Whether it 
can be qualified as degeneration or not, that is a matter of adhering to the one or the 
other school of thought. As Kant himself claimed: “it is the desire of every state, or of 
its ruler, to arrive at a condition of perpetual peace by conquering the whole world, if 
that were possible”164. 
 
            One additional observation is needed here: I do not claim that whenever 
Athenian “realism” cannot sufficiently explain international developments, it ceases 
automatically to be qualified as such and that it takes a convenient Kantian facade and 
thus “realism” becomes in a way theoretically “invincible”; what I want to denote is 
simply that expansion based on an overestimation of one’s power is not an exclusive 
outgrowth or even side effect of “realistic” thought, as it is sometimes claimed, but 
more like a stamping ground for a “revolutionist” decision making; in other words, 
this slow burning fuse can equally constitute the transitory level of realism’s 
transformation into “revolutionism”. Besides, it is true that “over-expansion” is 
effectively explained by “realism”, which often regards it as an off-side parameter of 
the standard operating procedure of states for relative gains, struggle for survival and 
power maximization in an anarchic society165. In view of the foregoing, one can admit 
that Athens’ expedition to Sicily could have been dictated as well after “realistic” 
analysis. However, the final outcome can be better framed by perusing a “Kantian” 
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rationale, given, precisely the lack of prudent, as I have already noted, decision 
making within the Athenian camp (which had been obvious since Melos’ events). In 
other words, it is clear here that notions of state interest and the practise of decision 
making are separate notions which do not always integrate effectively. That is not 
perhaps a novel idea. But what is interesting is how this conflict (namely state interest 
versus decision making within the same state) can be explained with the tools of 
International Relations theory. At that point the said, prima facie self evident, 
observation about prudence becomes pertinent. And by prudence I refer to the 
Aristotelian notion of “phronesis”, that is “practical wisdom” or “the weighing of the 
consequences of alternative political actions”166.  
 
         There is always room for interventionism in foreign politics, as long as there is 
will to put it forward. That will lies within the remit of the decision making process 
and it is subject to distinctive interpretation by the three aforementioned schools of 
thought: in short and to put it schematically, for “Realists” intervention  is a means for 
the pursuance of state interest in limited cases, for “Rationalists” intervention is a 
means for the improvement of cooperation between states, mostly on humanitarian 
grounds, while for “Revolutionists” intervention is a means for the establishment of a 
universal moral regime. Concerning the issue of humanitarian intervention in 
particular, the realist tradition puts forward the raison d’état, diminuating any 
humanitarian justification to this direction. The rationalist tradition prefers to promote 
the non-intervention, while the revolutionist seems ready to sacrifice everything in the 
altar of certain humanitarian emergencies. In view of the foregoing, the pretext for the 
Athenian involvement was always there: the low intensity conflict between the Ionian 
town of Egesta and the Dorian town of Selinouda. Apart from Thucydides’ claims on 
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the plausible motives for this Athenian action167, it is interesting how Athenian 
democrats themselves interpreted this opportunity for further involvement, since one 
can trace within their various proposals characteristic elements of the three 
International Relations schools of thought.  
 
             The radical democrats, under the leadership of Alcibiades, were staunch 
supporters of the expedition, which was regarded: (a) as a conditio sine qua non for 
the maintenance of the Athenian maritime power, and (b) as promoting a force to 
balance Sparta in the wider Greek world. Alcibiades’ exaggerated fear of Sparta’s 
rapid maritime enforcement, enabling the latter to intervene in pro-Laconic Syracuse 
and supposedly reduce ipso facto Athens into a second-class power in the Aegean was 
seemingly an outgrowth of a “realistic” and “revolutionary” rationale. The moderate 
democratic camp of Nicias, along with the oligarchs of course, were on the contrary 
more pragmatic and averse to the idea of expanding Athenian power to Sicily, not out 
of fear for Syracuse, but of skepticism towards the unfavorable geography and the 
impending multi-fronted war. Nicias furthermore articulated the basic parameters of 
the classic “realistic” security dilemma, namely that striking with a view to increasing 
one’s own security provokes fear and enhances other’s insecurity168. It can fairly be 
said that Nicias’ opposition was a rare expression of reason, especially if one reads 
behind the officially stated aims of the said expedition, which were: (a) Athens should 
support Egesta in the latter’s struggle against Selinouda, (b) the democratic 
Selinoudians should return from the exile back to their country and (c) all appropriate 
measures should be taken in Sicily for the fulfillment of the Athenian interests. Most 
of my attention claims the factitious nebulosity of the (a) and (c) aims, which were 
giving Alcibiades the room to maneuver with his personal plans only, namely without 
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paying due attention to long term interests of his state, as they were also portrayed by 
Pericles few years earlier. 
 
            The aforementioned will, which lies behind every attempt to intervention, 
needs not only to be transformed into coherent action, but also to be communicated to 
the people and gain public legitimization. It is to be noted that in fluid time periods 
like the never-ending war intervals, ordinary people are more receptive to 
“revolutionist” ideas, which usually bring with them an attractively novel and reckless 
idea towards terminating instantly the war, than to “realistic” ones, which often 
propound starkly moderation and more time for prudent action. On one hand, the 
expedition was indeed, by and large, welcomed by the Athenian citizens169, which 
found it naturally associated with the missionary mission of Athens in the region 
(reminiscent of the well-known “City upon the hill” rhetoric of the American 
colonialists, taken from the Bible and used to give a supernatural boost to their 
struggle for settlement in the new lands; that spirit is easily detected in Pericles’ 
Obituary speech as I earlier noted). That, however, was not the case amongst the 
leading class: Athens dispatched to Sicily a significant170 part of its military power, 
namely 5,100 men and 136 battle-ships, though under the command of three Generals, 
Alcibiades, Lamachus and Nicias, who represented three different grand strategic 
approaches171, each evocative of the three schools of international theory (on grand 
strategy).  
 
                 The first (Alcibiades) opted for a “revolutionary” campaign, namely to 
outflank diplomatically as many allies of Syracuse as possible and afterwards attack 
Syracuse; the second (Lamachus) was in favor of a “realistic” blitzkrieg against 
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Syracuse; while the third (Nicias), which afterwards succumbed to Alcibiades’, 
advocated a constrained expedition, driven by “liberal” aspirations for cooperation 
and negotiation with the Sicilian states and successive withdrawal back to Athens. 
More concretely, Nicias expounded, in essence, a political involvement using mostly 
diplomatic means and less military force, proposing a peace solution in the dispute 
between Egesta and Selinouda and thereafter sailing along the coastline of Sicily to 
demonstrate Athens’ power to Syracuse and the other cities. This approach, however, 
disregarded serious eventualities, namely Syracuse’s powerful reaction, as well 
Athens’s long term objectives in the area (commercial privileges were destined to be 
only temporary, but accession of Syracuse, along with her influence upon other states 
in the region, to Athens’ alliance was to be naturally the critical point). Lamachus was 
astute enough to discern that Syracuse’s role in this affair could not be lightheartedly 
disregarded and therefore he suggested an immediate all-out attack against her, taking 
advantage of one precious ally, i.e. the element of surprise. However, purported lack 
of sufficient intelligence discouraged possible supporters of this strategy, possibly 
losing the golden chance to nip any Sicilian attempt of resistance in the bud. The third 
suggestion, of Alcibiades, on a simultaneous action at the military and diplomatic 
levels, by attempting to promote a pro-Athenian bloc of Sicilian cities and occupying 
Messene was initially rejected, because of two problematic factors, which were 
eventually overestimated: favorable response by the Greek cities of Sicily and a 
sufficient period of time to put the plan into motion without interruption. It was 
evident that coherent decision making was absent within the Athenian camp in sharp 
contrast to the Sparta one. Athens was about to follow eventually the “revolutionary” 
rhetoric of a man, whom soon was about to chase (Alcibiades) 172.  
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             Within Sicily, the Athenian expedition was by all surviving evidence met 
with certain reluctance and apart, of course, from the explicitly interested town of 
Egesta, all the other cities were not eager to provide Athens even with material 
assistance. Instead, Sicilians adhered to the general principle of neutrality, which, as I 
have stated, had been laid down already since the first fruitless expedition of Athens 
to Sicily. Syracuse’s response, at the beginning, was blocked by the internal long-
pending animosity between democrats (under the leadership of Athinagoras) and 
aristocrats (under the leadership of Hermocrates), who attempted to interpret Athens’ 
activity in the context of their respective ideological beliefs. But the majority of the 
people had already decided that the foreign threat was real and imminent.  In short, 
Athens did not grant the manifestly unpropitious aspects of her grand strategy with 
the necessary attention and underestimated the conspicuous disinclination of the other 
Sicilian cities to meddle in this affair.  
 
             First and foremost, it is not my intention to give a detailed account of the 
campaign and military operations; I only touch upon certain turning points of this 
affair, which are to be highlighted in order to demonstrate certain grand strategic 
aspects of the international behavior of the main rivals, Sparta and Athens. Despite 
Athens’ effort to create a net of pressure around Syracuse, the latter slowly but 
steadfastly took the initiative and became even more aggressive over time. Reading 
“realistically” the situation before her, Athens reinforced the city’s walls and launched 
scouting campaigns into the Athenian base of Catani in Sicily in order (a) to verify the 
operational capability of her opponent and (b) to promote the image of an active 
resistance against the intruders, something that constituted an important constant for 
the cohesion of the Sicilian cities against Athens173.  
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                Since Athens did not opt for a fast, decisive battle against Syracuse, it was 
to be expected that the operations would last long, unless a major shift in the balance 
of power ensued. That shift was indeed the momentous decision of Sparta to intervene 
in the Sicilian affair, following ironically the recommendations of an expert in 
Athenian strategy, Alcibiades; it is quite interesting at this point to consider the 
speech Alcibiades delivered to the Spartan Apella (the public Assembly in Sparta, 
similar to the one in Athens called “Ekklisia tou dimou”), which aimed to reveal the 
grand strategic aims of Athens and give a supposedly convincing insight into the 
Athenian endeavor in Sicily174. Certainly, no prudent mind was expected to adhere 
hastily to the attractive sayings of an ambiguous personality like Alcibiades (who 
afterwards escaped back to Athens175); but the speech should not be dismissed all 
together, given that Alcibiades was obviously forced to present some truths so as to 
gain credibility. That said, it is a noteworthy example of how the idea of a state’s 
expansion is rationalized so as to gain its people’s support and how it receives a moral 
mantle. In short, Alcibiades attempted simply to illustrate the Athenian plans with 
more threatening colors in order (a) to spread fear amongst the Spartans; the 
“Thucydidean fear” that was lurking since the beginning of the war in the Spartan 
minds and (b) to enhance his own status, perceiving at the same time that the 
Athenian expedition not only did not constitute an urgent, peril for Sparta, but on the 
contrary a favorable contingency for Sparta.  
 
                I cannot, obviously, embrace unwaveringly Alcibiades’ belief that Athens 
would eventually occupy Peloponnesus, by campaigning against Carthage or Syracuse 
first, since that would apparently presuppose that: (a) Athens was not satisfied with 
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the maintenance of the system as such, a structural rationale that was practically in 
sharp contrast to her international behavior up to that time, considering especially her 
prior strategic decision to entrench her citizens behind the walls and wait for Sparta to 
be exhausted in burning down the crop fields, and (b) Athenian Generals would be 
capable of articulating a long term strategy hoping that all Sicilian states, along with 
Carthage would be so weak as to be rapidly subjugated, whilst Sparta would hold fire 
indefinitely. Besides, Athens’ campaign to Sicily was not to be seen microscopically 
supposedly as a step to seize Peloponnesus, but rather macroscopically as an 
outgrowth of her distinctive preference as an empire to pursue self-aggrandizement in 
order to survive (more resources and access for her maritime commerce176). 
 
           Beyond any international theory, military power in the field always matters the 
most; instead of “balance of power”, “there is no question that the odds of success are 
substantially affected by the  balance of resources, especially in protracted wars of 
attrition in which each side is trying to wear down the other by virtue of material 
superiority”177.Since the truce of Nicias ended officially in August 414 B.C., Sparta, 
under the leadership of General Gylippus, was ready to campaign in Sicily and 
provide every possible assistance (around 2,500 men) to Syracuse178.  It is apparent 
that the entry of Sparta into Sicily emboldened many local leaders to resist Athens. 
And this became a major obstacle for the vital procurement of supplies and 
reinforcements for the expeditionary force from Athens, who, out of 
contemptuousness for Sparta, had not taken any precautionary measures to cope 
effectively with the involvement of the Spartan fleet in the conflict, another 
manifestation of the “revolutionary deviation” in the decision making process within 
the Athenian camp. Sparta’s first move was an implementation of her silent strategy 
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of “buck-passing”179 in Sicily, namely of transferring the burden of facing the 
Athenians onto the shoulders of the Sicilian states. Gylippus’ perspicacity and 
determination were further accentuated by Nicias’ procrastinations and pusillanimity. 
What matters at this point is that Sparta, acting swiftly, was about to transfer the 
impasse in operations from Greece to Sicily; she had been looking unsuccessfully for 
a decisive battle in Greece against Athens, but eventually was close to finding it in 
Sicily; whilst Athens, who for a moment seemed to be back on track after the second 
battle of Mantinea, was now close to experiencing the destruction of a significant part 
of her forces.  
 
               Athenian choice to stay in Sicily after Sparta’s arrival in the field could be 
explained schematically by claiming that a great power does not have a right to 
silence. Athens was obliged to act, even before an imminent deadlock. This systemic 
responsibility reflects the determinism behind a great power’s role, namely that the 
latter’s emergence as inescapable action may eventually endanger its own security. 
Indeed, if Athens was to withdraw from the island, she would preserve valuable 
forces for the critical developments in Greece, but on the other hand she would 
probably send the wrong signal to her allies and enemies, i.e. that she was too weak to 
continue to lead the alliance. In that case, the simmering volcano of her suppressed 
allies would explode and Athens would have to confront another costly and dangerous 
round of revolts within her alliance. On the other hand, if Athens opted for continuing 
the campaign it would inevitably require reinforcements to be sent from the 
metropolis and also very quickly and that’s why on April 413 B.C., were sent from 
Athens almost 20.000 additional soldiers under the leadership of Demosthenes and 
Evrimedodas. In view of the foregoing, what makes the difference here is how 
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balanced the decision making process will be so as to defuse the aforementioned 
“slow burning fuse” of great power’s contemptuousness, i.e. how well controlled is 
the spiraling and at the same time degenerating effect of the leader’s overconfidence 
(namely his conviction that victory was close and that only a few corrective measures 
will suffice).  
 
           Sparta, having abandoned a time-consuming attritional strategy and given that 
she seemed unable to ensnare Athens into a decisive battle on a Greek soil, adopted a 
strategy of exhaustion and opened concurrently a new front in Greece, by occupying 
Dekeleia, a stronghold very close to the town of Athens itself. Sparta was in fact 
creating the conditions for a “fighting water birds dilemma”180, namely to watch from 
the sideline the Athens’ adventure to Sicily, while the water birds (Athens and 
Syracuse) were fighting over the catch, the fisherman (Sparta) was spreading his net 
(in Dekeleia). It was indeed a brilliant strategic move, because Dekeleia was 
something more to Athens than what Sphakteria was earlier to Sparta; it was literally 
her backyard, a place in absolute proximity to Athens (only 36 km away). This had 
immediate ramifications for Athens: (a) a great blow for her economy, since she could 
not harvest supplies anymore from her near countryside, to which the access became 
perilous enough, (b) imports from the neighboring and fertile allying city of Euboea 
were forced to deviate and reach Piraeus only by sea and not, as previously, by road, 
(c) due to the frequent raids from Spartan infantry, the silver mines of nearby Lavrio 
city had to suspend operations and a large number of slaves escaped; as a result 
golden and copper coins had to be minted which brought further instability to the very 
grounds of the Athenian commercial activities and (d) the Spartan army kept the 
Athenian military forces busy and Spartan military prowess became evident again, 
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provoking tense discontent within the town of Athens and sapping the moral of the 
people.  
 
             After constant skirmishes and limited battles between the united forces of 
Sparta and Syracuse against the Athenian ones, finally, on 16th September 413 B.C., 
the Athenian army was trapped at the river of Assinaros, where they were forced to 
surrender to the Spartan general Gylippus in order to avoid the revengefulness of 
Syracuse. It is to be emphasized that especially after the arrival of Spartans to Sicily, 
there was no serious diplomatic initiative to find a negotiated resolution. The 
Syracusians, who, contrary to Spartans, already since the first Athenian expedition to 
the island, were “realistically” convinced that only the total defeat and ousting of 
Athens from Sicily could contribute to their long term domination in the region. 
Besides, Syracuse’s choice for a decisive battle, devoid of any intention for 
negotiation and idealistic exchange of views, was in fact bolstered by Nicias’ 
wavering strategy, which provided the enemy ample room for essential military 
maneuvering. 
 
            Clearly the very foundations of Athenian power suffered a major blow by the 
failure of the Sicilian expedition. Taking into consideration that the notion of power in 
this context refers primarily to military capability and population181, it is worth 
grasping the monumental impact of Athens’ losses: out of 45,000 men of the Athenian 
league, 38,000 were killed in battle (10,000 were Athenians), while 7,000 were taken 
as prisoners to the mines of Syracuse. What was possibly more important, specifically 
in the case of Athens, was that 210 battleships were destroyed, out of which 151 were 
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Athenian along with 30,000 experienced oarsmen, with obvious dramatic 
consequences for the continuation of the war on the mainland Greece182. 
 
               Much discussion has been devoted to the strategic causes of the Athenian 
disaster in Sicily, the majority of which lays the blame of this total defeat on the 
shoulders of the overconfident and conceited Alcibiades, while some others on 
Nicias’ idleness and shortsightedness. It can also be assumed that Gylippus’ fervent 
desire to save Nicias’ life after the end of the battle, makes allowances for a possible 
preceded deliberate inactivity on behalf of the latter during the war; following that 
reasoning, Nicias could have prepared a decent exit for himself and at least find safe 
recourse to Sparta. However, positing that “tactics is the art of using troops in the 
battle, while strategy is the art of using battles to win war’’183, one should not be 
diverted by the relevant over- detailed historical essays actually on tactics and miss 
the obvious observation in pure strategic terms: the cause, to be found, lies within 
Athens’ inability (thus at the decision making level) to control the course of the 
expedition disregarding the obvious imminent dangers ahead (thus at the systemic 
level). This is the departing point, as I have already mentioned, as to further approach 
Athens’ Sicilian adventure. Whether Athens was defeated because of this or that 
particular action in the operational field is certainly interesting, but primarily for the 
delineation of the detailed military (namely the tangible components of a great 
power’s army and navy, i.e. speed of the battleships, specific military equipment, etc) 
framework and in this case only with regard to the notion of decision making (and its 
cognitive limits). In other words, International Relations theory becomes pertinent at 
the generating level of decision making and of the consecutive initial formulation of 
policy (i.e. grand strategy-position, aims, objectives and means), in wait for action, 
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which can be precisely met at a later stage, at the reifying level, namely the actual 
check of this policy in practice. Besides, it is well known that in a crisis situation 
military advice is almost bound to be colored by the kinds of plans which have been 
already developed, even if the situation is one for which no plans exist. One can 
detect that very often of course in the course of history, with plenty of paradigms for 
instance during the operations of the First World War. 
 
            In view of the foregoing, the strategic implications of the failure of the Sicilian 
expedition marked a significant change in the balance of power: (a) the maritime 
supremacy of Athens was so severely shaken that Sparta instantly attempted to benefit 
from the situation, by progressively carrying the war to the stamping ground of 
Athens, namely the Aegean Sea, (b) Athens, after the irreparable loss of manpower, 
resources and military equipment, suffered a major economic blow (c) her power to 
dictate the direction and form of the war was significantly reduced and 
notwithstanding any sporadic flickers of initiative, Athens was now recoiled into a 
defensive struggle, trying to hold on to the Attic hegemony184 in the Aegean, while 
securing the independence of her own city and (d) Persia emerged as the only great 
power properly accoutered for battle and quickly perceived that the balance of power 
was about to change favorably for her by supporting Sparta, while the allies of Athens 
started to flee away from the sinking ship185. 
 
            When a great power experiences a resounding defeat in the field, what 
immediately ensues is a shift in the balance of power to its disadvantage. Considering 
that a Kantian follower would not attribute major significance to the said shift in view 
of the long coveted civitas maxima and that a Grotian would be inclined to pursue a 
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cooperative post conflict framework, the Machiavellian, however, would strive to 
facilitate a quick restoration to the hegemonic driving seat. Athens could indeed 
reinforce her wounded alliance, by rebuilding her fleet and reanimating the morale of 
her people, while waiting patiently to take advantage of any window of opportunity so 
as to regain the initiative; and, if possible, by launching counter- attack and inflicting 
a major blow primarily on the Spartan army (not to the Syracusean, or anyone else), 
by diversifying also its maritime military orientation. It is noted at this point that on 
top of the extensive elaboration of Thucydides on “sea power” in B. II.60-64, Athenian 
orator Isocrates in his speeches “De Pace” (102-103) and “Panathenaicus” (115-116), did not 
hesitate to bring up a very thoughtful consideration and speak against sea power per se as a 
“demoralizing” factor (primarily due to the immorality and lack of permanent basis of self-
orientation of the oarsmen who usually constitute the crew of the ship) for Athens, but also 
for Sparta, after the latter built up a strong navy and lost its supremacy like Athens. That in 
fact should have been foreseeable to a “realist” Athenian, in view precisely of (a) 
Sparta’s own highly innovative effort to build, almost from the scratch, an efficient 
navy, which would enable her to shift the center of gravity of the present warfare from 
land to sea and thus diversify the scope of her military operations to her benefit 
(indicatively by launching attacks on the harbours of Athens and her allies) and (b) 
the fact that the former associates of Sparta (Boeotians, Corinthians, Locrians) were 
alone building 100 battle ships, while the allies of Athens were girding up to subvert 
the Athenian rule (Evvoia and Lesvos almost immediately gained the assent of 
Lacaedemonians to defect from Athenian league). 
 
             I have stressed that buck-passing strategy is when a power “tries to get 
another great power to check the aggressor while the first power remain on the 
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sidelines”; threatened states usually prefer buck-passing to balancing, mainly because 
the buck-passer avoids the costs of fighting the aggressor in the event of war186. 
Whether Persia can be regarded as a buck-passer towards specifically Sparta or 
Athens remains a question; it is not clear whether Persia would be satisfied only with 
the shrinking of Athens’ power and not Sparta’s or both of them simultaneously. I 
believe that any of these options would have suited Persia; so, buck-passing was a 
possible catch-all path to her domination. Besides, Persian expansionism was 
constantly encroaching over her borders and it was naturally to its strategic interest 
that both Sparta and Athens be debilitated, so as to enable her to impose, unhampered, 
its own rules over the Ionian cities and the Aegean. So, Persia, at first recognized a 
plausible interest to align with the Spartan struggle against the dominant sea power, in 
order at least to secure her possessions in Asia Minor and cash in on all the relevant 
tributes and taxes from them. Persians indeed negotiated with the oligarchs of certain 
cities of the area187 and incited them into anti-Athenian actions, thus critically 
vitiating the Attic alliance and its important commercial activities.  
 
             Sparta, with the non negligible, though not decisive, assistance of Persia 
facilitated its task of reducing Athens’ political leverage specifically in Ionia and 
utilizing to its full extent her increasingly sizeable fleet started to exert pressure on 
Athens at its strong point: the sea. In 412 B.C. the first official pact between Persia 
and Sparta was signed, which in short meant that the war in Greece could now be only 
terminated after the assent of the King of Persia188. This “realistic”, if risky, 
diplomatic move on the part of Sparta incurred a negative mortgage upon her future 
hegemony over the other Greek states, not because she was formally providing Persia 
with the room to intervene in the Greek affairs, but because she might not profit by 
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the favorable circumstances to further increase her own power and solidify her own 
rule. Although Persia’s action proved to be totally procrastinating and 
opportunistic189, Sparta chose deliberately to give away certain responsibilities in the 
short term but also to recoil from certain rights in the long term. It is to be stressed 
that when a state-aspiring hegemon extends an invitation to its peer competitor to 
assist him in securing his place in the system, it is crucial to ascertain that the inviting 
hegemon is not weaker to the invitee one. Otherwise, he will be eventually 
overshadowed by the latter one in terms of power and the third states in this affair will 
soon claim their own say by paying tribute to the one they consider as the real 
hegemon and not to the one that he supposedly presents himself as such190.   
 
              In view of the aforementioned observations, much has been said about 
Persia’s financial contribution in favour of Sparta and consecutive Persia’s special 
strategic role in the area191.  What has to be retained in mind and should not be 
questioned, though, is that Sparta was capable of dealing with Athens by her own 
means effectively enough. Nowhere in the literature is it seriously contested that 
sooner or later Sparta’s final domination was imminent, irrespective of Persia’s 
intervention, after the Sicilian disaster.  
 
          Sparta’s self-powered dynamics was corroborated by the second round of 
negotiation with Persia, in view precisely of the latter’s deliberate oscillations192 and 
Peloponnesian league’s gradual enforcement, which further entailed that the necessity 
for financial contributions was receding. Alcibiades’ defection at this point and this 
time from Sparta to Persia was of course a negative development, but not one of 
paramount importance for the Spartan interests, since no Spartan statesman could 
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have believed that the Athenian General was ever committed to the Peloponnesian 
cause. But Alcibiades’ case is not to be disregarded altogether because it is depictive 
of the role that decision making can actually impose upon the systemic interaction 
between states at a certain point. That said, cultivating his reappearance in the politics 
of Athens193, Alcibiades artfully overemphasized to Tessafernes the distinct military 
characteristics of Sparta and downgraded those of Athens, stressing that Athens was 
solely interested in the establishment of her maritime commerce in the Aegean, while 
Sparta had an important naval presence, combined with unparalleled capabilities in 
land operations, which were purportedly considered as a sound evidence that an attack 
on Persian coastal territories could be imminent194.  Sparta’s navy was of course a 
danger, but yet not an intimidating one. Actually, Alcibiades attempt to twist once 
more the reality (in favour of Athens) was not simply another manifestation of his 
intriguing character, but a sound reflection of Athens’ fear for Sparta’s initiative to 
diversify its military options.  However, this newly born Athenian tendency to attain a 
détente with Persia against Sparta was nipped in the bud by Persia herself; the latter 
espoused indeed a careful stance towards Athens and Sparta, (a stance) which was not 
only reflective of the respective Greek states’ negotiating leverage, but also of their 
actual power capacity. And that power capacity had already been transformed 
significantly to Sparta’s benefit. Besides, that was also reflected in the way that the 
other actors were henceforward approaching these two Greek states. In view of the 
foregoing, Persia, recognizing the weaknesses of Athens, but also the merits of 
Sparta’s ascendancy, did not hesitate to put forward onerous terms upon Athens, 
while with Sparta proved to be particularly lenient on the negotiation table195. And 
that was the epitome of the notion of balance of power in International Relations 
theory, applied by Persia who: (a) had not acquired, according to all sources and in 
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view also of the disastrous experience with Greco-Persian wars in the past, immense 
military capacity so as to impose its rules on the Greek mainland and therefore (b) 
was motivated primarily by “relative power concerns”196, keeping its own power 
intact within a specific competitive framework and did not care to maximize absolute 
power, taking up the risk of endangering its own security.   
 
              In view of the foregoing, the third pact of understanding between Sparta and 
Persia came as a defense-oriented agreement for Persians, who were satisfied to 
merely secure their possessions in Asia Minor out of harm’s (Sparta) way, instead of 
proceeding with a fragile allocation of spheres of influence between the parties 
involved as it was the case earlier197. It was crystal clear that Sparta enjoyed a 
privileged position to the Persian eyes amongst the other major cities in Greece and 
that was ascertained by the content of the said third agreement, as well as by the 
limited, though effective, consequent naval operations in the area of Hellespont 
(islands of Hios, Samos, etc.). That Spartan position was further solidified by an 
important internal development in Athens198 where the simmering oligarchs, cloaked 
institutionally within ideological groups called “etairies” (“companies”), eventually 
managed to prevail by introducing their political program with the guidance of 400 
oligarchs, who became members of the parliament alongside with the democrats. It 
was not coincidental, that the first act of this new heterogeneous regime in Athens 
was to put on the table a peace proposal to Sparta, according to which the war would 
be ended promptly and the combatants would keep whatever they possessed up to that 
time199. It was another manifestation of the fact that there are no status quo powers as 
such in the international system (namely simply satisfied with their power without the 
slightest need to increase it and to take advantage of any window of opportunity), 
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save for the occasional hegemon, who wants to maintain its dominant position against 
rival powers.  
 
          Alcibiades’ astuteness, once again, seemed to be the only answer to the 
intensive activities of the Athenian politicians200. Given that the Persian commanders 
Farnavazos and Tessafernes were following a policy of procrastination, favouring, on 
an ad hoc basis, this or that city, their stance was brilliantly exploited by Alcibiades, 
who was expert in skating on thin ice201. As a result, Sparta’s reservations against 
Persia were further reinforced and the latter’s assistance to Lacaedemonians should 
henceforward be regarded as very limited, especially in comparison to the first stages 
of their alliance202. In any case, the latest developments and the gradual attenuation of 
Sparta-Persian relations did not have an immediate impact upon the balance of power 
between Sparta and Athens, but in the long run constituted the lift, which Sparta was 
methodically searching so as to rise against the Athenian alliance as a whole, namely 
by provoking the defection of some of Athens’ allies, while luring some others to 
Sparta’s side203. In such circumstances, when the final confrontation between two 
great powers becomes imminent, it always matters the wider power calculus in the 
region, which is based upon the analysis of the power resources not only of the two 
competitors, but also of the surrounding ones. And that because a war ex definitio 
provides even the smaller states with a chance of re-adjustment of their position 
within the system. The said analysis resembles a mosaic, all the pieces of which, even 
the smallest ones, are indispensable in order to portray an impeccable image. 
Therefore, if a state opts deliberately for inaction, it inadvertently affects significantly 
the image, namely the course of the war.  
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             The imminent final turn of the war was precipitated by two factors at the 
decision making and systemic level correspondingly: (a) the presence of the 
emblematic military figure of General Lysander in Sparta, who was, according to all 
sources, gifted of high strategic intellect and as a commander of the Spartan naval 
forces was, from the beginning, a staunch supporter of a final battle with Athens, 
which would terminate once and for all the prolonged warfare204 and (b) the declining 
political influence of Athens upon her allies following her alienation from Persia. 
Both factors gained a maximum thrust, when Sparta adopted the policy of cherry 
picking (namely the act of pointing to individual cases or data that seems to confirm a 
particular position, while ignoring a significant portion of related cases or data that 
may contradict that position): instead of rhetorically defending herself towards the 
rest of the Greek cities (supposedly because of her collaboration with the ex-major 
enemy, Persia), she began to distance herself from the eastern super-power and even 
to stand forth as a purported leader of all Greek states to liberate them from Persian 
influence. General Lysander’s re-appearance in the political scene was indeed 
triggered in 406 B.C. when the Athenian fleet unexpectedly, dramatically and with a 
high cost overpowered temporarily the Spartan in the naval battle of Arginusae205. 
Sparta dispatched an embassy to Athens, asking for a truce within the limits of those 
territories, which had been possessed by the combatants up to that moment206. It was a 
decent proposal that was eventually declined by Athens, not, however, without 
opposing internal voices, which were forecasting that this war of friction would 
inevitably turn against their own city and that this battle was their last chance for a 
respectable peace without loss of face207.  
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                   That said, in a war of friction there always comes a point of strategic 
deadlock, a point of no return for the combatants, a situation where they are enmeshed 
in such reciprocative action, that they cannot afford to disentangle themselves without 
suffering a major blow to their long term national interests; so they have to terminate 
the conflict either by diplomatic or military means. In this case, diplomatic means 
were already ineffective and therefore the prospect of a final naval confrontation was 
imperative. When Sparta seized the strategically important town of Lampsacus, in 
Hellespont, it was clear that this became even more probable, since, it threatened the 
soft underbelly of Athenian maritime commerce. Athens would have to pick up the 
gauntlet or suffer irreparable economic damage.    
 
               In 405 B.C., in the area of Aegos Potamoi, Lysander did what Sparta was 
now equipped to do: he launched a blitzkrieg, an unexpected, fast and devastating 
attack against the greater part of the Athenian forces, which were scattered on the sea 
and land208. And literally he took them by surprise to such an extent, that many 
Athenian battle ships, which were on their way to the battlefield, preferred to run 
away and ask shelter from other war lords, as far as Cyprus. The ensuing moral 
collapse of the once famous naval Athenian commanders was not evident only within 
the Athenian camp. The Lacaedemonians, under the intense pressure of their allies 
and contrary to their military tradition, took the decision to slaughter all the Athenian 
prisoners after the battle in Aegos Potamoi, although, according to the sources, this 
decision was mostly dictated on a reciprocative basis, namely on a previous standing 
resolution of Athens to mutilate any Lacaedemonian prisoner of war. In any case, 
moral decadence in this war was now fierce, a phenomenon which historically serves 
as a portent of structural changes in every socio-political system209.   
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            Lysander, first, seized astutely almost all the islands of the Aegean, before he 
sailed to Athens itself, in order to secure the hinterland and to stifle any potential 
uprisings210. Oligarchic regimes mushroomed instantly among the former Athenian 
allies, serving as a cordon sanitaire (in the sense of a buffer zone) between the 
Peloponnesians and the population. At the same time, Sparta encircled Athens by land 
and, for the first time during the war, managed to blockade the port of Piraeus from 
the sea. The Athenian people were now threatened with true starvation. Sparta’s 
Peloponnesian allies manifested a tremendous revengefulness against Athens and 
urged Sparta to destroy the city and enslave its citizens. However, Sparta did not 
succumb to these demands and treated Athens as a defeated, though great, power, 
respecting the minimum standards of jus ad bellum, which, she, by tradition 
championed much earlier around the Greek world211.   
 
          Detailed post war-arrangements, as I have already noted, are not put under the 
magnifying glass of international relations’ theories in this thesis, but a great power’s 
general post-war behaviour can be the stepping stone to the conclusions ahead. 
Indeed, Sparta’s refraining from annihilating Athens was not solely a manifestation or 
interpretation of the Greek  jus ad bellum212, reflecting the moral reflexes of Greeks at 
war at least up to that time213; it rather ushers me deeper into the concept of balance of 
power itself “which remains an important aspect of the present global system”214. 
Besides, the notion of the enemy’s utility in post war developments alludes eventually 
to the cardinal notion of a state’s long term interest, which emerges as the ultima ratio 
in the relations between the state actors in every anarchic society. 
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1 History is written not in order to prove but in order to narrate. 
 
2 The thing speaks for itself. 
 
3 I stress at this point that I am going to use alternatively the terms “city”, state” and “town”. It is not 
the purpose of this study to delve into socio-political origins of these terms. 
 
4 More importantly, all hegemonic states share one common characteristic: they enjoy “structural 
power”. It is this structural power that permits the hegemon to occupy a central position within its own 
system, and, if it so chooses, to play a leading role in it”, (M. Griffiths, T. O. Callaghan, S. C. Roach, 
“International Relations: The key concepts”, p. 138). By “structural power” it is meant the 
“unintentional power or the power with respect to the creation and/or control of structures” (mentioned 
in W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse, B.A. Simmons, “Handbook of International Relations”, p. 185). 
 
5 Polybius, “History”, B.III.9. 
 
6 J. Mearsheimer, “The Tragedy of Great Power’s Politics”, p.269. 
 
7It is worth mentioning synoptically the preceding events of the Peloponnesian War in order to have a 
general grip of the era. Besides, Thucydides, himself, places a high emphasis on this specific time 
period in order to show how the “Athenian power grew bigger” (B.I.97): After the Persian expedition 
led by Xerxes against Greece had been repulsed in 479, the Athenians assumed the leadership of the 
war against Persia in the Greek coastlands of Asia Minor. The Delian League, initially an alliance 
against Persia, began to assume the form of an empire as the Athenians began to use force to prevent 
any of their "allies" from withdrawing from the League. The First Peloponnesian War began in 460 
when Megara withdrew from the Spartan alliance and allied itself with Athens. The Athenians built 
long walls for the Megarians to their port at Nisaea, thereby earning the everlasting enmity of Megara's 
old rival Corinth. At the height of their success in this war, the Athenians, allied with Megara and 
Argos, controlled all of Central Greece except for Thebes. In 446 B.C. a revolt broke out in Boeotia 
which was to spell the end of Athens's "continental empire" on the Greek mainland. After a force sent 
against the Boeotians was defeated, the Athenians evacuated Boeotia, Phocis, and Locris. Then Euboea 
revolted as well, and after an expedition was dispatched to deal with the rebels, Megara went over to 
the Spartan alliance and allowed a Peloponnesian army to invade Attica. The Athenians agreed to 
renounce their claims on Central Greece and to give up their alliance with Megara, and the Spartans 
withdrew, allowing the Athenians to put down the Euboean revolt. Athens signed a "Thirty-Years 
Peace" with Sparta in which each agreed to respect the alliances of the other, something which was 
bound not to last for long. 
 
8 Map 1. 
 
9 Map 2. 
 
10 “Defections of the allies arose from different causes, the principal being their neglect to pay tribute or 
to furnish ships, and, in some cases, failure of military service. For the Athenians were exacting and 
oppressive, using coercive measures towards men who were neither willing nor accustomed to work 
hard. And for various reasons they soon began to prove less agreeable leaders than at first. They no 
longer fought as equals with the rest of the confederates, and had no difficulty in reducing them when 
they revolted” (Thucydides, B.I.99). 
 
11 Thucydides, B.I 140-141. 
 
12 The cardinal pretext for the Spartans and the allies in the “first” Peloponnesian war (460-445 B.C.) 
was the establishment by Athens of Messenian warriors, defenders of Ithomi, in Naupactus, which was 
also controlled by Athens. Naupactus is located in a geographical point of high strategic importance, 
since it can control the traffic with the Corinthic bay. The occupation of Naupactus was therefore 
significantly confining the freedom of movement of Corinth’s navy, although it didn’t, in fact, 
annihilate it. In military level the blockage of the Corinthian bay presupposed by all means the 
bulwarking of many areas of Achaia and the building of battle ships in the Athenian base of Naupactus. 
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There was also the need for securing the alliance or at least the abstention of the Aetolians (who at that 
time were neutral and pro-Lakons) and the Akarnanians (allies of the Athenians). Besides, one should 
bear in mind that Athens followed the same strategic avenue in the immediate future and sought to hold 
sway first over the areas of Western Greece of economic interest to her and then with the manipulations 
of General Alcibiades, to bulwark Achaia and get command the Bay of Corinth.  
             In view of the economic rivalry of the two city states (Corinth and Athens), a potential 
blockage of the bay would be tantamount to cutting Corinth off from her numerous colonies and 
commercial markets in the West. The commercial network of Corinth was spread over a vast area, with 
intermediary trading bases in the islands and the coasts of the Ionian Sea. The most important colony of 
Corinth was Corcyra, in the north, which served as an outpost to the Adriatic Sea and controlled the 
commercial avenues to the Italian peninsula. The so called “Magna Crecia”, namely Southern Italy and 
Sicily, were areas with immense natural assets and wealth. It produced abundant corn, wood, wine, iron 
and other products, the control of which was vital for Corinth, but also for rising Athens; that was 
eventually a sound, by argumentum ex post, cause of war. Notwithstanding the military efforts of 
Corinth, Naupactus remained under Athenian control after 446 B.C. with the peace treaty, which put a 
(temporary) end to the “first Peloponnesian war. Athenian interventionism in Western Greece was not 
tailed off, despite the widespread spirit for political collaboration. In 437 B.C., the Athenian general 
Formion, rushed to Western Greece with a fleet to defend the Amfilohians, when they were threatened 
by the Corinthians. 
 
13 Another example of striking similarities between past and modern events. In this regard one can 
recall the “Peace of Versailles” (28.06.1919), or the period after the First Balkan War in Europe 
(October 1912 to May 1913). 
 
14 Indicative is the tradition of “krypteia”, which, according to Plutarch (Life of Lycurgus 28.3-7), gave 
the Spartan Ephors the right to declare every year ab initio the war against the helots (slaves), so as to 
facilitate and legitimise their murder by the young Spartans.   
 
15 Map 3. 
 
16 “How a statesman interprets others’ past behavior and how he projects it into the future is influenced 
by his understanding of the security dilemma and his ability to place himself in the other’s shoes. The 
dilemma will operate much more strongly if statesmen do not understand it and do not see that their 
arms – sought only to secure the status quo – may alarm others…” (“Cooperation under the security 
dilemma”. p. 181). 
 
17 Principles of War, Ch. III. 
 
18 This battle took place between the Athenian-led Delian League and the Boeotian League in 447 
BC during the “First Peloponnesian War”. In 457 BC the Athenians had taken control of Boeotia at 
the Battle of Oenophyta and spent the next ten years attempting to consolidate the League's power. In 
454 BC Athens lost a fleet attempting to aid an Egyptian revolt against Persia. Fearing revolts by the 
other members of the Delian League, Athens moved the treasury to their city from Delos in 453 BC, 
and signed the Peace of Callias with Persia around 450 BC. The Delian League was, as already 
indicated, essentially a part itself of the Athenian empire, and while the Athenians were usually 
successful at holding state possessions in the Aegean Sea, they were less successful on land. By 447 
BC some of the men exiled from Boeotia after the Athenian victory there in 457 had returned home and 
had begun to take back some of the Boeotian towns. The Athenians with 1,000 hoplites plus other 
troops from their allies marched into Boeotia to take back the recaptured towns. They 
captured Chaeronea, but were attacked and defeated by the Boeotians at Coronae. The Athenians were 
forced to give up control of Boeotia, and the defeat led to subsequent revolts on Euboea and in Megara, 
which in turn led to further conflict with Sparta, triggering the intensification of their encounter 
(Thucydides, B.1.113). 
 
19 The blatant utilization of the alliance’s financial assets by Athens was orchestrated by Pericles 
according to Angelos Vlachos, Greek Academician, one of the largest embezzlements in human 
history, (“Thucydides’ Bias”, 62-63). 
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20 Map 4. 
 
21 Thucydides, B.I.98. 
 
22 Thucydides, B.I.100. 
 
23 Thucydides, B.I.98. 
 
24 Thucydides, B.I.98. 
 
25 Thucydides, B.II.67-70. 
 
26 “The Corinthians were a small and rich community, in many ways like their Athenian competitors, 
but with the crucial difference that they were never powerful enough to determine the way Hellas 
should be run” (“The evolution of international society”, p.56). 
 
27 Corinth often raised protests against the Athenian empowerment, as in the case of the building of the 
peripheral walls of Athens under the leadership of Themistocles, or in the case of her alliance with 
Aegina, formerly a traditional enemy of Athens, after the entrance of the city of Megara into the 
Athenian camp from the Spartan one in 458-457 B.C. However, Corinth took her vengeance since in 
447 B.C. she manipulated the situation to incite the abstention of Megara once again from the Athenian 
alliance, solidifying her control in the strategically sensitive area of the Isthmus of Corinth. 
 
28 To this end lead also the remarks by A. Momigliano: “Thucydides knows exactly what is relevant 
and makes a distinction between the superficial and the profound causes of the war” (p.18 “Secondo 
contributo alla storia degli studi classici e del mondo antico”). 
 
29 G. Blainey, “The causes of war”, p.123. 
 
30 Thucydides’ famous passage in B.VI.6.1 gave rise to many claims that he was distinguishing 
“pretexts” from “causes”, thus creating another notion, that of “motives” (“These were the nations, 
Greeks and barbarians, that inhabited Sicily. And though it was thus great, yet the Athenians longed 
very much to send an army against it, out of a desire to bring it all under their subjection, which was 
the true motive, but as having withal this fair pretext of aiding their kindred and new confederates”). I 
postulate, though, without delving further into this very important but not that complicated controversy, 
that the Greek text is clear enough, since the thorny word, namely “τῇ  ἀληθεστάτ ῃ  προφάσει” 
corresponds indeed to the English word “pretext”.  
 
31 For a useful and illuminating examination of the thorny issue in the literature see P. Zagorin, 
“Thucydides, an introduction to the common reader”, p.40-46 or H. Rawlings’ “A Semantic Study of 
Prophasis to 400 B.C.” (p.97). D. Kagan, (“The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War”,p. 345), makes 
the assertion that Thucydides “invents” the distinction between immediate and underlying causes of 
war.  
 
32The defensive character of an alliance was not perfunctory or merely declaratory as today but literally 
restrictive as to the commitments of the parties involved; the terminology used for that reason speaks 
for itself: defensive alliance was called “apemahia” in contrast to the normal alliance which was called 
“ksemmahia”. 
 
33 Thucydides B.I. 35-36. 
 
34 Thucydides B.I, 38-41. 
 
35 For Machiavelli, observes Carr, “politics are not… a function of ethics, but ethics of 
politics…morality is the product of power” (E.H.Carr, “Twenty years’ crisis, 1919-1939. An 
introduction to the study of international relations”, p.64). 
 
36 J. Mearsheimer, “The tragedy of Great powers politics”, p.3.  
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37 “Alleged” is considered as well by A. Momigliano: “Thucydides knows exactly what is relevant. He 
certainly puts his finger on some of the most important knots. The story of what happened at Corcyra 
and Potidaea is there forever. But he himself realizes that this is not enough…He makes a distinction 
between the superficial and the profound causes of the war.”(p.18, “Secondo contributo alla storia 
degli studi classici e del mondo antico”). 
 
38  Perdiccus B’ never forgave Athens for her continuous plots against him and in favour of his brother 
Phillip, in succession to the throne of Macedonia following the death of King Alexander in 452 B.C. 
Although he occasionally signed pacts of friendship with Athens, he always looked for opportunities to 
undermine her and boost Sparta’s plans.    
 
39 B. I. 75-76. 
 
40 It is to be noted that Thucydides himself did not put a particular emphasis on this Decree, treating it 
only in general terms (B.1.139 and B.1.67). What one knows more on the issue comes from other, 
“immediate” sources, that is the Comedian Aristophanes and mainly his works “The 
Acharnians”(II.530-7) and “Peace”(I.609), as well as Diodorus of Sicily and his work “Library of 
World History” (B.12.39.4-5). 
 
41 Map 5. 
 
42 J. Mearsheimer, “The tragedy of Great powers’ politics”, p.35. 
 
43 “...And war is not an affair of arms, but of money which gives to arms their use, and which is needed 
above all things when a continental is fighting against a maritime power: let us find money first, and 
then we may safely allow our  minds to be excited by the speeches of our  allies.” (Thucydides B. I.80 
& 83). 
 
44  According to Xenophon (“Constitution of Sparta” 15.7), there were five Ephors in Sparta, who were 
elected annually by the assembly of the people and all citizens were eligible to that end. An Ephor 
could significantly influence through his vote the policy of Sparta; that’s why all the Kings found 
themselves in an irritating tug-of- war with these dignitaries in order to impose their choices; It is a 
common assertion that the institution of Ephors played a significant role in the final decadence and fall 
of Sparta, while they were opposed to any innovative changes, harbouring excessively retrograded 
ideas. 
 
45 Thucydides states at this point: “The feeling of mankind was strongly on the side of the 
Lacaedemonians; for they professed to be the liberators of Hellas. Cities and individuals were eager to 
assist them to the utmost, both by word and deed; and where a man could not hope to be present, there 
it seemed to him that all things were at a stand. For the general indignation against the Athenians was 
intense; some were longing to be delivered from them, others fearful of falling under their sway” 
(B.II.9). 
 
46 “Kyloneio Agos” or the “Cylon Affair” around 632 B.C.: citizens, led by the Athenian archons, who 
were exiled from Athens for violating the laws against killing suppliants/ followers of an Athenian 
noble called Cylon (Thucydides, B.1.126). 
 
47 Athens demanded that Sparta abandons their practice of periodic expulsion of foreigners from their 
territory and to recognize the autonomy of its allied cities, something of course too ambitious to be 
fulfilled. 
 
48 One should not forget that Aegina was the biggest island of the Saronic Gulf, strategically located 
very close to Athens, with a significant naval power. 
 
49 How critical this Decree was for Spartans is also demonstrated by the fact that when Athens rejected 
the said proposals of the second Spartan delegation, the latter insisted strongly only on this very issue 
with the hope that even at the last moment they could keep their “vital space” intact. 
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50 “I would have none of you imagine that he will be fighting for a small matter if we refuse to annul 
the Megarian decree, of which they make so much, telling us that its revocation would prevent the war” 
or further below “You should have no lingering uneasiness about this; you are not really going to war 
for a trifle” (Thucydides, I 140-141).   
 
51 For example, when a country is asked to abide by specific international measures, gives its full 
support orally, but in some times also by taking some minor adjusting measures, which, however, at the 
end of the day are all falling within a carefully orchestrated “conflict” with other rules and procedures.  
 
52 It is quite interesting to note that both states use the word “arbitration” but in their own particular 
sense as to the expected outcomes: “our  agreement says that when differences arise, the two parties 
shall refer them to arbitration, and in the mean time both are to retain what they have. But for 
arbitration they never ask; and when it is offered by us, they refuse it.” (Thucydides, B. I 140-141).   
 
53 F. Schuman, “International politics’’ p. 277. 
 
54  As R. Jervis puts it “subjects are more apt to see their own actions as an important cause of their 
successes than of their failure” (“Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Relations”, p.344). 
 
55 “Athenians, I say, as I always have said, that we must never yield to the Peloponnesians.. For in the 
seeming trifle is involved the trial and confirmation of your whole purpose…Wherefore make up your  
minds once for all, either to give way while you are still unharmed, or, if we are going to war, as in my 
judgment is best, then on no plea small or great to give way at all; we will not condescend to possess 
our  own in fear. ..” (Thucydides, B. I 140-141). 
 
56 R. Jervis, “Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Relations”, p.104. 
 
57 “Any claim, the smallest as well as the greatest, imposed on a neighbour  and an equal when there 
has been no legal award, can mean nothing but slavery” (Thucydides, B.I 140-141).  It was obvious 
that Athens stringed along with the letter of the law (the 30 years Peace) and promoted the 
“procedural” formula of solving the dispute by arbitration, following the relevant stipulations of the 
peace treaty. 
 
58 “…We must never yield to the Peloponnesians although I know that men are persuaded to go to war 
in one temper of mind, and act when the time comes in another, and that their resolutions change with 
the changes of fortune” (Thucydides, B.I 140-141).  The Plague which shortly after this oration 
pounded upon Athens was certainly one of these “changes of fortune”, which were also responsible for 
Pericles’ death. 
 
59 Considering that the level of my analysis is principally the states’ behavior (contrary to the neo-
“rationalistic” view, which caters for the human needs in the interest of public policy at all levels), I 
take cautious note of those individuals’ special influence upon certain aspects or episodes of the 
warfare between Athens and Sparta, without diminishing their role in the course of the events.  
 
60 Polybius in fact ascribes the Athenian failure in the siege of Syracuse to the incompetence of her 
generals, and more specifically to Nicias’s ever present superstition (B. IX. 19). 
 
61 With the exception, perhaps, of Vrasidas, who was not a King, but a General, and managed to earn 
Thucydides’ gentle remark: “And presenting himself (Vrasidas) before the multitude (for he was not 
ineloquent, though a Lacaedemonian)…” (B.IV.84).  
 
62 Thucydides, B.II 40. 
 
63 At this point it is useful to recall the words by K. Waltz: “The explanation given generally runs this 
way: Democracies of the right kind (i.e., liberal ones) are peaceful in relation to one another. This was 
Immanuel Kant's point. The term he used was Rechtsstaat or republic, and his definition of a republic 
was so restrictive that it was hard to believe that even one of them could come into existence, let alone 
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two or more. And if they did, who can say that they would continue to be of the right sort or continue 
to be democracies at all? The short and sad life of the Weimar Republic is a reminder. And how does 
one define what the right sort of democracy is?” (“Structural realism after the cold war”, p.2). 
 
64 “But a democracy can only with great difficulty regulate the details of an important undertaking, 
persevere in a fixed design and work out its execution in spite of serious obstacles. It cannot combine 
its measures with secrecy or await their consequences with patience” (Alexis de Tocqueville, 
“Democracy in America”, Vol.I, p.235). 
 
65Carlsnaes, W., Risse T., Simmons B.A., “Handbook of International Relations”, p.167. 
 
66  Boulding used the term image as “the total cognitive, affective, and evaluative structure of the 
behavior unit, or its internal view of itself and its universe” (“The Image”, p.423). 
 
67 “Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Relations”, R.Jervis (p.319). “This is a 
manifestation of the drive to squeeze complex and unrelated events into a coherent pattern. As Francis 
Bacon put it: "the human understanding, from its peculiar nature, easily supposes a greater degree of 
order and equality in things than it really finds”. 
 
68  “Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Relations”, R.Jervis (p.341). 
 
69 Thucydides B. I, 69-70. 
 
70 Thucydides, B. I 140-141.   
 
71 Thucydides B. I 69-70 . 
 
72 “Instead of attacking your enemy, you wait to be attacked, and take the chances of a struggle which 
has been deferred until his power is doubled…Of all Hellenes, Lacaedemonians, you are the only 
people who never do anything: on the approach of an enemy you are content to defend your selves 
against him, not by acts, but by intentions, and seek to overthrow him, not in the infancy but in the 
fullness of his strength”. (Thucydides B. I.69-70). 
 
73 Thucydides, B. I 140-141.   
 
74 However, the war of attrition does not in fact correspond to the traits which were attributed to Athens 
shortly before by the Corinthians, namely that they (Athenians) were swift in action and “pursuing their 
victory to the utmost”. 
 
75  “Principles of War”,ch.III. 
 
76 Thucydides, B. I. 13. 
 
77 Thucydides, B.V.109.     
 
78 R. Gilpin, “War and change in world politics”, 1981. 
 
79  “War is likely to break out only if the decision makers believe that military action will be relatively 
risk free and that the attendant costs will be quite low” ( J. Mearsheimer, “Conventional Deterrence”, 
p.62). 
 
80 Map 6. 
 
81 Thebes and Plateaus were in tense territorial and political antagonism already, since the 6th century 
B.C., and they were powerful centres, but both crammed in the small geographic area of Boeotia. 
 
82 “A political policy seeks either to keep power, to increase power or to demonstrate power” (H. 
Morgenthau, “Politics among nations’’, p. 36). 
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83 Map 7.  
 
84 I, unfortunately, do not know precisely what the ambassador intended to convey to his interlocutors, 
but I do know that Athens, at the order of Pericles, sent him away back and his mission was vainly 
ended. Taking into account the earlier artfully vague diplomatic efforts from Sparta, as well as the 
indignation and resoluteness in the Athenian camp, It would not be inconsequential to surmise that the 
ambassador was about to present certain, already in the past, articulated proposals, but on different 
pretextual grounds.  
 
85 “The defensive army, on the contrary, should endeavour, by all means, to neutralize the first forward 
movement of its adversary, protracting operations as long as possible while not compromising the fate 
of the war, and deferring a decisive battle until the time when a portion of the enemy's forces are either 
exhausted by labours, or scattered for the purpose of occupying invaded provinces, masking fortified 
places, covering sieges, protecting the line of operations, depots, &c.” (B. Jomini, “The art of war”, 
p.325). 
 
86 Contrary to the greater part of the literature on this subject, H. Delbruck maintains that “the 
execution of this decision (to let the Athenian countryside be burnt away by the Lacaedemonians) is a 
strategic deed that can be compared favorably with any victory” (“Warfare in antiquity”, p. 137). 
 
87 It is indicative of the intensity of the confrontational politics in Athens at the commencement of the 
Peloponnesian War, that Cleon’s’ opposition to Pericles was so fierce so as to be culminated in the 
latter’s removal from the office out of accusations for embezzlement (Grote, “History of Greece”, 
p.406).  
 
88 “As for the dictum that war is a necessary evil, the Rationalist emphasizes the noun, evil (“war is 
inescapable evil”), while the Revolutionist emphasizes the adjective necessary (“war is a regrettable 
necessity”). M. Wight, “International Theory: The three traditions”, p.212. 
 
89 “The evolution of international society” (p. 51-52). One can also spot it in the remarkable “Melian 
dialogue” of Thucydides, where Athenian envoys to the island of Melos, arrogantly suggest to the local 
leaders that “For we want to make you ours with the least trouble to ourselves, and it is for the interests 
of us both that you should not be destroyed” (B.V.89). 
 
90 Surely not to “morale”, contrary to Livy’s relative oversimplification (B.32.21), who epitomizes the 
all-time transformable morale of the combatants as “the fortune of war”: “It is the fortune of war which 
imparts confidence to the demands of one side and takes it away from those of the other”. 
 
91 B.V.102. 
 
92 B. II.54. 
 
93 M. Wight, “International Theory: The three traditions”, p.45. 
 
94 Polybius, B. 6, 43. 
 
95 “There are two ways of rising to be a prince, says Machiavelli, through ability, or through favour  or 
luck (per virtù o per fortuna)”, (M. Wight, ““Four  seminal thinkers in international theory: 
Macchiavelli, Grotius, Kant  and Mazzini””, p.78). 
 
96 H.D.F Kitto, “The Greeks”, p.139. 
 
97 B. II, 65. Thucydides also states that “under his guidance Athens was safe, and reached the height of 
her greatness in his time. When the war began he showed that here too he had formed a true estimate of 
the Athenian power. He survived the commencement of hostilities two years and six months; and, after 
his death, his foresight was even better appreciated than during his life.”  (B. II, 65).  
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98 “There were other and worse forms of lawlessness which the plague introduced at Athens. Men who 
had hitherto concealed what they took pleasure in, now grew bolder. For, seeing the sudden change,—
how the rich died in a moment, and those who had nothing immediately inherited their property,—they 
reflected that life and riches were alike transitory, and they resolved to enjoy themselves while they 
could, and to think only of pleasure.  Who would be willing to sacrifice himself to the law of honour  
when he knew not whether he would ever live to be held in honour ? The pleasure of the moment and 
any sort of thing which conduced to it took the place both of honour and of expediency.  No fear of 
Gods or law of man deterred a criminal. Those who saw all perishing alike, thought that the worship or 
neglect of the Gods made no difference. For offences against human law no punishment was to be 
feared; no one would live long enough to be called to account. Already a far heavier sentence had been 
passed and was hanging over a man's head; before that fell, why should he not take a little pleasure?” 
(Thucydides, B.II, 53).    
     
99 After Pericles’ death the succession to the leadership was an issue to be solved within the 
Democratic Party only, given that the oligarchs and the aristocrats didn’t yet possess enough leverage 
to impose their will on internal affairs in Athens (something that radically changed after the disaster in 
Sicily some years later). The opposing camps were led by Cleon and the other by Nicias. Cleon was a 
gifted general (he ceased the island of Sphacteria in 425 B.C. highly important for Sparta’s security) 
and unscrupulous politician, whose contribution to the city’s general improvement is rather 
intentionally downgraded by Thucydides. Nicias, on the other hand, was certainly less popular and 
pompous compared to Cleon and his tense submissive character was about to show its true colours 
during the disastrous campaign to Sicily. In any case both emerged quickly as political personalities 
solely because of Pericles death. 
 
100 This is exactly what Sparta attempted to do in the case of the island of Zacynthus, where 
Peloponnesians dispatched 100 war ships, a considerably important number in relation to the fleet sizes 
of that period and in sharp contrast to the established common view that the Spartans operated 
exclusively on the land and not on the sea or in the illustrious case of the town of Plateaus, where, 
literally, they built its population within the city walls (erecting new walls outside and along the walls 
of their houses) , until its citizens surrendered two years after the commencement of the siege (429-427 
B.C.). 
 
101 E. Luttwak (“Give War a Chance”, p. 38). 
 
102 B. II, 65. 
 
103 Thucydides (B. VI.89). 
 
104 As A.Moravcik calls it “Liberalism and International Relations theory” (p.1). 
 
105 Again in the same work of  A. Moravcik I meet the statement that “ the most fundamental premise 
of Liberal political theory is that politics is embedded in a social context, which decisively (and I stress 
“decisively”) constraints the purposes and possibilities of government”, but also – and this in fact 
confirms our supposition about Athens’ not truly democratic democracy -  it can be further said that 
“this pluralist conception of society leads Liberals to reject the notion, often falsely attributed to them, 
that there exists an automatic harmony of interest between individuals, social groups…to the contrary, 
politics is always problematic, since it involves conflict between competing, sometimes 
incommensurable, private goals. A conflict-less society, as Mill and de Tocqueville most vigorously 
asserted, would be profoundly illiberal”. (ibid, p.7) 
 
106  K. Waltz, “Theory of International politics”, (p.65). 
 
107E. Mead, “Makers of modern strategy: military thought from Machiavelli to Hitler”, p.182. 
 
108 Thucydides B. III, 39-40. 
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109 That Mytilene did not revolt, but rebelled by taking sides with Sparta and precisely this “is far more 
atrocious than if they had been led by motives of ambition to take up arms against us on their own 
account” (Thucydides B. III, 39-40). 
 
110 That “for men naturally despise those who court them, but respect those who do not give way to 
them; yet it is not too late to punish them as their crimes deserve… and mercy should be reserved for 
the merciful, and not thrown away upon those who will have no compassion on us, and who must by 
the force of circumstances always be our enemies” (Thucydides B. III, 39-40).  And furthermore: 
“Chastise them as they deserve, and prove by an example to your other allies that rebellion will be 
punished with death. If this is made quite clear to them, your attention will no longer be diverted from 
your enemies by wars against your own allies” (ibid). 
 
111 Republic, 423b. 
 
112 Corcyra, in short, was supposed to be part of the Athenian camp, but the oligarchs, taking advantage 
of the concurrent situation in the case of Mytilene, attempted to take on power and neutralize the 
island, of course, in favor of Sparta. 
 
113 (Thucydides B. III, 70-72). 
 
114 “Pretext” is the word that lies behind the lines in the ancient text as well: “The Athenians are a much 
more convincing argument of peace than any words of mine can be. They are the greatest power in 
Hellas; they come hither with a few ships to spy out our  mistakes; though we are their natural enemies, 
they assume the honourable name of allies, and under this flimsy pretence turn our enmity to good 
account”. (Thucydides, B. IV 60). 
 
115 Thucydides,B. IV 60. 
 
116 This is not an exaggeration, considering the specific era and its consequent level of technological 
evolution; in other words it was not self evident that a state’s rumour could travel rapidly around, based 
on detailed reports of its behaviour .   
 
117 “And at some future day, when they see that we are exhausted, they are sure to come again with a 
larger armament, and attempt to bring all Sicily under their yoke” (Thucydides, B. IV 60). 
 
118 This is clear out of Thucydides general remarks in relation to him, something that also supports with 
fervour H. Delbruck: “The description of Thucydides and his judgement of Cleon in this 
matter…Thucydides is unconditionally, exclusively and completely right.” (“Warfare in Antiquity”, 
p.127).   
 
119 Map 8. 
 
120 H. Delbruck considers, indeed, as herculean an effort as the Spartans demonstrated in this case, 
supporting their uniqueness and justifying their eventual defeat by fortuitous facts as well: “Small as 
the band of Spartan hoplites was, the Athenians still did not wish to attack them directly…they 
therefore held back their hoplites and released against the Spartans a huge mass of unarmored 
men…who threw stones. To these overwhelming numbers, swarming on them from all sides, the 
Spartans finally succumbed..Of special note in this case was the fact that the noise of the mass 
prevented the Spartans from understanding their leaders’ commands” (“Warfare in Antiquity”, p.127).  
  
121 Reference is made to the work of G. Allison on his well known three models of decision making, 
i.e. “rational actor or unitary government model”, “organizational behaviour model” and 
“governmental politics model or bureaucratic politics model”.  It is noted that the third model of 
“governmental politics” can be properly seen, according to the writer himself, as a part of the two 
previous models, a fact that finds room in our case as well (G. Allison-P. Zelikow, “Essence of 
decision”). 
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122 They were the real “Spartiates”, in relation to the “Mothakes” (free men raised as Spartans), 
“Peroikoi” (freedmen) and “Helots” (the slaves). 
 
123 The slaves, “helots”, constituted the pillar of the society in terms of craftsmanship and every day 
trivial work just of course as in many other cities of that era, but with a major difference: the soldiers, 
who were considered to be “genuine” citizens were, by law, excluded from any interaction with the rest 
of the population, something that in the long run was lowering down the city’s power to narrow 
numbers. 
 
124 Lanchester F.W., “Mathematics in Warfare in The World of Mathematics”, Vol. 4 (1956) 
Ed. Newman, J.R., Simon and Schuster, 2138-2157. 
 
125 Note is to be  made to the well known work of Senator J. Fulbright, “The Arrogance of Power”, 
Random House, 1966 and his specific remarks in the conclusions referring to U.S. politics, but echoing 
as well in our  case: “there are two Americas. One is the America of Lincoln and Adlai Stevenson (see 
Pericles); the other is the America of Teddy Roosevelt and the modern hyper patriots (see Cleon). One 
is generous and humane, the other narrowly egoistical; one is self-critical, the other self-righteous; one 
is sensible, the other romantic; one is good-humored, the other solemn; one is inquiring, the other 
pontificating; one is moderate, the other filled with passionate intensity; one is judicious and the other 
arrogant in the use of great power”. 
 
126 “Pericles”, XXXI. 
 
127 “Of all the accidents of this war, this same fell out the most contrary to the opinion of the 
Grecians. For they expected that the Lacaedemonians should never, neither by famine nor whatsoever 
other necessity, have been constrained to deliver up their arms, but have died with them in their hands, 
fighting as long as they had been able, and would not believe that those that yielded were like to those 
that were slain” (Thucydides, B.IV.40). 
 
128 To quote the Duke of Wellington in the Quebec campaign against others who thought of it as one of 
the most brilliantly executed operations in military history.  
 
129 Map 9. 
 
130 It’s not coincidental that Thucydides himself, the great historian, was along with Efkles the two 
Athenian generals assigned in this region. 
 
131 To this specifically attests H. Delbruck’s observation that “The Athenians lost the battle because of 
the lack of ability of Cleon, who in his insolent thoughtlessness, exposed the army to an attack just as it 
had gone from a battle formation into march formation” (“War in Antiquity”, p.131). 
 
132  Baron de Jomini remarks in his precious work “Art of War” that “Strategy, as has already been 
explained, is the art of bringing the greatest part of the forces of an army upon the important point of 
the theater of war or of the zone of operations. Tactics is the art of using these masses at the points to 
which they shall have been conducted by well-arranged marches; that is to say, the art of making them 
act at the decisive moment and at the decisive point of the field of battle.” ( p.324). 
 
133 Alcibiades is indeed brought to one’s attention by Thucydides immediately after the signature of the 
peace of Nicias, for which the Athenian politician was extremely disappointed: “This difference arising 
between the Lacaedemonians and the Athenians, it was presently wrought upon by such also of Athens 
as desired to have the peace dissolved.  Amongst the rest was Alcibiades, the son of Clinias, a man, 
though young in years, yet in the dignity of his ancestors honoured as much as any man of what city so 
ever. Who was of opinion that it was better to join with the Argives, not only for the matter itself, but 
also out of stomach labouring to cross the Lacaedemonians, because they had made the peace, by the 
means of Nicias and Laches, without him, for his youth they had neglected and not honoured as for the 
ancient hospitality between his house and them had been requisite; … But supposing himself on all 
hands disparaged, he both opposed the peace at first, alleging that the Lacaedemonians would not be 
constant and that they had made the peace only to get the Argives by that means away from them and 
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afterwards to invade the Athenians again when they should be destitute of their friends; and also, as 
soon as this difference was on foot, he sent presently to Argos of himself, willing them with all speed 
to come to Athens, as being thereunto invited, and to bring with them the Elian’s and Mantineans to 
enter with the Athenians into a league, the opportunity now serving, and promising that he would help 
them all he could”  (B.V.43). 
 
134 For instance, A. Vlachos argued (Thucydides’ Bias, 59&c.) that Alcibiades could have brought to a 
happy end for the Athenians their Sicilian Expedition, if it wasn’t for Nicias. 
 
135  Like Donald Kagan, who, in his volume on the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war has reviewed 
and analyzed its antecedents and tried to prove that even the war was not inevitable and need not have 
occurred. 
 
136 Quite indicative is the following passage from Thucydides, when Alcibiades speaks to the Spartans: 
“But as for us, when we had the charge of the whole, we thought it reason, by what form it was grown 
most great and most free and in which we received it, in the same to preserve it. For though such of us 
as have judgment do know well enough what the democracy is, and I no less than another (insomuch as 
I could inveigh against it; but of confessed madness nothing can be said that is new), yet we thought it 
not safe to change it when you our enemies were so near us” (B. VI.89). 
 
137 It is useful to recall the prospects of the weak states in the balance of power from the mouth already 
of Plutarch: “For he considered that the Greek states which were weak would be preserved by mutual 
support when once they had been bound as it were by the common interest, and that just as the 
members of the body have a common life and breath because they cleave together in a common 
growth, but when they are drawn apart and become separate they wither away and decay, in like 
manner the several states are ruined by those who dissever their common bonds, but are augmented by 
mutual support, when they become parts of a great whole and enjoy a common foresight.” (Plutarch’s 
Lives, Aratus, XXIV). 
 
138 After the concluding of the fifty years' peace and the league which followed, and when those 
ambassadors which were sent for out of the rest of Peloponnesus to accept the said peace were departed 
from Lacedaemon, the Corinthians (the rest going all to their own cities), turning first to Argos, entered 
into treaty with some of the Argive magistrates to this purpose:  that the Lacaedemonians having made 
a peace and league with the Athenians, their hitherto mortal enemies, tending not to the benefit, but to 
the enslaving of Peloponnesus, it behoved them to consider of a course for the safety of the same, and 
to make a decree that any city of the Grecians that would, and were a free city, and admitted the like 
and equal trials of judgment with theirs, might make a league with the Argives for the one mutually to 
aid the other; and to assign them a few men, with absolute authority from the state, to treat with; and 
that it should not be motioned to the people, to the end that, if the multitude would not agree to it, it 
might be unknown that ever they had made such a motion; affirming that many would come into this 
confederacy upon hatred to the Lacaedemonians (Thucydides, B.VI.27). 
 
139 R. Jervis, “Cooperation under the security dilemma”, p. 189. 
 
140 “The makers of modern strategy warfare”, p.190. 
 
141  Plutarch (Alcibiades, 14) and Thucydides (B.V.45) attest to the fact that Spartan ambassadors were 
sent to Athens over the interpretation of the treaty’s stipulations, but Alcibiades managed to proceed 
with secret deliberations with them and afterwards did not hesitate to undermine their credibility in 
front of the Athenian citizens and therefore nip in the bud every intention for détente between the 
belligerent parties. This successful machination was the ticket for Alcibiades to become General and at 
the same time discredit even more Nicias as a politician to the eyes of the Athenian public. 
 
142 Contrary to the famous “Byzantine” diplomacy which was the first to serve in practice the purposes 
set by the state and managed to accomplish significant successes within its remit. 
 
143 Plutarch, “Alcibiades”, 15. 
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144 “Here too the essential “billiard ball” or black box model of the realists was retained and there 
remained a tendency to anthropomorphize state entities in order to compare them” (Fergunson H.– 
Mansbach R. W., The elusive quest continues. Theory and global politics, p.140). 
 
145 Thucydides B. V.  
 
146 “E il giudizio nostro non puo non coincidere con quello dell’antico storico della guerra 
peloponnesiaca nel ritenere che questa fatale avventura determino le sorti della Guerra e prepare la 
rovina di Atene” (De Sanctis, Storia dei Greci 2, p. 307). 
 
147 Sun Tzu, “Art of War”, ch.8.  
 
148 In the sense that a great power is actually forced to strive for more gains if she wants to maintain her 
status, let alone to leap forward towards an empire. What Thucydides puts succinctly in the mouth of 
Corcyreans, who tried to attract Athenians to their cause against Corinth: “If any here think that the war 
wherein we may do you service will not at all be, he is in an error and seeth not how the 
Lacedaemonians, through fear of you, are already in labour  of the war; and that the Corinthians, 
gracious with them and enemies to you, making way for their enterprise, assault us now in the way to 
the invasion of you hereafter..” (B.I.33).  
 
149 Thucydides, B. VI,90”. 
 
150 “In this war (Peloponnesian), execution of part or whole of the male population and enslavement of 
the rest became acceptable options… Other forms of brutality are to be noted. From the beginning of 
the war the Spartans executed all those they caught at sea, even neutrals (11.67.4), and the Athenians 
used this as justification for some executions of individuals who fell into their hands. There was more 
disposition to hold on to prisoners taken in regular action, who could be used for ransom or bargaining; 
not all of them were kept in the most comfortable conditions…The voice of humanity was never stilled, 
and, even towards the end of the war, Callicratidas, for example (p. 491), proclaimed himself against 
the enslavement of Greeks (Xen. Hell. 1.6.14—1 j75), but, in general, the realities were harsh.” 
(C.A.H. 5, page 393). 
 
151 J. Mearsheimer, “The tragedy of great power politics”, p.46. 
 
152 D. Singer, “International Conflict, the three levels of analysis on K. Waltz’ Man, State and War”.  
 
153 A.Momigliano makes exactly a distinction between the immediate and the remote causes of the 
Peloponnesian war, attributing to Thucydides a certain level of negligence or indifference to gathering 
more data from ancient times, before the commencement of the war. However Momigliano readily 
adds, that the remote causes, as defined by Polybius (namely isolated episodes of past history rather 
than all-pervading economic, social, religious and psychological factors), do not represent a significant 
object of analysis in the handling of the war phenomenon (“Secondo contributo alla storia degli studi 
classici e del mondo antico” p.18 and p.25) . 
 
154 This tense friction between Persian empire and Athens and her allies, ended up with the “Peace of 
Callias” (an Athenian politician), which was in fact a “hands up” agreement, resembling those of 
Americans during their fight for independence with the other powers of that era: Athens (autonomy of 
Ionian states in Asia minor, prohibition of Persian ships in the Aegean) and Persia (no Athenian 
presence in Persia’s possessions in Asia minor, Libya or Egypt) would maintain their own sphere of 
influence without the other’s intervention. (Diodorus Sicilus, B.12.4 (4-6).)   
 
155 Thucydides, B.III.59-64. 
 
156 Map 10. 
 
157 Thucydides B.I. 35-36. 
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158 “We sailed to Sicily hoping in the first place to conquer the Sicilian cities; then to proceed against 
the Hellenes of Italy; and lastly, to make an attempt on the Carthaginian dominions, and on Carthage 
itself. If all or most of these enterprises succeeded, we meant finally to attack Peloponnesus, bringing 
with us the whole Hellenic power which we had gained abroad, besides many barbarians whom we 
intended to hire—Iberians and the neighbouring tribes, esteemed to be the most warlike barbarians that 
now are. Of the timber which Italy supplies in such abundance we meant to build numerous additional 
triremes, and with them to blockade Peloponnesus (Thucydides, B. VI.90)”. 
 
159 See in particular J. Mearsheimer, “The tragedy of Great power Politics” (p. 19).  
 
160  This echoes Morgenthau’s realism but also this is also the explanation provided by many authors 
upon Athenian campaign to Sicily: “It was quite in the nature of things that the Athenian sea-power, 
predominant in the east, should seek further expansion in the west. An energetic establishment of 
Athenian influence in that region was recommended by the political situation” (J.B.Bury, “A History of 
Greece to the death of Great Alexander”, p. 485). 
 
161 “Force and Statecraft”, Gordon Craig, Alexander George, p. 170. 
 
162 For the purposes of this study, I posit that “theory is a general statement that describes and explains 
the causes or effects of classes of phenomena.” (S.Van Evera, “Guide to methods for students of 
political science”, p.5). 
 
163 Following J. Mearsheimer’s argument that “One can distinguish between global hegemons, which 
dominate the world and regional hegemons, which dominate distinct geographical areas. My argument 
is that except for the unlikely event wherein one state achieves clear-cut nuclear superiority, it is 
virtually impossible for any state to achieve global hegemony” (“The tragedy of Great Power Politics, 
p.40-41)”. 
 
164 It is quoted in J. Mearsheimer, “The tragedy of Great Power Politics” (p. 34). 
 
165 See for instance again J. Mearsheimer, “The tragedy of Great Power Politics” (p. 46) and his 
examples concerning Nazi Germany’s expansion. 
 
166  H.J. Morgenthau, “Politics amongst nations”, (p.4-15). By this notion I hint at the notion of 
“cosmo-icon” in fact, which I will examine at a later stage. The notion of “prudence” points to the 
appropriate answer given to the “Goldilocks problem” in international relations, namely that the course 
to be chosen among the ones presenting certain extreme options, is the one which is characterised as 
“just right”. 
 
167  That should be Thucydides’ hint that Athens could be lured into this affair by mere financial 
calculations, based on Egesta’s financial assets (Thucydides, B.VI,8). Certainly, I cannot subscribe to 
that, since Thucydides himself clearly reminds that many myths concerning the presence of Greece in 
Sicily were already known to the prudent Greek politicians and in this case, they were spelled out by 
Nicias: “And the truth is, there are neither so many men of arms as they boast of, nor doth it appear that 
there are so many Grecians there in all as the several cities have every one reckoned for their own 
number. Nay, even Greece hath much belied itself, and was scarce sufficiently armed in all this war 
past” (Thucydides, B. VI, 17). Another reason of similarly limited credibility could be Alcibiades claim 
that Athens embarked upon the campaign in order to take advantage of Italy’s ample timber, which 
would serve to build more ships and enforce her power further so as to encircle Sparta in the long run  
(Thucydides B. VI, 69). 
 
168 “For when one is grown mightier than the rest, men use not only to defend themselves against him 
when he shall invade, but to anticipate him, that he invade not at all”. (Thucydides, B. VI, 18). 
 
169 “The citizens came to take farewell, one of an acquaintance, another of a kinsman, another of a son, 
and as they passed along were full of hope and full of tears; hope of conquering Sicily, tears because 
they doubted whether they would ever see their friends again… Nevertheless their spirits revived at the 
sight of the armament in all its strength and of the abundant provision which they had made. The 
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strangers and the rest of the multitude came out of curiosity, desiring to witness an enterprise of which 
the greatness exceeded belief…” (Thucydides, VI, 30). 
 
170  To give an indicating parallelism of the magnitude of the Athenian Forces, the British Empire 
invaded in 1758 Quebec via an amphibious assault in Louisbourg. To accomplish such a task the 
British amassed 39 ships with about 14,000 sailors, and a further landing force of 12,870 soldiers. This 
gave them a comfortable superiority over the French who had 10 French ships with 3,870 sailors, and 
another 3,920 soldiers inside the fortress itself. 
 
171  Thucydides, B.VI  47-49. 
 
172 Athens’ radical democrats managed to sap Alcibiades’ reputation within the party by accusing him 
of being the possible mastermind behind the affair of “cutting the Hermes’ heads” (“Hermokopides”) 
with further religious and political implications and they recalled him to Athens. However, Alcibiades, 
unraveling his multifaceted personality, escaped on the way back from Syracuse and defected to 
Sparta. This act played a more important role for Athens than for Sparta in relation to the final outcome 
of the war. 
 
173  “The two armies advanced; the Syracusians to fight for their country, and every man for his life 
now, and liberty hereafter; on the opposite side the Athenians, to gain a new country and to save the old 
from the disaster of defeat; the Argives and the independent allies eager to share the good things of 
Sicily, and, if they returned victorious, to see their own homes once more. The courage of the subject 
allies was chiefly inspired by a lively consciousness that their only chance of life was in victory; they 
also had a distant hope that, if they assisted the Athenians in overthrowing others, their own yoke might 
be lightened” (Thucydides B. VI, 69). 
 
174 “Thucydides, B. VI,90”. 
 
175 Even if one surmises that Alcibiades did not divulge every component of the Athenian strategy, he 
was, nevertheless, felt impelled to build further upon his notable egoism and promote his image 
amongst the notoriously suspicious Spartans, especially since the chances of his possible return to 
Athens were remote. 
 
176 Athens imported corn, pigs, and cheese from Sicily, metal-ware from Etruria and woven stuffs from 
Carthage: “all the pleasant things of Sicily and Italy were brought together at Athens” (Ps. –Xen. De 
rep.Ath.ii.7). 
 
177 J. Mearsheimer, “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics”, p.58. 
 
178 Map 11. 
 
179 J. Mearsheimer, “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics”, p.13. 
 
180 G. Bainley, “The causes of war”, p. 57-67. 
 
181 J. Mearsheimer, “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics”, p.22. 
 
182 As Thucydides puts it (B. VII.87): “Of all the Hellenic actions which took place in this war, or 
indeed, as I think, of all Hellenic actions which are on record, this was the greatest-the most glorious to 
the victors, the most ruinous to the vanquished; for they were utterly and at all points defeated, and 
their sufferings were prodigious. Fleet and army perished from the face of the earth; nothing was saved, 
and of the many who went forth, few returned home. Thus ended the Sicilian expedition”. It is also 
noted that Generals Nicias and Demosthenes were executed, in spite of Gylippus’ firm will to bring 
them back safe to Greece with a view, on top of everything else, to capitalize on his triumph.  
      Plutarch narrates also the resounding moral blast to the Athenian population as well: “It is said that 
the Athenians would not believe their loss, in a great degree because of the person who first brought 
them news of it. For a certain stranger, it seems, coming to Piraeus, and there sitting in a barber's shop, 
began to talk of what had happened, as if the Athenians already knew all that had passed; which the 
149 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
barber hearing, before he acquainted anybody else, ran as fast as he could up into the city, addressed 
himself to the Archons, and presently spread it about in the public Place. On which, there being 
everywhere, as may be imagined, terror and consternation, the Archons summoned a general assembly, 
and there brought in the man and questioned him how he came to know. And he, giving no satisfactory 
account, was taken for a spreader of false intelligence and a disturber of the city, and was, therefore, 
fastened to the wheel and racked a long time, till other messengers arrived that related the whole 
disaster particularly. So hardly was Nicias believed to have suffered the calamity which he had often 
predicted” (“Life of Nicias”). 
 
183 C.Clausewitz, “On war”, p. 127-132. 
 
184 “Hegemony” in the descriptive sense given by J. Meirsheimer (“The Tragedy of Great Powers’ 
Politics”, p.2), rather than the prescriptive one given by H. Bull in “Anarchic Society” (p.214-215). 
 
185 Thucydides’ remark at this point is quite illuminating in order to depict the aftermath of Sicilian 
amongst the Athenians: “Whichever way they looked there was trouble; they were overwhelmed by 
their calamity, and were in fear and consternation unutterable” Thucydides, (B. VIII, ch. 1). 
 
186 J. Mearsheimer, “The Tragedy of great power politics”, p.139. 
 
187 Islands of Hios, Erithres, Klazomenes, Ephesus, Teas, Miletus. 
 
188 Thucydides, B. VIII, 18. 
 
189 For example, in the case of the effort of the island of Miletus to defect along with other towns, from 
the Athenian league in 412 B.C., it became ostentatiously visible the opportunistic attitude of Persia, 
who first enmeshed Sparta into a local warfare against an Asian king in the area of Iasos, very close to 
Miletus, and then provided further assistance to Spartans in the area. In view of the subsequent growing 
resentment of significant number of the Lacaedemonians at characteristic Persian intrigues, there came 
a new pact between Theramenes (Peloponnesian) and Tissafernis (Persian), which was supposed to 
commit the two sides to help each other “to their best possible effort” (Thucydides, B. VIII, 37). 
 
190 The smaller states inclination to search for a third party arbitration for their own problems is 
pertinent enough: “Great powers—as opposed to middle or small states—are in general less likely to 
submit to third party settlement of their disputes; this is particularly so when there is power disparity 
between the disputants. It has been rightly noted that the great powers of the Hellenistic Age, including 
Rome, never agreed to have their disputes arbitrated. But it is not so accurate to assert that the great 
powers of the Greek east never went to mediation, and it would certainly be incorrect to state that the 
Hellenistic kings responded to offers of mediation with anger or affront (though they might, and often 
did, respond with a cynical insincerity (Eilers C., “Diplomats and Diplomacy in the Roman World”, 
p.40). 
 
191  As is the case with A. Watson, who explains the end of the Peloponnesian War with the Persian aid, 
but neglects every other factor, such as the Spartan military prowess or the Athenian domestic politics 
(“The evolution of international society” p. 62). 
 
192 After the important victory in the island of Simi and other military successes, Lacaedemonians put 
forward the plan of gradual disengagement from Persia and proposed the substitution of the earlier 
bilateral pacts with more “balanced” ones, something that plausibly acerbated Tessafernes and caused 
his immediate departure from Hios, where he was temporarily located. 
 
193 Alcibiades’ manipulations became, of course, perceivable to the Athenians, a significant part of 
which really were in favor of his return to the city. Most of them were renowned oligarchs, who 
deemed his prior ousting from the city as a fatal mistake of the Democratic Party, a belief which was 
further enhanced by the current, unfavorable for Athens, turn of the events. Under these circumstances, 
internal politics in Athens were dominated by the gimmicks of Alcibiades and it was a matter of time, 
before oligarchs would take the reins within the city, with the invariable contribution of Persia to this 
end. 
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194 Thucydides (B. VIII, 47) cites at this point: “In giving this advice to Tessafernes and the King, now 
that he had passed under their protection, Alcibiades said what he really thought to be most for their 
interests. But he had another motive; he was preparing the way for his own return from exile. He knew 
that, if he did not destroy his country altogether, the time would come when he would persuade his 
countrymen to recall him; and he thought that his arguments would be most effectual if he were seen to 
be on intimate terms with Tessafernes.  And the result proved that he was right... He would at the same 
time make Tessafernes their friend; but they must establish an oligarchy, and abolish the villainous 
democracy which had driven him out”. 
 
195   The oligarchs in Athens, under the leadership of Peisandros came into deliberations with 
Tessafernes and Alcibiades, however they failed to reach an agreement, due to the overtly over-
ambitious demands of Persians, who were asking, in essence, the dissolution of Athens’ sovereignty 
(the area of Ionia and the islands of the Eastern Aegean should be handed to Persia, the Great King 
should have the right to build ships in ports, which were located within the Athenian alliance’ limits 
and move unobstructed with his ships, etc.),  something which could not be accepted by the political 
classes in the city. In view of the foregoing, Tessafernes was compelled this time to take first the 
initiative and cast bridges with the Peloponnesians in order to dissuade possible military operations of 
the latter in the coastline of Asia Minor. 
 
196 “States that are motivated by relative power concerns are likely to forgo large gains in their own 
power, if such gains give rival states even greater power, for smaller national gains that nevertheless 
provide them with a power advantage over their rivals” (J. Mearsheimer, “The Tragedy of Great Power 
Politics”, p. 78). 
 
197 (Thucydides, B. VIII. 58). 
 
198 “...Even when Cyrus the son of the King joined in the war and supplied the Peloponnesian fleet with 
money, they continued to resist, and were at last overthrown, not by their enemies, but by themselves 
and their own internal dissensions” (Thucydides, B.II.28). 
 
199 However, the oligarchs in Athens did not acquire adequate leverage within the army, which, for its 
most part, was located in the island of Samos from where it was trying to dethrone the new regime. 
Thucydides clearly reveals this internal tug of war in Athens (B. VIII. 76). 
 
200 It was indubitable that, as a politician, he had significant influence amongst both political parties in 
Athens and at the same time he had established certain connections with the Persian side as well. At the 
first level he was successful, at the second not to the extent he probably desired; In 410 B.C. after 
endless internal bickering, the democratic regime was reinforced and established in its prior form, i.e. 
before the coming of the 400s. 
 
201 To this end, he was trying to arrange frequent meetings with the Persians, first and foremost for 
communication purposes, namely to plant the seed of insecurity and anxiety in the minds of Spartans 
and then, of course, to create the best possible conditions for Athens’s military operations in the 
Aegean. 
 
202 This limitation of Persia’s assistance to Sparta attests to the fact that during 409-408 B.C., the 
Peloponnesian effectiveness in naval operations subsided considerably and reached its nadir as a 
disaster in the naval battle of Kizikos in 410 B.C., where almost all the ships of the Peloponnesian fleet 
were destroyed or captured by the enemy at Hellespont. 
 
203 Such was the case for example at the naval battle of Cynossema in 411 B.C. when a small Spartan 
fleet provoked the Ionian cities to defect from the Athenian Empire (Thucydides B.VIII, 14-17.) The 
same tactic of instigating revolts in pro-Athenian cities was followed specifically by Peloponnesian 
ships in other islands of the Aegean as well (Rhodes, Euboea, Samos, etc). 
 
204 Lysander maintained balanced relations with Persia and Commander Cyrus (son of the King 
himself), but one can safely deduce from the facts that Alcibiades had indisputably many more political 
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connections within the Great King’s entourage. Lysander’s quick successes in the battlefield (Samos, 
Ephesus) in 407-406 B.C. sparked again the omnipresent mistrust of many Athenians against 
Alcibiades and as a result the latter found recourse to Thrace, where he was sheltered by local war 
lords.  
 
205 Opposite to the island of Lesvos, very close to the Ionian coastline and therefore to the sphere of 
interest of Persia. 
 
206 Aristotle, “Constitution of the Athenians”, 34. There is a controversy in the literature over whether 
this report of Aristotle really refers to this battle and is not confusing the terms of this peace offer with 
previous ones (D. Kagan, “The fall of the Athenian Empire”, p.377).  
 
207 Considering that Callicratidas was killed in this battle, it is not paradoxical to surmise  that this 
important diplomatic move on Sparta’s behalf can be attributed rather to personal initiative of the camp 
of Callicratidas supporters so as to maintain their internal positioning after that defeat and justify their 
role towards powerful Lysander, than to a widespread assent from all the people of Sparta and 
especially her leadership, who after all were already convinced  that the close of the war was imminent. 
To this further attests the fact that the Ionian cities were the ones who first propelled Sparta to 
overcome its constitutional restrictions and assign again Lysander to command the naval operations in 
Eastern Aegean Sea. 
 
208 See Diodorus Siculus “Library” 13.106.1 and Xenophon “Hellenica” 2.2.1. 
 
209 Xenophon, “Hellenica”, 2.2.3. 
 
210 Xenophon, “Hellenica”, 2.1.15-19. 
 
211 To perceive the Spartan approach to the notion of “Great power” or “Empire” it is useful to 
remember the terms of the final peace: (a) The long walls, as well as the walls of Piraeus would be 
destroyed, (b) All the Athenian fleet , apart from twelve ships, would be surrendered to the 
Peloponnesians, (c) the Athenian guards would leave the towns and areas they had occupied, along 
with the Athenian citizens who had acquired the right cultivate lands in foreign countries, (d) the 
political fugitives, oligarchs and aristocrats, would return to Athens and (e) Athens, would, 
thenceforward joint Lacaedemonians to their campaigns in land or sea. 
 
212 Sparta never in fact pursued the annihilation of her rival (Xenophon, Hell. VI, 5, 46-47). 
 
213  That homogeneous stance before morality at war of the Greeks backtracked a little during the 
Hellenistic years:  “Demoralization and class antagonism made extremely acute by the impoverishment 
and proletarian condition of the working class provided favourable conditions for the manoeuvres of 
unscrupulous politicians. These conditions prevails at the same time of the “Social War” and they 
persisted during the first and second Macedonian Wars and the interval between them” (“Social and 
Economic history of the Hellenistic World”, p. 610)”. 
 
214 A. Watson, (“The evolution of international society” p. 51-52). 
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 Chapter Four: Methodology and analysis of the Macedonian wars. 
 
4.1.
 
The strategic environment.  
              First and foremost what has been stressed previously as to the outline of the 
methodology and analysis of the Peloponnesian War is valid also for the chapter in 
question, namely, in a nutshell, chronological approach of the facts to guard their 
consistency and coherence along with an emphasis only on the most pertinent ones for 
the remit of our study. In view of that initial observation, at the beginning of the 3rd 
century, Rome has already mastered all central Italy and enjoyed common and 
widespread borders with the states, which constituted the so called Magna Grecia. The 
Greeks of these states1, remained at that time strongly divided and in order to cope 
with the imminent Roman danger tried to counterbalance it by asking for the help of 
the rising power of Epirus, and its King Pyrrhus2.  In 280 B.C., for the first time, 
Greek and Roman troops had to confront each other in battle field and although the 
Greeks won over their rivals, their victory proved to be only temporary and a 
“Pyrrhic” one indeed3. Since Pyrrhus did not have the vast appurtenances for a large 
scale war campaign against Rome, he soon ceased to represent any serious peril to the 
Romans and all the aforementioned neighbouring Greek states succumbed one after 
another to the newborn Roman Imperium. Epirus’ defeat shall not be construed by its 
limited military resources, which were abundant in reality, but it shall be considered 
as  alarming evidence that these resources were not even enough for a war against 
Rome; in other words, the Pyrrhic wars (279-280 B.C.) highlighted the ascending 
overwhelming power of Rome per se, rather than the weakness of Epirus. It was a 
proof of a growing prudent Roman approach in international relations, based on a cost 
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and benefit analysis in military terms, where coercion is not intertwined with a 
spontaneous war of annihilation, but at first with a carefully contrived war of 
exhaustion. That paradigm was to be a shining beacon for Roman foreign policy 
against Greek states, serving at the same time as a reminder of both the need to “timeo 
Danaos et dona ferentes”4 and the need to constantly exert pressure upon specific 
points of interest, without compromising for less.   
  
              After prevailing  (264-241 B.C.) over the other great power of the western 
Mediterranean region, Carthage, Rome emerged significantly reinforced, but she 
could not yet be considered as a regional hegemon, since she did not hold sway over 
the “distinct geographic area”5 of the eastern Mediterranean region. That said, Rome, 
first of all, had to consolidate her position in the neuralgic area of the Adriatic Sea, 
which could be regarded at that time as its own lebensraum, for plausible commercial 
as well as political reasons. This specific area has been always at the epicentre of the 
Roman geostrategic vision, as it served not only as a buffer zone of protection 
between her and the others, but as a bridge to the East, where the opportunities for 
expansion could be limitless. It is useful here to recall Haushoffer’s organic theory of 
boundaries, which contained also a statement that a state strives to achieve a frontier 
which contains a zone of sparse settlement – a zone outside the living space, separate 
the state from neighbouring states. Walbank accords precisely to the potential of a 
limitless commercial expansion, the existence of a peculiar social structure in Greece 
and in Rome “because of which, both states never ever considered the possibility of 
catering for the proletariat and peasantry and so creating a deeper instead of a wider 
market”6.  
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               The said potential of limitless commercial expansion brings me to its 
overarching at that time underlying setback, which also instigated Rome’s fears for 
security (despite the “neutralizing” effect of the distance that vast maritime 
boundaries, such as Adriatic Sea, may provide) namely maritime piracy. Rostovzeff 
places the utmost importance on the role that the pirates were playing in the procedure 
of the ancient warfare. Parenthetically, it is to be stressed that contemporary 
discussion among scholars in dealing legally with terrorists at international level abuts 
precisely on the notion of “hostis humanis generis” (namely “enemy of the 
mankind”), which in turn remains interwoven with the disruptive activities of pirates 
in the past7. That problem did not only serve for Rome as a stepping stone to spread 
her interests, her culture and consecutively her “geostrategic clout” in Ratzel’s terms, 
but it principally mirrored the inadequacies of the neighbouring countries. 
Considering that the various Hellenistic states8 of the eastern coast of the Adriatic 
Sea, could not deal with the pirates because of lack of any rudimentary coordination 
between them, but also of a sizeable and experienced in this field fleet to chase the 
pirates down, it does not constitute a surprise how fast Rome evaluated this power 
vacuum9 to her benefit and contrived ways to create her first alliances (Macedonians 
were the most powerful Greek, but they missed the vision of a Pan-Hellenic 
government with a common ideological denominator)  and expanded her leverage 
first in Illyria, using the town of Apollonia as a focal point, in 227 B.C. After all, 
Romans had already in the past, intervened diplomatically in favour of the 
Acarnanians, the enemies of the Aetolians (239 B.C.), while they had already in their 
possession Corcyra, many small islands in South Illyria, maintaining also friendly ties 
with Apollonia since 270 B.C. and the important strategic port of Dirrachio. Polybius 
explicitly remarks that Rome set her eyes on this area, because she wanted to secure 
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her eastern neighbourhood in view of the threatening open war front with Carthage10. 
These aspirations were facilitated by the fuzzy situation in Metropolitan Greece, 
where division was a constant composite of the political scene and the pungent 
altercations between the various states an everyday reality. As a result the social 
confrontations were simmering and the poorer classes could be disorientated only by 
the outbreak of a war, which the richer classes used as a tool to cement their rule. And  
that “disorientation imperative” should not be disregarded, given that public 
indignation was really fierce, while the only remarkable effort to solve the said 
intense social problems was made by King of Sparta Cleomenes the 3rd, who, 
however lost the battle of Selassia in 222 B.C. by the alliance of the Achaeans and 
Macedonians. In view of the foregoing, Phillip’s sharp eye on the Adriatic, during at 
least the first period of his ascendancy in the throne, is better construed, following 
many writers, by a mere indeed, though exceeding, influence of Doson’s advisers on 
him than by any coherent strategic vision11 under any long term perspective. Besides, 
Macedonia had never in the past striven seriously to extend its control on the Adriatic 
coast. Thus, it could be seen as paradoxical the fact that what was already evident for 
Rome from the scratch, was not evident for Macedonia for a long time: the strategic 
value of the Adriatic Sea and its maritime commerce. 
 
4.2.War causes and war pretexts: “The clouds that loom in the west”
 
.  
            I chose deliberately to delve into the main facets of the Macedonian Wars, by 
using as a benchmark the formation in 223 B.C. by the King of Macedonia, Antigonos 
Doson, of the “Common Alliance”, (bringing together the Achaeans under the 
Kingship of Aratus and other Hellenistic states), in the backyard of which the Roman 
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influence over the neighbouring region started to unfold and to become for the first 
time evident to the rest of the Greek states as well. A further attestation to this choice 
is the plausible observation of Polybius: “It was at this same period that the Romans 
for the first time crossed Illyricum and that part of Europe with an army. The history 
of this expedition must be carefully studied by those who wish to understand clearly 
the story and to trace the progress and consolidation of the Roman Empire”12. 
Besides, this is precisely the time that “history becomes a connected whole: the affairs 
of Italy and Libya are involved with those of Asia and Greece, and the tendency of all 
is to unity”13. The hardwired trait into this alliance nevertheless was not the supposed 
will for a cooperation and better coordination against any outside threat to the 
interests of the states concerned, but the resounding reaffirmation of the great power’s 
will upon the other members of the Alliance, implicitly or, if the case may be, 
explicitly.  
 
              Alliances of that ilk do not border with any notion of Grotian cooperative 
structures, but rather with the Machiavellian idea of bringing forth a great power 
together with its satellites-states so as to streamline their communication with an 
institutional cloak. It was indeed rather prophetic, what the leader of the Aetolians, 
Agelaus, stressed at the peace Conference after the war that the Common Alliance, 
led by Macedonia, fought against Aetolia, Sparta and other Greek states (220-217 
B.C.) in Naupactus: “it is evident even to those who give but scanty attention to 
affairs of state that whether the Carthaginians beat the Romans or the Romans the 
Carthaginians in this war, it is not in the least likely that the victors will be content 
with the sovereignty of Italy and Sicily, but they are sure to come here and extend 
their ambitions and their forces beyond the bounds of justice..if once you wait for 
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these clouds that loom in the west to settle on Greece, I very much fear lest we may 
all of us find these truces and wars and game at which we now play so rudely 
interrupted that we shall be fair to pray to the gods to give us still the power of 
fighting with each other and making peace when we will, the power in a word of 
deciding our differences for ourselves”14.  
 
             What Agelaus expresses in a remarkable way and almost in terms of 
contemporary International Relations theory, merits and demands certain further 
elaboration: (a) what is already conspicuous to the ancient analyst of foreign policy is 
the systemic nature of the international relations; he is not disorientated by a single 
warfare, but he is capable of illuminating the big picture, of synthesizing separate 
events, between distinct powers in different places and depicting a common pattern of 
state behaviour. The insatiable appetite for power and the struggle for survival lie at 
the epicentre of this reasoning (b) attempting that synthesis comes with an end, it is 
not formulated in vitro; it targets in fact at preventing similar incidents in the future. 
The ancient analyst synthesizes in order to reach a correct prognosis irrespective of 
any moral15 principles or ideological affiliations, and (c) Agelaus foresees the 
incoming change of the traditional up to that moment “paradigm”; the wars between 
the Greek states did not constitute the proper framework of honing any social and 
military protective machinery against an outside enemy like Rome. That was the case 
for example with the later use of gladius by the Roman soldiers, who were thus 
enabled to pierce through the Macedonian phalanx and defeat their enemies in a close 
battle16. I have to make however crystal clear at this point that the “revolution in 
military affairs (“RMA”)” which Rome brought with her mainly through the orderly 
use of the short sword (“gladius”) against the long Macedonian spear (“sarissa”) was 
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of paramount importance17 indeed in the long run, but not immediately visible during 
the Macedonian Wars18. Thus it would not be accurate to claim that these Wars were 
determined by this factor only, but that they were simply influenced significantly: 
“the phalanx like the dinosaurs perished of overspecialization”19 and that will do20. 
Military analysis of tactics and strategy in the Macedonian wars constitutes a useful 
source for highlighting certain aspects of the states’ foreign policies, but it does not 
constitute the preponderant basis for the deduction of conclusions that command 
general assent.  Indicatively, in the words of H. Delbruck, “strangely enough, it never 
came to a completely fair test of the battle validity of the two methods of combat. The 
two battles in which the Macedonians succumbed to the Romans, Cynoscephalae and 
Pydna, were so greatly influenced by fortuitous events that the general validity of 
their results could be contested and the third battle, Magnesia, where the Macedonian-
Syrian Empire lost to the Romans, shows no phalanx formation at all, according to the 
admittedly completely fantasy like battle reports we have” 21. 
               
           The expansion of Rome in Illyria22 was not halted after the capture of 
Apollonia in 227 B.C. Roman foreign policy showed from the scratch that it did 
operate neither sentimentally nor tentatively, but on carefully elaborated steps, which 
constitute the crux of every “realistic” state action. Expansion was therefore 
rationalized since Rome regarded its power as a constant to be preserved against 
threats and to be enlarged at any given chance and without unreasonable risk. In view 
of this fundamental observation, peace itself was not seen as a policy guideline, but as 
a mere condition for enhancing relative power. 
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           During the spring of 219 B.C. a powerful fleet of Lefkius Aimilius Paulus and 
Marcus Livius Salinator reached the Illyrian coast to castigate Demetrius Pharos, a 
then ally of King of Macedonia Philip V. The reasons for this controversy with 
Demetrius Pharos lied in the latter’s initiative to extend his commercial clout over 
various Greek islands, not only upon the ones in the immediate neighborhood 
(Adriatic Sea, Ionian Sea), but even towards the Cyclades (Aegean Sea)23, with a view 
to controlling as many commercial maritime avenues as possible and filling thus the 
emerging vacuum of power in this region. Given that Demetrius Pharos’ power was 
not, apparently, breathtaking in comparison to other Hellenistic states, let alone 
Rome, I can surmise that this served more as a plausible pretext of the Roman 
machinery to put a footstep on the eastern side of the Adriatic Sea24 and attain at once 
two significant goals: (a) a principal bridgehead with a view to closely monitoring the 
significant Macedonian power and (b)  an effective bulwark against any possible 
attempt for expansion from any other state and of course from the long standing 
enemy, namely Carthage25. That Roman policy was premeditated, in search for the 
convenient circumstances to be unraveled was remarkably highlighted by Polybius: 
“They (Romans) looked out for a suitable opportunity and a decent pretext to justify 
them in the eyes of the world. For indeed the Romans were quite rightly very careful 
on this point”26.  
 
             Further to the said observation it is not accidental Polybius’s slightly acerbic 
perusal of the word “happened”, when describing Rome’s next step to Illyria: “For it 
happened that just at this time, Demetrius Pharos was sacking and subduing to his 
authority the cities of Illyria which were subject to Rome”27. The Romans seemed ab 
initio to consider in this specific region only Macedonia as a potential peer 
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competitor, who had to be effectively discounted so as to be restricted down from an 
active international player to a harmless observer of the Roman activity in the Greek 
soil28. That political targeting was becoming an imperative need after Demetrius 
Pharos’ strong advocacy of the Greek states’ unity, in view also of the fact that those 
states that were not yet immediately subjected to Rome, after the latter’s Illyrian 
adventure, remained still  under the rule of another Illyrian King, Skerdilaidas, who 
nevertheless was considered to be more or less pro-Roman. In any case, at the 
beginning of the Macedonian wars, the Romans did not have the support of any other 
state, apart from those on the north of Macedonia, namely, the Illyrians, the 
Athamanians and the Dardanians, which all happened to be outspoken enemies of 
Macedonia. 
 
             Considering that war was the standard operating procedure for the settlement 
of the disputes between the states at that time, it is interesting to ponder over the 
footpath that Rome chose so as to impose her own rule and that was not diplomacy 
per se, but a negotiated power projection, falling rather into the notion of coercion: 
the threats and demands that encourage the adversary to either reverse its action or 
stop what it has been doing. Unlike deterrence, which stresses the prevention of an 
attack or the use of threats by a state to dissuade another state from attacking, 
coercion in this case consists precisely of the use of threats by Rome to reverse the 
acts of aggression by Demetrius Pharos. Certainly, to coerce a state, means practically 
to employ a range of diplomatic and military options. That brings me to the specific 
notion of coercive diplomacy, which “is essentially a diplomatic strategy, one that 
relies on the threat of force rather that the use of force. If force must be used to 
strengthen diplomatic efforts at persuasion, it is employed in an exemplary manner, in 
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the form of quite limited military action, to demonstrate resolution and willingness to 
escalate to high levels of military action if necessary”29. The efficiency of coercion 
abuts obviously on the credibility of the coercer30. Rome seemed and was indeed a 
credible coercer, who disposed all the necessary inducements and punishments to 
convince the Illyrian states that the cost of non-compliance would outweigh the cost 
of compliance. This disposition of these assets mirrors the extent of Roman power, 
which was indeed the “ability to move men in some desired fashion, through 
persuasion, purchase, barter and coercion”31.  However this process to convince 
unavoidably entailed, a counter reaction, what naturally entails a crisis escalation.   
 
4.3. 
     
Rational and irrational actors: Crisis escalation.          
            In 218 B.C. there was a great chance for Philip V of Macedon to inflict a 
preventive and most probably decisive blow to the Roman plans for expansion, 
nipping them in the bud. Rome had been involved in the second war with Carthage, 
and she was forced by the reality on the ground (the adventurous period when 
Hannibal crossed the Alps by war elephants) to concentrate a significant part of her 
military forces towards this end32. Some Illyrian states, as well as Phillip V, started 
indeed to flirt with the idea to take advantage of this favourable concurrence of 
unfortunate events for Rome. Hannibal warmly recommended the invasion of Italy, 
where alone, he affirmed the Romans were vulnerable33. One factor, though, was 
critical and had to be met in order to question Roman premiership: A strong and 
experienced fleet so as to have the strategic luxury to swiftly change the theatre of the 
war and hit with ease at the opponent’s centre of gravity (namely the Clausewitzian 
“hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends”34). It was well 
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known that Rome did not possess a powerful navy during the Punic Wars and 
certainly not at this embryonic stage of her conflict with the northern Greek states. 
Macedonia did not also have navy forces since the kingship of Antigonos Doson and 
Phillip did not hold the necessary funds to build up a powerful armada. 
Notwithstanding this setback, Phillip decided to start from the scratch and build 100 
ships, at least to enable him to transport his troops elsewhere in the neighbouring 
coastline. However, due to his very limited financial resources, Phillip couldn’t equip 
the ships with skilled oarsmen, but with ordinary soldiers (6,000 men)35 and sailed in 
the summer of 216 B.C. towards the coast of Northern Epirus, with a view to 
conquering the focal point of the Roman power to the area, the town of Apollonia. 
However, Phillip’s decision to fall back from his original planning, by fearing that the 
mere approaching of ten Roman ships would constitute the beginning of the end, was 
to be proved preposterous.  
 
           Phillip’s telling reluctance to proceed to Apollonia, renders already evident 
Roman prowess at the level of image management36, which along with intelligence 
gathering and policy implementation constitute the three main functions of 
diplomacy. Considering that Phillip V was infused by what R. Jervis calls “cognitive 
consistency”, namely that the Macedon King had the strong tendency “to see what he 
expected to see and to assimilate incoming information to pre-existing images”37, 
Romans simply played artfully the card of intimidation, since they could not in fact 
afford to send more ships against Phillip, in view of their simultaneous open front 
with Hannibal in Italy. 
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                Phillip, on the other hand, banking on his lack of a professional fleet, 
espoused the policy of forging an alliance with the enemy of his enemy. Approaching 
Hannibal and eventually coming into a verbal only – to all appearances - alliance with 
the leader of Carthage, seemed to be a rather ham-handed Macedonian strategic 
choice at that moment. According to the nebulous stipulations of that understanding38 
(since it was not even a formal treaty, but merely a gentlemen’s agreement, a fact that 
holds its own truth as to the extent of Hannibal’s unwavering commitment to the 
common cause), the Macedonians were called to support the Carthaginians during the 
latter’s war with Rome, while the Carthaginians would grant help to the forces of 
Phillip, when that was needed (there was no reference as to who and how was going 
to decide upon this eventuality)39. In addition to this, it was agreed that no peace 
would be agreed upon, if it did not include both the allies (towards Rome) and in that 
case it would be stipulated as an explicit clause to any potential peace treaty, the 
withdrawal of the Romans from the Illyrian coast. It is not new that the significant 
strategic value of controlling the Illyrian coasts was evident to Rome from the first 
moment of its rise as a regional hegemon.  What was coming to the fore was that 
Rome’s sights upon east and south were now evident to all parties involved without 
any exception40. Rome manifested its reluctance to coexist with Macedonia, which 
presented itself not only as a powerful state above other Greek states, but also as a 
significant threat to the regional interests of Rome and therefore as a peer competitor 
in her backyard. And here also abound the striking similarities with contemporary 
times. One can, for instance, recall the exact American rhetoric in the period of the 
early days of U.S. independence (“hands-off policy”, “backyard” later, etc) and 
Quinctius' reply: "Since it pleases you to draw these distinctions and to enumerate the 
various ways in which friendly relations can be established, I too will lay down the 
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two conditions apart from which, you may tell your king, no friendship with Rome 
can be established. One is this - if he does not wish us to concern our selves with the 
cities of Asia, he must himself keep his hands off every part of Europe. The other is 
this - if instead of confining himself within the frontiers of Asia he crosses over into 
Europe, the Romans will be perfectly justified in protecting their friendship with those 
cities where it exists and in winning new ones"41.  
 
             In view of the foregoing, not only the internal process of Rome’s gradual self-
orientation, but also the external process with the alliance of Macedonia and Carthage 
can be qualified as another instigator for Rome’s entrance into the Hellenistic state 
system of power. Phillip “realistically” assumed that Rome’s entanglement with 
Carthage would provide him with the vital leeway to unravel without impediments his 
plans for hegemony over the Greek states. However, that “realistic moment” in 
Macedonian foreign policy was soon followed by “revolutionary” aspirations of 
supposedly instant domination over the weaker Greek states, since: (a) there was no 
detailed scenario from Phillip to expand his influence upon Rome. It is crystal clear 
from the sources42 that Phillip confined himself in the eastern coast of the Adriatic sea 
and he did not aspire to be a new Pyrrhus or Hannibal, but on the contrary he had one 
nebulous target: to conquer and maintain the Illyrian coast, as a vague power 
projection point to the West of manifold use (commercial, military, etc). This self-
containment, as I have already stressed in the case of the Peloponnesian War and 
Sparta, does not always comply with a great power’s advancement, on the contrary it 
undermines it, (b) Carthage didn’t consign all her trust to Macedonia, since Hannibal 
had already proved that he had the means, as well as the volition and the audacity to 
rock the Roman boat on his own (The Cannes campaign is an illustrating example). 
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However, following deftly the merits of a strategy of buck-passing (namely when the 
endangered power tries to get another state to shoulder the burden of deterring or 
defeating the threatening state43) he would certainly not discourage Phillip’s 
involvement and especially in the frame of such a loose understanding, (c) Instead of 
setting his sights upon the real centre of power, as it was the case for Rome, Phillip 
expended all his efforts and thoughts over the Greek states, which could, at least at the 
beginning, serve as precious allies in a campaign against Rome. In other words, 
Phillip V did not decipher the international environment around him, setting 
incompatible for the time and the reality of strategic priorities. Half of the solution of 
a problem is actually its detection and Phillip V was incapable of realizing this, and 
(d) It was to be expected that Phillip’s strategic choice to associate himself with 
Hannibal would be inscribed in the memory of the Roman Senate. It has been artfully 
said that “one side effect of Pyrrhus defeat was that it put Rome on the map for the 
Greek world”44 and as in the case of Pyrrhus, Rome would never condone 
Macedonia’s positioning during the second Punic War and in fear of another similar 
incident in the future and with the precedent of Epirus in mind, she would not leave 
Phillip V unharmed45. It is to be noted that a similar incident is not solely tantamount 
to any war, but to an imminent invasion of the Roman territory, a fear, which after 
Hannibal’s campaign through Alps, was constantly rising. Romans recalled always 
the traumatic experience of Hannibal’s invasion of the Italian peninsula and they were 
clearly predisposed against any strategic plan which would endanger the arrival of the 
enemy in their land. “Let Macedonia rather than Italy be the seat of war, let it be the 
enemy's cities and fields that are devastated with fire and sword. We have learnt by 
this time that our arms are more potent and more successful abroad than they are at 
home”46. In this vein a preventive war seemed to be preferable to a conventional one. 
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And additionally, no one seemed capable of stopping it: “the effective decisions were 
almost always made in the Senate. No case is known in which a senatorial decision to 
make war was successfully resisted by the people, and even formal war votes may 
have ceased not long after Polybius wrote…(people) had  no power over the conduct 
of negotiations with foreign states and no formal control over the continuation of a 
war once it had been started”47.                      
 
            The aforementioned uneven balance between “realism” and “revolutionism” in 
Phillip’s political conduct became further apparent with the adoption of an open48, hot 
headed, diplomacy of Kantian nature, which treated the other weaker actors with 
striking frivolity and with the simultaneous chase of nebulous aspirations for 
expansion to Italy.  Indicative is the case of the Achaeans, who, without their assent, 
were deviously included in the oral agreement of Phillip with Hannibal, provoking the 
reaction of Aratus (King of the Achaeans) and his refusal to join the Macedonians in 
the understanding against the Romans49. Another manifestation of Phillip’s erratic 
behaviour50 and arrogant policy towards the other Greeks was his decisions to buttress 
the democrats against the oligarchs (his political peers) in Messenia and even at a 
personal level his open love affair with the wife of Aratus’ son.  
 
              Phillip, a real homo ludens of his time, did not only underestimate the 
ramifications of channeling artlessly fear to the other, while neglecting the importance 
of a deft diplomacy, which could deceive, without at the same time alarming the 
opponent, but also the perplexity of an expansion towards the Italian peninsula, 
adhering to reductionisms: “For Greece is already entirely obedient to you, and will 
remain so: the Achaeans from genuine affection; the Aetolians from the terror which 
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their disasters in the present war have inspired them. Italy, and your crossing into it, is 
the first step in the acquirement of a universal empire, to which no one has a better 
claim than yourself. And now is the moment to act when the Romans have suffered a 
reverse”51. That said, the Greek states, disturbed by the intrusive power of Macedon, 
were more than ready to take up the offer of an alliance with Rome. It was “the 
development of these balance of power maneuvers” that “the two subsystems merged 
under a common anarchic structure52”. Polybius also gives a purely systemic, in 
international relations theory terms, approach by treating in principle the Roman 
involvement in the Greek peninsula as one which leads to “the complication and 
amalgamation”53 of the acts of the great powers and thus to the fact that “the outputs 
of one (system) affect the inputs of another (system)”54.          
   
            Even if (a) Phillip’s invasion in Illyria from the sea, in 214 B.C. and his 
attempt to seize Apollonia, which was initially hardly (since it was indeed a matter of a 
great power’s credibility whether she could sustain successive incursions by a peer competitor 
in her sphere of influence)55 saved by the Roman fleet under the leadership of Marcus 
Valerius Lavinus, seemed strategically sound (east-northern borders of Macedonia 
was considered always the soft underbelly of this state’s security) and (b) the 
following year, Phillip managed to seize a significant part of Illyria, defeating the 
forces of King’s Skerdilaidas, whilst the Romans did not really seem capable of 
standing up against him, it should be allowable, however, with this view that at this 
very moment, Phillip did not master the situation and that his “revolutionary” foreign 
policy, laden with ups and downs, was inconclusive and incompatible with the aims 
he supposedly tried to set (E.Will claims glibly that “what  Phillip V lacked was the 
ability to put down a plan and stick to it”). In other words, for Phillip, “if one asked 
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what may cause war, the simple answer was "anything." That is Kant's answer: The 
natural state is the state of war. Under the conditions of international politics, war 
recurs; the sure way to abolish war, then, is to abolish international politics”56. 
 
               Espousing a Kantian policy of expanding his rule upon the other states and 
occasionally in the name of a nebulous “Greek unity”, without any effort to find at 
least a nominal legitimization of his campaigns and leaving open other fronts (in this 
case the southern one), undermined in the long run Phillip’s own security and his 
attempt to deal effectively with the Illyrians in the northern suburbs of Macedonia57. 
Also, by meddling without any obvious strategic reasoning in the internal affairs of 
the Messenians58, and by opting out from the Common Alliance, Phillip actually 
pushed the Messenians further in the hands of the Aetolians, (given that the 
Thessalians, Acarnanians, Epirots, Boeotians, Achaeans and many other less powerful 
states were for one reason or another already Macedonia’s allies59). And the latter 
could only find refuge to Rome in order to protect their interests in this emerging field 
of competing alliances60.  
 
              Forming cooperative frameworks from scratch is a tenuous procedure, which 
undoubtedly encapsulates a risk for a possible longstanding allegiance between the 
members of it. Suffice then to stress that dismantling abruptly an existent alliance 
(considering that even the aforementioned alliance of Macedonia was not in fact a 
birth child of Phillip V, but that of his predecessor Antigonos Doson) with a view to 
bringing as many states as possible to one’s own alliance, it can be deemed as 
excessively adventurous within an anarchic society, where no state can calculate 
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accurately the other’s power resources and extremely frequent warfare grants the  
notion of borders with merely a transient importance.  
 
               Of paramount importance is also the postulation that focusing upon the 
wider picture was not a distinctive feature of Phillip’s character61 at those initial 
stages of the conflict with Rome. Parenthetically, A. Momigliano put it glibly, when 
he stressed in general that “that we have come up against a very important and 
perhaps little noticed feature of Greek historical wing and more in general of Greek 
political thought. Political thought in Greece tended to concentrate on the internal 
changes of the States, on constitutional problems (Polybius for example makes a 
direct comparison between Sparta and Rome in terms of their constitutions’ 
stipulations in B.VI.50). Causes of war, external conflicts remained marginal issues 
rather than central problems”62. This is also why the notion of the causes of war tends 
to be quite misleading in the study of the Macedonian Wars, when various facts are 
often implied or even presented as “causes of war” in the ancient texts. Polybius states 
for example that the Senate decided to make war against the Dalmatians, one of its 
reasons being that it did not want the people to be enervated by a lengthy peace63. 
Livy, again, mentions that L. Furius Purpurio claimed in 199 B.C. that the Romans 
had undertaken the First Macedonian War on behalf of the Aetolians64. This is 
succinctly also the case in the Peloponnesian Wars, with the extensive, as we saw, 
interpretations given to incidents like the Megarian degree, etc. The said notion 
therefore commands for a thorough, holistic, investigation, which takes into account 
the characteristics of the system along with those of the decision making procedures. 
That need was precisely conspicuous in Phillip’s case, who was disorientated by 
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micromanagement and by every minor aspect of the internal developments in each 
Greek state, disregarding the big picture of the international environment before him.      
      
4.4.
 
Decisive battle: the conclusive quest of forging alliances. 
               Granting the Aetolians the status of an ally to the Romans was regarded by 
the Senate as a conditio sine qua non in view of the circumstances which were being 
unraveled after Phillip’s invasion to Illyria. Considering that in the past, Aetolian 
support in the Greek affairs had been a desideratum of Macedonia as well65, it was not 
simply a counterpoise of the constantly expanding Macedonian influence in the region 
or a need to secure the Greek front in view of the other open fronts in Spain and Sicily 
with Hannibal, but an indication of an active, deliberate involvement thenceforwards 
to what could be called in general terms, “the affairs of Greece”. Competing against 
Phillip was one thing, but actively taking sides with other Greek states in the south 
was more compelling not just for Rome: it was tantamount to a formal statement upon 
her intention to re-arrange the subsystem of this region. 
 
          On September 212 B.C., the Roman fleet under the leadership of Laivinus 
reached Naupactus signaling the first time ever that a Roman military force stepped 
on Greek soil. That moment along with the ensuing alliances of Rome with certain 
Greek states can be regarded as the kickoff point of the First Macedonian War. The 
Roman commander came into an agreement with the Aetolians, in the fall of 212 
B.C., which was infamously called “The Pact of Depredation”, since it stipulated, 
among others, the following: The Aetolians would be responsible for the land 
operations, while the Romans for the naval ones, the areas which would be conquered 
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by both the Aetolians and the Romans would end up to the first ones, while their 
inhabitants and half of their wealth would fall under the absolute power of the 
Romans. What mattered most in this Pact was the tricky provision that the parties 
involved would not be entitled to unilaterally withdraw their forces from the war, 
whilst at the same time this pact would remain open to further accessions. In other 
words, Rome managed to bind down Aetolia into a cause, which was based upon a 
common interest, namely the fight against Macedonia, but in fact it was rather an 
appendix to her own pre-fixed plans for this region. It would be at least credulous to 
espouse the idealistic and rather “revolutionary” claim of L. Furius Purpurio that the 
Romans had undertaken the First Macedonian War simply on behalf of the 
Aetolians66. The striking provision of no-withdrawal denoted on the contrary the 
clear-cut power gap between the contracting parties and it was equal to a subjection of 
the one to the other, despite any rhetoric cloak. This subjection meant to decrease 
Rome’s insecurity, whilst increase her animus dominandi, as it was similarly the case 
for Athens versus Melos in the Peloponnesian War (“so that your subjection will give 
us an increase of security, as well as an extension of empire”67). In view of the 
foregoing the conflicting parties were from one side the Common Alliance of the 
Macedonians, Thessalians, Epirots, Boeotians, Acarnanians, Achaeans and some 
minor other towns, while from the other side were the Romans, their Illyrian friendly 
tribes, the Aetolians along with their Greek allies (Spartans, Helians, Messenians) and 
the Dardanians, who were lurking to cut into pieces the Macedonian territories on the 
north, as well as Attalus, King of Pergamum and loyal ally of Rome, who since 
around 220 B.C. grew hostile to Phillip’s rambunctious foreign policy and friendly to 
the Aetolians. 
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         Phillip’s disturbing activity in Illyria could not pass unnoticed to the allies of 
Rome as well, creating a domino of conflicting interests. The Aetolians campaigned 
to grasp the old coveted geographic territory of Central Greece (Thessaly, Phocis,) 
from the traditional enemies, the Acarnanians, who, thus, were forced to approach 
Phillip V, despite his refusal to provide them with an effective assistance. Spartans, 
although hesitant enough to join the Pact of Depredation68 at the beginning, followed 
a Grotian policy flowered with cooperative-loving rhetoric69. Under this mantle, 
Spartans were in fact “flying the kite” to join the alliance with the best possible 
benefits and they eventually took the best offer from the Aetolians and the Romans, 
despite Acarnanians’ diplomatic activity to the opposite direction. Spartans proved in 
fact to be more interested in diluting the Achaic Sympoliteia. Thus, the Achaeans 
were destined to support the Macedonians and under the leadership of Philopoemen 
they were to pose great hurdles indeed on the Romans’ way.  
  
               The aforementioned, hectic, byzantine-wise diplomatic activity is only 
succinctly articulated so as to denote that the decision makers in the states of this 
period did not manage to identify Rome as a potential hegemon who was coming to 
the fore for good, so as to envisage their place within this new political setting. On the 
contrary, they mostly regarded Rome as an ordinary ascending great power, which 
could serve as an intermediate or at best as a facilitator for their own interstate 
quarrels. It is really interesting to bear in mind that the formation of the alliances in 
this period falls within the pattern of an effective diplomacy, in the sense that it 
(diplomacy) “met the prerequisite that the state must be willing to compromise on 
issues that are not vital to it”70 and not of a gun-boat diplomacy as I have earlier seen 
in the case of Athens and her allies during the Peloponnesian war. To that end, 
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Romans were also sagacious to gently kindle the war flames, whenever these were 
close to fizzling out, mastering the well known policy of divide ut regnes71. A 
manifestation of this can be traced since their early presence in the Greek soil, when 
in spring 209 B.C., General Pyrrhias of the Aetolians tried unsuccessfully to hammer 
Phillip down in the town of Lamia, and he was forced to come with a truce, which 
only lasted for 30 days72. During that period, many neutral Greek states tried to 
intervene between the belligerent parties and negotiate the terms of a possible peace. 
The Romans were shrewd enough to step in the middle and turn further the Aetolians 
against the others, so as to sink the peace efforts73. It was now evident that Rome’s 
leverage has been extended to the other side of the Adriatic Sea and Roman 
diplomacy was effective to such an extent as to prevent a warfare or instigate another 
if need may be. 
 
         Considering the grounds of Rome’s entering into Greek affairs, it is of 
paramount importance to retain at this point the contributing notion of the three fetters 
of Greece, namely Chalcis in Euboea, Demetrias in Thessaly and Corinth in Achaia 
(forming a geographic triangle in the very heart of Greece), which according to 
Phillip74 were considered to be the strategic pillars for Greece’s control75. It was clear 
that Rome grasped also the importance of these fetters of Greece after a carefully 
designed action, not only at the military but first and foremost at the diplomatic level. 
That diplomatically intrusive character of Roman foreign policy granted Rome the 
convenience of maintaining garrisons only where she deemed it necessary and 
summon them at once and without any revolts from the local people to the hot spots 
that were arising. In the context of a “realistic” strategic vision since the beginning of 
her presence on the Greek soil, Rome highly evaluated the said fetters as the 
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geographic “centers of gravity”76 for the accomplishment of her mission in the region; 
it is indeed self evident by the ensuing historical developments that Rome strove 
methodically to control Chalcis and Demetrias, while in Thessaly the final battle of 
the Third Macedonian War took place.  
 
4.5. 
 
Change in grand strategy: the First Macedonian War as a doorstep to the Second 
or how attrition is shielded by expansion. 
         Geography and history stand to one another in relation of mutual influence, 
equally important whether one is thinking in terms of geography or of history. 
However, the last one is constantly changing, while the former one is constant by 
minor changes. Geography was playing a catalytic role for Macedonia’s plans for 
further expeditions to the mountainous Greek soil. Mount Pindos was impeding the 
Macedonian Kings from extending their rule over the west (the exit to the Adriatic 
Sea was surely a long coveted aim, but a hard one to get), so they preferred to cast 
their eye on Southern Greece (Peloponnesus) and Athens or Eastern Greece (Boeotia), 
or even more conveniently Northern Greece (Paionia) and to the rest of the Illyrian 
tribes. In addition to this, none of the Greek cities had much of a hinterland. These 
small coastal enclaves were easily defendable, but they were not easily unified nor 
could become self sufficiently rich or large due to a dearth of local resources (Greek 
mountains are characterised by deep gorges, jagged peaks and steep cliffs). In view of 
the foregoing, geography was not only a curse but also a blessing. Macedonia has 
parlayed its natural borders and jagged terrain into a defensive advantage. Invasion 
forces that managed to make a landing on one of the few plains were immediately met 
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by high rising cliffs hugging the coastline and well entrenched Macedonian defenders 
blocking the path forward.  
 
              What was also obvious was that geography’s influence varied depending on 
the specific calculus of power between the states involved. Macedonia’s geography 
could be a blessing against weaker neighbours, but not against a really great power, 
like Rome. The main determinant which could possibly serve as an offset to this 
outweighing advantage of the great power could have been technology, but 
Macedonia was admittedly not taking huge strides in this field so as to outflank 
without difficulties her neighbouring states, let alone to surpass Rome (following 
Brodie “technology and geography are the two main factors that determine whether 
the offense or the defense has the advantage and on the tactical level, as a rule, few 
physical factors favor the attacker but many favor the defender”77). After all that 
determinant did not seem to earmark the combatant parties in the Peloponnesian war 
either, where technology cannot be regarded the decisive factor for the final outcome 
of the war or even its development; following H.Delbruck’s words “as long and 
oscillating as the Peloponnesian War was, it still did not produce new forms of the art 
of war. The one new aspect it did bring to Greece was the professional military status, 
the real mercenary system”78. 
 
           In view of the foregoing, the northern front was the decisive array, which led to 
the outbreak of the First Macedonian War, given that the Illyrians and Dardanians had 
espoused a systematic war of attrition, disturbing to such an extent, that Phillip was 
forced to stifle their forays. However, by that very decision he was to oscillate the 
subsystem of the Greek states with unknown consequences, since another major 
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player was lurking now in the back scene, namely Rome. Coping with the northern 
front was therefore a structural challenge, which called for a concrete and coherent 
strategy and certainly not for impressive and reckless moves. Indeed, Aetolians had 
the time to cover themselves up in Thermopiles, the Spartans under the leadership of 
Mahanidas raided again Argolis, while the combined forces of the Romans and the 
Pergaminians were plundering the inshore towns of the Aegean Sea. Thus, the only 
method to defend himself while he was away was for Phillip to put observers in situ 
on the islands, so they could be able to give a prior warning by fire every time his 
opponents were launching a foray (consecutively  the warnings were transmitted to his 
commanding centre, which was placed on the mountain Tisaio of Thessaly79). There is 
enough evidence that the Romans experienced certain problems with the 
aforementioned defence method of Phillip, and this is the reason they could not 
successfully unravel attacks against Chalcis, or the Aetolians could not invade Opuda 
(town close to Aetolia itself). For once, Phillip paid occasional attention to the power 
of information and espionage, combined with a certain pinch of technology, which 
were however trademarks of Rome’s expansion. In any case, Phillip’s all in all 
“revolutionary” diplomatic tactics could not obviously be harmonized with the 
imperative need of a systematic advancement of technological skills so as to 
compensate for the concrete geographical weaknesses of Macedonia. 
 
              In view of the aforementioned, mounting, Roman pressure, it was becoming 
already evident that Phillip’s preponderant place among the other Hellenistic states 
was not autonomous, but dependent on Rome’s plans in the region. Perceiving the 
ascending power of a competing regional hegemon can be attained – apart obviously 
from analysing the latter’s “elements of national power”, namely geography, food,  
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raw materials, industrial capacity, military preparedness, population, national 
character, national morale, the quality of diplomacy, the quality of government 80 - by 
throwing light as well on the particular behaviour of the rest of the great powers 
towards the state in question. In this respect, it is revealing that for the first time a 
segment of Carthage’s navy reached the coast of Aegium in the context of a hide and 
seek naval warfare with Rome, but not with a view to providing Macedonia with 
military assistance as one would surmise. Instead of joining with the Macedonian 
army, as Phillip was craving for81, the Carthaginian fleet departed away, provoking 
Phillip’s disappointment, as well as his decision to build up 100 battle ships in order 
to at least decrease his wounding sense of naval inferiority. The said stance of the 
Carthaginian navy demonstrated that Macedonia was not admittedly regarded as a 
clear match to Rome.  That was also a turning point in the Roman-Macedonian tug of 
war itself, because: (a) maritime supremacy constituted for the Macedonians a long-
coveted, though unfulfilled, aspect of their military plans in the Mediterranean region 
and (b) it became conspicuous that Phillip was not able to establish and refine an 
alliance against Rome neither with Carthage nor with the great majority of the Greek 
states (Livy points out characteristically that Phillip had not “met a single situation at 
the right moment”)82. In addition, he was experiencing significant financial problems, 
which impeded him in practise from putting his ambitious navy-building plans into 
reality.  
 
             Multi-front war is a taxing issue for a “realistic” foreign policy but not an 
insurmountable one. The key word is prudency in decision making, which 
consecutively invites an imperative need for prioritisation of the war-fronts. That 
ascertainment is not self-evident, though, neither for a “revolutionist” foreign policy, 
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where multi-front war can be actually sought for as a means for the supposedly final 
and quick prevailing of an overarching ideology, nor for a “rationalist” one, where 
multi-front war can be seen at least as a necessary evil and as a highly uncomfortable 
situation of total absence of any cooperation prospect between the states of the 
system.  
 
              In view of the foregoing, a war on two fronts was not desirable for Rome as 
long as Macedonia did not pose an impending threat like Carthage. Therefore, the 
aforementioned activity of the Carthaginian navy had no immediate repercussions, 
only because the Romans were in parallel tied up by their effort in destroying the 
town of Demes in 207 B.C. and in gathering their fleet so as to confront Carthage in 
Africa. That, however, did not signify Rome’s inaction in case a war on two fronts 
emerged as a conditio sine qua non for the maintenance of her supremacy in the 
region (as it would have been the case for instance if Macedonia and Carthage were 
coming eventually to effective alliance). In this vein, E. Luttwak noted factually that 
“a war on two fronts was a great danger to the military integrity of the empire and 
civil war an even greater one. In the third century both calamities occurred”83. 
 
         Finding an unexpected (given that almost all the Greek states had taken sides 
with Rome) ally in the face of the Achaean General Philopoemen, who, being a very 
apt and clear-sighted general, had already managed to reorganise the army of the 
Achaean Sympoliteia, was of paramount importance for the Macedonian presence in 
Peloponnesus and its aforementioned need for autonomy towards the continuously 
expanding Roman influence. To that contributed significantly Philopoemen’s decisive 
win over the Spartans in the battle of Mantinea in 207 B.C. (almost 4,000 members of 
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the Spartan army were killed, including their leader Mahanidas), which seemed to 
secure in favour of Macedonia at least the neuralgic battlefront of Peloponnesus.  
 
             What was now missing for Macedonia was Aetolian assistance, which could 
prove critical for the continuation of this war of friction rather than attrition against 
Rome (considering that up to that point there were no battles between Rome and 
Macedonia directly, but only minor skirmishes between their allies). At this point 
there was again a Rhodian diplomatic effort to convince the Aetolians to refrain from 
a war which would plunge all Peloponnesus into blood, but the Aetolians, placing 
their hopes on the Roman expressed eagerness to meddle in  Greek affairs, rejected all 
the proposals. It worth singling out here Thrasycrates’ speech, an ambassador from 
Rhodes, who, using a purely “realistic” approach of international relations theory, 
tried brazenly to depict that the Aetolians were regarded by the Romans as a 
temporary convenience, which was destined to tail off rapidly after the Roman plans 
in the Greek region would be about to be concluded: “For I presume no one can fail to 
see that, if once the Romans get rid of the war in Italy,—and this is all but done, now 
that Hannibal has been confined to a narrow district in Bruttium,—they will direct 
their whole power upon Greece: professedly, indeed, in aid of the Boeotians against 
Philip, but really with the view of reducing it entirely under their own power. And if 
they design to treat it well when they have conquered it, theirs will be the honour and 
glory; and if badly, theirs too will be the plunder from the states they destroy, and the 
power over those which they allow to survive: while you will be calling upon the gods 
to witness your wrongs, when no god will be any longer willing, nor any man be able 
to help you”84. These are telling indicators of the reasoning lying behind an imprudent 
revolutionary foreign policy dotted with aspirations for an indistinct grandeur, but 
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also of the exigencies of a “realistic” foreign policy within an anarchic society, where 
there is no safe refuge of everlasting alliances after the meticulous analysis of the 
international behaviour of every great power and her insatiable appetite for more 
power.  
 
            What the ambassadors could not reify with the power of words, Phillip took 
the initiative to do with the power of swords. The summer of 207 B.C. Phillip 
campaigned against Aetolia and he soon conquered her capital, Thermos. It was 
crystal clear that Thrasycrates’ earlier sayings were not far from reality, since the 
Romans did not hasten to assist their allies, given that they were bogged down in the 
Carthaginian front. Phillip had at this crucial juncture two equally “realistic” paths: 
either to follow a strategy of deterrence based on punishment and devastate Aetolia, 
depicting that the cost of her non-compliance would outweigh the cost of its 
compliance or to follow a strategy of prudent appeasement, namely giving a second 
chance to the defeated with a strong reminder that he was determined to proceed with 
its destruction in case of disobedience. Phillip, in one of his rare flickers of 
sagaciousness, did not impose unbearable terms upon the Aetolians, inviting ordinary 
people’s indulgence, banking on their positive stance in the future and thus stirring the 
simmering discord between them and the Romans. That campaign could indeed end 
up as a very valuable military, as well as diplomatic asset for Phillip who concluded a 
separate peace agreement in 206 B.C. with the Aetolians. This alliance, however, was 
destined to yield in practise meagre results, since it constituted a breach to what 
Aetolia had already agreed upon with Rome. 
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            On one hand, the end of the war with the Aetolians was not a panacea for 
Phillip; he seemed to be non-distracted from his march against Illyria, but valuable 
time had already been lost and now the campaign in the northern front could not pass 
unnoticed by the Romans, who considered it as the last straw. The geographic and 
strategic importance of this region can be indicated from the very fact that Epidamnus 
(the city where the Peloponnesian War first broke out and which afterwards was 
named by the Romans “Dyrrachium”) served historically as a destination point for 
Romans travelling through the Ionian Sea, but also as a starting point for the building 
of the famous “Via Egnatia”, a military-commercial avenue which was heading up to 
Macedonia and Thrace.  During the spring, the Senate sent Poplius Sebronius 
Touditanus to Epidamnus with a remarkable military force of 35 battle ships and 
11,000 soldiers, while at the same time an embassy approached the Aetolians to 
convince them to re-launch  operations on the Roman side. Rome was now applying 
literally a gun-boat diplomacy, since the strategic environment seemed to be 
unfavourable. She was not totally ready to project her military power directly upon 
her rivals on the Greek soil, but at this point she was obliged to demonstrate certain 
diplomatic leverage and offensive capability towards Macedonia and Aetolia. And 
that despite the fact that Rome was separated by both with large bodies of water, 
which in this case did not prove “formidable obstacles that cause significant power-
projection problems for attacking armies”85. The Aetolians did not take active stance 
against these developments86, at least for the time being and Tuditanus managed to 
battle down the town of Dimallum (in Illyria). 
 
                 On the other hand, Phillip’s volition to expand through Apollonia in Illyria 
was not lined up with the imperative prerequisite of a strong fleet, the lack of which 
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was precisely that additional factor which could make the difference at this juncture. 
Roman fear for the current distribution of power with Macedonia remained intense 
pending the war with Carthage (the second Punic War lasted from 218 to 201 B.C., while 
the First Macedonian War roughly from 214 to 205 B.C) and the threat of a possible 
Macedonian military arrival, not just any arrival, in their coastline was always 
looming larger (Aurelius pointed out that “the only question is whether you will 
transport the legions into Macedonia or wait for the enemy in Italy”87), so Phillip, 
with the proper naval equipment, could have made wonders if he was to take up 
decisive action on Roman soil.  
 
              There is also an overriding consideration, although it is reported only by 
Livy88, namely that the representatives of Phillip and Hannibal had been in the past 
captured together by Romans, who consecutively discovered a letter disclosing a lax 
frame of cooperation between Carthage and Macedonia. That eventually increased 
tremendously the consternation within Rome nevertheless, following the example of 
Athens in the Peloponnesian War, Phillip opted for “a war without decision, through 
simple attrition”89. That was not incongruous also with Rome’s deeper, “realistic”,  
thoughts, following which Rome was obliged to exploit this Macedonian inaction by 
abstaining from another battlefront. And to finally come into peace arrangements with 
Phillip without any other delay, considering that “the opportunities in war do not 
wait”90. 
 
                  The First Macedonian War of attrition was formally terminated with the 
peace of Phoenicia (named after the town, which served as capital of the Alliance of 
Epirots) in 205 B.C. This treaty stipulated a balanced outcome for the two parties, 
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namely that the Macedonians would maintain their hold on some towns they 
possessed already and the Romans would hold their place in Illyria. In any case the 
peace of Phoenicia was evocative of the Peace of Nicias in the Peloponnesian War, 
namely enough to make a first approach to the security competition problem, although 
hardly enough to solve it. Six elements, mirroring the ground conditions, became 
evident from this treaty: (a) Rome had still the war front with Carthage wide open in 
her peninsula and she would not opt for another one in unknown, what’s more, 
territory for her. However, by the time the Romans began to make their presence felt 
in the Greek east, the initial élan of all the Hellenistic Kingdoms had already begun to 
weaken (b) Rome very aptly perceived the inherent weaknesses of the Hellenistic 
states. Aptly, because “the character of the Romans and the values and organization of 
their state set them apart from the Greeks and indeed from all the other peoples of the 
Hellenistic world”91. And inherent weaknesses because of the unstable political 
leaderships, without long term aims, with an unparalleled introversion and emphasis 
on local – internal trivial politics, and not on wider international issues. That was 
facilitated from the fact that for rather more than a century – from 480 to 360 B.C. – 
the city states of Greece pursued their  rivalries and feuds without even serious 
challenge from outside, (c) corruption in a great scale amongst the Greek states 
accompanied by moral decay of the people, (d) lack of a powerful and experienced 
fleet of the Macedonians and the other Greek city states as well, (e) there were certain 
resemblances in the social-political stratification in Rome and in many Greek states. 
Romans had an oligarchic political regime and it was self evident that they would 
favour an oligarchic regime of their liking in other states as well, be that under the 
mantle of aristocracies or even tyrannies. Besides, it is important to note that the mere 
spread of Roman hegemony was in itself the cause of increased competition within 
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the Roman elite. The number of praetor ships had been increased in 227 B.C. from 
two to four and in 197 B.C., with the need to organize the provinces in Spain, the 
number was further increased to six. The top rung, the consulship, continued to have 
room for two. In any case, the Senate engaged in a constant power calculus, 
regardless of ideological affinities or domestic political attitudes. Such was the case at 
this time period for the Aetolians, Athenians, Thebians, Argians and the vast majority 
of the rest of the city-states, where the poorer classes very often revolted against the 
richer ones, searching for drastic changes in their miserable everydayness and 
rendering the necessity for reforms omnipresent. Hence, the ruling classes were eager 
to use every possible means to attain their own goals and cement their place in power 
with the aid and abet of a “willing intermediary” like Rome, and (f) The Macedonian 
army based its strength upon its cooperation with allies, given that in an era, when 
Rome could marshal troops of around 200,000 men, Macedonia could hardly rally 35-
40,000, the Aetolians 12,000, the Achaeans 6-8,000, whilst the other city-states even 
less. 
 
              The said elements eloquently supported the testimony of Rome’s effort first 
to espouse gradually a war of attrition against the Macedonians, taking the sides of as 
many states as possible, exploiting the local hostilities between them, mortgaging thus 
their future as independent international actors and changing drastically the power 
distribution in this subsystem. The Roman policy was justifiable since it regarded its 
power as a constant to be preserved against threats and to be enlarged and extended 
when opportunities present themselves for so doing without unreasonable risk92. 
Although it is widely perceived that the First Macedonian War ended with a draw or 
at least without a clear victory of any of the involved parties, the mere fact that the 
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Romans were still holding firmly their bases in Illyria could be sufficiently regarded 
as an essential Roman victory. Concurrently, Rome was thenceforwards in a position 
to take advantage of time so as to establish closer ties with other Greek states and 
widen thus its alliances in the area. Peace itself was not a policy objective, but solely a 
necessary condition for enhancing relative power. 
 
          Historically, it is claimed that the Second Macedonian War is rooted in 
Macedonia’s provocative military campaigns, with the aid of Antiochus III, King of 
the Seleucid Empire (there are no explicit sources on the Syro-Macedonian “alliance”, 
if there were any, but one could claim that at all events there had to be a kind of 
rapprochement between Phillip and Antiochus to such extent that the Romans could 
surmise a probable link of friendship between them too), against the Ptolemaic 
territories of Egypt and Miletus in Asia Minor (which were subversive to the 
commercial interests of Rhodes and Pergamum and its rising powerful King, Attalus, 
staunch allies of Rome) in contrast with the relevant stipulations of the previous treaty 
of Phoenicia. That Phillip nourished expansionist plans over his neighborhood is an 
indubitable fact which is premised not solely on the traditional warmongering of 
Macedonia, but also on the case of his secret pact with Antiochus of Syria with a view 
to taking possession of the lands of Ptolemy in Egypt in 203-202 B.C. However, 
evaluating that international stance of Macedonia focusing on the region of Asia 
Minor and Northern Aegean Sea would seem weak since it discounts the big picture, 
which is unavoidably defined by the activity of the great power93, namely Rome. 
Indeed, even the Syro-Macedonian pact reflects Phillip’s hesitance to put forward any 
master plan of regional domination in view of Rome’s ascending power. So, this pact, 
of which the Rhodians and the Pergamians were already aware, was similarly crispy 
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like the one previously between Phillip and Carthage, without any significant 
stipulations for mutual support in the case of a future warfare and without specifying 
the frame of their collaboration against the major rival great power, Rome. Hence, it 
was more than obvious that even Macedonians themselves “considered the Romans 
superior to the Persians…”94. 
 
               The roots of the Second Macedonian War have to be identified therefore 
first within the ambit of Rome95. In fact, this is what the First Macedonian War, 
though not decisive prima facie redounded to and served as: the introduction of Rome, 
as the undisputable potential hegemon into the subsystem of Greek states. The Second 
Macedonian War was building precisely upon that. The “realistic” approach was now 
elevated by the Roman Senate into the dictum that “If we allow the king (Phillip) to 
make proof of our slackness by storming Athens as we allowed Hannibal to do by 
storming Saguntum, it will not be in five months - the time Hannibal took from 
Saguntum - but in five days after he sails from Corinth that he will set foot in Italy”96. 
Thus, the Second Macedonian War derived naturally from Rome’s maturation, after 
her prior adultness with the wars against Carthage. Following “realist” tradition, 
Rome could not be expected to remain in supine position after her self-realization as a 
great power97. 
 
           In view of the foregoing and given my primordial choice to take on board the 
observations of both Livy and Polybius, but with a clear emphasis, for well known 
reasons of accuracy and credibility, upon the writings of the latter98, I can trace the 
starting point of this war at the end of the wars with Carthage, namely within Rome’s 
own subsystem and not within the Greek one. This observation is interrelated with the 
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aforementioned highlighting of the crucial time point of Roman self-realization as a 
great power, which is glibly caught by Polybius, who provides the reader with a quite 
systemic explanation of the Macedonian Wars: “For it was the Roman victory over the 
Carthaginians in this war and their conviction that thereby the most difficult and most 
essential step towards universal empire had been taken, which encouraged the 
Romans for the first time to stretch out their hands upon the rest and cross with an 
army into Greece and Asia”99.  
 
          What is also extremely interesting at this specific point is the fact that Polybius 
implicitly introduces the notion of “global hegemon”, when he claims that these states 
(meaning Rome, Carthage, Macedonia) were rivals for “universal empire”100. As I 
have indicated, that is practically not feasible in terms of offensive “realism’s” 
tenets101 since Rome, as every other aspiring global hegemon, cannot sustain her 
hegemony over the entire world, including every single state whatsoever. In this case 
Rome was just starting to expand in the Greek subsystem only, so it would be 
accurate to tag her rather as a “regional hegemon”, than as a “global” one. However, 
Rome’s will for a global hegemony (“universal empire”) was sound and this “animus” 
is precisely what Polybius managed to grasp. Besides, judging ex post factum, Rome 
indeed tended from the scratch to approach this “universal empire” in terms first and 
foremost of pure (in theoretical terms) power and then by means of any material 
acquisition; the principal criterion of Rome’s expansion was not territorial occupation, 
legal structures or fiscal exploitation, but primarily plain power, in the sense of “the 
capacity to command obedience”102. That observation fits with Haushofer’s organic 
theory of boundaries, which encapsulated this indefinite and implicitly ad libitum 
tendency of a state to expand further.  
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          Defeating Carthage in the second war vested Rome with the status of the 
dominant power in the Adriatic Sea, but there were four peremptory demands 
emanating from the international as well as the domestic environment for Rome in 
order to leap forward from the great power status to the regional hegemon one: (a) 
frequent wars of conquest seemed almost the sole direct generator of wealth for the 
masses and the aristocrats, particularly in the context of the Roman society, where one 
realizes, through Polybius (B.I.31.4 , VI.15.6, XVIII.39.4, XXXVIII.8.3, 
B.XXXII.13), that the consuls many times speeded up the negotiations or the terms of 
the peace, or the war itself in order to keep for their selves the glory of triumph in the 
battlefield, but also they could declare war or make peace without consulting with the 
Senate or the people (but it was up to the Senate to ratify the peace treaty, otherwise 
the Consul was bearing the brunt of having to present the “non treaty” to the enemy 
once more), (b) the East was heavily divided, morally and politically, laden with 
weighty social problems, though blessed with rich resources and therefore it 
constituted an ideal fruitful framework for the artful  (Roman) farmer, (c) Romans had 
already experienced during the First Macedonian War the endemic divisiveness 
within the Greek camp, be that in Sicily or in the mainland, so they were no less eager 
to take advantage of the controversies arising between the Hellenistic states and (d) 
Phillip V had gradually developed a capricious behaviour towards substantial political 
problems to the extent that he was widely considered, following the ancient sources, 
an irrational leader of a powerful state, something that rendered him dangerously 
unpredictable.  
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               I do not echo extreme claims103, which all in all portray Phillip as a mad 
King who was inviting scorn and animosity from the other states (particularly from 
Dardania, Athens, Pergamum, Rhodes), but I do admit that certain unexpected 
imbalances in his decision making ability were evident and played a significant role to 
the evolution of the events104.  Besides, the case of young Phillip’s lack of experience 
can be seen in both ways; either as a weak point but also as a sign of strength: on one 
hand it is easy to interpret Macedonia’s “Kantian” behavior by her King’s idealism in 
the field, on the other hand it shall be retained that young Phillip was wise enough to 
learn by the experienced (namely his father Demetrius II Aetolicus who continuously 
fought the barbarians from the north and managed also to increase Macedonia’s 
territories) and not merely out of experience. This is what Polybius implies when he 
claims that “the king gave the final decision, if that decision may be called the king's: 
for it is not reasonable to suppose that a mere boy should be able to come to a 
decision on matters of such moment. Historians, however, must attribute to the 
highest official present the final decisions arrived at: it being thoroughly understood 
among their readers that propositions and opinions, such as these, in all probability 
proceed from the members of the council, and particularly from those highest in his 
confidence”105.   
 
             Rome’s decision to declare war on Phillip V in 200 B.C. was not unexpected, 
considering all the previous developments and her desideratum for universal empire. 
What deserves to be pointed out though is the alacrity with which Rome finally tilted 
towards launching a military campaign against Macedonia, considering her relative 
doubts in the past. Romans expressly portrayed this direct shift of policy before the 
Aetolians, their only valuable allies in the Greek affairs: “at present, as we, having, by 
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the favour of the gods, brought the Punic war into a conclusion, have fallen on 
Macedonia with the whole weight of our power, so you have an opportunity offered 
you of regaining a place in our friendship and alliance, unless you choose to perish 
with Philip, rather than to conquer with the Romans”106. The military potential of the 
two opponents was strikingly unequal: Rome could bring together 140,000 men and 
100 battle ships, up to 500,000 men as reserves, whilst Macedonia had by far more 
limited capabilities, since Phillip could group 20,000 soldiers, while 20,000 men were 
part of the garrisons in the towns and the reserves could count only for the one tenth 
of the corresponding Roman. In addition to this, the most resounding defect of the 
Macedonian military machine, was as I have already stressed, the lack of a mighty 
navy; Macedonia had only 100 to 120 small and light ships and far less battle ships 
with inexperienced sailors, a fact which in the dominating maritime environment of 
the Greek peninsula, it could, by all means, be devolved into a degenerating factor for 
the state at war (something, which started to become apparent already during the First 
Macedonian War). It is not inconsequential to recall that even Hannibal when asked 
by Antiochus III some years later how would the later be able to prepare a campaign 
against Rome, the Carthaginian General immediately advised him to equip a fleet and 
take himself troops in Southern Italy. 
 
       Roman Consul Poplius Sulpikius Galvas, with a force of 23,000 soldiers and 
2,000 horsemen disembarked at Apollonia and established there his camp of 
operations. Positing that “basically decision makers are faced with three distinct and 
narrowly defined strategies, namely the attrition, the blitzkrieg and the limited aims 
strategies” 107, the initial activities of Galvas are very interesting indeed, because they 
reflect Rome’s ensuing foreign policy of combining since the beginning a limited 
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aims strategy in the diplomatic field, namely to lure as many allies as possible with 
persistence and patience, with a war of attrition, namely to continuously obstruct the 
enemy without engaging in a decisive battle. In this context, he sent limited forces 
under the leadership of an experienced General, Lefkius Apustius, to ravage mainly 
the suburbs of the Macedonian state and at the same time he sent a squadron to the 
port of Piraeus in Athens. That war of attrition was not novel after all: it is also 
referred as Fabian strategy108, since dictator Fabius Maximus perceived that attrition 
was a safe path to undermine the power of Hannibal, when the later reached the 
Italian soil. However, it should be stressed that even in the case of Fabius himself, 
eventually he was toppled down by another leader Varro, because Roman people 
could not eventually sustain the demanding efforts and what ensued was the battle of 
Cannae, where Hannibal was victorious. Thus, this specific strategy required also a 
steady and solid public support in the internal front to prove itself, given that it needs 
time to bear fruits and therefore it tests the patience of the people, as it was the case 
also with the Periclean strategy of Athens against Sparta, when the latter ravaged the 
suburbs in Attica. What Galvas was prowling for was to tie down the Macedonians on 
the northern front and concurrently try to destabilize and debilitate them from the 
southern front.  
 
                In this context, Roman expansion in Italy and elsewhere109 was marked by 
acquisition of booty as well as by occupation of land, whilst the main obligation upon 
communities under Roman control was to provide manpower. It worth trying to 
fathom the extraordinary size of the booty during those days, which (a) was not an 
outgrowth of spontaneous action, but a carefully devised act of war in the external 
front and (b) it was a decisive factor for social stability and cohesion in the internal 
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front, bearing an alleviating impact upon the soldiers and the people. In view of the 
aforementioned, I quote indicatively the extent of Aimilius Paulus victory over 
Perseus, Phillip’s son, few years later and its huge financial ramifications for Rome: 
“To the exploits of Aimilius in Macedonia is ascribed his most unbounded popularity 
with the people, since so much money was then brought into the public treasury by 
him that the people no longer needed to pay special taxes until the times of Hirtius 
and Pansa, who were consuls during the first war between Antony and Octavius 
Caesar”110.  
 
                 Taking into account that in the front of Southern Greece there was a 
military as well as political stalemate between the Greek states and Macedonia, the 
winter of 200 B.C. to 199 B.C. proved to be a very hectic one from the diplomatic 
point of view and its outstanding point was the Assembly of the Aetolians (the so 
called Panaetolium), during which the Aetolians were struggling to justify their pro 
Roman position in the past towards the others. There was a fierce verbal encounter 
between the ambassadors of Phillip and the ambassadors of Rome and her allies with 
the single aim of gaining public legitimization. The first endeavoured to depict the 
fraudulence of the Roman actions, while the latter tried to put the blame on Phillip V 
for the destruction in the wider area of Attica.  
 
                It is really interesting to observe that from the Panaetolium Rome 
inaugurates a sui generis framework of exchange of views. That framework was not 
exactly a negotiating table in the traditional sense, because Romans were not there, 
according to all the ancient sources, as one of the negotiating sides directly involved, 
but either as an intermediary or as an arbitrator. Diplomacy for the Romans was 
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effective, because, to put it in Sir Harold Nicolson’s words, it met the prerequisite that 
the state must be willing to compromise on issues that are not vital to it111. In 
international theory’s terms, diplomacy for Romans was fictitious, since what 
mattered only was the amoral (though not immoral) pursuance of the state interest. 
Rome seemed to retain occasionally certain favour for cooperation instead of conflict, 
reminiscent of Grotian tenets, but that was not based on guiding principles, but it was 
rather opportunistic depending on the fluidity of the circumstances. Thus, the Roman 
approach of diplomacy could border with that of the Kantians with the cardinal 
interpretation that the Kantian vision for a community of mankind, namely a “civitas 
maximas” was transformed conveniently into a vision for a human brotherhood under 
the Roman supervision; and here lies the trespassing from peaceful co-existence to a 
universal empire.  
 
                 Eventually, the Aetolians, expressly and “realistically” in the name of the 
state’s interest112, decided to espouse a neutral position, notwithstanding Macedonia’s 
sedulous efforts to play the card of a Greek allegiance, and to utilise a purely idealist 
rhetoric of natural alliances. “Trifling causes occasionally unite and disunite the 
Aetolians, Acarnanians, and Macedonians, men speaking the same language. With 
foreigners, with barbarians, all Greeks have, and ever will have, eternal war: because 
they are enemies by nature, which is always the same, and not from causes which 
change with the times”113. Aetolians’ outspoken impudence to wait and see for the 
most powerful state to take sides with shall not pass unnoticed. In fact, it confirms 
implicitly Rome’s limited aim diplomatic strategy, following which Rome was in fact 
“forced” to condone the fluctuations of Aetolia considering that Rome did not have 
from the beginning any other staunch and recognisably114 powerful supporter in the 
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Greek mainland than Aetolia and also war of impressions was crucial for gaining 
more friends and exposing existent foes, Rome was therefore virtually obliged to stay 
silent for the moment in the Panaetolium, taking into account that “nothing is so 
uncertain or so unpredictable as the mental reaction of a crowd”115. 
 
           The cat and mouse game before Phillip was taking shape: from the west of 
Macedonia it was Epirus and the Roman protectorates of Apollonia and Epidamnus, 
from the south it was Athens, Aetolian League, from the north the well known 
Dardanians and other inimical tribes and from the East it was Asia Minor’s states, 
with Pergamum and Rhodes little bit far lurking behind them. In view of that, Phillip 
adopted the same strategy like Rome, namely a war of attrition, but with a different 
objective aim in military as well as in international theory terms: to avoid a decisive 
battle with the Romans, so as to wear them down and force them a posse ad esse to 
leave the Greek peninsula without tangible successes. Phillip was forced to maintain 
garrisons in various places even within his own borders, in order to confront the 
mushrooming threats emanating from the Roman strategy of attrition. Additionally, 
after some minor battles (mostly in the northern Macedonia, close to the area of 
Florina, of Amintaio or the valley of Eoradaia, namely to a safe distance from the 
territories of Rome’s allies) he had to constantly move along his troops, because there 
was always the constraint of possible invasions of his northern neighbours 
(Dardanians, Illyrians) into Macedonia. However, the cardinal difference between the 
Macedonian and the Roman war of attrition was that in the first there was no 
underlying decision for an ending of the situation in the offing, while in the second 
one that decision was there, solidified by the will for a universal empire.  
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           In this vein, the Macedonian positioning seemed similar to the Athenian one 
during the Peloponnesian war116 and it was furthermore infused from Phillip to his 
son Perseus. The later simply thought that Rome would be a victim either of its 
tergiversations or of its dearth of resources. Plutarch states on this point: “For Perseus 
… lay in great security, thinking that by delay and expense he would wear out 
Aimilius”117. It is therefore hard to escape the conclusion that these distinct 
approaches on the very final outcome of the war were also based upon distinct 
theories of international relations: the purely Machiavellian (Roman) view of securing 
the state interest and promoting power maximization combined with apt diplomacy of 
occasional alliances to this end and the superficially Machiavellian one (Macedonian) 
tinged with Grotian or Kantian assumptions of fighting for the state interest, but with 
the messianic dream that the recourse to self-help without sufficient preparation or 
even forming long lasting alliances could ipso facto deter the possibility of a direct 
conflict and also that the regional hegemon will remain satisfied with the status quo 
and the uneven distribution of power in the Greek subsystem. In other words, Roman 
international theory was coherent and consistent in sharp contrast with the 
Macedonian one, which, although not totally devoid of “realistic” aspects, was in vain 
trying to marry them with the other currents of international theory in a disorderly 
manner.       
 
            “Realism” teaches that “the war of attrition might be the deliberate choice at 
the outset or the result of a failed blitzkrieg or limited aims strategy”118.  In this case, 
the war of attrition was the deliberate choice of Rome at the outset of a limited aims 
strategy in the diplomatic field. Given also that “each war creates crucial situations 
that must be exploited with bold courage”119, revenge for some states which had not 
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taken sides openly with the one or the other power, became attractive for it now 
seemed feasible. Bearing the aforementioned in mind, three major diplomatic events 
took place before the crucial battle of the Second Macedonian War between Rome 
and Macedonia:  
 
(a) Aetolians moved once more to the Roman side (September 199 B.C.), after 
relative reassurances of a Roman embassy and they marched into Thessaly. That 
development facilitated Roman establishment in the Greek soil120, since they had the 
leeway to return unscathed to Apollonia, leave behind in nodal points certain 
garrisons and wait patiently for the winter to pass, choosing thus a more favourable 
time for the final fight against Macedonia. It is clarified that Rome was not aimlessly 
procrastinating, but was waiting “realistically” for a convenient time to unravel a 
decisive blow; this is what Livy also highlights when he claims that “the Consul was 
not preparing, but actually waging war”121,  
 
(b) Antiochus III, after the victorious important battle of Panium (200 B.C.) between 
his Seleucid Empire and Ptolemaic Egypt, emerged as a significant regional power in 
the back yard of the Greek states, affecting thus indirectly the interests of Rome in 
this region. “The best that a state can hope for is to dominate its own back yard”122 
and Antiochus’ decision to conquer the neighbouring Thracian peninsula (the slice of 
earth opposite to Hellespont, not of course the whole region of Thrace to the northern 
side of Macedonia) in 198 B.C., but also his reception of Hannibal at his court shortly 
after that, transformed him in Roman eyes into a handy threat against the power 
distribution in the Greek subsystem. Handy in the sense that Rome had multiple 
pretexts at this juncture to meddle in Greek affairs123 and also alleviate the fears of the 
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soldiers for the continuous campaigns, as well as those of the Senate for the allocation 
of the financial resources. It is to be stressed that the rising power of Antiochus III 
was definitely a thorn for Rome, but not supposedly the dreadful peer competitor, as 
one could hasten to claim. It was indeed well known that the Syrian King was not 
equipped sufficiently to cope with a long term campaign against Rome and her allies. 
Quite illuminating for the case is the remarks of Aulus Gellius in his “Attic nights”: 
“In collections of old tales it is recorded that Hannibal the Carthaginian made a highly 
witty jest when at the court of King Antiochus. The jest was this: Antiochus was 
displaying to him on the plain the gigantic forces which he had mustered to make war 
on the Roman people, and was manoeuvring his army glittering with gold and silver 
ornaments… And then the king, filled with vain glory at the sight of an army so great 
and so well-equipped, turned to Hannibal and said: "Do you think that all this can be 
equalled and that it is enough for the Romans?" Then the Carthaginian, deriding the 
worthlessness and inefficiency of the king's troops in their costly armour, replied: 
"I think all this will be enough, yes, quite enough for the Romans, even though they 
are most avaricious." Absolutely nothing could equal this remark for wit and 
sarcasm;  the king had inquired about the size of his army and asked for a comparative 
estimate; Hannibal in his reply referred to it as booty”124. 
 
c) Titus Quinctius Flamininus was elected in 200 B.C. to replace Publius Sulpicius 
Galba and it is widely admitted that his personality was perhaps that missing critical 
touch upon the Roman policy in the Greek affairs, so as to successfully convert the 
limited aims diplomatic strategy combined with a war of attrition into a blitzkrieg 
strategy with a decisive battle. Flamininus did not surely possess a magic stick, but he 
merely managed to channel the Roman “realist” reasoning into practise, considering 
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the profoundly restricted capabilities of his predecessors in this field (his predecessor, 
Villius, did not admittedly leave any noticeable marks on the developments of that 
region125). In short and in terms of International Relations theory, I concur with the 
substantial view that “Flamininus did not bring with him a considerable change of the 
Roman Foreign policy, if not a change at all, but he did try to trim her with a mantle 
of solidarity and affection towards the enslaved Greek states by the autocratic and 
ruthless rule of Philip. Flamininus’ aim was thus not so much a balance of power as a 
balance of weakness in the Balkans”126. The same view in the frame of the specific 
margin of impact which an individual can bring upon the operation of the system had 
been articulated as well in the case of the Peloponnesian war. 
 
          In view of the aforementioned, Rome was astute enough, as it was already 
indicated, not to wage warfare simultaneously with multiple states, but preferred to 
deal with each one separately and most importantly on a permanent basis127. In this 
vein after all, Rome was to wait patiently a few years later to first expel Antiochus III 
from the Greek mainland at the battle of Thermopylae (191 B.C.) and then hunt him 
down up to Magnesia ad Sipylum (in contemporary Lydia) in 190 B.C., where the 
Syrian army was totally devastated in a decisive battle and harsh terms were imposed 
upon the Syrian King. It is to be recalled that even Plutarch feels compelled to 
underline that “had not Titus, in view of all this, made favourable terms of peace, and 
had the war with Antiochus in Greece found the war with Philip still in progress there, 
and had a common cause brought these two greatest and most powerful kings of the 
time into alliance against Rome, that city would have undergone fresh struggles and 
dangers not inferior to those which marked her war with Hannibal”128. Social unrest in 
the internal front was always lurking and that was an additional factor to constrain 
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Rome and plant a “realistic” restraint in her strategy for power maximization; it is 
characteristic that in the case of the First Macedonian War already, Livy points out 
that the commencement of a war could have other more sinister implications than the 
more obvious ones, stressing that the patricians could manipulate the waging of a 
warfare, in fact invent one, in order to keep “chained” the plebeians into a harsh 
reality, and therefore powerless to create any further turmoil or upset to their 
(patricians’) plans129.  
 
             Phillip V chose to act fast with a view to taking advantage of Romans’ 
physical inability to be omnipresent in the Greek peninsula and the plausible lack of 
credible early warning system for both sides. That should not of course seem bizarre 
taking into account the military developments of that era, since it was very frequent 
that two enemies could not meet each other until something concrete could pop up130. 
He stormed to the North against the Dardanians and the Illyrians through his general 
Athinagoras, while he himself defeated the Aetolians and Athamanians in Trikala 
(Central Greece). The image of Macedonia’s power in the Greek region was quite 
appealing to other Greek states after these campaigns of Phillip, while on the other 
hand, the Hellenistic states (in modern Turkey) remained invariably states-clients131 
of Rome. Sometimes the “client” states are of course called “amici” or “socii”. What 
matters is not the label but the product that comes with it and in our case it is the 
exertion of power, direct or indirect, which is the crucial metric for judging Rome’s 
relations with the other states and the approach of this power through the magnifying 
glass of international relations theory. Indeed, in addition to their ordinary land-
operations the Romans managed to use their fleet to browbeat Phillip’s other allies 
into their cause (such was the case of the cities in the coastal area between Euboea 
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and Magnesia, previously allies of Macedonia), but, at the same, time they could not 
fully exploit their fleet to hammer Macedonia down from the sea (to ravage 
Cassandreia, which was the most important coastal city of Macedonia and could be 
transformed into a precious naval base), so they were forced to withdraw their forces 
and operate from their more distanced naval bases in Euboea (Central Greece). 
 
          Titus Quintus Flamininus’ election as a new Consul in 198 B.C. (the “cursus 
honorum” was not yet in practice and that contributed further to his fast ascent to the 
office) was a considerable factor for the acceleration of events: though 30 years old, 
he was an apt general, dexterous diplomat and above everything else, he was 
purported to be a philhellene, banking a lot on his knowledge of the Greek 
language132. These very traits of his character and especially this mantle of his 
familiarity with Greek culture made him quite popular amongst the Greek states, 
which wrongfully and idealistically considered him as the solution to their problems 
with the Macedonians133. This is of course a purely moral approach of international 
relations, clearly incompatible with the fierce antagonism of great powers for power 
and as such it was soon belied by the facts: applying at their very first steps of their 
presence in Greece an entrenchment policy Romans did not explicitly demand from 
Philip to evacuate his possessions in Greece neither to renounce his alliances with all 
the other states, but they simply preached for the maintenance of the status quo. 
However, the desiderata expressed by Flamininus in the Conference of Aous in 198 
B.C. went a step further, taking now the form of an ultimatum and diluting every 
aspiration for peaceful bargains: Philip should abandon his garrisons in the places he 
possessed in Greece and limit himself in Macedonia only. The lack of any Grotian 
hope for a cooperative spirit on behalf of Rome, supposedly on the basis of the 
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previous peace of Phoenicia, was underscored by the fact that the Roman ultimatum 
did not even mention the respective treaty. In addition to this, immediately after 
taking over the command, Flamininus, having almost 30,000 soldiers on his side, tried 
to topple down on his own the defensive garrisons of Phillip V in certain city states of 
mainland Greece, although he could not bend the Macedonian determination.  
 
            Stalemate in war fighting meant idleness of the troops and idleness leaded 
unavoidably to extend plundering of the neighbouring land. Therefore, local people 
were forced to intervene as intermediaries in order to swiftly alleviate the harsh 
consequences of a foreign war on their land and save their belongings. That was the 
case with the Epirots, who attempted to bring together Flamininus and Phillip V, but 
to no avail134. It was a very interesting diplomatic attempt, because it illuminated 
further the fact that Roman foreign policy had already undergone the significant swift 
towards the final battle; Flamininus’ preventive diplomacy was buttressed by the 
power of his country and therefore it was fully equipped to deter Phillip in terms of H. 
Kissinger’s relative aphorism: He had “the required combination of power, the will to 
use it and the assessment of these by the potential aggressor. His deterrence was 
indeed a product of these factors and not a sum; otherwise if any part was zero, 
deterrence would fail”135. Concurrently, he was self projected as the altruist liberator 
of the Hellenistic states, a rhetoric which made an impression upon the credulous 
Greek audience. Considering the axiom that foreign policy is principally operated on 
a do ut des (“I give so that you will give”) approach, it was not the stance of 
Flamininus that was misleading, but the stance of the other Greeks, who did not grasp 
its ramifications (as for example the Epirots who promptly offered afterwards every 
possible assistance to the Roman troops during the incoming fighting with the 
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Macedonians). Flamininus did not cease to use bribery, pressure, psychological 
manipulations and every possible means to persuade any reluctant city state to step in 
with him against the Macedonians136. That should be obvious even to the untutored 
eye, but it was not. 
 
              Contrary to the Roman multi-vector diplomatic and military activity, 
Macedonia was raised as a monolithic aspiring hegemon, who, ignoring the 
complexity of the international society surrounding him, built his purportedly 
unifying of the Greeks image upon inchoate ideas about the “clouds from the west” 
and the “barbarians”. Re-enforcing one’s military is a dead end if it is not 
accompanied by the proper communication of these efforts to his target group, namely 
to his possible allies, so as to create at least a web of potential sympathisers and thus 
galvanise further its rising power. That said it was counter-productive for Phillip to 
reorganise his army, then to plunder Thessaly’s valley (undermining his popularity 
amongst the locals) and finally to alienate himself from his faithful allies (Achaean 
League) by delivering Argos to Nabis, King of Sparta and a renowned erratic, 
opportunistic (joining Romans afterwards with 500 soldiers) and unstable character 
(detrimental to his own state, considering that Rome subdued Sparta by leaps and 
bounds some time later137).          
               
           It has been shrewdly stated that “although the first word of the Romans was 
“peace in Greece”, it was now gracefully transformed into “freedom of Greece”138. 
Actually, through 197 B.C., Flamininus, contrary to his predecessors139, perceived 
that he should eventually invade Macedonia after having first alienated her to the 
greatest extent possible from her allies; Plutarch is quite clear on this: “For the realm 
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of Macedonia afforded Philip a sufficiently strong force for actual battle, but in a war 
of long duration his phalanx was dependent for its vigour, its support, its places of 
refuge, and in a word for its entire effectiveness, upon the states of Greece, and unless 
these were detached from Philip, the war with him would not be a matter of a single 
battle”140. Besides, Phillip V started to grasp that he was forced to confront the 
Romans in a decisive battle as far as possible away from his state’s provinces. Also, it 
is well known that “the defensive army should endeavour, by all means, to neutralize 
the first forward movement of its adversary, protracting operations as long as possible 
while not compromising the fate of the war, and deferring a decisive battle until the 
time when a portion of the enemy's forces are either exhausted by labours, or scattered 
for the purpose of occupying invaded provinces, masking fortified places, covering 
sieges, protecting the line of operations, depots, etc.”141.  Phillip would probably bank 
on this scattering of the Roman forces for the purposes of occupying invaded 
provinces, considering that he could not in aeternum turn a blind eye to the pressing 
demands coming from his own people on ending the continuous skirmishes in the 
frame of that extremely costly war of attrition142.  
 
        Certain procedural aspects of the confrontation between the two armies deserve 
to be highlighted, because they can shed light on the theoretical parameters of the 
conflict which are of particular interest to me. First and foremost, judging merely 
from the facts at hand, the battle was not the apex of conscious military planning 
based on sound “realistic” considerations, given that it took place quite accidentally 
and sheer luck earmarked its stages .Due to the weather conditions and the physical 
geography of the ground, the two armies were marching almost side-by-side in the 
region of Velestino, ignoring virtually the one the existence of the other143. Eventually 
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they bumped upon each other on a scouting expedition in nearby hills, which were 
called “Cynos Cephalae” (“The dog’s heads”), near today’s town Pharsalus, in central 
Greece.  
 
          Consecutively, the confrontation, at the beginning took place at a limited scale, 
since the opponents were initially completely bewildered the one by the presence of 
the other. However, the moment came that Romans were to be compensated for their 
artful diplomatic stance up so far, namely to condone in many instances previously 
the Aetolian behaviour. They were thus immediately enforced with 400 experienced 
Aetolians horsemen and 2,000 soldiers, a development that forced Phillip to involve 
more soldiers (3,500) and horsemen (1,400) so as to repel the attack and secure the 
vital access from the western side of the hills to his camp. The role of the Aetolians 
horsemen144 more particularly was indeed critical for the Roman fate, since they 
defended the Romans with vigour against the intense forays of the Macedonians and 
they saved Flamininus from greater evils. Individual’s role emerged once more highly 
significant for the course of the events: Phillip was disorientated by the mushrooming 
enthusiasm of his troops and their belief that the Romans were a falling castle and he 
disregarded the natural battleground, which was completely unfavourable for the 
smooth operation of the “phalanx”. Strategic thought alarms that “the natural 
formation of the country is the soldier’s best ally, but a power of estimating the 
adversary, of controlling the forces of victory and of shrewdly calculating difficulties, 
dangers and distances, constitutes the test of a great general” 145. Flamininus, on the 
contrary, having witnessed the defeat of his scouting forces, he sought the battle by all 
means in order to prevent a possible dramatic moral drop amongst his troops. In view 
of the foregoing, Flamininus drew up 31,400 soldiers (including 7,000 Aetolians), 
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while Phillip, around half of the available to him forces (due to a delay of 16,000 
soldiers to reach the mountainous battlefield, given their previous confrontation 
against the Roman scout forces), namely 14.900 soldiers.  
 
                    It shall not also escape one’s view that this battle of Cynos Cephalae was 
not simply the culmination of the states’ respective foreign policies, but also the 
stamping ground of their distinctive military formations on the ground, namely the 
phalanx versus the legion. In addition to this, that battle was revealing of the 
unbendable Roman ethos at war, which depicts the hegemon’s animus. In this regard, 
at the beginning the Macedonians seemed to be able to achieve their goals, because of 
their dense formation and their specific positioning on the ground (they were standing 
on higher point on the hills, looking down upon the legions). However Flamininus 
and an unknown Roman chiliarch were ingenious enough to discern the weaknesses in 
the left side of the phalanx, while exploiting at the same time the advantage of the 
elephants (an unusual, though significant, weapon of that era, which the Greeks have 
not seen for the last 80 years, so they were not quite familiar with their presence in the 
battle), they managed to balance the situation and turn the anomalous ground against 
the Macedonian phalanx.  Thus, Phillip squandered a unique chance to scatter almost 
one eighth of the total Roman forces. It is to be noted that the Macedonians, could 
have retained their defence line, but they were not that operational as they used to be 
during the reign of Alexander the Great. So the phalanx did not perform a prompt 
retroversion, while in the close warfare, the roman gladius (the broad sword) was 
proved extremely powerful. Consecutively, the Romans chased the Macedonians to 
death, while the Aetolians sacked the Macedonian camp (something, however, that 
provoked Romans’ wrath, in view of the stipulations of the Pact of Depredation). It 
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worth pointing out that the material consequences upon Macedonia were particularly 
high, considering that the loss of 13.000 soldiers (8.000 dead and 5.000 taken as 
hostages), was tantamount to more than 50% of Phillips’ men, while at the same time 
the Romans suffered the loss of not more than 700 soldiers. 
 
                In view of the foregoing, it is often asserted146 that the outcome of the battle 
of Cynos Cephalae147 was defined primarily by fortuitous events, to such an extent 
that it should not be ascribed to the Roman military efficiency per se. I do not 
underestimate the influence or even the primordial, in certain cases, role of tyxe (in 
Thucydides after all there is a contrast between human foresight-“gnome” and non 
human fortune-“tyxe”, which are the sole determinant factors in a series of human events), 
but I do claim that it is not that the decisive element when one ponders over the 
historical events macroscopically in the frame of international relations theory. In the 
context of purely historical narration and analysis, fortuitous events undoubtedly 
possess a significant seductiveness, but they do not supersede the importance of an 
overriding “realistic” paradigm of behaviour between states, with specific systemic 
ramifications and structural building elements. That paradigm cannot negate its 
permanent characteristics (anarchic international society, struggle for survival, 
unremitting quest for power and eventually the emergence of one or more potential 
hegemons, etc) solely because of the appearance of temporary ones, like “tyxe”. A 
subsequent invasion of the Dardanians from the north into Macedonia, which exerted 
a significant pressure upon Phillip to conclude a peace treaty with the Romans (which 
took place in 198 B.C. under heavy terms148) attests certainly to this observation, as 
an indicative systemic factor which is not affected by any tyxe. Here finds also 
application the plausible observation of Thucydides, that, fortuitous events cannot be 
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overstressed, but they should be expected after all, when the duration of a war gets 
longer and thus they serve as the driving forces to its conclusion149. 
 
             First and foremost the outcome itself of this battle is in a sense depictive of 
the respective foreign policies of the states involved, in view of four specific aspects: 
(a) the Macedonians, though well prepared, fumbled into the fight too hastily, without 
managing to gather their forces first and then march all together in time, a fact that 
attests to the previous “revolutionary” wise and overenthusiastic preaching of Phillip 
for quick victory  (b) there were many fresh recruits in the Macedonian camp (even 
below the age of 16 as well as many too old), whereas the Roman consisted of very 
experienced ones, motivated additionally by significant reward-policy (booty, pieces 
of land back home, possible intermission of their duty as soldiers after a successful 
campaign), another indication of the “realist” orientation of the Roman society as a 
whole, devoid of any sentimental impediments or ethical constraints (c) in the 
operational field the Roman troops were extremely mobile and divided in distinct 
commands, which were more able to act spontaneously and effectively at the same 
time (as it happened under the leadership of the unknown chiliarch who realised the 
unexpected Macedonian retroversion in this battle), something that came into sharp 
contrast with the stiff-necked reaction of the Macedonian phalanx towards unexpected 
events, reflective of certain dogmatism in the political field150 and (d) the role of the 
only ten Roman elephants is perhaps exaggerated by Livy151, but it could be indeed 
regarded as particularly important, judging by Perseus’ arduous efforts some years 
later to cope with the same challenge. What is pertinent here to note is that in view of 
the previous victorious battles of Alexander the Great against Persia, where he coped 
successfully with these animals, the military-political elite of Macedonia was 
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expected to have been far better prepared. That again testifies to the widespread 
harebrained conduct of state affairs by Phillip’s entourage. In sharp contrast, Roman 
politician, distant from any “frivolousness”, expended considerable care on gaining 
the favor of laymen and the aristocrats for an extensive campaign against any other 
enemy, which was very important considering the fresh memories from the bloody 
confrontation with Carthage and the lurking war fatigue of the people. 
 
        In view of the foregoing, the outbreak of the B’ Macedonian War was rather of 
political nature than a stricto sensu military escalation in the sense that it was already 
delineated in the political level, long enough before the two armies stand against each 
other in the field of battle. In fact one can discern the fact that all the major conflicts 
in this specific era are interrelated, something that denotes certain prevailing systemic 
characteristics of the politics in this period. Polybius states remarkably that “we see 
that the war with Antiochus took its rise from that with Philip; that with Philip from 
the Hannibalian; and the Hannibalian from the Sicilian war: and though between these 
wars there were numerous events of various character, they all converged upon the 
same consummation”152.  
 
            An indispensable part of the said systemic approach was the 
comprehensiveness of the Roman strategy. Applying meticulously the principle of 
divide ut regnes (“separate and rule”), Rome dissipated first the already stumbling 
Greek alliances system and then confronted them one by one. Political “realism” was 
steadily there to dictate Roman interests, which were best served at this particular 
time point through an “indirect approach”, while afterwards they had to be 
transformed in view of other increasing threats from the surrounding geostrategic 
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area. E.Will shrewdly asserts that on the second Macedonian war “there was a change 
of style in Roman policy towards Greece: the time had come for a militant 
philhellenism” 153. In addition to this, I cannot ignore the overriding consideration that 
Romans were not threatened on their soil, like Macedonians, and it was easier for 
them to mobilize their troops without significant cost to the internal front because of 
any possible delay due to unforeseen circumstances, as it was the case for Macedonia. 
Phillip, indeed, was forced to maintain garrisons in many cities of Greece (in the 
West, the commander was General Athinagoras, in the north, his younger son Perseus 
and in the south, General Phelokles), which meant that a significant part of his army 
was practically tied down and the time response to a probable attack was doomed to 
be further prolonged. On the other hand, it is to be admitted that Romans did show a 
certain admiration for the Greek civilization and culture (Oratius, the great Roman 
poet, observed that “Greece conquers Rome, by which she was conquered”-“Graecia 
capta ferum victorem cepit et artis/intulit agresti Latio154), but that was not and cannot 
be regarded as a reference point for a rational political analysis, which, in turn, 
Romans showed to apply in their foreign policy since the very beginning of their 
entanglement in Greece. That philhellenism could have been a fancy idealistic 
argument of course, but it is restricted at the level of impressions.  
 
              To the aforementioned “realistic” Roman attitude towards Macedonia attests 
quite glibly Flamininus: “Alexander (an Aetolian) was mistaken not only as to the 
policy of Rome, but also as to the object which he proposed to himself and above all 
as to the true interests of Greece. For it was not the Roman way to utterly destroy 
those with whom they had been at open war…For his part, moreover, he had never 
entertained the idea that it was necessary to wage an inexpiable war with Philip; but 
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on the contrary had been prepared before the battle to come to terms with him, if he 
would have submitted to the Roman demands…Yet, in truth, to the Greeks 
themselves it is greatly to their interest that Macedonia should be humbled, but not at 
all so that she should be destroyed. For it might chance thereby that they would 
experience the barbarity of Thracians and Gauls, as it has been the case more than 
once already”155. I have at this point to underline that the Greek ancient text states 
“Ῥωμαίων προαιρέσεως”, which is translated not quite successfully in English as “the 
policy of Rome”. If one approaches it accurately, that would read “Roman 
predisposition” affecting significantly my analysis, since it leads to the observation 
that Rome’s initial reluctance towards a decisive battle, let alone a war of 
annihilation, was explained on pre-existing strategic and political grounds, and it was 
not an outgrowth of momentary choice of policy or spontaneous decision making. 
This is also why specifically the option of annihilation was a priori excluded from the 
Roman vocabulary, where the “realistic” notion of a buffer-state possessed an eminent 
position: “towards the conquered the greatest minds show the greatest clemency. You 
think that kings of Macedon are a danger to the liberties of Greece. If that nation and 
kingdom were swept away, Thracians, Illyrians, Gauls, savage and barbarous tribes, 
would pour into Macedonia and then into Greece. Do not, by removing the danger 
closest to you, open the door to greater and more serious ones”156.  
 
            Last but not least, the systemic ramifications of the battle Cynos Cephalae 
have not been evident to the other Hellenistic states, which were taken away more by 
the defeat itself of the impressive, up to that time, Macedonian army than by the 
tangible uprising of the Roman army. Contrary to the “revolutionist” dotted with few 
“realist” aspects policy of Macedonia157, Greek states tended for the time being to 
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negate the unravelling status quo and attribute the defeat to sheer luck, to God’s will 
or to the general supercilious demeanour of Phillip towards them158.         
 
4.6.
 
Exit strategy in preventive war: C Macedonian War and forced expansion. 
              The 25 years that lapsed between the second and the third Macedonian war 
(196-171 B.C.), were the final transitory years for the Roman policy in Greece to be 
refashioned into a policy of the imperium, namely of the regional hegemon. It has to 
be clarified that the term “imperialistic” is merely a general subjective notion159, 
which falls comfortably enough within the scope of “realism” or “revolutionism”160 in 
terms of International Relations theory. Indeed, the roman word “imperium” does not 
necessarily have the connotations it has in modern language. If one examines 
etymologically the word, he will notice that the verb “imperare” meant for the 
Romans simply “to command” and therefore “imperialism” was in fact the action of 
the state towards this specific direction, namely to extend its command, which, 
consequently should be obeyed. It did not certainly have the pejorative sense of today 
and in any case did not entail that this command was exerted in an extreme and 
authoritative way, as a supporter of Cant would probably suggest and a follower of 
Grotius would probably imply161. Although the enemies of Rome already had a rough 
idea about her expansionist plans, Livy or even more contemporary authors tend to 
adjudicate any Latin involvement in foreign soil in terms of cruel imperialism: “In his 
reply Antiochus expressed his surprise that the Romans should go so carefully into the 
question as to what Antiochus ought to do, whilst they never stopped to consider what 
limits were to be set to their own advance by land and sea”162.  
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              That said, Perseus, son of Phillip V succeeded his father in 179 B.C. (the 
sources at hand do not provide for a full account of the last years of reign of Philip V), 
and “the war had thus been left as a heritage to Perseus by his father, bequeathed to 
him together with the crown, and from the first day of his rule all his plans were laid 
to feed and foster it” 163. The new king of Macedonia had embarked upon taking 
generous measures to the benefit of his people164 and it seemed that an era of 
development and prosperity165 was dawning once more for the country. As a 
consequence, these developments reconfirmed Macedonia’s power status and whetted 
even more Rome’s appetite to establish its rule in Greece. It is very distinctive of the 
rapidly rationalized Roman behavior the fact that while Rome had already sent 
expeditionary forces to Illyria after the battle of Cynos Cephalae and mobilized to this 
end her military forces, at the same time she was trying to humble diplomatically 
Macedonia166, by refusing to even address the Macedonian ambassadors, who had 
already reached Rome carrying pro-peace proposals. Roman hegemonic attitude was 
therefore already there, calculating first the costs and benefits to be later unraveled. At 
this point, International Relations theory becomes more insightful in explaining 
Roman behavior than historiography. This is indeed evident in the claim of E.Will to 
which I subscribe: “Although Titus Livy tags the Roman action to set Macedonia free 
as an “idealist” idea to liberate the slave-nations, it is in fact about a policy strictly 
“realistic”, which is dictated by experience: Macedonia was in essence stripped out of 
its components and exterior possessions as well into four autonomous states, without 
any constructive relations between them”167. That pre-calculation was taking place for 
Rome since the end of the second Macedonian war already and it is encapsulated 
precisely in the word “experience” of E. Will. Livy is also illuminating on this 
“undeclared war” when he stresses: “War had now been determined upon, though not 
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yet declared; the Senate was waiting to see which of the monarchs would befriend 
Perseus and who would support them”168.  
 
            The cost in the said calculation for Rome was not to be trivial: Perseus, being 
aware of his unfavourable strategic condition and of the uneven balance of power for 
his state, perceived quickly what his father tended to ignore. That rhetoric is important 
but direct diplomatic action on the ground was monumental. Thus, he was ready to 
take up preventive measures first and foremost in the diplomatic field for the 
eventuality of a new warfare with Rome, taking advantage of his ample financial 
assets. “Ellenokopein”169 is exactly Polybius' word for Perseus’ early policy “to play 
the Greek” or “to court the favor of the Greeks”. The aim, certainly, was to turn the 
Greek eyes towards him. It is evident in any case that diplomacy for its own sake was 
an evanescent idealist aspiration; it was existent in principle, though it was productive 
only on a basis of a quid pro quo: money was invariably the most credible connecting 
bond between allies. Characteristic is the description of Cretans by Plutarch in 
relation to their motives to support Perseus: “they were as devoted to his riches as 
bees to their honeycombs”170. 
 
          Perseus’ task was nevertheless particularly difficult, because Rome had already 
smoothed her campaign against Macedonia by securing the allegiance of many 
neighbours of Perseus: King of Pergamum, Eumenes, as well as King of Syria 
Antiochus and King of Egypt Ptolemy, refused explicitly to provide Perseus with any 
assistance to his cause against the Romans. In the mainland of Greece, the states 
themselves seemed on one hand to be reluctant to oppose to Perseus, on the other 
hand, because of Rome’s evident power projection and previous Macedonian war 
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atrocities, they were pressed to opt for the Roman side. In fact, only the Thraces-
Odrysses and their king Cotys offered their allegiance to Perseus, since “Thrace was 
open to him as a never-failing source from which he could draw fighting men, 
supposing that the supply from Macedonia should fail”171. What becomes 
conspicuous again is the great power’s credibility, which is strongly interrelated with 
the wider notion of a state’s image. Indeed, the Greek states’ stance was not a product 
of any momentary stimulus coming from Perseus’ side, but of the whole image of 
Macedonia, which had been already established in their minds172 from the past 
activity of the latter. In International Relations theory words, it was their “cognitive 
consistency” to assimilate incoming information to pre-existing images173. However 
that sort of institutional memory, which was for the most part regarded as consistent 
due to the traditional involvement of the same individuals belonging usually to a 
certain Macedonian noble class in the decision making process, was not invariably 
reflecting the public memory, which ex definitio is short-sighted and historically liable 
to sentimental fluctuations. The poor masses indeed in various Greek states as well as 
within Macedonia, seemed to be in favour of the proclaimed Macedonian enmity 
towards Rome174, contrary to many members of the wealthy classes, who were 
inclined to favour, for their own distinct reasons, any Roman status quo which could 
secure their own fortune.          
 
         “Si vis pacem para bellum” is met in Greek philosophy175 earlier than in the 
Latin. In this vein, fervent military preparation during peace time with Rome was 
inscribed in the hardcore of Macedonia’s foreign policy176, emitting signs of an 
emerging “realistic” political thinking. That observation can be attested by two 
significant factors: (a) Phillip V, only one year before his death and therefore very 
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close to the commencement of Perseus’ kingship, had his other son, Demetrius, 
executed because of his purported “Romanship”. That extraordinary fact is a 
resounding affirmation of the bleak and tense climate in the King’s court against 
Rome, something that of course could not have simply tailed off177 instantaneously 
and (b) at the beginning of the campaign against Rome, Perseus’ army consisted 
already of 4,000 horsemen and 39,000 soldiers, while 10-15,000 men were assigned 
to the garrisons of the cities and to the bulwarks. To understand how impressive were 
these numbers, especially considering the previous two Macedonian wars, where 
Phillip was considered defeated, I underline that in the same period, Roman Consul, 
Poplius Likinius Crassus formed an army of 33,000 soldiers and 1,700 horsemen and 
along with further enforcements from the allies of Rome (Pergaminians, Aetolians, 
Voiotians, etc), brought together 40,100 men (excluding the considerable number of 
Roman garrisons in near towns), namely less than that of Macedonia.  
 
            However, military preparation is not per se an automatic process towards a 
victorious warfare or a successful “realistic” foreign policy, if other “elements of 
national power”178 lag behind and especially that of diplomacy. That was precisely 
what occurred in Macedonia since the first stages of the First Macedonian War. H. 
Morgenthau put it shrewdly: “Diplomacy is the brains of national power, as national 
morale is its soul. If its vision is blurred, its judgement defective and its determination 
feeble, all the advantages of geographical location, of self sufficiency in food, raw 
materials and industrial production of military preparedness of size and quality of 
population will in the long run avail a nation little”179. The time scale (“in the long 
run”), evocative precisely of the notion of consistency in foreign policy, is indeed the 
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keyword to distance oneself from any dithyrambic assessment on the said impressive 
military preparation of Macedonia.  
 
         My previous reservation to overemphasize upon Macedonia’s military 
preparedness is compounded by the acute antithesis between the outcomes of the first 
serious confrontation of Perseus with the Roman army in the battle of Callinicus (171 
B.C.)180 precisely in terms of the aforementioned time scale. Indeed, that battle 
evolved into an outstanding victory for Perseus, since the Romans suffered 2,500 
losses, while the Macedonians hardly 60. However, in the long run it did not produce 
to Perseus’ benefit any tangible results at all. It is in fact still under discussion why 
Perseus, despite his leading momentum, terminated abruptly the battle and sought 
negotiation with Crassus, after having retreated so as to be “contented with what he 
had gained” and “keep a peace with honour”181. Besides, the hegemonic way by 
which Crassus responded to the Macedonian propositions for peace is not under 
discussion and actually proves once more the “realistic” background thoughts of his 
state: Perseus did not acquire a navy so as to seriously ponder over the possibility to 
invade Rome, which was the powerful regional hegemon, equipped with a strong web 
of alliances and diplomatic understandings, something that provided them with the 
leeway to quickly recover from any occasional losses (demography was also playing a 
vital role in this regard, since approximately every year Rome could gather up to 4 
legions of 4-5,000 soldiers each, given that everybody –adult, male – irrespective of 
his freedom status was obliged to join the Roman forces). 
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            The said “objective” element of Rome’s advantageous relative power position 
must be read along with a “subjective” one, namely how Roman preponderance 
passed to the Greek states, including Macedonia. it is really striking how Macedonian 
decision makers perceived the power situation, something that becomes crystal clear 
in the astonishing advice of the counsellors to the Macedonian King: “The king was 
holding a council to decide upon the future conduct of the war, and as his exultation 
over his victory had cooled down, some of his friends ventured to give him advice. 
They argued that it would be better for him to take advantage of his good fortune by 
securing an honourable peace than to buoy himself up with idle hopes and so expose 
himself to chances that might be irrevocable. To set a measure to one's prosperity and 
not to place too much confidence in the smiling fortune of the hour is the part of a 
wise man who has achieved a deserved success”182. In “offensive realism’s” words, 
the  Macedonian ruling class not only did they recognise Roman superiority, but they 
espoused feverishly, under the mantle of modesty, the option to “bandwagon with the 
aggressor”, since it deemed that “solitary resistance was futile”183, despite 
Macedonia’s clear victory in Callinicus hill. In that case it becomes pertinent 
Thucydides’ crucial reasoning: “if you yield to them in a small matter they will think 
you are afraid and will immediately dictate some more oppressive condition; but if 
you are firm you will prove to them that they must treat you as their equals’’184. 
Macedonia seemed to kick-start from a totally false mind-setting, since it was unable 
to show that necessary firmness185. 
 
      “The prestige of a nation is very much like the credit of a bank. A bank with large, 
proven resources and a record of successes can afford what a small and frequently 
unsuccessful competitor cannot: to make a mistake or suffer a setback”186 . Indeed, 
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the battle of Callinicus was soon left behind for the Romans, who hastened to reaffirm 
their prevailing position by mobilizing their army and moving their camp to a more 
advantageous place in the same area, being additionally reinforced with 2,000 men 
and 22 elephants (from their ally Masanasis of Numidia). Decisive and not desultory 
action is necessary in the frame of a “realist” thinking in order to correct precisely an 
unexpected turn of events, but also in order to prevent any other blow to the image of 
the great power. It is not self-explanatory, since it can be attributed as well to a 
“realist”, labeled as cynic, thinking or to a “revolutionary”, promoted as a passionate, 
one187.  
 
            The said effort to prevent a blow brings me again to the emerging issue of 
preventive action: “Even Bismarck, who once called preventive war “committing 
suicide from fear of death”, said that “no government, if it regards war as inevitable 
even if it does not want it, would be so foolish as to leave to the enemy the choice of 
time and occasion and to wait for the moment which is most convenient for the 
enemy”188. Rome, indeed, was forced by her distributive role in terms of power 
accumulation within the system to act swiftly and fully exploit diplomacy, in all its 
three main functions, namely intelligence gathering, policy implementation and 
primarily, image management189. That Roman preventive stance was also dictated by 
certain ensuing developments: Perseus’ victory in the battle of Callinicus hills sowed 
the seeds of discord between the poorer masses and the wealthy people within the 
Hellenistic states, the result of which was the King’s increased popularity. In this 
vein, the Rhodian decision to dispatch nothing more than 5 battleships to support the 
Romans, instead of the 40 that they had originally promised, was inevitably to be 
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interpreted as another clarion call for the blemished Roman image after the battle of 
Callinicus hill. 
 
        It is often said that “a plan is merely a basis for changes”190 and Roman plans 
had to change rapidly so as to precipitate the conflict with Macedonia and establish 
her as the unchallenged dominant in the region, especially since the Macedonian front 
remained now the only open one for the Romans191. As Crawford observes, 
“whenever one solution failed, the Romans were always sufficiently flexible to try 
another”192 and thus the final warfare was in fact that other solution, the continuation 
of their diplomacy in other means. To this end, they devastated the town of Aliartos in 
Boeotia and they sacked various towns to the east and the west.  The now blatantly 
ruthless Roman tactics kindled the sympathy of certain Hellenistic states towards 
Perseus, who recognised there an opportunity to influence further the war 
developments and gain the favour of Epirus, the second most significant (after 
Apollonia) footstep of Romans in the Greek soil. The Macedonian king managed 
indeed to disperse the alliance of the Epirots (“Koinon ton Epiroton”). But the 
Romans were deft enough to relocate once more the war front and invade into 
Macedonia itself, though unsuccessfully, withdrawing then back to Thessaly.  
 
            It worth mentioning, at this point, that Romans, contrary to what one could 
expect they seemed remarkably “balanced” even within their “unbalanced” moments. 
In order not to instigate fear in the hearts of their allies, they were eager to offset their 
galloping aggressiveness by appeasing their allies and keeping them close and 
together: when Roman sailors ravaged the coastal town of Chalcis, a staunch ally of 
Rome, the Senate did not hesitate to ask from the Consul in charge to compensate the 
220 
 
people of the Greek town for his actions193. That single fact is astounding because 
Rome was, in terms of International Relations theory, capable of analyzing the 
international environment around her as a system which comprises units, interactions 
and structure and therefore even the weaker ally like Chalcis was not to be 
disregarded. Here of course the system refers to a group of parts or units whose 
interactions are significant enough to justify seeing them in some sense as a coherent 
set and therefore a group of states forms an international system when "the behavior 
of each is a necessary factor in the calculations of the others"194.   
 
           The aforementioned Roman balance in foreign politics did not occur in vitro. It 
had immediate negative ramifications on Macedonia, depicting precisely the “zero 
sum game” (in the sense that “one’s state gain in power is another state’s loss”195) 
logic of the strictly competitive relations between the opponents. After another 
unsuccessful attempt of Macedonians, to draw the Aetolians to their side and after the 
further reinforcement of the Roman army (now with the lead of the Consul Cointus 
Marcius Phillipus) with 50,000 men (40,000 Romans and 10.000 allies) in land and 
the parallel operations of the Roman navy (under Gaius Marcius Figlus) in the 
coastline of Thessaly, it was imperative for Perseus to seek for a diplomatic solution, 
considering as well his submissiveness after the victorious battle in the hill of 
Callinicus. To the aforementioned I have to add and concurrently highlight the 
significant losses in manpower for Macedonia, which deprived the latter of 
experienced officers to run the campaign. It is not a factor to underestimate that 
Macedonia faced serious troubles with the decimation of its population after the 
violent campaigns with her northern neighbours and of course the wars with Rome. 
Mercenaries were a temporary treatment but not an antidote to this costly ailment. 
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Besides, “mercenaries rarely fought to the death and war often meant compelling the 
enemy’s mercenaries to surrender and then enlisting them”196. “Owing to the 
perpetual wars which had for so many generations drained the manhood of Macedonia 
there was a serious lack of men of military age”197 affirms Livy. It goes without 
saying that population is a highly critical element for the continuation of the war, but 
also the vitalizing substratum for its successful outcome and the consecutive 
qualification of a state as a great power198. That observation leads me unavoidably to 
the important issue of the level of a great power’s military offensive capability, not 
necessarily in view of the final outcome of a warfare, but first and foremost of its very 
maintenance: Rome succeeded in replacing her losses after every battle, pumping 
manpower from a rich well of alliances, while Macedonia was forced to be left to her 
own devices and tried to find recourse to highly questionable for war fighting groups 
of the population (children, slaves).  
 
           Taking into account of the aforesaid, it was ostensible that Romans would 
discard without any hesitation every Macedonian proposal for a diplomatic solution, 
something that was soon confirmed by the Roman rejection to a possible 
intermediation by Rhodes or Bithynia. As it has already been stressed, Rome was 
moving consciously from the level of a war of attrition to a decisive war, a blitzkrieg 
(in the wider of course notion). The latter one “relies” precisely “on mobility and 
speed, so as to defeat an opponent decisively without a series of bloody battles”199 and 
therefore diplomacy was now considered to be redundant. 
 
              Lefkius Aimilius Paulus, the consul who was about to “capture more than 
any one such enormous treasures in Macedonia”200, was sent to Greece for the final 
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decisive battle against Macedonians, while at the same time the Romans were 
intensifying the war preparations, with a view to fighting at a specific place, namely 
Thessaly (just at the doorstep of Macedonian territory to the south), where they would 
be enabled to utilise the major part of their army and inflict the greatest blow possible 
to their enemy. Thus, while they enforced further their troops in Thessaly, they 
managed to eliminate the possibilities from a simultaneous war front in Illyria: there 
they defeated their previous ally King Gentius, in Illyria cutting off Perseus once 
more from the routes which were leading to the Adriatic Sea. Macedonia disposed 
39,000 soldiers and 4,000 horsemen, whereas Rome 4,200 horsemen and 44,000 
soldiers, as well as around 30 battleships in the near coastline.  
 
                 In the morning of 22nd of June 168 B.C. in Pydna, an accidental event, 
constituted the spark for the outbreak of the war (a horse ran away from the roman 
military camp, while according to Plutarch, the horse did not escape coincidentally the 
Romans’ attention) and as a result of which, small forces from both camps came close to 
confrontation.. Even though man will never be able to assess accurately the objective 
risks of ultimate accidental disaster, it must be pointed out that history and the social 
sciences furnish abundant evidence that the initiation of war is a matter of conscious, 
deliberate choice and scant evidence of decision-less outbreaks of war exists (or 
following W. Churchill’s dictum that “long antagonisms express themselves in 
trifles”201). In any case the initial enthusiasm of the Greeks, who unravelled they, first, 
an impetuous attack was offset by the ample Roman passion for glory202.  The war 
soon favoured Rome, who, nevertheless, suffered great losses despite the relative 
references in the literature, which speak for less than 100203. And that because the 
members of the phalanx were trained to attack their enemy to the face, so the 
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possibility for a Roman to be solely wounded was limited. In addition to this, one 
should bear in mind that in the similar battle of Cynos Cephalae, where the Romans 
were almost one third of those in Pydna and confronted the same strikes of the 
Macedonian phalanx, suffered alone 700 losses. However, the losses for the 
Macedonians were over 20,000 soldiers, while more than 10,000 men were taken as 
hostages; it was therefore undoubtedly a decisive outcome: Livy points out that “it is 
universally admitted that never had so many Macedonians been killed by the Romans 
in a single battle”204.   
 
           Examining the major aspects of the Macedonian Wars with the magnifying 
glass of International Relations theory, it worth concluding by referring to a certain 
extent to the famous, in modern literature, confrontation between the two military 
weapons, Macedonian sarissa and Roman gladius, which represented two different 
military philosophies, but they can also provide me with a succinct portrayal of the 
opposed two distinct political theories. Although at the beginning the Macedonian 
phalanx with the sarissas launched a tremendous attack upon the puzzled Romans205, 
the course of the battle veered in favour of the Roman side due to, not again 
necessarily purely military, reasons: 
 
 (a) The deployment of 22 elephants by Rome put Macedonians into an extremely 
difficult position, since, although they expected their emergence, they could not come 
to grips with their ferocious power in the battlefield. That denotes that Rome had now 
perfected (after her wars over her mainland enemies in Italy206), in total her modus 
operandi in the battlefield, namely not only the military weapons, but also the 
soldiers’ quite obedient military formation. 
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(b) The inherent disadvantages of the Macedonian phalanx came once again to the 
fore, namely that she could not operate on an anomalous ground as well as against 
smaller, mobile units, something that the cunning Aimilius Paulus soon realized and 
preferred to ensnare the Macedonians back in inaccessible mountainous allays, 
launching a man to man attack in order first and foremost to scatter the impenetrable 
phalanx. In this context and in addition to what have already been said above on the 
social-political connotations of this specific operation of the phalanx, the lack of 
powerful allies was also a sapping factor for her efficiency: “for the realm of 
Macedonia afforded Philip a sufficiently strong force for actual battle, but in a war of 
long duration his phalanx was dependent for its vigour, its support, its places of 
refuge, and in a word for its entire effectiveness, upon the states of Greece, and unless 
these were detached from Philip, the war with him would not be a matter of a single 
battle”207. It is surely interesting to remember that interrelation of the military and 
political aspects in the context of phalanx’s operation. 
 
 (c) Crystal clear were the internal dissents of political nature in the military camp of 
Perseus, where the horsemen, manned traditionally by the wealthy aristocrats, did not 
take part effectively  in the fight, namely in full and unconditional support of the 
phalanx, which was falling under extreme pressure. It is often claimed that Perseus 
chose deliberately to keep his horsemen away from the first line, perhaps with a view 
to predisposing positively the Romans having in mind a possibly negative outcome of 
the battle. However, this does not explain the initial success of Perseus to hold back 
Crassius’ troops and the vigour with which the Macedonians were fighting. Therefore 
it seems reasonable that the horsemen, strongly disappointed by the previous 
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demagogic policy of Perseus (it is illustrating the fact that never before had been 
gathered so many soldiers from the laymen, almost 21.000, while the expected 
number was about 12-16.000 men) took advantage of this very time to influence the 
result of the battle, banking on Perseus’ defeat and boosting their personal rise to 
power. In other words, one notices that domestic developments do play a perhaps non 
major, though important, role on the shaping of the events, a fact that a Machiavellian 
“realist” would not whole-heartedly admit208. 
 
(d) As I have already observed, the war against the Romans was also social-economic, 
since the oligarchs209 viewed in general Romans as a safe bulwark for their assets. 
Besides, according to Plutarch210, “to the exploits of Aemilius in Macedonia is 
ascribed his most unbounded popularity with the people, since so much money was 
then brought into the public treasury by him that people no longer needed to pay 
special taxes until the times of Hirtius and Pansa, who were consuls during the first 
war between Antony and Octavius Caesar”. That remarkable comment testifies to the 
hypothesis that if Perseus had the expected succour from his rich horsemen – 
aristocrats, perhaps he could have easily hired mercenaries at a later stage to advance 
the cause further and counter attack at a given notice. 
 
             The second greatest battle in the Greek soil in terms of numbers of 
combatants after the battle of Plateaus against Persia earlier, the battle of Pydna was 
indeed the definitive culmination of the Macedonian Wars, after which balance of 
power in the Greek subsystem would be restored exclusively to the benefit of Rome. 
Even if one claims that pinpointing upon the ancient sources does not reveal a 
formally vaunted Roman political approach in terms of a balance of power theory’s 
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tenets, it has to be stressed that upon attentive interpretation of these sources, there is 
certainly on behalf of Rome a diffusing notion of preserving her interests, namely 
hegemony or search for hegemony, given the uneven distribution of power in the 
geostrategic area of the Hellenistic states.  In other words, Rome was not interested 
just in every possible balance of power which could bring along certain stability in the 
area and therefore a wide margin for her to possibly reap the various benefits along 
with other players, but solely in this balance of power which would simply “border” 
without any cacophonies her unravelling imperium211. After having spotted the 
various inlaid pieces of information which potentially lead to the building procedure 
of that Roman interest possibly in contrast to the Spartan one, I will proceed in the 
next chapter to the final outline of this emerging mosaic and the ensuing conclusions 
which can be of use to modern time.   
                                                          
1 Tarantinians, Krotoniatians, Riginians, Thourians, etc. 
 
2 Map 12. 
 
3 “Pyrrhus replied to one that gave him joy of his victory that one more such victory would utterly undo 
him. For he had lost a great part of the forces he brought with him, and almost all his particular friends 
and principal commanders; there were no others there to make recruits, and he found the confederates 
in Italy backward. On the other hand, as from a fountain continually flowing out of the city, the Roman 
camp was quickly and plentifully filled up with fresh men, not at all abating in courage for the loss they 
sustained, but even from their very anger gaining new force and resolution to go on with the war” 
(Plutarch, “Pyrrhus”). 
 
4 “I fear the Greeks even when bearing gifts.” (Homer’s Iliad, B.II, V.49).   
 
5 “Thus one can distinguish between global hegemons, which dominate the world and regional 
hegemons, which dominate distinct geographic areas” (J. Mearsheimer, “The tragedy of Great power 
politics”, p.84). 
 
6 “The decline of the Roman Empire in the West”, (p.22). 
 
7 That should not sound strange for us, since along with maritime commerce comes and maritime gain 
and therefore vested maritime interests, which are strongly interrelated with analogous risks. One of 
these risks, (apart from weather conditions, vulnerability of the products, etc) were the pirates who 
acted vastly in the Mediterranean as well as Adriatic Sea, serving as a significant destabilizing factor, 
which was posing serious obstacles to the efforts of the great powers to secure their grasp in the area. 
What is astonishing however is that in many times, these pirates served solely as a stooge in the hands 
of the other states, which preferred to use them in order to inflict damage on their rival states. (“Social 
and Economic history of the Hellenistic World”, p. 607). 
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8 Map 13. 
 
9 That “pre-existence” is according to H. Luttwak the factor which facilitated Rome’s “realistic” 
approach by coercion instead of direct exertion of military force as was the case in the West (“The 
logic of anarchy neorealism and structural realism, p.84). 
 
10 B.III.16. 
 
11 F. Walbank, “Polybius, Rome and the Hellenistic World, Essays and Reflections”, p. 94. 
 
12  Polybius, B.II. 2. 
 
13 Polybius, B.1.3. H. Delbruck makes the same observation when he stresses that “if we wished to 
begin the history of the Roman military system and experience…we would have to start with the 
(period of) second Punic War” War in Antiquity”, p.255. 
 
14 Polybius, B. V, 104. 
 
15 “Moral principles are of value only for propaganda purposes or when they coincide with national 
power” (F. Schuman, ‘’International politics’’, p. 277). 
 
16 “The strength and general efficiency of the phalanx was lost when it was thus broken up; and now 
that the Macedonians engaged man to man or in small detachments, they could only hack with their 
small daggers against the firm and long shields of the Romans, and oppose light wicker targets to their 
swords, which, such was their weight and momentum, penetrated through all their armour to their 
bodies. They therefore made a poor resistance and at last were routed.” (Plutarch’s Lives, Aimilius 
Paulus, XX). 
 
17 Polybius gives a thorough description of Macedonian phalanx in B.XVIII. 28-32. 
 
18 “Philip's men had been accustomed to fighting with Greeks and Illyrians and had only seen wounds 
inflicted by javelins and arrows and in rare instances by lances. But when they saw bodies 
dismembered with the Spanish sword, arms cut off from the shoulder, heads struck off from the trunk, 
bowels exposed and other horrible wounds, they recognised the style of weapon and the kind of man 
against whom they had to fight, and a shudder of horror ran through the ranks” (Livy, B. XXXI.34). 
 
19 H. Tarn, “Hellenistic Civilization”, p. 55. 
 
20 Interesting in this context is the observation of military nature but with political and social 
ramifications by J. P.Vernant that already during the period of Macedonian Wars “the phalanx brings 
with her the annulation of the sense of ethics, given that the hoplite is now integrated and assimilated 
into a wider group, where he forsakes his individuality and spirit of initiative in the name of the group’s 
coherence and mass effectiveness” (“Problèmes de la guerre en Grèce ancienne”, p. 170). 
 
21 “War in Antiquity”, p.397. 
 
22 Map 14. 
 
23 Polybius, B.III.16, B.IV.19. 
 
24 The key to Rome’s unimpeded power in the Adriatic Sea was in fact located in the Illyrian coast: “as 
long as Hannibal was in Italy, it was important that the Straits of Otranto remain in friendly hands; and 
should Phillip abandon traditional Macedonian policy and following the self-interested advise of 
Rome’s enemy Demetrius, engage in Illyria, the Senate must have inevitably taken notice of his 
activities.” (F. Walbank, “Polybius, Rome and the Hellenistic World, Essays and Reflections” p. 95). 
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25 Polybius pays particular emphasis on the Carthage factor: “Wherefore the Senate, by way of 
preparing to undertake this business, and foreseeing that the war would be severe and protracted, and at 
a long distance from the mother country, determined to make Illyria safe.” (B.III,16). 
 
26 Polybius B.XXXVI.2. 
 
27 Polybius, B.III,16. 
 
28 “The first Macedonian war arose out of Philip V’s ill – advised policy of expansion towards the 
Adriatic and his alliance with Hannibal” (F. W. Walbank, “Polybius, Rome and the Hellenistic World, 
Essays and Reflections”, p. 95). 
 
29 A. L. George, “Introduction: the limits of Coercive Diplomacy”, p.2. 
 
30 Ibid, p.20. 
 
31 Mentioned in “America’s strategy in world politics’’ (N. J. Spykman, p. 11). 
 
32 Map 15. 
 
33 Livy, XXXIV, C. 60. 
 
34 “On War”, p.595-596.  
 
35 “Macedon was a basically agrarian state with open country and very little urban population. The 
great mass of farmers and shepherds were not sufficiently well-off to provide themselves with hoplite 
equipment and were also unable, without difficulty, to gather in large units in a single place.” (H. 
Delbruck, “Warfare in antiquity’’,p. 175). 
 
36 “Rome’s diplomacy succeeded for several reasons. She had created a new image of herself as the 
champion of autonomy for the Greek states. And this posture was made more plausible by her 
dissociation from Aetolia...” (F. Walbank, “Phillip V”, p. 421). 
 
37 “Perception and Misperception”, p.117. 
 
38 Polybius, B.VII,9, 12-13. 
 
39 One should not of course omit the always latent factor of lack of sufficient sources, which could, 
probably fill in the missing gaps in this regard, but it is evident from the sequence of the events that 
there was really a certain reluctance of Hannibal to squander his favourable strategic position in the 
area and bind himself with another king, sharing further thus the “dividend of peace” in the region. 
 
40 “States that gain regional hegemony have a further aim: to prevent other geographical areas from 
being dominated by other great powers. Regional hegemons, in other words, do not want peer 
competitors. Instead, they want to keep other regions divided among several great powers so that these 
states will compete with each other” (J.  Mearsheimer, “The Rise of China Will Not Be Peaceful at All”, 
p.2). 
 
41 Livy, B.XXXIV.58. 
 
42 “Philip making a treaty with Hannibal of Carthage (Polybius B.VII.9, Austin 61), which may not 
have even been ratified by Carthage, does not imply that Philip had designs on Rome, it may have been 
purely for his own safety, but in such situation and remembering Pyrrhus’s invasion sixty years earlier, 
the Romans could hardly ignore the potential danger” (G. Shipley, “The Greek World after Alexander”, 
p. 372). 
 
43 J. Mearsheimer, “The tragedy of great power politics”, p.13. 
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44 “The Cambridge Ancient History: Rome and the Mediterranean up to 133 B.C.”, p.83. Rome was 
indeed learning from the events with Carthage, and with the two Epirote Kings, Alexander and 
Pyrrhus.  
 
45 One should not dismiss the Roman fear for a possible imitation by Philip of Pyrrhus or Hannibal’s 
earlier aggressive strategy in the Italian soil. This very fact is stressed by Livy as well: “Aurelius 
pointed out that the Romans would have to display far greater energy in the prosecution of this war, or 
else Philip, encouraged by their slackness, would venture on the same enterprise which Pyrrhus, whose 
kingdom was considerably smaller, had ventured on before.” (Livy, B.31.3) or “what you have to 
decide is not whether you will have peace or war; Philip will not leave you any option as to that, he is 
preparing war on an enormous scale both by land and sea. The only question is whether you will 
transport the legions into Macedonia or wait for the enemy in Italy” (Livy, B.31.7). 
 
46 Livy, B.31. 7. 
 
47 W. Harris, “War and imperialism in Republican Rome”, p. 41. 
 
48 M. Wight, “The Three Traditions”, p.196. 
 
49 Map 16.  
 
50 His behaviour was also interrelated to his peculiar character as a person: It is well known that Phillip 
had a debauched life, he was prone to women, and enjoyed a certain impact on the masses. On the 
other hand, he could be characterised as well, though in demagogical terms, as a “charismatic 
personality” (as it is also the case today for certain political leaders, the personal life of which often 
inspires the people to an extent of being worshiped). See also Livy, B.XXXII, 33. 
 
51 Polybious 5.101. 
 
52 B. Buzan, C. Jones, R. Little, “The logic of anarchy”, p.88. 
 
53  Polybius, B.IV.28. 
 
54 R.M.Kaplan, “System and process in international politics’’, p.21. 
 
55 “The question was, however, how long Roman credibility in the area would survive when, despite a 
substantial Roman naval presence, Phillip was able without difficulty and without provoking 
retaliation, to take control of some of Rome’s friends and of major fortress” (The Cambridge Ancient 
History, B.VIII, p.98). 
 
56 K. Waltz, “Structural realism after the cold war”, p.3. 
 
57 Map 17.  
 
58 “And the reason in my opinion was this, that being neighbours to two of the most powerful nations in 
the Peloponnese, or I might almost say in Greece, I mean the Arcadians and Lacedaemonians,—one of 
which had been irreconcilably hostile to them from the moment they occupied the country, and the 
other disposed to be friendly and protect them,—they never frankly accepted hostility to the Spartans, 
or friendship with the Arcadians” (Polybius, B.IV.32). 
 
59 Polybius in B.IV.29-31 gives an illuminating account of the motives of these states to join this or that 
side . 
 
60 Map 18. 
 
61 This is why Demetrius Pharus strives to explain Phillip during the First Macedonian War that he has 
to take one front at the time: “The latter seized the occasion to advise Philip to throw over the war 
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against the Aetolians as soon as possible; and to concentrate his efforts upon Illyria, and an expedition 
into Italy” (Polybius, B.V.5.101).  
 
62 A. Momigliano, “Greek Historiography” History and Theory, p.21. 
 
63  B.XXXII 13.6-8. 
 
64 B. XXXI. 31. 
 
65 This is precisely what Demetrius Pharus had advised Phillip: “The latter seized the occasion to 
advise Philip to throw over the war against the Aetolians as soon as possible…”For Greece," said he, 
"is already entirely obedient to you, and will remain so: the Achaeans from genuine affection; the 
Aetolians from the with terror which their disasters in the present war have inspired them. Italy, and 
your crossing into it, is the first step in the acquirement of universal empire, to which no one has a 
better claim than yourself. And now is the moment to act when the Romans have suffered a reverse." 
(Polybius, B. V.101). 
 
66 Livy, B. XXXI. 31. 
 
67  Thucydides, B.V.97. 
 
68 “Disgrace” they call it the Rhodians: “You profess to be at war against Philip on behalf of the 
Greeks, that they may escape from servitude to him; but your war is really for the enslavement and ruin 
of Greece. That is the tale told by your treaty with Rome, which formerly existed only in written words, 
but is now seen in full operation. Heretofore, though mere written words, it was a disgrace to you: but 
now your execution of it has made that disgrace palpable to the eyes of all the world” or even more that 
Aetolians “handed over all Greece to the Barbarians” through this pact (Polybius, B.XI.5). 
 
69 Polybius, labels this Grotian, wavering, policy as “unjustifiable towards all” (Polybius, B.IV.35).  
 
70 H. Nicolson, “Evolution of diplomatic method”,p.11. 
 
71 Also, F. Walbank, “Phillip V”, p. 454. 
 
72 Livy, B.XVII, 30. 
 
73 “Cycliadas, who held the chief command, and the Achaeans met the king near Dymae, being not 
only inflamed with hatred of the Helians because they were at odds with the rest of the Achaeans, but 
also hostile to the Aetolians, who, they believed, had stirred the Romans likewise to a war against 
them” ( Livy, B.XVII, 31). 
 
74  “That so long as Chalcis, Corinth, and Demetrias were subject to Macedonia, it was impossible for 
the Greeks to think of liberty; for Philip himself had spoken the exact truth when he called these places 
the 'fetters of Greece” (Polybius, B.XVIII, 11).  
 
75 Map 19. 
 
76 C.Clausewitz, “On war”, p.144. 
 
77  “Strategy in the missile age”, p.179. 
 
78 “Warfare in antiquity”,p.149. This is corroborated also elsewhere: “By sea, at any rate, the 
Peloponnesian War is not a story of the development of new techniques, except for the Corinthian and 
Spartan moves of 413 to counter Athenian skills. It is a story of how the Athenians lost those skills.” 
(Cambridge Ancient History, p.382). 
 
 
79 Polybius, B.10.41, Livy, 28.5. 
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80 H. Morgenthau, “Politics amongst nations”, p. 127-169. 
 
81 “Thereupon the king (Phillip) went to Aegium for the council of the Achaeans, at the same time 
thinking that there he would find the Carthaginian fleet which he had summoned that he might be able 
to accomplish something by sea as well. A few days earlier the Carthaginians had crossed over to the 
Oxēae, and then had made for the Acarnanians ports, on hearing that Attalus and the Romans had set 
sail from Oreum. They were afraid they might be pursued and overpowered inside of Rhium, the 
narrows, that is, of the Gulf of Corinth.” (Livy, B.28.8). 
 
82 “Philip was sorry indeed and vexed that, although he had himself made rapid marches in every 
direction, nevertheless he had not met a single situation at the right moment, and that fortune had 
mocked his speed by whisking everything out of his sight” (Livy, B.28.8). 
 
83 “The grand strategy of the roman empire : from the first century A.D. to the third’’, p.72. Even 
Plutarch feels compelled to underline that “had not Titus, in view of all this, made favourable terms of 
peace, and had the war with Antiochus in Greece found the war with Philip still in progress there, and 
had a common cause brought these two greatest and most powerful kings of the time into alliance 
against Rome, that city would have undergone fresh struggles and dangers not inferior to those which 
marked her war with Hannibal” (“Plutarch’s Lives”, Titus Flamininus, IX). 
 
84 Polybius, B.XI.6. 
 
85 Contrary to the relative argument of offensive realism and J. Mearsheimer (“The tragedy of great 
powers politics”, p. 44). 
 
86 Livy, B.29.12. 
 
87 Livy, B.31.7. “Aurelius also pointed out that the Romans would have to display far greater energy in 
the prosecution of this war, or else Philip, encouraged by their slackness, would venture on the same 
enterprise which Pyrrhus, whose kingdom was considerably smaller, had ventured on before.” (Livy, 
B.31.3). As it has already been mentioned at the initial chapters, Livy’s exaggerations and sometimes 
outspoken inaccuracies throughout his narration are not rare; in this category falls his dubious claim 
(Livy, B.23.33) that Phillip was ready to outflank Rome with a powerful fleet, although that has not 
been proved and the ensuing events could attest to that as well. In other words, Macedonia would of 
course be interested in embarking upon a campaign against Roman soil, but not that she was capable 
indeed of doing it on the spot. Livy’s uncertainty on the issue can be seen also in other parts of his 
narration, where he deliberately abstains from taking a clear position on Macedonia’s assets in this 
regard (Livy, B.24.13, or Livy, B.25.23). 
 
88 Livy, B.23.34-35. 
 
89 H. Delbruck, “War in antiquity”, p.135). 
 
90 Pericles, (Thucydides, B.I.142). 
 
91 F. Walbank, “Philip V Macedon” p. 227. 
 
92 “The senate regarded the peace of 205 as provisional and was always determined to pursue the war 
with Philip as opportunity arose individual ambitions, attested by Polybius as affecting Flamininus 
conduct..also played a part” and “it may well be that the refusal of the first assembly to vote for war 
was occasioned by the fact that the formal grounds advanced for war were very weak, the real grounds 
having to be decently veiled” (M. Crawford, “The Roman Republic”, p. 67). 
 
93 The Roman emphasis is in any case of highest importance even to the current affairs and particularly 
in Greece, as it is implied by F. Walbank as well: “...Antiochus used to say that Rome had no locus 
standi in Asia, eastern Thrace was inherited from Seleucus Nicator and Ptolemy was about to marry 
one of his daughters. These were excellent debating points fully justified in terms of Hellenistic 
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international law. But the cold facts were that Rome had ordered Philip to keep hands off the Greek 
cities in 200 and had answered his debating points by war” (“Phillip V”, p. 446). 
 
94 Plutarch’s Lives, “Titus Flamininus”, VIII. 
 
95 Livy implies that the underlying causes of the second war with Phillip were Roman anger at him not 
only because of the treacherous peace he had concluded with the Aetolians and other allies in that 
region, but also because of the military assistance and money which he had recently sent to Hannibal 
and the Carthaginians in Africa (Livy, 31.1.9-10). 
 
96 Livy, B.31.7. 
 
97 “The peace with Carthage now left the Romans free. They were angry with Philip for his attacking 
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Chapter Five: Summary and Conclusions 
 
5.1.
 
The notions of Continuity and Homogeneity demarcating the scope of the war 
developments. 
              In the previous chapters I made an effort to approach chronologically the 
evolution of the two major military confrontations (Peloponnesian and Macedonian 
Wars) in question, placing a particular emphasis upon those elements which I deemed 
prolific enough so as to explain the wars in question. I tried not to conveniently pluck 
specific facts out from the respective historical context in order supposedly to 
subsume them in a particular International Relations school of thought. On the 
contrary, I strived to bring up the ones that could be interpreted in view of the basic 
tenets of the international relations theory in general. In this vein I espoused Polybius’ 
view that “those who ask for dissertations in history on every possible subject, are 
somewhat like greedy guests at a banquet, who, by tasting every dish on the table, fail 
to really enjoy any one of them at the time, or to digest and feel any benefit from them 
afterwards. Such omnivorous readers get no real pleasure in the present and no 
adequate instruction for the future”1. 
 
          In this chapter I try first to bring together certain observations made upon the 
general evolution of the wars and the exit strategy from those of the competing great 
powers and then to substantiate them utilizing the respective guidelines of the 
International Relations schools of thought. Consequently I will explore the possibility 
of deducing particular conclusions, which perhaps could serve as benchmarks for 
action, applicable even today mutatis mutandis. And that considering precisely that 
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“every age had its own kind of war, its own limiting conditions and its own peculiar 
preconceptions. Each period, therefore, would have held to its own theory of war, 
even if the urge had always and universally existed to work things out on scientific 
principles”2. This is a theoretical challenge, in the sense that although I do not strive 
to formulate a compact theory of foreign policy, I cannot avoid articulating 
propositions which may command for wider assent, considering that theories, indeed, 
are not just collections of assorted variables, “but conceptual frameworks that relate 
phenomena in coherent and logical ways”3. That should not be seen as an 
overambitious attempt purportedly in search of universal truths or of an holistic 
theory, but merely as a need to extract into the present the maximum practical utility 
of what I have studied. Besides, “the test by which a theory may be judged is not a 
priori and abstract but empirical and pragmatic"4. In this context these conclusions do 
not possess an axiomatic descriptive power similar to that of a thoroughly formulated 
theory and they are not built upon any notion of causation between independent and 
dependent variables5. Even Thucydides does not make any effort to develop a 
systematic theory of causation. He describes the origins of the Peloponnesian War in 
considerable detail, but leaves the reader to draw conclusions concerning the relative 
weight of the various factors on which he touches. As A. Moravcik points out in the 
same vein “those who aim to refute “realism”, are condemned to amend it”6. In the 
same lines that goes the argument that “theory should be study, not doctrine”7, I find 
it logical, away from sectoral blindness which is an occupational hazard of all human 
specializations, to contain in a prima facie “realistic” approach of international 
relations even elements coming from domestic politics (which of course do not belong 
to those elements to be considered as decisive by a typical Machiavellian foreign 
policy analysis). Thus, the said conclusions constitute simply what is left after the 
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historical data pass through the filter of the three schools of thought like the milk 
passes through the cheesecloth.  
 
          What becomes evident from the beginning of my study is the notion of 
continuity. These pieces of evidence which “suggest that there is considerable 
continuity between the era of cavalry and the era of intercontinental missiles” as G. 
Bainley remarked (without, however, referring to these periods at all8). In the same 
vein comes the only pellucid relative remark from A. Watson, when he highlights, in 
general though thoughtful terms, the linkage between the present and this specific 
time period, which “is important to us for two reasons: First, the city states and the 
Persians in the first half of the period, and the Hellenistic monarchies in the second, 
organized their external relations in very innovative and significant ways. Second, the 
Greco- Persian system exercised great influence on the European system, out of 
which the present system has developed; and for several centuries, aspects of Greek 
practice served as models for the European society of states. There was a natural 
resemblance between the two societies. Both were in theory well towards the 
independences end of the spectrum; and the parallels were greatly reinforced by the 
classical education of European and American statesmen and thinkers who dominated 
international practice from the Renaissance to the early part of this century”9. 
 
           The world during the Peloponnesian war was indeed reflecting adequately 
what one calls today an international system of states. Indicatively, already “by the 
sixth century B.C. there were 1,500 Greek cities, most of which had begun life as 
commercial centers, so that none was more than 25 miles from the sea”10. Again and 
contrary to the widespread notion that Sparta only was dominated by military oriented 
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population, in fifth-century Athens more than third of the citizens (ten to twelve 
thousand) were hoplites, while the rest, the “thete” class, were poor peasants, unable 
to afford the cost of equipping themselves for heavy duty, similarly to the “helots”, 
namely the slaves in Sparta11. Economic relations between the states brought up 
antagonism, which in turn was “defused” sporadically by military campaigns of the 
parties involved. And those military campaigns became indeed “an essential element 
of the capacity of states to reproduce themselves”12. In other words and while it is not 
the purpose of this study to delve into the particulars of economics in antiquity, it is 
stressed that economy played indeed a role of utmost importance like contemporary 
times, but again it was receding when there was a direct conflict with political reality 
again like present times; in terms of IR theory it seems convincing indeed that “states 
operate in both an international political environment and an international economic 
environment and the former dominates the latter in cases where two come into 
conflict. The reason is straightforward: the international political system is anarchic” 
13. Besides, though not disputable at all Thucydides’ fundamental remark that “war is 
not an affair of arms, but of money which gives to arms their use, and which is needed 
above all things when a continental is fighting against a maritime power”14, it holds 
also truth the simple but not simplistic observation of Prof. E.Badian that “no 
economic motives can be seen, on the whole, in Roman policy; strange as it may seem 
to a generation nourished on Marx, Rome sought no major economic benefits”15 (the 
accent shall be placed here on the word “major”). In similar lines, the period of 
Macedonian wars “was as close as an ancient economic system comes to the modern 
notion of globalization in the sense that there was a vivid interaction among city-
states with a view to getting higher economic benefits and further securing their 
interests, exploiting the gain for building up armies and fortifying the cities”16. 
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Similarly, it is also of utmost importance to bear in mind Gibbon’s penetrating 
observation for that specific era in Roman history: “the principal conquests of the 
Romans were achieved under the Republic; and the emperors, for the most part, were 
satisfied with preserving those dominions which had been acquired by the policy of 
the senate, the active emulation of the consuls and the impartial enthusiasm of the 
people”17.   
 
                 It needs to be stressed that these periods of the Peloponnesian and 
Macedonian Wars are not only connected with the present but they are interconnected 
with each other as well. Polybius states emphatically that “for instance, we see that 
the war with Antiochus took its rise from that with Philip; that with Philip from the 
Hannibalian; and the Hannibalian from the Sicilian war: and though between these 
wars there were numerous events of various character, they all converged upon the 
same consummation”18. Through all of my study, indeed, an effusing notion of inter-
dependency lies behind the action of all the states, not only of the great powers, in the 
sense that every action in the international scene is not taking place in isolation, but it 
is met with a certain re-action (for example, Corinthus and Corcyra over Epidamnus 
in the Peloponnesian War “involving” afterwards Athens and Sparta, or Dimitrius 
Faros and Rome in the Illyrian region and beyond, “involving” the Macedon King)19.  
That brings me precisely to the crux of the notion of the system, which in terms of 
international relations, refers to a group of parts or units whose interactions are 
significant enough to justify seeing them in some sense as a coherent set. And indeed, 
a group of states forms an international system when "the behavior of each is a 
necessary factor in the calculations of the others"20. But also that inter-dependency is 
at the same time evocative of a high degree of suspiciousness between the states, 
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which is conspicuous through all of my study particularly in the relations of the great 
powers. One can recall Macedonia’s and Carthage’s overtly conflicting understanding 
at the first stage of the First Macedonian war, Athens’ and Rome’s spurious friendship 
with their allies respectively, competitive antagonism between Sparta and Athens over 
the period of the Peace of Nicias and so forth21.  
 
           Postulating the existence of an international system it follows plausibly that 
this system comprises units, interactions, and structure. That brings me to the notion 
of homogeneity, which runs parallel to the one of continuity. It includes the basic 
aspects of what prominent scholars of International Relations’ theory approach as 
“international society”, namely a “group of states, conscious of certain common 
interests and common values, which form a society in the sense that they conceive 
themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one 
another”22. The states of the ancient international system presented the same basic 
characteristics in their interactions as the units today, with the struggle for hegemony 
at the epicenter. At this point a notional clarification is needed: it is not my purpose to 
specify continuously between the “regional” and “global” hegemon (following the 
argumentation of J. Mearsheimer throughout his book “Tragedy of Great Powers’ 
Politics”), but I prefer to bear in mind the general ascertation by E. H. Carr, where he 
restates the Hobbesian position: “any international moral order must rest on some 
hegemony of power”23. Interesting to note is that Polybius uses explicitly the same 
path: “for their (Peloponnesians) universal desire of supremacy, and their obstinate 
love of freedom, involve them in perpetual wars with each other, all alike being 
resolutely set upon occupying the first place”24. Besides, it is important to underscore 
that in the original text, the Greek world for “supremacy” is “ἡ γεμονικοὶ ” 
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(“heyaemoneke”), which in fact is nothing else than “hegemonic”. In this respect 
supremacy reflects nothing more than what J. Mearsheimer defines as “hegemony” as 
well, namely the “distribution of power”, with “only one major power in the 
system”25. That said, the observation about the significance of the struggle for 
hegemony becomes even more pertinent if it is re-stated the other way round, namely 
that despite this embryonic – prima facie - level of state-building in ancient times, it is 
clear that the states were not amorphous entities, which acted without strategies and 
were guided solely by irresponsible leaders, behaving in an erratic way (following a 
very common misperception about international relations in antiquity).  
 
            On the contrary, it is clear that the states during the outbreak of the 
Peloponnesian and Macedonian wars were already positioned to increase their 
security and to maximize their power, guided by mostly, in principle, rational decision 
makers, who were not satisfied with the distribution of power among them. 
Considering after all that in antiquity the notions of power and security are 
interrelated, there is no convincing room to proceed with any further elaboration or 
theoretical distinction upon that (K. Waltz for instance generally argues that the 
ultimate concern of states is not power but security, while J. Mearsheimer asserts that 
states ultimately pursue to maximize their relative power). In other words it is also 
noted that there is not strict hierarchy of goals (security, wealth etc) in practice since 
the notion of power itself encompasses all these elements. In more subtle terms, it 
becomes specifically evident in both periods that “it is the mix and trade-offs of 
objectives rather than their ordering that is critical to an understanding of foreign 
policy”26. In addition to this, Polybius stressed starkly that “it is a peculiarity of the 
Roman people as a whole to treat everything as a question of main strength”27. That 
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said, the preponderant characteristic or the essential imperfection of the human 
society was also there: anarchy, which has been omnipresent in “all the international 
systems in the strict sense of the term, namely that they have not been subjected to an 
arche”28. But with one extremely significant observation in terms of International 
Relations theory, easily detectable throughout this study: it can be fairly said that 
international relations in these periods are perhaps the most authentic, in the sense that 
they are uncolored by the subsequent complications of the contemporary institutional 
interaction (international organizations, civil society, nongovernmental organizations 
etc). M. Wight touches upon the same consideration, when he pointedly remarks that 
“there was no Greek or Roman Grotius” and “perhaps it is a characteristic of medieval 
and modern Europe that, in contrast to classical civilization, it has cultivated this 
middle ground, and developed the conception of a political morality distinct equally 
from personal morality and from Realpolitik”29.  
 
             Therefore, recognizing monumental similarities between the basic parameters 
of the ancient and modern international system does not necessarily entail the 
existence of a theoretical straitjacket in the sense that all the aspects of the wars in 
question can be tailored to fit within all the three International Relations schools of 
thought. After all “human nature in which the laws of politics have their roots, has not 
changed since the classical philosophies of China, India, and Greece endeavored to 
discover threes laws. Hence, novelty is not necessarily a virtue in political theory, nor 
is old age a defect”30. In fact, “realism” (Machiavellians) and “revolutionism” 
(Kantians) do have obviously precedence over “rationalism” (Grotians) ratione 
temporis since the first two can be traced notionally and formally back during 
antiquity. Indeed, apart from “realism”, which dominates, as we have noted in many 
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instances, the ancient texts, “revolutionism” presents strong ideological affinity with 
certain philosophical currents in Greek antiquity, such as the Epicureans or the Stoics: 
it is well known that first Diogenes of Sinope used the notion of “cosmopolitism”, 
namely that he was “citizen of the world” (“cosmos” + “politis” in Greek language), 
while this approach lies at the very heart of what later “revolutionists” baptized as 
“civitas maxima” (“universal society”). However, the formally chronological lead of 
“realism” and “revolutionism” does not imply their precedence ratione materiae, 
since a compromise between them two could not possibly be excluded from such a 
rich philosophical environment, in favour, par excellence, of the middle ground, as the 
one of ancient Greece, where her famous seven sages (Solon or Cleoboulus) already 
had propounded that “moderation was the best thing” and, indeed, Aristotle 
(famously).  
 
             In view of the foregoing and in the framework of an ancient state’s (but not a 
statesman) foreign policy, “rationalism”, though very poorly represented, is indeed 
manifested within a, perhaps, hollow, though not negligible rhetoric of an otherwise 
surreptitiously cynical diplomacy and sometimes echoes of distant archaic values 
within the societies involved: a typical example is that in her confrontation with 
Athens, Sparta represented those archaic values, which constituted her idiomorphic 
political standing, namely honesty, distinctness of political aims, no unnecessary use 
of military means, military mastery, unparalleled boldness and intrepidity in the 
battlefields, granting of high importance to the individual value of the armoured 
soldier (see incident of Sphacteria) were only some elements of Spartan policy and 
ingredients of her social behaviour. This grandeur was not only manifested within the 
war as military prowess, but also during peace time, before and after the warfare, 
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initially as an effort to shirk the war and finally as acclamation to the skills of the 
enemy. In a nutshell, when the Corinthians and the Thebians leaned over backwards 
to dishonour Athens after her collapse, Sparta resisted not only because of her 
political far-sightedness, but also because of her rich past of morally waging war. 
Furthermore, given that precisely on the issue of war and the anarchic society, 
“rationalism” highlights the possibility of a society quite peacefully operational 
mainly at the levels of institutions such as diplomacy or international law, I saw that 
these two elements certainly are not yet notionally refined, so as to claim that they - 
ipso facto - are adequate factors to hold together any ancient concert of great powers 
or to prevent the disruption of the balance of power (and thus render “rationalism” 
even more relevant in theoretical terms).  
 
5.2.Morality and Prestige in the states’ “psycho-milieu”.
 
  
          “Rationalism’s” limited and hollow impact in the said periods and the 
observation that its vestiges were mainly located in the rhetoric of the statesmen of 
Athens, Sparta, Rome and Macedonia (but of the smaller states as well, like Corinth 
in the Peloponnesian war and Aetolia in the Macedonian Wars), may introduce the 
remark that “rationalism’s essential contribution in the said periods is restricted to the 
so called “psycho-milieu” (reality as it is perceived by the individual) and not to the 
“operational milieu” (reality as it is) in the decision making process31. That said, two 
highly important and interconnected parameters of a state’s international behaviour, 
namely morality and prestige, are brought forward through the contours of the 
“psycho-milieu”.  
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          In relation to the first parameter, I noticed that morality was used merely as a 
tool, rather as a conceptual metric to purportedly judge the words and acts of a state in 
line with a specific set of principles. This “tool – approach” is very significant to my 
opinion in sharp contrast to the “value - approach”, which posits morality as a widely 
accepted universal value with specific aspects. Indicatively, I find not convincing 
G.F.Kennan’s attempts to define morality in international relations between states as 
“the acceptance of one’s limitations”32, since he finds recourse to the vague notion of 
“duty”, which again is liable to subjective interpretations and perhaps imperialistic 
maximalist views. I concur therefore fully with the observation that “when we talk 
about the application of moral standards to foreign policy, we are not talking about 
compliance with some clear and generally accepted international code of behaviour”33 
and that was precisely obvious during the periods in question as well. And that tool 
had one principal objective, namely to directly advance one’s political and military 
interests by gaining public support and legitimization in the eyes of the allies34.  
 
                  It is in this context that the notion and additional value of every alliance is 
principally captured during the Peloponnesian as well as Macedonian wars; namely, 
searching for allies is for a great power rather an effort to galvanize her power, which 
remains the sole point of reference, than an idealistic strategic initiative for “pure”, 
“just” or “righteous” cooperation between states. Certainly, one cannot discount the 
general and in particular the military, significance of forging an alliance (alliance is 
fruitful simply because “swells the numbers of your own citizens” as Machiavelli 
points out35), but the whole process is seen, at least in antiquity36, principally as a 
strategic action or a “balance of power manoeuvre”37 of a state in the latter’s bid to 
escape from the security dilemma, which “cannot be abolished, it can only be 
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ameliorated and therefore bonds of shared values and interest can be developed”38. I 
find here very pertinent the Machiavellian reference to the Roman methods, when 
entering the territories of other nations, as “the ladder to climb”, namely “to seek for 
some friendly state, a door through which to pass or an instrument wherewith to keep 
their hold”39. Besides, one should not forget that formally, in ancient Greek language, 
“alliance” is something too vague, applying equally “to the League of Nations, the 
Swiss Republic, a Cambridge College, a Trade Union and the village cricket club”40, 
while the same remark as to the pragmatic essence of that notion may be valid, even 
today, for the “realist” observer. In addition to that after all, it is important to bear in 
mind that Sparta espoused a not strikingly inferior “alliance policy” to that of Rome: 
Sparta placed also her own people in key positions within the “client” states, who 
were Greeks, speaking the same language, sharing the same cultural values, while she 
imposed also a tribute41 and put a garrison in Athens, the same tactics that were 
followed later by Rome in Greece. It is characteristic that the League of 
Peloponnesus, in the Roman footsteps, was convoked not an ordinary basis, but only 
after the initiative of the Lacedemonians; quite the opposite used to happen with the 
Athenians and the League of Delos, which was supposed to be the legitimizing 
locomotive of the Athenian imperium towards her allies, however it was convoked 
periodically. As a consequence, the Peloponnesian League lasted almost two 
centuries, whilst its rival, the League of Delos lasted for 73 years and the 2nd maritime 
Confederation of Athens, hardly 23 years. Therefore I am not eager to ascribe 
unwaveringly the effectiveness of Roman foreign policy to Rome’s indubitably high 
skills in luring allies to her cause, since to wage a war is one thing; the cause of a war 
or the process of an after-war settlement is another.  
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                 In view of the foregoing, morality’s impact on the ground is explained 
satisfactorily by means of “realism”, since it was indeed a “product of power”42, an 
“epiphenomenon of security”43 at the service of pre-ordained political aims and it did 
not lie at their epicentre (indicatively when Flamininus propagated his “pure 
philhellenism” to attract the Greek political audience or Perseus later in his bid to gain 
more allies). It is abundantly clear in my study that “realism” permeates much of the 
reasoning of the participants in Peloponnesian44 but also in Macedonian Wars45 and 
consists mostly of the estimation of power and interest, having a clear grasp of the 
amorality and the anarchic international system of sovereign states like that of 
classical and Hellenistic Greece, where states are predominantly motivated in their 
actions by self interest and power. As M. Wight puts it glibly “if you are apt to think 
the moral problems of international politics are simple, you are a natural, instinctive 
Kantian; if you think they are non-existent, bogus, or delusory, you are a natural 
Machiavellian; and if you are apt to think them infinitely complex, bewildering, and 
perplexing, you are probably a natural Grotian”46. This is why Corinthian or Aetolian 
delegates in front of Athenians and Romans respectively utilised a “rationalist” 
wording on a purported need for cooperation and respect for certain legal rules, while 
invoking at the same time justice as the ultima ratio in inter-state relations, mixed 
with nebulous admonishments about moral obligations; or why Athens and Rome 
sought for a plausible reason to justify their defensive alliance against Sparta and 
Macedonia respectively, but not so as to seem to be first provoking the conflict and so 
forth47. In all the cases there was a sole “realistic” object, namely to hinder their 
audiences from taking the sides of their enemies. As Polybius puts it, “the senate for 
the first time embarked on the policy of weakening those in the various states who 
were working for the best, while building up those who, whether justly or unjustly, 
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appealed to it for help. As a result it came about by degrees, as time went on, that the 
senate found it had lots of yes-men, but was short of genuine friends” 48. 
 
             Besides, it is clear from both periods (indicatively Melos’ incident with 
Athens or Rome against Demetrius Pharos49) that: (a) moral argumentation is actually 
by itself evocative of the essential imperfection of the international society, namely 
anarchy: when a weak state pleads morality, it does so because it does not have any 
other option, pleading in fact for another authority to take up its issue favourably (all 
the allies of Sparta and Corinthians when explicitly castigated Spartans for hesitating 
to take action against Athens; Aetolian back and forth diplomacy towards Rome, 
Spartan rhetoric towards Phillip V in Macedonian Wars, etc.). Thus morality in 
international relations becomes a crooked path heading to “realism”. But when a 
strong state utilizes, though less often, moral argumentation, then, judging from the 
evidence of my study, it does so because it has many more options50. However it 
deliberately chooses to invoke moral rules in order either to make its policy more 
appealing to the ordinary people, thus earning their hearts for the present as well as 
for the future developments or to pass the buck of the burden of a confrontation to an 
ally, thus saving its own human resources and military equipment. In the first case it 
worth referring to the case of the Senate compensating “by her own initiative” the 
people of Chalcis, staunch ally of Rome, for the casualties that Roman soldiers have 
provoked or of Sparta, when refusing to proceed with the total devastation of Athens 
after the final encirclement of the latter, contrary to the demands of her allies within 
the Peloponnesian league. As H. Morgenthau puts it succinctly: “It is not enough 
however for a government to marshal national public opinion behind its foreign 
policies. It must also gain the support of the public opinion of other nations for its 
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foreign and domestic policies”51. In the second case one may recall Sparta in the 
incident of Mytilene in 428 B.C., but also Macedonia, when she benefited from 
Demetrius Pharus expansion in the region of Illyrian coast at the expense of Rome, 
and (b) the notion of morality as such is highly a matter of interpretation especially in 
war time, when the nature of people’s behavior and therefore statesmen changes 
dramatically52. It is of utmost importance to recall again Thucydides shrewd remark: 
“Words had to change their ordinary meaning and to take that which was now given 
them”53. That was precisely the manipulating aspect of moral argumentation, which 
goes hand in hand with the prevailing amorality of war54. Athens’ campaign to Sicily 
could be seen as a freedom quest against the oppressive Syracusians, but equally as a 
pure militaristic expedition of the hegemon. Rome’s alliance with the Greek states 
against Macedonia could be seen as a righteous support to the oppressed, or as a 
devious attempt to establish her influence in the Hellenistic region and so forth55. In 
this case, morality becomes a handy dictionary to translate as well as to interpret 
reality according to one’s aims (“either war is a crusade, or it is a crime”56). To stress 
that “a man who thinks he can cloak by words the clear evidence of facts must be 
regarded as a foolish and futile person”57 is not a self-evident observation, but on the 
contrary it is “one of the most important and most difficult tasks for the student of 
international politics”58. Since I admit that “the true nature of the policy is concealed 
by ideological justifications and rationalizations”59, morality leads me again indirectly 
to “realism’s” tenets.  
 
         Closely connected with the notion of morality is the one of ideology, which is a 
catch-all word for a Grotian as well as for a Kantian (for the first more as a 
“righteous” medium to attain a wider political goal and for the latter more as a self 
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fulfilling prophecy to apply its tenets in practise). In a nutshell, ideology is not 
certainly a benchmark with which to gauge the specific course of a great power’s 
foreign policy neither in the Peloponnesian nor in the Macedonian Wars. In fact, “the 
ideological basis for Roman intervention in Greece was already established. There is 
from this point an absolute continuity of policy, through the message of M. Aimilius 
Lepidus to Philip at Abydus to the peace with Philip after the battle of Cynoscephalae, 
the proclamation at Isthmus and the declaration of war against Antiochus III”60.  In 
addition to the aforementioned it should be noted that there were no solid 
commitments even within the same ideological camps. Numerous were the cases of 
“disobedience” within the camps of oligarchs or democrats during the Peloponnesian 
War and certainly there was no fixed ideological boundary between them. The same 
counts in the case of the Macedonian Wars, where states jumped over the respective 
alliances very easily following ad hoc considerations about what seemed to be more 
lucrative or advantageous for their own interests. Nowhere during the said wars did 
one see ideology being the exclusive and definitive parameter for a state’s action: 
Sparta had no problems allying herself with former democratic allies of Athens (such 
was the case with Euboea, Chios and other islands of the Athenian Alliance which 
were ready to revolt against the metropolis), while Athens did not hesitate to welcome 
former members of the Peloponnesian League (such was the case with Corcyra in her 
rivalry with Corinth or with Argos, Mantinea in their attempt of finding a third path 
during the Peace of Nicias); again Rome was eager to accept any Greek state in her 
bid to defeat Macedonia (that was the case with Sparta, or Aetolia), while Macedonia 
espoused the same road when trying in vain to gather around her the Hellenistic states 
against Rome (see Perseus’ initial victories over Crassus’ troops). Confirming that 
ideology is not important at the level of concrete policy choices (it is another issue 
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how ideology is presented at the declaratory level, in the frame of decision making 
and here becomes relevant Henry Kissinger’s tripartite classification of “leadership as 
bureaucratic – pragmatic”, “ideological” and “charismatic – revolutionary”61) and 
therefore understandable mostly in terms of “realistic” school of thought, is again a 
significant element of my study62. That observation is important as well at a more 
general level of “scientific theoretical accuracy” in the sense of determining my 
objectivity towards the study of the facts; what Habermmas calls “the emancipatory 
cognitive interest”, namely an interest in securing freedom from "hypostatized forces" 
and conditions of distorted communication (e.g., ideology). 
 
        Concerning prestige, the second parameter, it is important to note that this 
element is already of utmost relevance in the periods in question, contrary to what a 
modern reader could probably surmise, given that detailed theoretical approaches of 
this notion can be found in contemporary literature only and mostly in terms of 
propaganda. Athenians stated explicitly that they were “forced to advance their 
dominion”, inter alia, for “honour”63. At this point, I wish to stress that by “prestige” 
I refer to image-management in a state’s foreign policy and not to the decision making 
process as such which lies behind it and falls within the general ambit of domestic 
policies, neither to the even more general notion of diplomacy, the impact of which 
during the said wars will be analysed afterwards64. Having, indeed, already noted that 
there are three main functions of diplomacy, namely intelligence gathering, image 
management, and policy implementation, it would seem expectable to analyze image 
management within diplomacy’s remit. However, I deliberately choose not to do so, 
because image management corresponds logically better to the subjective and illusive 
contours of “psycho-milieu”, while diplomacy falls ex definitio within the procedural 
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austerity of “operational milieu”. That said, the “policy of prestige” can be fragile, but 
also substantial and although it should be followed, as in every policy, by actions, it is 
completed mostly by words65. Like Jonathan Swift’s house, in Gulliver’s Travels, 
which a master builder constructed in such perfect accord with all the laws of 
equilibrium that when a sparrow alighted upon it, it immediately collapsed, the policy 
of prestige is built through time and usually upon smaller issues, but it can be 
vanished by minor details. Before their final confrontation, Sparta and Athens each 
for different reasons were involved in the case of Potidaea so as to enhance their 
power image and, accordingly, pass the right signals to their opponents. Rome did the 
same in numerous incidents in the region of Illyria before the actual commencement 
of the wars against Macedonia.  Statesmen took serious account of this factor when 
they were running the state’s foreign policy, since it was an element which could give 
the state an elbow room to (a) trace the opponent’s point of resistance (this is how it 
could be seen as well the provocation from Thebes towards Plataies shortly before the 
actual commencement of the Peloponnesian war or Roman fleet’s arrival in 
Naupactus in 212 B.C. supposedly to come into terms with the Aetolians) and (b) 
solidify its power status without losing significant human and financial resources (see 
Perseus after the battle of Callinicus (171 B.C.) or Sparta’s involvement in the case of 
Potidaea). 
  
          However, in evaluating the aforementioned observation I am inclined to make 
one significant remark: when “image” is accompanied by the notion of 
“management”, there is implied, in view of International Relations theory, a certain 
degree of mistrustfulness towards international society or disbelief in certain 
principles of action. This is roughly the reason that this image has to be carved before 
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its promotion. That said, it is clear that prestige echoes “realism’s” tenets, which, as I 
indicated, approaches in the same captious way the interactions between the states. It 
is also clear that contrary to Sparta, Athens and Macedonia, Rome was the sole great 
power which took advantage of this element in exemplary fashion by communicating 
methodically and directly her views to the people of the states which were about to 
serve as her springboard into the Greek soil (Aetolia, Messinia, Hellia, Pergamum and 
other states), while promoting in particular her cultural continuity and affinity with 
the Greek civilization in the frame of a “militant philhellenism”66. Indeed, 
“methodically” if one recalls Flamininus talking about “Roman predisposition” for 
indirect but not for a total war approach (Polybius, B.XVIII 37) or how useful proved 
to be the Aetolian horsemen’s contribution in the Cynos Cephalae battle, 
notwithstanding Aetolia’s previous continuous backs and forths. Again “directly”, 
considering that since September 212 B.C., when the Roman fleet under the 
leadership of Laivinus reached for the first time the Greek soil, Rome was remarkably 
open to send representatives to explain and promote her interests in advance before 
the Greek audience (see “Panaetolium” for example and Flamininus orations). That 
could seem logical for a Greek state, namely to send representatives to talk before the 
people of another Greek state, but not for a distant foreign power, which had showed 
in the past (see her entanglement in the Illyrian region) that she was eager to claim by 
sword her vital élan whenever she deemed it appropriate. That modus operandi 
(which has been already highlighted more or less by certain scholars as a principal 
contributing factor to Rome’s ascendancy and lasting rule67), apart from solidifying 
further why the notion of “image management” deserves its own separate analysis, it 
is in my opinion a sound testament to the option that a “realistic” policy does have to 
change and adapt to the given circumstances, provided that it is always conducted in 
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the frame of specific interests. I have already noted that Rome had from the beginning 
set her sights upon the Greek states for specific reasons and to this end she followed 
afterwards a policy which catered first for her image towards the Greek states.  
Prestige was the medium and it was articulated before the actual commencement of 
the warfare, so as to facilitate the pursuit of a purely “realistic” foreign policy. In my 
view, since this factor can be sufficiently accommodated within the ambit of 
“realistic” school of thought through the contours of image management, it can 
provide a convincing, though not exclusive, theoretical account of why a state 
changes its strategy over the other, (contrary to what is often ascribed to “realism”, 
namely its inability to explain change in international relations68).  
 
5.3.
 
“Just War” and Diplomacy in the states’ “operational milieu”. The notion of 
“cosmo-icon”. 
      Staying within the context of “homogeneity” and of those general defining 
characteristics of the wars in question, which are particularly relevant for the 
International Relations theory, I am inclined to notice that the issues of morality and 
prestige may logically reflect the aspects of “just” war and diplomacy respectively in 
the state’s “operational milieu”.  
 
        Defining first the notion of “just war”, one has to keep in mind: (a) that although 
the term is relatively modern, in terms of substance it preexisted and it was evident in 
the rationale of the ancient writers, as it was the case for the more general parameters 
of the modern International Relations theories as I saw earlier. Indeed, although there 
was no evidence of a developed, formalized philosophy of ‘just war’ until the 1st 
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century BC, writers such as Cicero, were working under the influence of Stoicism. In 
fact Cicero is generally cited as the chief representative, but his remarks are in fact 
rather thin, and at times ambiguous, while Livy speaks in general terms constantly of 
iustum piumque bellum69. This universal70 notion of a just war was evident in 
Aristotle’s “Politics” and in his approach of noble life71 or in Plato’s “Republic” and 
in his approach of the just city, named “kallipolis” (in ancient Greek language: “kalli” 
denotes “good”/“just”)72. Besides, Polybius’ comments on the distinction between the 
real reasons the Romans chose to fight a war, and the pretexts which they put forward 
as acceptable also suggest a concern about this idea73, (b) a distinction is made 
between the jus ad bellum, which refers to the legitimate reasons for which a state 
may engage in a war and the jus in bello, which is the set of moral rules that comes 
into effect once the war begun (the “jus ad bellum” comprises more specifically the 
elements of just cause, legitimate authority, just intentions, public declaration of 
causes and intents, proportionality, last resort, reasonable hope of success, while the 
“jus in bello” the one of discrimination, non-combatant immunity74). Given that the 
“jus ad bellum” suggests the exploration of the pronounced causes of war in general, I 
assume that at this point reference is made only to the purportedly “just” aspect 
(which ex definitio is laden with certain grade of emotion) of these causes, namely 
ones that appeal to the human sentiment, while the causes based on state power 
considerations will be crystallized at a later stage75.  
 
          Consequently, I noted that all the great powers in the Peloponnesian and 
Macedonian wars strove indeed to put forward not every ground for war, but par 
excellence a “just” one, namely one that could ipso facto earn the hearts and minds of 
as many people as possible in both camps (domestic and enemy), galvanizing thus the 
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morale of the soldiers before the battle. And that irrespectively of the tangible 
(political or economic) interests at stake. Therefore, it would be a false to claim that 
there was a conscious effort to wage purely a “just” war; in fact there was an effort to 
merely invoke moral causes for war76. There was more space for “jus ad bellum” and 
gradually less for “jus in bello”. And “less”, because one may claim as well that there 
was truly a minimum respect for the enemy during the war, following an attachment 
to certain ethical rules (especially during the classic period in Greece) and there was 
no “medieval chaos” in the battle. However, I wish to focus precisely on the fact that 
when the stakes were high the states did not hesitate to apply indeed the cruelest 
tactics during the war and that was indubitable throughout my study. In relation to the 
Hellenistic period what is more, I would be judged for credulousness if I claim for 
example that the initial Roman decision to abstain from pillaging the Greek cities was 
an impetuous act based on pure emotional considerations; shortly after the 
solidification of their rule, Romans did not show any sensitivities to the other Greek 
states, as Plutarch himself is forced to admit: “when he (Aimilius Paulus) had put 
everything in good order, had bidden the Greeks farewell, and had exhorted the 
Macedonians to be mindful of the freedom bestowed upon them by the Romans and 
preserve it by good order and concord, he marched against Epirus, having an order 
from the senate to give the soldiers who had fought with him the battle against 
Perseus the privilege of pillaging the cities there…But when the appointed day came, 
at one and the same time these all set out to overrun and pillage the cities, so that in a 
single hour a hundred and fifty thousand persons were made slaves, and seventy cities 
were sacked.” 77 
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            That said, Sparta tried to arrogate to herself the position of the “liberator” and 
“freedom fighter” so as to convince every reluctant ally (see the case with the 
Arcadians and the intermediation of Corinth), invoking repeatedly the “just” need to 
overturn the oppressive Athenian rule. Rome acted far more blatantly on the same 
lines to dispel the Macedonian influence in the Greek soil. Given also that “just” is a 
notion which is liable to subjective interpretation and appeals directly to the human 
sentiment, one recalls that a human sentiment as well, namely “indignation”78, was 
the cornerstone of the anti-Athenian and anti-Phillip alliance and one of the “just” 
causes of the Peloponnesian and Macedonian wars. Besides, precisely because “just” 
is a subjective interpretative notion, it can be exploited abundantly urbi et orbi. This is 
why each and every state involved in the war claimed its own individual share in the 
justice of the war: Corinth framed that notion in relation to her controversy with 
Corcyra, Thebes against Plateaus, Aetolians against Achaeans and so forth.  
 
         What matters, however, as I said, is a more inclusive view of the war-causes, 
which should be as objective (that is to say emotionally-detached) as possible. 
Considering also that objectivity can be compromised by any individual analysis, this 
inclusiveness refers to the approach of the causes as parts of a wider pattern, namely 
historical process and not as isolated incidents. Therefore this perceptive 
diversification of the notion of “just cause”, but also the respectively high number of 
the “just causes”, attests to the limited substantial value of this element in the context 
of my theoretical approach. An indicative example of the said remark is the overtly 
anecdotal description of Livy himself79 against the Roman selective use of ius fetiale 
(by that it was meant the priestly law which controlled the initiation of war making 
and which laid it down that enemy  had performed wrongful and aggressive acts, it 
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had been given the time and opportunity for proper reparations to be made and it 
received a formal declaration of war, duly made, with the appropriate ritual gestures 
and prayers) in international relations, when Rome purportedly appealed to “divine 
guidance” by cherry picking specific rules of justice so as to impose her rule over the 
other states.   
 
             At this point also it is useful to mark another important observation: the 
selective use of “just cause” was popular amongst all the great powers and not merely 
Rome, but the high degree of that use is evocative of that state which was not satisfied 
with the status quo. In other words I saw that the intense recourse to a “just” cause 
was principally the stamping ground for Sparta in the Peloponnesian War and Rome 
in the Macedonian Wars. These states responded effectively to the Latin adage cui 
prodest, since they were the ones who had much to gain from the change of the 
situation, while Athens and Macedonia respectively were content with the previous 
reality and cautious enough not to undermine it80. In this framework of “justice”, 
“ideology” and labeling a power as or as not status quo (roughly a power which is 
favored by the standing situation of power distribution amongst states) kindles81 the 
appearance of the theoretically thorny issue of imperialism, the subjective notional 
limits of which I already touched upon in the analysis of the Third Macedonian War 
more particularly. What is highly relevant for my study is that in practice imperialism 
is usually ascribed to powers who strive to overturn the status quo, while it is very 
often infused with ideological disguises contrary to the “status quo policies which can 
be presented as what they actually are”82. In view of the foregoing it is once more 
pertinent to stress that “liberalism” (let alone “revolutionism” with its famous Kantian 
“categorical imperatives” and the ensuing framework for an ideological war) is 
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relevant during these wars only to the extent of a sophisticated verbal preaching83. In 
other words it can attempt to explain isolated individual behaviors, but not state power 
calculations.  
 
             Considering the meaning of prestige must also entail an evaluation of the role 
that diplomacy played in practice apart from her pro forma contribution (mostly for 
ceremonial or purely communication purposes) to the international relations between 
the states during the Peloponnesian and Macedonian Wars. This smooth “passage” 
from image management to diplomacy is crystal clear in the case, as I saw, of 
Senate’s decision to compensate the people of Chalcis, a staunch ally of Rome, for 
what they suffered by the Roman army itself in the diplomatic quest of the latter 
against Macedonia for gaining the cities of the crucial region of Thessaly. As a 
general remark one has to bear in mind that diplomacy is notionally differentiated 
from the decision making process, (by “decision making” I wish to denote simply the 
act of choosing among available alternatives about which a certain amount of 
uncertainty exists) simply because during these specific time periods diplomacy was 
not yet refined neither institutionalized in the context of the states’ interaction and 
therefore it served more as a technical medium, than a process based upon an 
extensive political master plan (this is also why H. Morgenthau, not cursorily, when 
he elaborates upon the elements of national power, he does not mention “diplomacy”, 
but the “quality of diplomacy”84). Diplomatic activity was coming in the forefront 
sporadically and mostly after certain impetuous suggestions of powerful political 
personalities (for example Pericles or Titus Flamininus). It was to such extent 
unsophisticated and especially in the early times of Rome85 that could be seen 
principally as virtually concomitant to war, a procedural medium towards this end and 
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its technical aspects (for example, defining time or place or number of the enemy’s 
battle force). It was rather declamatory than concise, pretextual than revealing, short 
term than long term oriented. In other words, in these wars it was not really the case 
that “war was usually the outcome of a diplomatic crisis which could not be solved 
because both sides had conflicting estimates of their bargaining power”86. On the 
contrary, wars could be premeditated even without the slightest modicum of previous 
serious diplomatic considerations. Diplomacy was not at all a systemic imperative for 
the commencement of the war. On a less committed estimation, even today, 
diplomacy acquires sometimes only a formal recognition of its value when the stakes 
are really high and power calculations take up the reins at the expense of the former. 
One should not hasten to claim that these “calculations” encompass necessarily some 
basic elements of the notion of diplomacy itself. It is one thing that diplomacy 
presupposes a certain degree of negotiation, which in turn presupposes a certain 
degree of retreat from one’s initial positions. And it is another thing the imperative of 
“splitting the gains” without, at least, clearly dissatisfying any of the parties is the 
dominant trend even in the current legal framework (one can take indicative examples 
from the jurisprudence of the “international courts” or arbitrators which adjudicate 
upon differences between states). 
 
            In view of the foregoing if one delves deeper into the crux of diplomacy 
during these wars, one tends to conclude that when diplomatic initiatives present the 
same minimal utility as the legal arguments (promoting “justice”), serving as a 
smokescreen for a conscious political action, then it is at this precise point that it 
becomes significantly easier to detect the fundamental parameters of the thorny 
question “why a war begins”, but “also if there is an exit from this”. The answer is 
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based on the following assumption: As far as the causes of war are concerned, the 
ancient texts denote quite clearly the existence of a multiple causality. Thucydides’ 
narrative does not resolve the issue of the relative importance of structural and 
immediate causes, nor does it seek to do so. Distribution of power among states 
constitutes a constant reason for going to war, but the human element is 
simultaneously present, not only through perceptions and misperceptions or domestic 
interactions, which both respond, actually, to inputs from the international 
environment, but principally through pre-fixed positioning, which, in fact, acquires 
the role of an output to and not from the international environment.  
 
          That said, it behooves me to introduce at this point the notion of “cosmo-
icon”87, that I touched upon in the first chapter and by which I mean the inherent 
subjective view that a person maintains for its environment in general, which comes 
as a result of one “decision”, based upon specific predefined approaches of the reality. 
This view is maintained in general, otherwise I would have referred to the mere 
reaction to specific incidents as “perception”. This view is inherent, and that’s why it 
cannot be pre-assessed, but it can be approached ex post factum by evaluating given 
facts and individuals’ actions as it is the case with everything which is subjected to a 
methodological, scientific, enquiry. Additionally, it is in this vein that H. Morgenthau 
introduces the plausible observation that the world is the result of forces inherent in 
human nature and bearing in mind that human nature is indeed motivated, following 
Thucydides as I saw, by fear (“phobos”), self-interest (“kerdos”) and honour 
(“doksa”), then “to improve the world one must work with these forces not against 
them”88 and very rightly indeed. Cosmo-icon falls consequently within the notional 
contours of “fear”, which after all along with “uneven growth”, constitute the 
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Thucydidean diptych of the causes of war and, to my opinion, correspond 
qualitatively to the main two level of analysis in International Relations’’ theory, 
namely unit and state.   
 
                In view of the foregoing, the fact that a cosmo-icon is based upon specific 
predefined approaches of the reality shall not be seen as falling within the modern 
catch-all terms “contextual intelligence” (upon which elaborates extensively J.Nye 
lately in his book “Presidential Leadership and the Creation of the American Era”) or 
“mental map” (launched as a concept by the geographer P.Gould and taken up by IR- 
scholars like Keohane and Goldstein thenceforward), since the latter connote merely 
an assessment of power positions, cultures and sense of timing, but not what possibly 
pre-exists and consecutively shapes that very assessment in line specifically with the 
state level of analysis in foreign policy. Thus, a “cosmo-icon” can be “realistic” 
irrespective of the final outcome of its decisions, considering that this outcome is also 
dependent on the international society’s multiple variables (state system, foreign 
policies of the other states and interaction between them, etc). It is a key variable for 
determining the state’s foreign policy in parallel with, not simply following, that of 
the system of the states or even merely in vitro. This is why Thucydides, when he is 
narrowing the causes of war, refers to uneven growth and fear, namely to an element 
which corresponds to the international environment89 and to an element which 
corresponds to the human dimension of it. This is what is hidden also in E. H. Carr’s 
(the most important figure in post-war British realism) argument that “we cannot 
ultimately find a resting place in pure realism. Political action must be based on a co-
ordination of morality and power...Sound political thought and sound political life 
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will be found only where both [reality and utopia, power and morality] have their 
place”90. 
 
           In the analysis of the said wars,  “cosmo-icon” emerges in practise  from those 
fundamental, pre-existed91, elements (they are specified to nothing else than the 
leader’s positioning towards key aspects of international system’s function, such as 
power, state actors, international anarchy, security dilemma, etc., which in essence 
boil down to what at a later stage I quote as “power conversion” capability), which are 
observable through the leader’s decisions and they are more tangible when coercive 
diplomacy is to be applied (as I have already noted in the case of Rome) and not just 
any sort of diplomacy. The emphasis upon the element of coercion92 is not justified 
only from the fact that it was indeed per se evident in the context of diplomacy during 
the said wars specifically, but also because it renders crystal clear the subjectivity that 
precisely dominates the decision making process and which constitutes the 
precondition of the actor’s “cosmo-icon”. Besides, an essential task of coercive 
diplomacy is to dissuade the enemy to continue to do what it is doing. Coercion, 
therefore, is a situation that involves crisis escalation and de-escalation and in a way 
encompasses the very notion of any successful diplomacy. Thus it should not be seen 
as an isolated case, but rather as an holistic notion, intrinsic to every applied 
diplomacy of any aspiring great power. To this attests also M.Wight when he 
intertwines axiomatically diplomacy with coercion and stresses that “when stripped of 
niceties of the protocol, diplomacy is seen to proceed by coercion and bribery, by 
stick and carrot”93.  
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               Contrary to what one may hasten to guess, the aforementioned fundamental 
elements do not merely reflect the policy makers’ supposedly subjective interpretation 
of history. Any correlation with the notion of history at this point comes in fact 
independently of the formation of the fundamental lines of one’s cosmo-icon, 
otherwise, evidently, all policy makers would have espoused the same opinion on the 
same historic facts, which is not obviously the case. This is why also that in the 
literature94, when policy makers struggle to interpret reality, there is a clear-cut 
distinction, as to how they behave towards history specifically, thus into three general 
patterns, namely analytic history, omnipresent history, and selective history 
(depending precisely on history’s purported preponderance over the decision making 
process in the mind of a leader). In the same lines, the effort to identify the notion of 
“cosmo-icon” is further facilitated in the case of the wars into question, considering 
that the international environment of Rome and Sparta was not that “stained” by the 
complexity of diplomatic interdependency (in the sense that there were no regular 
exchanges of view at the diplomatic level) and thus there was plenty of room for these 
un-honed aspects of foreign policy to be unravelled95. Suffice to mention that at the 
beginning of both periods and before the commencement of the respective wars, 
diplomatic activity was virtually non-existent and there was a sheer struggle for better 
positioning before the race (see Sparta’s initiative to begin the war at the level of 
communication without ceding to any diplomatic arrangements or Rome’s actual 
targeting of the “fetters” of Greece, namely Clacis, Demetrias and Thessaly, since the 
beginning of her entanglement in the Greek soil). 
 
            In view of the foregoing, the task of procedurally identifying these aspects can 
be sufficiently fulfilled only ex post factum utilizing precisely as benchmarks the 
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founding principles of each school of thought and evaluating one’s cosmo-icon from 
his respective actions. Whether it could be fulfilled a priori or concurrently with the 
decision taking, it is another issue which theoretically falls within the remit of what is 
usually called “fog of foreign policy-making”, which is more important than what the 
military analysts call the "fog of battle"- the severe limits on the ability of each side to 
tell what the other's army (and often what its own army) is doing.  As R. Jervis puts it 
“it is terribly hard to tell what others are up to (the moment that they are up to), to 
infer their predispositions, and to predict how they will behave. Because of the 
importance and difficulty of these tasks, decision-makers do and must employ short-
cuts to rationality, often without being aware of the way they are doing so. But these 
short-cuts often produce important kinds of systematic errors, many of which increase 
conflict”96. In essence, the aforementioned describe one’s obvious inability to de-
codify the so called “informational basis” of the decision makers, which by definition 
is extremely vague and thus cannot be rationally evaluated97. However, it is in this 
process of identification of those “short-cuts to rationality” that becomes highly 
relevant, as I noted, the notion of “cosmo-icon”.  
 
            What comes naturally out of these observations is that “realism” emerges as 
the main framework to evaluate diplomacy’s role during these wars, since it captures 
the important nuances of the diplomatic activity already described in my study; one 
can recall that the four heads98 of the Machiavellian conception of diplomacy, namely 
“flux or change” (see Sparta’s “fear” from the growth of Athens, which was ipso facto 
the definition of the security dilemma: to go with it or to go against it, namely flux or 
change); “fear or greed” (for example Rome’s card of “intimidation” against Phillip in 
view of Hannibal’s lurking presence, as well as Perseus’ retreat notwithstanding the 
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victorious battle of Callinicus); “negotiation from strength” (see Athens in the case of 
the capture of Melos island or Rome after the battle of Callinicus against Macedonia); 
and “the technique of bargaining”  (quite indicative of which is the Roman principle 
of “divide ut regnes”, already conspicuous from the beginning of its presence in the 
region of the Hellenistic states and crystal clear in how artfully Romans instigated the 
differences between Aetolia and Macedonia in the case of the town of Lamia in 209 
B.C., or, to a lesser extent of course, how Sparta promoted the image of freedom 
fighter against Athens despite the latter’s declaration of war against Megara) are all 
not just evident, but prevailing during these periods, over the respective elements of 
Grotianism or Kantianism.  
 
               However, what comes also out of this analysis is that contrary to the other 
great Greek powers like Sparta, Athens or Macedonia, only Rome’s diplomacy 
encompasses elements from all the said schools of thought together, while balancing 
among them with “realism” at the forefront. And that is compounded by the fact that 
Roman “cosmo-icon” hinged on a twofold axiom, namely first “creating the interest” 
(predetermined, general, subjective view in the lines that “moral obligations of 
governments are not the same as those of the individuals”99) and then “defending it” 
irrespective of any particular domestic regime or systemic variable (specific action 
according to the developing circumstances in the lines that “there are forms of 
plebiscitary “democracy” that may well prove less favorable to a state’s interests than 
a wise and benevolent authoritarianism”100). Suffice to recall how highly Polybius 
evaluates the moment that Roman forces first crossed the Adriatic in 229 B.C., while 
in a simple police action against the Illyrians: “This is a matter not to be lightly passed 
over but deserving serious attention of those who wish to gain a true view of the 
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formation and growth of the Roman dominions”101. In other words, for Rome outputs 
(concrete foreign policy decisions and “cosmo-icons” on the general substance of 
foreign policy relations) came first, while inputs (objective environment, namely the 
everyday process of foreign policy relations) followed.  
 
            Given that Roman diplomacy was mainly transformational102 and only little 
transactional, in the sense that it shaped the developments, not followed them (this is 
not self-evident neither common observation - on the contrary, it is latent in a 
significant part of the literature that “the policy of Rome in Greece in general looks 
not coherent enough”103), I noticed how a limited aims diplomatic strategy combined 
with a patiently waged war of attrition were immediately transformed into a gun-boat 
diplomacy and a blitzkrieg strategy aiming at a decisive battle, so as to seize the 
“fetters of Greece”. Rome’s proclivity towards that transformation process emerges as 
significant in terms of International Relations theory, constituting the key to the 
success of its diplomacy in sharp contrast to the one of the other great powers. Indeed, 
it shall not be regarded as an easy task for a great power, notwithstanding its military 
capacity, to keep silent and wait for the best room to manoeuvre, as it was the case in 
the Panetolium or with the patient stance of Rome towards Aetolia in general. That 
readiness is precisely evocative of a pre-existent “cosmo-icon”, which espoused all 
the three rationales of the respective schools of thought, contrary to the monolithic 
signals that Sparta, Athens and Macedonia used to send out. The latter were depictive 
of an entrenched approach of the developments, lacking thus the crucial element of 
adaptability to the circumstances and accordingly of admitting the change.  
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            It is true that Sparta showed certain signs of Machiavellian diplomatic activity, 
which could have been potentially advanced even further, precisely by her “special” 
social and political structure (one can recall the outrageous proposals posed by 
Spartans in their first diplomatic delegation to Athens and the demand for the 
banishment of Alkmeonidae”s breed104), however that occurred only sporadically 
(when for example they started to subvert the truce of Nicias two days after the 
agreement by supporting the defection of some allies of Athens from the latter’s 
League or Sparta’s understandings with Persia or her “war of attrition” in the first 
stages of her confrontation with Athens, by which she gained the non-opposition of 
Thrace and Macedonia to her plans) and not in the frame of a consistent and coherent 
action. On the contrary, Spartan diplomacy highlighted the need for further action 
principally with the aid of the Peloponnesian league, projecting thus the image of a 
state which, although militarily powerful, was relying also upon the cooperative spirit 
of the other members of the alliance. A prominent example of which is the 
willingness of Spartans to put trust on cooperating with Alcibiades to such extent or 
their quite self restrictive action in the field (contrary to what one could expect) in the 
case of Athens’ Sicilian adventure. Besides, there are scholars who tend to dismiss 
even Sparta’s initial steps during the Peloponnesian War as part of a realpolitik, 
describing them on the contrary as a generally “pacifist” one, “consistently aimed at 
preserving peace”105. That thinking was not necessarily a harbinger of more evils for 
Sparta, considering that it could be seen equally as a “realistic” component of a “buck 
passing” strategy, but the rub lay in the fact that this “Grotian” element was 
preponderant within the Spartan diplomatic activity at the expense of the 
“Machiavellian” one. It is plausible to observe that Sparta was always in favour of 
flexible cooperation (indicative example her relations with her allies in sharp contrast 
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with the respective of Athens), contrary to Rome which was invariably ready to reject 
blatantly every diplomatic arrangement if she deemed that her political aims could be 
served quickly otherwise, even at a risk (such was the case with Epirotes, inter alia, 
when they attempted to bring together Flaimininus and Phillip V or the case with 
Rhodes and Bithynia, and so forth).  
 
              Athens’ and Macedonia’s attitudes, as far as diplomacy is concerned, proved 
to be similar, but this time principally within the lines of “Kantianism”. I noticed 
indeed that the “Kantian” argumentation of Athens and Macedonia was very often 
interwoven with that of “Grotian”, in the sense that that the categorical imperative 
(“revolutionism”) was in need of a rationalization (“liberalism”); illustrative example 
was Macedonia’s hardly convincing élan to promote she first the differences between 
the “barbarians and the Greeks”106. Similarly, it can be recalled the “naïve”, idealist, 
military choice of Perseus, with obvious diplomatic ramifications, to avoid Aimilius 
simply by hide and seek gimmicks without entering into the substance of what had to 
be done either militarily or politically. The aforementioned are not surprising, since at 
the beginning they both enjoyed the prominent place of the regional hegemon, and 
consequently they both espoused the same callousness towards international disputes 
(one can recall the short-sighted stance of Athens in 433 B.C. against Potidaea to 
bring her back in the tracks of the Delian league, as well as the numerous occasions 
that Macedonia showed immense lack of diplomatic flexibility in order to gain allies 
from Rome, by utilising needless force or suppressive rhetoric).  
 
          The said practice, always “in need of ideology” and in defense consecutively of 
“a burden of proof”107 was incorrectly advanced by a nebulous rhetoric. In other 
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words, Athens and Macedonia lacked diplomatic adaptability and they opted for 
instigating further the animosities between the states, by utilizing a gun-boat 
diplomacy or by pontificating uselessly upon them, instead of coping with the Spartan 
and Roman diplomacy respectively in rational terms, by prudently analyzing the 
current balance of power in their own sub-systems, by methodologically approaching 
the respective “cosmo-icons” of their opponents and by pragmatically exploiting the 
existing alliances. At this point, by “methodologically” I mean that it had to devoid 
itself precisely from the approach of “unitary rational actor”, which is often, 
according to the “realists”, the appropriate representation of the opponent’s decision 
processes and thus whatever happens is the direct result of deliberate choices 
(disregarding consecutively the possibility of taking into account the respective 
“cosmo-icons”). And that was indeed extremely important for establishing an 
hegemony, since indeed “the worst kind of diplomatists are missionaries, fanatics, and 
lawyers; the best kind are the reasonable and humane skeptics”108.  
 
         It is therefore clear that the “diplomatic compass” which Rome had artfully 
utilized through the commitment to an evolving “cosmo-icon”, was still irretraceable 
in the cases of the other great powers. It has to be stressed that other scholars identify 
this peculiarity of Roman diplomacy, but they do not approach it in terms of an action 
stemming from inside (namely the “cosmo-icon”) the decision making process, but in 
terms of its surroundings, which they try to interpret it. In this regard there is for 
example the “systemic”/”structural” explanation, namely that diplomacy was effective 
because this region was the proper field for exercise109, or the very common 
“medium” one, namely that Rome applied a diplomacy using successfully the other 
states as mediums for the fulfillment of her plans110. In both cases of course the 
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explanation is provided over and above the decision making process. M.Wight, also 
focuses at a later stage of that process, when he points out that “a successful foreign 
policy must oscillate between the apparently opposite poles of force and 
appeasement”111.  
 
5.4.
 
Decision making as indispensable part of a comprehensive Realistic approach of 
states’ interaction. 
           After having identified the two principal notions, namely continuity and 
homogeneity, defining both the general lines along which an explanation can be 
extended upon the nature of the wars using the International Relations tools, I can 
furthermore proceed with deducing certain conclusions from the previous chapters, 
where I made an attempt to isolate those elements which could sufficiently portray 
how the wars began, were fought and ended.  
 
             It is true that in history Rome or Sparta are presented to “having taken the 
decision” to go to war against Macedonia and Athens respectively. It is also true that 
in International Relations theory one of the cardinal theoretical pillars of “realism” is 
to regard the state and not the individual as the unitary actor in international relations. 
In this vein, other crucial variables for the outcome of a foreign policy (the war itself 
can be considered an outcome of course, being “a continuation of politics by other 
means” following the Clausewitzian dictum), such as domestic politics in general and 
decision making in particular are to be taken into consideration only marginally, 
“largely as an irrelevant noise of internal processes in explaining state behavior”112. 
And by domestic “politics” I wish to denote apart from leadership, social and 
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religious developments as well, which are all important aspects of a man’s single 
behaviour within the remit of his individual contribution to his state, something which 
precisely the ancient literature approached as “politics”, following the wider 
Aristotelian definition of the term (“from these things it is evident, that the city 
belongs among the things that exist by nature, and that man is by nature a political 
animal"113). 
 
            However, even if “political thought in Greece tended to concentrate on the 
internal changes of the States, on constitutional problems, rather than in causes of 
war, external conflicts” 114, what the wars in question teach is that “realism”, when 
explaining the behavior of great powers, can and should take aboard the specific 
parameter of decision making process, which has been further crystallized into the 
notion of “cosmo-icon”, and that occurs without negating itself as being purportedly a 
“state-centralized” school of thought. A clarification here is needed: My emphasis on 
the complementary importance of decision making specifically (along with that of the 
standard state level approach of “realism”) and not for domestic politics in general, is 
based not only upon the narration itself of the historical facts, but upon the plausible 
assumption that domestic politics cannot be entitled to holistically explaining 
international relations in terms of “realism”, since domestic politics simply cannot 
serve as a fully fledged, sufficient, framework of analysis, being a variable too 
immeasurable compared to an individual’s “cosmo-icon”, which can be identified and 
evaluated as such. For example, tagging these wars “ideological”, so as to explain 
them by utilizing the opposing ideologies of the political camps within these states, 
would have been both too generic and inaccurate; the Athenians represented only 
nominally the democrats, while the traditionally pro-oligarchs Spartans in manifold 
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instances were acting as the sole democratic unifying power towards the other states. 
Also, numerous times leaders promoted policies prima facie in sharp contradiction to 
the rhetoric of their own ideological camp, though consistent with the general political 
machinations of the specific moment.  By the lapse of time, the Greek city-states’ 
indignation was being expressed rather by Sparta and its oligarchy than by Athens and 
its democracy, given the latter’s evident aggressiveness and increasing despotic 
aspirations. Similar would have been the argument if I tried to explain the wars under 
the magnifying glass of ethnic origin, namely a battle between certain Ionians within 
Athens and certain Dorians in Sparta, the two most important branches of the ethnic 
genealogic tree of the Greeks. That distinction is undoubtedly too simplistic and 
deserves no more than passing mention. 
 
                That said, I have seen in practice that the evolution of a foreign policy was 
heavily influenced more by certain decisions, which by and large were independent of 
the wider proceedings within the states (and that despite the fact that the function of 
democracy was more present at that time than today in many “democratic” countries), 
than by various aspects of domestics politics altogether (social developments, 
opposition parties, etc). In this regard and taking as example the prominent place of 
“institutions” within democratic Athens during the Peloponnesian War, which 
supposedly constitute a significant part of what one calls “domestic politics”, it is 
illuminating the position of Polybius himself, namely that he “is convinced that little 
need be said of the Athenian and Theban constitutions: their growth was abnormal, 
the period of their zenith brief, and the changes they experienced unusually violent. 
Their glory was a sudden and fortuitous flash, so to speak; and while they still thought 
themselves prosperous, and likely to remain so, they found themselves involved in 
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circumstances completely the reverse…We must therefore conclude that it was not its 
constitution, but its men, that caused the high fortune which it then enjoyed”115. In 
view of the foregoing, domestic politics may notionally contain everything in the 
internal field of a state’s activity (the state’s “black box”), from the purely procedural 
works of the Roman Senate to the distinct strategic aspirations of the Consuls (given 
that the Consuls resembled, especially during war time, to the Kings116), from the 
ordinary congregation of Apella in Sparta to the ad hoc decisions of the Kings or of 
the Ephors the very moment before the battle. In this vein, suffice to mention that, the 
list in Polybius117, is not short at all with the Consuls who speeded up the negotiations 
or the terms of peace or the war itself in order to keep away for their successor the 
glory of having triumphed in the battlefield.    
 
              On the contrary the decision making process boils down to the leader’s 
perception of the reality, which can be ex post factum regarded also as “realistic” 
when it reads the developments with the defining notions of “realism” (states, power, 
anarchy, etc) and irrespective of the final result of the decision118. It can be evaluated 
mainly from the facts, as I saw, but also from the behaviour of the other states, 
namely by identifying what could be called “power conversion”: “the capacity to 
convert potential power, as measured by resources, to realized power, as measured by 
the changed behavior of others”119. Thus, Pericles’ strategic decision to keep 
Athenians behind the walls was not acclaimed wholeheartedly by the people of the 
state and the various components of what one could call domestic politics (other 
political groups, groups of interest, companies, generals, etc) would have suggested 
quite the opposite. However, it was that decision of Pericles which made the 
difference and paved the way for the specific foreign policy of Athens at that time. 
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Therefore, it is important to identify whether Pericles’s cosmo-icon was indeed built 
upon the said “realistic” notions, and thenceforward his decision would be tagged as 
“realistic” (which was not the case as I saw) irrespective of the final intrusion of the 
Spartan army. Useful here to recall that, in a similar context, A. Toynbee approached 
the very breakdown of civilizations in terms of the concrete actions of specific 
powerful persons, namely as results from the degeneration of the creative minority 
into a “dominant minority which attempts to retain by force a position that it has 
ceased to merit” and thus the society loses its social cohesiveness120. Or Niebuhr’s 
assertion that national power is the projection of the individual’s “will to power”121.  
 
             In view of the foregoing, this subjective element of the decision makers, 
which has been propounded by all the ancient writers, dovetails into a more compact, 
“realistic”, approach of the international relations along with the principal, in terms of 
International Relations theory, role of the state and this is something one shall admit 
when reading behind the constant fluctuations of the foreign policies of all the great 
powers involved in the said wars. Besides, natural law cannot be utilized as a homo 
homini lupus principle in the rhetoric of “realism” supporters exclusively at state level 
(namely in their bid to put the accent on states’ incessant antagonism for power 
maximization and prevail over the other states). Using a rough parallelism, it could 
also signify that also a person’s (see state) behavior (see foreign policy) is the 
aggregation of genetic traits (see cosmo-icon) and his environment inputs (see 
international society). Disregarding any element of the two would render any 
approach of the reality theoretically defective. And it seems to me that this is what is 
implied in “realist” IR theory, when it is argued that “there is nothing wrong with 
advancing theories that include both a realist and a domestic politics component. 
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Indeed, one could argue that such compound theories are better at explaining how the 
world works than straightforward realist theories...Realism needs considerable help 
from other bodies of theories if it hopes to explain state behavior as well as 
international outcomes”122. My addition to this claim lies precisely on the need to 
consider this “help” as coming not from any “other bodies of theories”, but simply as 
a component of the same theory. 
 
5.5.  
 
Four corollaries to four puzzling issues: (a) Every rational actor is potentially 
irrational, (b) limits of “change” in a “Realistic” Grand Strategy, (c) exit from a 
preventive war and the scope of preemptive attack, (d) skating over the 
“expansion”s thin ice.  
      The aforementioned conclusion on decision making as a variable of equal 
theoretical value when examining the outbreak, the evolution and the end of the war, 
running in parallel with (and not despite or above123) the said “realistic” 
characteristics of the ancient international society, has four immediate repercussions 
in the form of sub-conclusions:   
 
(a) It is not accurate to observe that every state is simply a rational actor, namely that 
“it is aware of its external environment and it thinks intelligently about how to 
maximize its prospects for survival”124. Because -excluding the despotic-authoritarian 
ones which promote consciously an overly revolutionary political agenda combined 
with an erratic behavior in foreign policy and therefore they can be deemed easily as 
irrational players - even the rational states may seem irrational in their international 
relations and that does not entail that they cease to be rational actors for one principal 
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reason: since one cannot ignore the existence of a cosmo-icon for every state unit of 
the international system, (namely for every leader of a state), there is no central 
authority (in the same lines as the argument goes with the notion of international 
anarchy) to judge what is rational and what is not, apart, it is stressed, from the 
aforementioned clear cases of some despotic regimes (and again under certain 
conditions). In other words, one could easily claim for example that, Perseus’ crucial 
filibustering after the battle of Callinicus, despite his clear advantage against the 
Romans to turn the tide of the events in the Greek soil, could be seen merely as an 
effort to artfully lure his enemies into a diplomatic solution by alleviating their fears 
of further aggression from his side, in a conscious policy of self-restraint based on a 
prior analysis of his own power assets. In view of the foregoing, taking aboard the 
notion of “cosmo-icon” when using the tools of “realism” (in the other schools of 
thought this subjective element is a priori not so fiercely excluded as I saw) may have 
also side-effects, namely “to expect rational long-term self-interest to control 
desire”125 (irrationality). However and in contrast to the relative realist assumption126, 
I claim the irrationality is in fact notionally compatible with “realism’s” explanatory 
framework of international relations. And its existence does not necessarily signify 
the existence of a school of thought other than “realism” (purportedly that of 
“revolutionism”). Actually, it can be in absolute theoretical harmony with “realism” 
through the notion of “cosmo-icon”, or it cannot even be considered as such (namely 
irrational), given that it could as well invite another plausible or “realistic” 
interpretation (as it was the case before). At this point acquires significance to my 
view the observation that “rational self-interest divorced from ideal principles is as 
weak and erratic a guide for foreign policy as idealism undisciplined by reason”127.  
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 (b) The notion of “change” of any given Grand Strategy and its interrelation with that 
of “human nature” often poses a theoretical conundrum128 to the supporters of the 
“realistic” school of thought. On the one hand “realists” are castigated in short for not 
acknowledging that some things in international life have fundamentally changed, on 
the other hand, very illustrative becomes the point K.J.Holsti, who maintains rightly 
that “change, like beauty and good skiing conditions, is in the eye of the beholder”. 
Thus everything becomes purely a matter of perspective, namely “the international 
events recorded in today’s headlines constitute change because they are not identical 
to yesterday’s news”, however “micro change almost never indicates macro 
transformation”129. Many professional Roman historians (f.i. Lawrence Keppie) have 
argued that the Roman grand strategy simply emerged slowly on an ad hoc basis and 
was not a defensive plan consciously applied by the emperors, therefore negating 
Grand Strategy’s very meaning, namely a long term (and not on an ad hoc basis) 
effort “to coordinate and direct all the resources of the nation towards the attainment 
of the political object of the war – the goal defined by national policy”130. Also, “It is 
well known that Morgenthau offers no theoretical account of when and why a state 
will chose one strategy over another”131, while Thucydides, in both the Archeology 
(B.I.89-118) and the Corcyran stasis (B.III.69 and B.V.105) as well as Livy (B.XXX. 
29) highlight the importance of the existence of laws of human nature, which by 
definition is hard to change at a moment’s notice132. Nevertheless, the analysis of the 
wars in question shows that “change” is not an incompatible notion with “realistic” 
implications and this is manifested fully in the foreign policy of Rome, hardly in that 
of Sparta and almost not at all in that of Athens and Macedonia. I saw how Rome did 
not stay satisfied with the status quo for long and when she identified the leeway to 
promote her interests, which had already been portrayed since her first intrusion in the 
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region of Illyria, she went on without hesitations. On the contrary, Sparta had hard 
time to decide upon the need to escalate her actions against Athens and her war of 
attrition could not be transformed into a substantive victory. Athens, again, followed a 
policy, which was clung to the previous era of her ascendancy to the regional 
hegemony, disregarding the developments within the Peloponnesian League, but also 
within her own Athenian league. Finally, Macedonia followed also an identical 
foreign policy within the three wars, without succeeding in forging significant 
alliances nor transforming herself into a more benign great power towards the other 
Greek states. The said argument is supported by the innate, contrary to the other great 
powers, Roman resilience before the constantly flowing developments within the 
Hellenistic states, namely “whenever one solution failed, the Romans were always 
sufficiently flexible to try another”133. And that adaptive comportement of Rome was 
accommodated with an invariably present calculation of power accumulation134. 
Therefore, along with the omnipresent “law of nature”, it cannot be denied that there 
is also a latent law of “incandescent change” in international relations per se, the 
filament of which glows when heated by a specific decision passed through it. In this 
regard there is the famous argument of P. Kennedy, namely that “there exists a 
dynamic for change driven chiefly by economic and technological developments, 
which then impact upon social structures, political systems, military power and the 
position of individual states and empires”135. And giving more emphasis to the 
passing of the said specific decision through the filament, I find not always 
convincing the argument that “all of the major shifts in the worlds’ military power 
balances have followed alterations in the productive balances; and further, that the 
rising and falling of the various empires and states in the international system has 
been confirmed by the outcomes of the major Great Powers wars, where victory has 
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always gone to the side with the greater material resources136; on the contrary, Athens 
had by far more material resources than Sparta. My concrete remark is that the study 
of the said wars substantiates the process of this impact, though without qualitative 
classifications (namely that economic interests overpower political ones and so forth), 
but by pointing out that one or more “cosmo-icons” can match together with a 
“realistic” foreign policy irrespectively of the qualitative success (victory or defeat is 
sometimes a matter of interpretation) it may entail: for example, one can claim that 
Rome did not clearly outflank Macedonia in the first Macedonian War, while 
Macedonia had the courage to re-emerge as a great power quickly enough, after her 
devastating defeat in the battle of Cynoscephalae, and to seriously trouble again the 
Roman plans in the area; however one cannot claim that during all this period Rome 
did not follow a consistent foreign policy, which did not abandon her predetermined 
sights upon the geostrategicaly important Hellenistic region and was reading the 
international society with the same “realistic” vocabulary, so as to “make the full 
exertion of her power unnecessary”137. And this matching leads me to the next 
observation, namely, that the theoretically thorny relationship of “change” in Grand 
Strategy and “realism” is actually a bogus one, since “change” as such is perceivable 
only at the level of states’ interaction, while at the unit level adaptability to the 
changing environment constitutes the principal notion to gauge a specific “cosmo-
icon” as “realistic”, which, in brief, helps us to reconfigure our conceptual equipment 
and look at the world in both ways (state-unit simultaneously). And that distinction is 
latent in the generic argument that “the differing abilities of the Athenians and the 
Spartans to adjust to the new economic and technological environment and the 
changed nature of power ultimately led to the war”138. 
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(c)  I have noted that all the ancient writers, along with prolific descriptions of the 
confrontations of the states in politics, economy or war battlefield, did not only devote 
special references on the general subjective views of the decision makers within the 
states, but they also highlighted the existence of certain predisposition of states139 
(thus denoting individuals140) towards the ongoing developments and the “right” path 
for action. I underlined indeed the initially long-standing Roman predisposition 
against a decisive battle and against a war of annihilation141 and of course the famous 
observation of Thucydides on the real cause of the Peloponnesian War, namely the 
Spartan fear of Athenian growth142, which eventually implies a predisposition in 
favour of a preemptive rationale, behind the façade of the Spartan decision (for the 
needs of that study, I posit that “predisposition” is notionally and practically related 
with that of “war of prevention”, a sub-form of which is the “preemptive war”143). At 
this point it becomes obvious that fear and uneven growth actually mirror, in terms of 
content, what it is examined at the levels of “cosmo-icon” and states respectively. 
Pinpointing also the element of preventive war is not merely another sound proof of 
“realism’s”144 strong echo within the ancient text. It gives also the opportunity to 
proceed with an important theoretical distinction: preemption as well is notionally 
related with the stage of the cosmo-icon, while prevention with the basic “realistic” 
principles of the states’ relations.  
 
             By definition, a preemptive attack is related solely to a pressing psychological 
need to take surprise action and contains more strongly the element of a specific 
subjective estimation as to when the enemy is about to strike, while a preventive war 
responds in principle first to certain developments and then to ensuing deliberations 
(internal or with the enemy as well and in any case without the element of surprise), 
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which create afterwards a general need for action145. Thus, preemption could be better 
framed in the context of the formation of a “cosmo-icon” (in the lines of the “realist” 
argument that a state can never be certain of the other’s benign intentions146), while 
prevention in that of states’ interaction along with that of the “cosmo-icon”, given 
precisely that the first (preemption) responds to a perceptional impulse and the second 
(prevention) to a refined analysis of the situation (which takes two to occur: data and 
analysis, namely inputs and outputs). Indicative example is the Roman stance towards 
the eventuality of a war in their soil, after the traumatic experience of Hannibal’s 
invasion to the Italian peninsula: Romans were clearly predisposed against any 
strategic plan which would presuppose the arrival of the enemy in their land. “Let 
Macedonia rather than Italy be the seat of war, let it be the enemy's cities and fields 
that are devastated with fire and sword. We have learnt by this time that our arms are 
more potent and more successful abroad than they are at home”147. 
 
          This distinction is important not only in theory, but first and foremost in 
practice and in particular when dealing with the thorny issue of the exit strategy from 
a preventive war and, where there is one, from a preemptive attack. It is clear indeed 
from the narration that both Sparta and Rome initiated the hostilities in order to 
prevent a further accumulation of power in the hands of Athens and Macedonia 
respectively (but also in the wider region of Asia, as I have seen from Roman stance 
towards Antiochus148) and both confrontations ended up in wars of attrition149. In 
other words Rome and Sparta grasped the security dilemma before them as ascendant 
regional hegemons (state level) and decided to take action in this regard (decision 
making). In addition, it seems that there was no striking incident of a preemptive 
attack per se, namely with the objective aim to terminate the war at once, apart from 
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certain battles (for example the attack of Athens against the Spartan guard in the 
island of Sphacteria, or the Spartan attack in the battle of the Aegos Potamoi, etc), 
which were obviously swift and bearing the element of surprise, however 
“strategically restricted” in the larger chessboard of the military confrontation.  
 
           In view of the foregoing, I perceived that the exit from the preventive war of 
Sparta against Athens was exhausting and consuming in sharp contrast to that of 
Rome against Macedonia. The difference does not lie purely at the level of the states’ 
confrontation as one could hastily claim. In both cases, after all, there was eventually 
a clear military victory and there are numerous indications that Sparta and Rome 
manifested in many instances “realistic” foreign policies. Therefore, it was not only a 
matter of overpowering force or international developments. What really constituted 
the difference was the fact that Rome did not forsake the rationale behind these 
preventive wars and “we may be sure that, as indeed happened during the war, further 
Roman demands would have followed, which in the end would have been impossible 
for Philip to accept and would have made the war 'necessary'” 150. While Sparta, 
almost since the beginning of its entanglement in the war, struggled to compromise 
the apparent constants for further action with its original tendency to inactivity and 
consecutively its desire to return to the status quo ante. And by apparent constants I 
can accept as comprehensive the ones stated by Thucydides, “fear”, “glory”, 
“profit”151 and to this subscribes Polybius, when he states for example that “Rome is 
not looking for security or peace, but for glory”152, or when he clearly stresses that 
“nor does any man of sense go to war with his neighbours for the mere purpose of 
mastering his opponents; nor go to sea for the mere sake of the voyage; nor engage in 
professions and trades for the sole purpose of learning them. In all these cases the 
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objects are invariably the pleasure, honour, or profits which are the results of the 
several employments”153. That said, fear (of uneven growth) was there in both cases, 
but for Sparta it served only as a necessary evil for mobilization, while for Rome it 
was a launching pad for firm action. In other words, when Sparta took up the 
preventive war, it did not seem to realize that at the same moment it took on the 
responsibility of substituting for Athens in the latter’s current power position in the 
system. So, apart from the material conditions (war) there was actually an imperative 
systemic need for Sparta to cope with the non-material ones (responsibility). In a 
nutshell and using schematically Cleon’s penetrating remark in 427 B.C. addressed to 
his own compatriots, Rome, contrary to Sparta, grasped the simple idea that an empire 
is built upon a mistress’ relationship towards the other states, not a lover’s one. And 
that in the sense that there will be “unwilling subjects who are always conspiring” 
against Rome and “they are not going to obey in return for any kindness which Rome 
did them to her own injury, but in so far as Rome was their mistress, considering that 
they have no love of her, but they are held down by force”154.  
 
        At this precise point the role of “cosmo-icon” becomes preponderant, which, as it 
has been indicated, is indispensable for “self-orientation”. Rome indeed, did not lose 
sight of that, cleaving to a “realistic” “cosmo-icon” irrespective of the actual 
developments on the ground (this is manifested throughout its foreign policy during 
all the wars, despite even the opportunistic fluctuations of its only ally in the Greek 
soil, Aetolia), while Sparta engaged into an occasional and insufficient, “realistic”, 
strategic plan, but with a Grotian “cosmo-icon” and a consecutive fluctuating decision 
making, rendering pertinent the simple, though not simplistic, observation of 
Napoleon, namely that “the art of war is simple: everything is a matter of 
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execution”155. It is in this context that I place the succinct observation of F.W. 
Walbank, who highlights, not the structures, not the institutions, but the “character” 
and the “values” as unique distinctive Roman traits in relation to other states156. Under 
this spectrum also, it becomes even easier to distinguish clearly the notions of “cause” 
and “pretext”, thus confirming that neither the “Megarian degree” nor the incursions 
of Demetrius Pharus to certain Greek islands could be regarded as causes of the 
respective wars. I can recall Polybius stating that “most historians confound these, 
because they do not keep a firm hold upon the distinction between a pretext and a 
cause, or again between a pretext and a beginning of a war”157 or that “they (Romans) 
looked out for a suitable opportunity and a decent pretext to justify them in the eyes of 
the world. For indeed the Romans were quite rightly very careful on this point”158. 
Besides, there are not scholars, to my knowledge, who explicitly compare the wars in 
question and reach to a conclusion as to their causes. Only Machiavelli touches upon 
very roughly the “measurable” reasons that Athens and Sparta didn’t become great 
empires like Rome, by arguing that population was the principal factor for the latter to 
dominate in its region, invoking the principle that “a puny stem cannot carry a great 
branch, so a small republic cannot assume control over cities or countries stronger 
than herself”159. In any case what remains solid truth is that the causes of war do not 
restrict their selves to a remuneration of isolated incidents, but they reflect structural 
aspects of the international system and respective decisions of the leadership. It is in 
this vein that British military historian Sir Michael Howard does not hesitate to claim 
that Thucydides’ explanation for the Peloponnesian War is equally applicable to the 
Second World War: “You can vary the names of the actors, but the model remains a 
valid one for the purposes of our analysis”160.  
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           Thus, Macedonian wars depicted that the successful exit from the preventive 
war is actually to stay within it161. This is promoted by the consistency162 of the 
“cosmo-icon”, which entails two necessary and always pertinent163 elements for an 
effective decision making, that of forecasting and adaptability. That is exactly what 
Plutarch implies when he stresses the notion of “foresight”: “that just as the members 
of the body have a common life and breath because they cleave together in a common 
growth, but when they are drawn apart and become separate they wither away and 
decay, in like manner the several states are ruined by those who dissever their 
common bonds, but are augmented by mutual support, when they become parts of a 
great whole and enjoy a common foresight”164. The same counts for the notion of 
“adaptability”, when M. Crawford observes pointedly that “whenever one solution 
failed, the Romans were always sufficiently flexible to try another”165, but also when 
M. Wight notes that “the Machiavellian attitude to political change might be traced 
through four words: adapt, forestall, facilitate and control”166. At this point, the 
emphasis on the term consistency is not opaque at all, since it is reflected extensively 
in the International Relations theory and actually it is flagged by the “realistic” school 
of thought as such, through the term of prudency, namely the weighing of alternative 
options for action, as the litmus test for a balanced “realistic” policy167.  
 
(d)     Taking aboard the aspect of “cosmo-icon” renders quite illuminating the 
invariably relevant and theoretically thorny issue of “over-expansion”, which is 
evident particularly in the case of the Sicilian adventure of Athens during the 
Peloponnesian war. Over-expansion as such or the thucydidean principle “they begin 
with us, but they will go on with you”168 shall not be reprehensible for a “realistic” 
thought (i.e. supposedly attributed to an irrational actor169). It does not also 
292 
 
presuppose any material annexation of territory (M. Holleaux claims that the Roman 
expansion was not carried forward deliberately by the Senate, because there was no, 
at least formal, annexation of countries into the Roman imperium170). It has been 
evident that precisely because of the decision making process’ “realistic” impact upon 
a state’s effort for maximization of its power, there has to be a distinction between a 
forced expansion, which in fact constitutes a prudent foreign policy action, and an 
over-expansion, which constitutes a degeneration of the former action in the frame of 
a rather missionary “cosmo-icon”, devoid of or distanced from a “realistic” view of 
the international system, earmarked with the belief that “the earth will not perish, only 
the damned will perish”171. That said, the expansion of Rome to the Greek region was 
forced in the sense that it was dictated by Rome’s ascending power within its 
subsystem as well as by the “realistic” articulation of the subjective views of her 
leaders (combination of both, not alternatively). On the contrary, the campaign of 
Athens to Italy was over-expansion, since Athens deviated from the Periclean 
admonitions to self-restraint and with an intense whiff of complacency pervading her 
groves, espoused a generally manichaistic foreign policy already present before this 
disastrous campaign (e.g. case of Melos island). After all, the Sicilian expedition “was 
not more flagrantly unrighteous than some of Athens’ other undertakings and it had 
the plausible enough pretext of protecting the weaker cities in the west against the 
stronger”172. Thus Athens transformed its foreign policy into a Kantian effort of 
imposing its own “categorical imperatives”, into “an instance of a whole people going 
mad, like the English people in the matter of the Crimean War”173. Additionally, the 
said distinction helps me dismiss with ease occasional reference in literature to the 
elements of “complete ignorance” or “accident” as purportedly preponderant, 
contributing, factors to foreign policy action174; it is possible for a state to delay in de-
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codifying a specific development at the long term level of its relations with other 
states, but it is not possible to turn a blind eye to instant decisions, which are always 
necessary for the regular management of the foreign policy issues. Putting thus the 
accent on the importance of the “cosmo-icon” completes the simple, but crucial 
observation of G. Blainey, that “no wars are unintended or accidental. What is often 
unintended is the length and bloodiness of the war. Defeat too is unintended”175. 
  
5.6.
         
Epilogue –suggestions for an effective exit strategy. 
       So, can these wars provide the reader with succinct suggestions for an effective 
exit strategy from a preventive war with a view to attaining hegemony? 
 
         All political forecasting176 is bound to include some error.   I cannot hope to 
have avoided errors of judgment, but I have done my utmost to play no tricks with the 
evidence. Besides, those who venture to predict should proceed with prudence, take 
care not to claim unwarranted confidence and admit that later hindsight will 
undoubtedly reveal surprises and mistakes. Nevertheless I do believe that science 
should try to offer predictions, even if “realist theory is better at saying what will 
happen than in saying when it will happen”177. Thus and taking into account that 
“each age has its own strategy”178, I take the liberty of epitomizing the 
aforementioned arguments from the analysis of the Peloponnesian and Macedonian 
wars with the tools of International Relations theory into the following general 
proposals:  
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(i) A great power first creates the interest and then defends it through a decisive battle. 
Only a decisive battle can bring a war to a lasting end and tangible gains to the 
victorious great power.  However and considering that the pursuit of the decisive 
battle is not, as one may surmise, a military, but first and foremost a purely political 
process, since it can be time-consuming, it necessitates political commitment first to 
the creation of the interest, as well as to the defense of it. In other words, inputs to the 
system from the unit level so as to affect the outputs and the system level and not 
conveniently for many leaders the opposite. In this context any crisis escalation 
should be expected to be deliberate, while any intermediate peace settlement only 
temporary.    
 
(ii) There are no multiple causes, but there are multiple pretexts for war. The war 
cause remains basically twofold: it can be identified at the level of states’ interaction 
and the inherent parameters of their incessant antagonism for acquisition of power and 
security in the international system, as well as at the unit level of decision making and 
more particularly, not principally through the ad hoc perception of the international 
developments (“inputs”, following the direction from the environment to the subject), 
but through the leaders’ fundamental view to the system, their “cosmo-icon” 
(“outputs”, following the direction from the subject to the environment). Thus 
surprisingly, a “revolutionist” element (it is well known that for “Revolutionists” 
international politics is first an issue among persons and then states) becomes in fact 
an essential ingredient of every “realist” or “rationalist” foreign policy. If that 
ingredient reacts to the state level analysis, then the foreign policy is characterized as 
“realistic”. If it interacts with it, it is about a “rationalistic” foreign policy, while if it 
counter-acts against it, the foreign policy can be tagged as “revolutionist”.  
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(iii) Fortuitous events cannot claim to be decisive factors for a war’s outbreak, 
evolution or end, even if their influence seems prima faciae to be overwhelming. In 
fact they serve only as “accelerators” or “brakes” of the developments, which after all 
retain their inherent dynamics, irrespective of the said events. This is a manifestation 
of the fact that a foreign policy is built at the state level and the unit level, it is not an 
outgrowth of isolated events. The latter may momentarily disrupt the course of the 
events, but the relentless equilibrium of the constant variables of the international 
system (power, international anarchy, etc.) will eventually reverse back.   
 
(iv) Forging alliances serves the enhancement of a great power’s influence towards its 
rivals, but also constitutes a metric for gauging a great power’s level of superiority 
over the components of the alliance itself. In this regard it is more efficacious for a 
great power to create a small, compact alliance and maintain strong hold over one ally 
only, than a loose control over many more. In the first case it secures at least a strong 
front, while in the second it jeopardizes its grand strategy from the sapping effect of 
unavoidably copious dissenting views within the alliance. 
   
(v) The effectiveness of the decision making process increases the smaller the number 
of the persons involved in it. It is not implied that a collective decision making 
process will not be successful, neither that a specific political regime has to be in 
place for that purpose. It is simply that what is endangered is the consistency of the 
“cosmo-icon” and the crucial for a war’s termination element of surprise, which is 
precisely easier to be exploited if decision makers are fewer and additionally their 
approach of reality goes in the same basic lines. 
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(vi) How long hegemony will last is strongly interrelated with how much consistent 
with the state level a “cosmo-icon” will be. In this context, hegemony remains strong 
as long as a state on one hand behaves as an “urban planner”, by striving to create the 
favorable situation beforehand so as to avoid rushing to hot spots and on the other 
hand does not hesitate to act as a firefighter when negative incidences call for fires to 
be put out. 
 
 (vii) Over-expansion or the principle “they begin with us, but they will go on with 
you” is not necessarily reprehensible for a “realistic” thought. Considering the impact 
of a “realistic” “cosmo-icon” at the state level, there has to be a distinction between a 
forced expansion, which echoes prudence in foreign policy action and therefore it 
should not be excluded as a foreign policy option for a great power, and an over-
expansion, which reflects a degeneration of the foreign policy planning in the frame 
of a rather missionary “cosmo-icon”, devoid of or distanced from a “realistic” 
purview of the international system, which shall be therefore meticulously detected 
and dismissed as a foreign policy option. Thus, they may both (over expansion and 
forced expansion) be subject to interpretation as to their results, but their generating 
“cosmo-icon” not. 
 
(viii) A “realistic” “cosmo-icon” does not exclude the possibility of change in grand 
strategy, if a specific perception upon a specific input in foreign policy calls for it. 
What is of cardinal importance at the decision making level therefore is the leader’s 
ability to distinguish between the mere interpretation of the recurrent facts and the 
enrichment of his firm positioning towards the system’s fundamental principles of 
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function. That firm positioning leads to what in the ancient literature is indicated as 
the predisposition of the states, thus denoting individuals, towards the ongoing 
developments and the “right” path for action.   
 
 (ix) Almost all the states of the system are “rational”, but since the respective 
“cosmo-icons” may diverge, “irrational” decisions shall be expected from every state. 
It is in this context that for a great power there is no room for self-complacency, but 
room for constant vigilance so as to maintain a favorable equilibrium and not merely a 
stable one. In this framework an aspiring great power shall perceive that the other 
states will be potentially unwilling conspiring subjects against her interests. Thus its 
relationship towards them shall be one of a mistress, not one of a lover’s: they will not 
obey in return for kindness, but they will be held down by force. 
 
 (x)  An effective exit from a preventive war is to stay within it and consistently 
pursue a “realistic” foreign policy at the level of states interaction, while maintaining 
a “realistic” “cosmo-icon” at the unit level. If one of the two levels does not converge 
qualitatively (as in the case of Sparta, “realistic” at times foreign policy, though with a 
Grotian “cosmo-icon”), then foreign policy’s effectiveness will be put sooner or later 
into question. This is why, in particular Thucydides, when he is narrowing the war 
causes, refers to uneven growth and fear, namely to an element which corresponds to 
the international environment and to an element which corresponds to the human 
dimension of it respectively. 
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86 Blainey G., “The causes of war”, p.114.  
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119 Joseph S. Nye Jr., “Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History”, 
p. 59. 
 
120 “A study of history”, p. 246. 
 
121 “Moral man and immoral society”, p.11. 
 
122 J. Mearsheimer, "Reckless States and Realism," p. 248. 
 
123 In that case and in order to be theoretically accurate, I would implicitly either attempt to introduce 
another school of thought per se or to create another branch of realism or to even merge realism with 
Grotianism, bearing in mind the latter’s “theoretical openness” to other “important” parameters of the 
international relations. 
   
124 J.Mearsheimer, "Reckless States and Realism", p.245”. Also Grotianism espouses the same 
approach for “rational actor” to a certain extent (see (R. Keohane, “After Hegemony, cooperation and 
discord in the world political economy”, p.27). 
    
125 Donelly J., “Realism and International Relations”, p.181. 
 
126 “In effect…Waltz ultimately assumes that states are not rational agents most of the time. In fact, he 
allows for considerable reckless behaviour by the great powers, which naturally leads to a more 
competitive and dangerous world, and which ultimately causes problems for his theory. 
(J.Mearsheimer, "Reckless States and Realism", p.245)”.  
 
127 R.Osgood, “Ideals and Self Interest in America’s Foreign Relations”, p. 446. 
 
128  See the very synoptic and significant article of K. J. Holsti, “The Problem of Change in 
International Relations’ Theory”. 
 
129 K. J. Holsti, “The Problem of Change in International Relations’ Theory”, p.4. 
 
130 L. Hart, “Strategy”, p.322. I stress again that by “grand” strategy I follow the steps of L. Hart and P. 
Kennedy (Grand Strategies in War and Peace, p. 5), who highlighted here the primordial role of 
politics. 
 
131 J. Donelly, “Realism and International Relations”, p. 46. 
 
132 The list can be too long, but I bear in mind the aphorism of Machiavelli: “For as all our actions 
imitate nature” (“Discourse on Livy”, p. 95). 
 
133 M.Crawford, “The Roman Republic”, p.94. 
 
134 I use the term “power accumulation”, so as to avoid to be enmeshed in an unnecessary for the scope 
of this study dispute between “power reservation” or “power maximization” (see K. Waltz, “Theory of 
International Politics”, p.126). 
 
135 “The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers”, p. 439. In other parts of his work, he summarizes this 
constant change as “uneven rate of growth” (“The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers”, p. Xv-xvi). 
 
136 P. Kennedy, “The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers”, p.439. 
 
137 M. Wight, “The Three Traditions”, p.189. 
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138  R. Gilpin “The theory of hegemonic war”, p. 605. 
 
139 “The senate regarded the peace of 205 as provisional and was always determined to pursue the war 
with Philip as opportunity arose individual ambitions, attested by Polybius as affecting Flamininus 
conduct..also played a part” and “it may well be that the refusal of the first assembly to vote for war 
was occasioned by the fact that the formal grounds advanced for war were very weak, the real grounds 
having to be decently veiled” (M. Crawford, “The Roman Republic”, p. 67). 
 
140 Indicative is the “demegoria” of Corinthians before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war in order 
to lure Spartans into the war or the altercations between Romans and, Macedonians on the how each of 
them tends to treat the states in war. In the same sense goes the references of Livy about the solidarity 
amongst the Greeks, which “by the will of the nature is perpetual” (“natura enim, quae perpetua est”) 
against the foreign inroads, at least at the level of the common people. “The Aetolians, the 
Acarnanians, the Macedonians, men of the same speech, are united or disunited by trivial causes that 
arise from time to time; with aliens, with barbarians, all Greeks wage and will wage eternal war; for 
they are enemies by the will of nature, which is eternal, and not from reasons that change from day to 
day.” (Livy, B.XXX 29).    
 
141 Polybius, B.XVIII 37.  
 
142 “And the truest quarrel, though least in speech, I conceive to be the growth of the Athenian power, 
which putting the Lacedaemonians into fear necessitated the war” (B.I.23.6). 
 
143 It is repeated that “Preventive war” is a war undertaken to avert a plausible but hypothetical future 
risk, such as an adverse imbalance of power, a position of increased vulnerability, or even potential 
subjugation, while “pre-emptive attack” (“attack” is more accurate than pre-emptive “war”) is an action 
on the basis of evidence that an enemy is about to strike. 
 
144  It is well known that “Grotianism” relates unsuccessfully, as I stressed, prevention with the 
nebulous notion of justice or “divine providence”, while “Kantianism” with the notion of “civitas 
maxima”.  “In contrast, Grotius rejected 'personal or collective self-aggrandizement' as a justification 
for war and also questioned the justice of undertaking war to weaken a growing power which, if it 
become too great, may be a source of danger. That this consideration does enter into deliberations 
regarding war, I admit, but only on grounds of expediency, not of justice. … [T]hat the possibility of 
being attacked confers the right to attack is abhorrent to every principle of equity. Human life exists 
under such conditions that complete security is never guaranteed to us. For protection against uncertain 
fears we must rely on Divine Providence, and on wariness free from reproach, not on force. (M. Wight, 
“Four  seminal thinkers in international theory: Machiavelli, Grotius, Kant  and Mazzini”, p.45). 
 
145 See for example R. Jervis, “Cooperation under the security dilemma” (p.189), E. Carr, “The Twenty 
years Crisis 1919-1939. An introduction to the study of international relations”, p.111, R. Gilpin, “War 
and Change”, p.87-88, K. Waltz, “Theory of International Politics”, p.126 and M. Holleaux, “Rome, la 
Grece et les monarchies hellenistiques au 3eme siècle’’, p. 212.   
 
146 Since, indeed, “minds can be changed, new leaders can come to power, values can shift, new 
opportunities and dangers can arise” (R. Jervis, “Cooperation under the security dilemma”, p.168. G. 
Blainey stresses that “the most effective way to prevent war was to possess exact knowledge of the 
comparative strength of the two rival nations or alliances. And this exact knowledge he wrote is very 
often attainable only by the actual fighting out of this conflict” (“The causes of war”, p.118). 
 
147 Livy, B.31.7. The same argument applies of course for Sparta (see Xenophon, Hellenica, IV, 2, 11 
ff). 
 
148 H. Bengston clearly stresses here (“Griechische Geschichte”, p.449) that Rome intervened in Asia 
out of imperialism, and not out of a need to defend its security threatened by the well-known friendship 
pact between Phillip and Antiochus, as M. Holleaux tends to assert.    
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149 In the sense that “the strategy of attrition, which by its very nature renounces the possibility of an 
absolute decision, is accompanied by the danger that the commanders may become entirely too 
cautious” (H. Delbruck, “War in Antiquity”, p. 136). Peloponnesian war was according to Delbruck a 
pure war of attrition, “a war without decision”. (ibid, p. 135). 
 
150 Cambridge Ancient History, B. VI., p. 260. 
 
151 B. I. 76. 
 
152 B. VI. 50. 
 
153 B.III, 4. 
 
154 W. S. Ferguson, “Greek Imperialism”,p. 166. Thucydides.,B. III.37. 2. 
155 It is mentioned in E. Mead’s “Makers of modern strategy: military thought from Machiavelli to 
Hitler”, p.127.  
 
156 “The character of the Romans and the values and organization of their state set them apart from the 
Greeks and indeed from all the other peoples of the Hellenistic world (F. W. Walbank, “The Hellenistic 
World”, p. 227). However, the same writer when he deals specifically with the beginning of the war he 
maintains the position that Rome “did not deliberately seek” to create the empire, but from “a mixture 
of motives they were generally ready to undertake” the mission again the Greeks (F.W. Walbank, “The 
decline of the Roman Empire in the West”, p. 9). To the opposite direction goes E. Will (“Histoire 
politique du monde hellénistique 323-30 av. J-C.”, p. 279). 
 
157 B. XXII.8. 
 
158 B.XXXVI.2.  
   
159 “Discourse on Livy, p.95. 
 
160 “The Causes of War”, p.16. 
 
161 This is corroborated by the view of E.N. Luttwak in “Give War a Chance” (p.36), when he stresses 
that “war, may be a great evil, but it does have a great virtue: it can resolve political conflicts and lead 
to peace. This can happen when all belligerents become exhausted or when one wins decisively”.  
  
162 In the same lines as the R. Jervis used the term in “Perceptions and Misperceptions in international 
politics”, where he stressed that decision-makers will always try to perceive their environment as 
consistently as possible, and to avoid contradictions.  
 
163 R. Kaplan, “On forecasting”, Real Clear World, 09.01.2014. 
 
164 Plutarch’s Lives, “Aratus”, XXIV. 
 
165 “The Roman Republic”, p.94.  
 
166  “The Three Traditions”, p.189. 
 
167 “Prudent self-interest,” as no less a realist than Niebuhr argues, is “almost as rare as unselfishness” 
(“Moral man and immoral society”, p.45). R. Gilpin gives prudence the meaning of “self restraint” 
(“War and Change in world politics”, p.87-88), while H. Morgenthau approaches it as “the weighing of 
the consequences of alternative political actions” (“Politics among nations”, p. 12). 
 
168 Thucydides, B.I.33. 
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169 In this respect I disagree with certain realistic analysis, which interrelates the over-expansion with 
“irrational” aggressors (J. Mearsheimer, “The Tragedy of Great Powers’ Politics”, p.211). 
 
170  “Etudes”, v.429-430. 
 
171 H. Bull, “Order vs. Justice in International Society”, pp. 269–83. 
 
172 J.B.Bury, “A History of Greece to the death of Great Alexander”, p. 484. De Sanctis places there the 
beginning of the end of Athens (“Storia dei Greci 2”, p. 307). 
 
173 J.B.Bury, “A History of Greece to the death of Great Alexander”, p. 484. 
 
174 M. Holleaux’s, for example, thesis is that down to 200 B.C. the Romans, as a result of mere 
indifference to the Greek world, had no eastern policy; they intervened in Greece in the two Illyrian 
wars and the First Macedonian war through a succession of accidents and disengaged themselves on 
each occasion as quickly as possible. I wish, however, to stress that it is one thing the influence of 
certain “accidents” in the turn of the vents and another thing the much stronger and unaltered by 
simple, fortuitous events, dynamics behind the international relations of the states.  As J.E. Dougherty, 
Pfaltzgraff R.L. Jr suggest “human conflict can be satisfactorily explained as a continuum in which 
violent outbursts differ only by such accidents as the nature of the parties, the size, the duration, the 
intensity, the nature of the issues and the objectives sought, the processual modes of conflict, the 
weapons employed and so forth, but not in their “underlying causes” or whether human conflict is an 
identifiable series of discrete phenomena each of which, despite a superficial external resemblance to 
the others, requires its own unique theoretical explanation” (“Contending theories of international 
relations”, p.145). 
 
175 “The causes of war”, p.249. 
 
176 In the sense that one can have the “illusion” of knowing in advance when the circumstances are 
more propitious specifically for state to go to war: “K. Waltz has declared that formulating a theory of 
foreign policy can predict the outbreak of particular wars” (J. Mearsheimer, "Reckless States and 
Realism," p. 247). 
 
177 K. Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War”, p.17. 
 
178 E. Mead, “Makers of modern strategy: military thought from Machiavelli to Hitler”, p.141. 
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Figure 1: “The Three Traditions in Christianity” (M. Wight, “Four 
Seminal Thinkers”, p.122).  
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Map 1: The Greek World during Persian Wars. 
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Map 2: Athens and Delian League at the brink of the Peloponnesian War. 
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Map 3: The expansion of Sparta 8th-5th B.C. 
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Map 4: Athens campaigning before the Peloponnesian War. 
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Map 5: Commercial interests of Athens in the Black Sea. 
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Map 6: The Peloponnesian War. 
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Map 7: Thebes and Plateaus. 
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Map 8: Sphacteria islet.  
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Map 9: Athens raiding the Peloponnesian coastline. 
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Map 10: The Greeks in Italy (500 B.C.) 
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Map 11: Spartan campaign to Syracuse.  
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Map 12: Epirus and Rome. 
 
 
323 
 
 
Map 13: Adriatic Sea and Hellenistic settlements. 
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Map 14: Expansion of Rome to Illyria. 
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Map 15: Rome, Carthage, Macedonia.  
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Map 16: Aetolian and Achaean Leagues.  
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Map 17: Northern neighbours of Macedonia. 
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Map 18: Competing Alliances in the Hellenistic World. 
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Map 19: The “fetters” of Greece. 
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PELOPONNESIAN WAR : A BRIEF  TIMELINE 
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460-  
445          
First Peloponnesian War between Delian League led by Athens 
and Peloponnesian League led by Sparta. 
454 Relocation of Delian League’s Fund to Athens. 
454 Destruction of the Athenian fleet by Persia in Egypt. 
447 Athens defeated by Boeotians in Coronae. 
446 Thirty Years Peace ending the First Peloponnesian War. 
434 Corcyrans defeat Corinthians at Leucimme. 
433            Athens allies itself to Corcyra Battle of Sybota. 
433/432   Athens renews its alliance with Rhegium and Leontini. 
432           Revolt of Potidea. Megarian Decree. 
432/431   Siege of Potidea. Conference of the Peloponnesian League in 
Sparta. 
431           Theban attack on Plataea. Outbreak of Archidamian War.  
Siege of Potidea continued. First Spartan invasion of Attica. 
431/430    Siege of Potidea continued. 
430            Second Spartan invasion of Attica. Siege of Potidea 
continued. Plague in Athens. Pericles fails to take 
Epidaurus. Spartan failure to send an Embassy to Persia. 
430/429   Fall of Potidea. 
429          Siege of Plataea. Plague continues. Death of Pericles. 
428           Third Spartan invasion of Attica. Siege of Plataea 
continued. Revolt of Mitylene. 
428/427   Siege of Mitylene. Siege of Plataea continued. 
427            Fourth Spartan invasion of Attica. Fall of Mitylene. Fall of 
Plataea. Civil War in Corcyra.  First Athenian expedition 
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to Sicily. Death of the Spartan king Archidamus II.  
427/426    Plague breaks out again. 
425           Fifth Spartan invasion of Attica.  Demosthenes captures Pylos. 
Cleon captures of 292 Spartans at Sphacteria. Destruction of 
the Corcyran oligarchs. 
424           Congress at Gela. Peace at Sicily. Fighting at 
Megara. Athenians defeated by the Thebans at Delium. 
424/423   Brasidas captures Amphipolis. Thucydides exiled. 
423           Armistice. 
423/422   Brasidas fails to capture Potidaea. 
422           End of the armistice. Cleon recovers Torone but is killed in 
action  at Amphipolis. Brasidas killed. 
422/421   Peace negotiations. 
421 Peace of Nicias. 
421 Athenians capture Scione. Alliance between Argos and 
Corinth. 
421/420   Fruitless negotiations between Athens and Sparta.  
420           Alliance between Argos, Mantinea, Elis, and Athens. 
419          War between Argos and Epidaurus.  
418           Agis II defeats the Athenian coalition at Mantinea. 
416           Athens attacks Melos. 
416/415        Athens captures Melos. Preparations for Sicilian Expedition. 
415 Mutilation of the Athenian herms. Alcibiades 
accused. Launching of the Athenian expedition to 
Sicily. Alcibiades flees to Sparta. 
415/414         Hermocrates convinces the Camerinans not to support the 
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Athenians. 
414 Athenians start siege of Syracuse. The 
Spartan Gylippus arrives at Syracuse.   
414/413        Nicias asks for reinforcements. 
413                Demosthenes with reinforcements to Sicily. Naval fight in 
harbour of Syracuse. Late summer: destruction of the Athenian 
expeditionary force. 
413               Spartan king Agis captures and fortifies Decelea (beginning of                     
the Decelean war). 
412               Revolt of the Athenian allies (beginning of the Ionian War). 
Alcibiades brings Spartan support to Ionia. Athenians start the 
siege of Chios. First agreement between Sparta and Persia. 
412/411         Siege of Chios continued. Tissaphernes in Miletus. Second 
agreement between Sparta and Persia. 
411               Third agreement between Sparta and Persia. Oligarchic coup in 
Athens (the Four Hundred). Spartan attack on 
Euboea. Countercoup by Theramenes (the Five Thousand).  
Athenian naval victories at Cynossema and Abydus. 
410                Athenian naval victory at Cyzicus.  Spartan peace offer                
refused. Restoration of the Athenian democracy. 
409 Thrasyllus in Ionia. Death of the Spartan king Pleistoanax. He 
is succeeded by Pausanias. 
407 Alcibiades in Athens. Lysander in command of Spartan fleet. 
406               Athenian defeat at Notion. Fall of Alcibiades. Athenian victory 
at Arginusae. Victorious generals executed. 
406/405       Spartan peace offer of peace, rejected by Cleophon. 
405               Lysander defeats the Athenians at Aigospotamoi.  Revolt of 
many Athenian allies, Pausanias, Agis, and Lysander lay siege 
to Athens. 
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405/404 Siege of Athens continued. Theramenes conducts negotiations. 
404                April: Fall of Athens; Long walls pulled down. 
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MACEDONIAN WARS: A BRIEF  TIMELINE 
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264  
Start of the First Punic War. The Mamertines called to 
Rome for help after being attacked by Carthage. 
264 - 241  The First Punic War between Rome and Carthage. 
263  Hiero of Syracuse becomes ally of Rome. 
260  
Rome builds its first major fleet and defeats Carthage at 
Mylae. 
259  Romans occupy Corsica. 
255  
Battle of Bagradas in Africa, in which the invading Roman 
army under M. Regulus was virtually destroyed by the 
Carthaginians under the mercenary leader Xanthippus, a 
Spartan. 
229 - 228  First Illyrian War - Romans start war with Queen Teuta. 
227 Rome captures the Illyrian city of Apollonia. 
226  
Treaty defining river Iberus (Ebro) as border of influence 
between Rome and Carthage. 
225  Invading Gauls defeated in northern Italy. 
223 
Antigonos Doson King of Macedonia establishes the 
“Common Alliance”. 
221  
The Spanish allied city of Saguntum appeals to Rome for 
help against Hannibal who succeeds to power in 
Carthaginian Spain. 
220  
The via Flaminia is built by the general T. Flaminius. It 
connects Italy to northern Greece. 
337 
 
220 
Conference in Naupactus amongst the Greek states after the 
Social War. 
219  Capture of town of Saguntum by Hannibal. 
219  Second Illyrian War, ending in conquest of Illyria. 
218 – 
202  
Second Punic War. 
218  
Hannibal crosses Alps and arrives in northern Italy. Battle 
of Ticinus and Battle of Trebia. 
216  
Hannibal crushes a large Roman army at the Battle of 
Cannaeunder commanders G. Terentius Varro and L. 
Aemilius Paullus. 
216  
Hannibal marches through the district of Cannae into 
Campania, and begins to plunder and ravage the 
countryside. Capua revolts against Rome. 
214 – 
205  
First Macedonian War. 
213  Siege of Syracuse in Sicily begins. 
212 
Roman fleet reaches for the first time Greek soil in 
Naupactus. 
211  
Rome enters into an alliance with the Aetolians against 
Macedonia. Pact of Depredation. 
209 Defeat of Aetolia from Macedonia in Lamia. 
208  
Scipio defeats army of Hasdrubal Barca near the town of 
Baecula. 
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207 
Achaean Sympoliteia defeats Sparta in the battle of 
Mantinea. 
207 Phillip captures Thermos, the capital of Aetolia.  
206  
Battle of Ilipa. Victory for Rome in Spain. Peace between 
Macedonia and Aetolia. 
205  Scipio to Sicily. 
205  End of the First Macedonian War. Peace of Phoenicia. 
204  Scipio Invades Africa. 
203  
Scipio defeats Syphax and wins battle of the Great 
Plains.Hannibal recalled to Carthage. 
202  
Scipio defeats Hannibal at the Battle of Zama. End of the 
Second Punic War. 
200 - 197  Second Macedonian War. 
200  Romans sack the Macedonian town of Acanthus. 
198  
Quinctius Flamininus defeats the army of King Phillip in a 
battle near the Aous River. Conference of Aous. 
197  
Second Macedonian War ends with defeat of Philip V by T. 
Quinctius Flamininus at Cynoscephalae. 
196  
The city of Smyrna appeals to Rome for help against the 
attacks of King Antiochus III. 
195  Hannibal Barca, exiled from Carthage joins Antiochus. 
192 – 
188  
Syrian War against Antiochus. 
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191  
Antiochus defeated at Thermopylae. Antiochus’ fleet 
defeated off Corycus. 
190  
An army under the command of King Antiochus III of 
Syria is defeated by Gnaeus Domitius Ahenobarbus and 
Eumenes II of Pergamum at Magnesia. 
188  Peace of Apamea ends the Syrian War. 
179 Perseus succeeds Phillip V in the kingship of Macedonia. 
171 - 168  
Third Macedonian War. Battle of Callinicus. 
168  Defeat of Macedonian King Perseus at Pydna. 
168  
Historian Polybius is brought to Rome as a hostage from 
Megalopolis in Greece, and is made a guest of Scipio 
Aemilianus. 
167  
Epirus plundered Macedonia divided into four parts, 
Illyricum into four. 
150  
Fourth Macedonian War. 
147  Macedonia annexed as a Roman province. 
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